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Summary
This study addresses the gap between macro level theories of financial repression - and 
their policy recommendations for liberalisation - and detailed micro level evidence of the 
role of power and of social relations in determining access to specific financial services. It 
is a study of the embeddedness of financial markets in social relations based in an 
institutionalist analysis that sees exchange processes as socially regulated and structured.
It therefore goes beyond both narrow neo-classical market analysis and political economy 
analysis of class to explore the importance of a range of social relations to the ways in 
which a “real” financial market operates.
The approach developed focuses on the organisational form of financial intermediaries. It 
identifies their ownership structure, and the rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms that enable them to function. First, the form of intermediary - private 
ownership, mutual, or state owned -  determines the range of services on offer and their 
price and non-price characteristics and gives rise to one source of market fragmentation. 
Second, the dependence of intermediaries both on formal laws such as property rights, and 
on informal norms and sanctions, means that social relations influence access.
The study then examines the extent, nature and origins of fragmentation in financial 
markets in Mathira in Central Kenya through an investigation of patterns of supply and 
demand. This highlights three sources of embeddedness. First, the social, political and 
cultural relations in which land rights are embedded explain its limited use as collateral. 
Second, the growing importance of mutual forms of financial intermediary in the area can 
be better understood once their non-price features and their relationship to social and 
political factors are explained. Finally, gendered patterns of use are explored using an 
analysis of intra-household income, expenditure and financial management alongside an 
examination of gendered enforcement mechanisms. This evidence suggests the complexity 
of ‘real’ barriers to entry on both the supply and demand sides and hence, also, of the 
effects of liberalisation on access to financial services.
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This study originated in a concern to interrogate the analysis of financial repression and the 
measures for financial sector liberalisation that it promoted during the 1990s. The 
resulting policy recommendations sought to remove controls on the formal sector and 
increase competition. The removal of interest rate ceilings was intended to raise interest 
rates so expanding the supply of deposits for investment. As a result there would be 
expanded access to formal sector credit, and its allocation via the price mechanism would 
favour projects with higher returns so improving allocative efficiency and hence growth in 
the economy. However, financial repression theory seemed to be based on a rather narrow 
set of assumptions that did not significantly analyse the influence of power and of social 
relations on access to financial services. On the other hand, the empirical literature 
examining factors affecting access tends to concentrate on specific providers in particular 
contexts rather than on the market as a whole.
This research attempts to fill this gap. It is a study of the embeddedness of financial 
markets in social relations based in an institutionalist analysis that sees exchange processes 
as socially regulated and structured. This approach -  termed ‘real’ markets - goes beyond 
a narrow political economy analysis of class to explore the importance of a range of social 
relations to the ways in which markets operate.
This chapter briefly sets out the theoretical and policy context of the research and explains 
the objectives of the study. It then proposes steps towards the development of an 
institutional analysis before providing an outline of how the study proceeds.
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1.1 Theoretical and policy context
Financial repression refers to measures such as interest rate ceilings, directed credit 
policies and high reserve requirements. These policies had enabled governments to raise 
finance for the public sector at low cost and sought to encourage private investment in 
sectors deemed a priority by government, by offering subsidised interest rates on loans.
The work of McKinnon (1995) and Shaw (1973), using the analytical tools of neo-classical 
economics, suggested that rather than promoting growth, these policies were in fact having 
a negative impact on growth. They argued that ceilings on interest rates (both deposits and 
loans) resulted in a limited supply of savings since interest rates favoured current over 
future consumption, and made investment in projects with relatively low returns profitable 
while also favouring more capital intensive projects. Hence policy prescriptions for the 
removal of such controls proposed that this would result in increased savings mobilisation 
and expand access to credit through the formal sector, and especially for those who were 
forced to other wise turn to the informal sector where they faced much higher interest rates. 
The allocation of credit to projects via the price mechanism would then increase returns to 
investment in the economy and hence growth rates, resulting in a virtuous circle of savings 
mobilisation, investment and growth.
Financial repression thinking has also been reflected in debates over the availability of 
financial services to poor people. The ‘rural financial markets’ analysis of the ‘Ohio 
School’ applied financial repression thinking to these markets, employing the emerging 
analytical tools of transactions and information costs in the process (Von Pischke, Adams 
et al., 1983). Their analysis used these tools to explain, for example, the high interest rates 
of moneylenders as resulting from the necessary costs of screening and default. Once 
these costs were taken into account, risk-adjusted rates of return could be derived 
(Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998); and only if these were unequal would there be evidence 
that markets were fragmented and this was expected to be evidence of barriers to entry.
This directly challenged the policy conclusions of political economy analysis that saw high 
moneylender interest rates as evidence of exploitative class relations (Bhaduri, 1977; 
Bhaduri, 1981) and which had provided a rationale for controlled interest rates in special 
credit programmes for small-scale producers and especially farmers. Instead, interlinked
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contracts between credit and land or labour markets were explained in terms of their ability 
to convey information about borrowers and so to reduce the transactions costs of screening 
and enforcement. The study of transactions costs also made the point that for borrowers 
approaching the formal sector the cost of loans was not adequately captured by the interest 
rate since a range of related costs, including travel, time and bureaucracy (for example, the 
costs of understanding the system and filling in forms for non-literate people), were also 
incurred by borrowers. As a result, this analysis explained the role and ongoing use of 
informal financial systems by poor people in terms of their accessibility and convenience 
and concluded that the key concern of policy should therefore be to expand access rather 
than lower price.
These findings gradually made their way into donor policy (McGregor, 1989).1 Efforts to 
provide financial services to poor people have also learnt from emerging practice, 
especially that in Bangladesh, and during the 1990s began to focus on the development of 
self-sustaining provision through microfinance organisations (MFOs) (Hulme and Mosley, 
1996; Wood and Shariff, 1997). Aid funds therefore offered subsidies for the development 
of the MFO sector with accompanying claims that this would widen access for poor people 
and extend the market rather than “undermine” it (Adams, Graham et al., 1984) through 
subsidised credit to users which experience suggested had resulted in unsustainable rural 
finance organisations and prevented the development of a competitive rural financial sector 
(Otero and Rhyne, 1994). Despite the proliferation of interventions, evaluation has 
focused on outreach, in terms of numbers of users, and financial sustainability.
Examination of the direct impact on users was no longer a priority (Hulme, 2000), and 
little analysis of the actual contribution of MFOs to the development of financial markets 
was made.
The combination of these policy developments in both formal and informal sectors leads to 
empirical questions as to how they have affected the structure and performance of financial 
markets and whether they have, in fact, led to improved access and lower prices in 
informal financial markets and for poor people in particular.
However, financial repression analysis based in a narrow neo-classical understanding of 
price formation and barriers to entry seems inadequate when viewed in the light of 
literature revealing the political economy of both rural financial arrangements -  termed
1 Indeed it was the aid arm o f the US government that had been instrumental in funding the Ohio School’s 
research (Von Pischke, 1983).
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“financial repression from below” (McGregor, 1994) and national banking sectors 
(McGregor, 1989; Wood and Shariff, 1997). An extensive body of research into rural and 
‘informal’ financial systems, much of it written by economic anthropologists, describes 
and analyses the complexity of the role that informal finance plays in relation to social and 
cultural, as well as economic systems (Geertz, 1962; Ardener, 1995; Hospes, 1996). In 
this light, analysis of barriers to entry based in state regulation, and of information and 
transactions costs, seem to present an inadequate account of the constraints to broadening 
access and the reality of market operation. In particular the transactions costs analysis of 
the new institutional economics has allowed the role of social relations in conveying 
information in credit arrangements to be recognised (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991; Udry, 
1993; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998), but has been unable to adequately theorise it.
Indeed, neo-classical analysis has been criticised for having no adequate basis for 
understanding ‘markets in practice’, and of treating them as “abstract” (Mackintosh, 1990; 
Alcantara, 1992). This body of research- especially into agricultural markets in 
developing countries -  has sought to develop theory inductively through detailed empirical 
research and ‘thick description’. More recently termed ‘real’ market analysis, this 
approach is rooted in the substantive approach of economic anthropologists that sees 
exchange as embedded in non-economic institutions (Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter, 1992) 
although the debate between ‘formalists and substantivists in the study of markets is 
ongoing (Cook, 1968; Wilk, 1996). These studies demonstrate the nature and extent of 
market regulation arising from social relations such as religion, ethnicity, class, and gender 
(Mackintosh, 1989; Harriss-White, 1996; Pujo, 1996; Rogaly, 1997).
These ‘real’ market studies are theoretically based in ‘old’ institutionalist economics. 
Rejecting the methodological individualism of neo-classical economics, ‘old’ 
institutionalism investigates patterns of behaviour that demonstrate habitual economic 
activity and examines how these are embedded in social institutions (Hodgson, 1988). 
Markets can consequently be viewed as exchange processes regulated and structured by 
social institutions (Pujo, 1996). This therefore provides a theoretical approach within 
which to locate analysis of the embeddedness of financial markets more broadly.
13
1.2 Objectives of the research
This study seeks to build on these developments in the analysis of ‘real’ markets and its 
two main purposes are:
(i) to develop an holistic analysis of financial markets using an ‘old’ institutional 
approach;
(ii) to systematically examine the nature and extent of the embeddedness of 
selected financial markets in social institutions.
The requirements of an holistic analysis are that it can deal with the variety of types of 
financial arrangement in operation. The labels ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ generally refer only 
to the state as a source of regulation in markets, but regulation may also arise from social 
sources. The approach must therefore be able to internalise this categorisation. Moreover, 
for the purposes of a ‘market-wide’ analysis it must allow the relative roles and uses of the 
different types of financial arrangement to be understood.
On the other hand, the requirements of a systematic analysis of embeddedness are that it 
can conceptualise, describe and analyse the influence of the variety of social institutions 
that might be in operation. In the terminology of neo-classical approaches, this is therefore 
an examination of the nature, extent and origins of fragmentation in the market.
In the light of the above discussion, related objectives of this study are also:
(iii) to investigate the role of MFOs in financial markets, in particular, to examine 
to what extent access has been improved;
(iv) to review the experience of financial sector liberalisation and the extent to 
which it has contributed to expanded access.
The field methodology of the study is necessarily innovative, since studies with a similar 
purpose could not be found in the literature. The ‘market’ was defined geographically by 
focusing the research in and around the small town of Karatina in Mathira Division of 
Nyeri District in Kenya’s Central Province. A survey of the supply side identified the full
14
range of financial services available and collected data on products, prices and quantities of 
funds. A survey of the demand side collected data on the use of financial services. The 
dimensions of embeddedness were then examined through quantitative assessment of 
differential use based on socio-economic characteristics such as wealth, gender, age and so 
on. Qualitative data is used to explain the findings in more depth. The use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods seeks to achieve rigour through their analytical 
interaction.
1.3 Towards an institutional approach
During the first phase of fieldwork two aspects of group-based financial arrangements 
emerged as particularly interesting. First, those taking loans from group funds were 
willing to pay high interest rates that they jointly agreed with other members because they 
also received this interest as a dividend at the end of the year. Second, many respondents 
explained that they had joined group-based financial systems because they knew they 
could get a loan, although they might have joined long before their demand for the loan 
actually materialised. These features highlighted the importance of their user-owned 
nature and of the interconnectedness of savings and loans in these systems. This 
precipitated the need for an alternative framework within which these characteristics could 
be analysed.
These findings provoked me to step back from the conventional focus on the supply and 
demand for savings and loans to examine the nature of financial intermediaries. They may 
be viewed in terms of their ownership structure and the rules and enforcement mechanisms 
that are required to enable them to operate. The three main types of financial intermediary 
arise from three different forms of collective action: banks arise from the private firm 
(private ownership); Savings and Credit Co-operatives (SACCOs), Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ASCAs) from the co-operative form (collective ownership); parastatals are formed by the 
state (collective ownership via the state). Microfinance organisations owned by Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are a charitable but privately owned form. 
Moneylenders and borrowing from friends and relatives are direct lending arrangements in
15
which there is no collective action. Each type of intermediary has a different set of rules, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that result from its form.
This approach suggests that the key elements of organisational form are determined by 
ownership: these determine how the rules and enforcement mechanisms are set up and the 
ways in which they operate. Moreover, organisational form then constrains who can 
access funds. Hence ownership, via organisational form, cannot be separated from the 
question of access.
This conceptualisation is useful in two ways. First, it can explain fragmentation in 
financial markets arising from the presence of different types of financial intermediary. In 
the terms of the new institutional economics (NIE), each type manages information and 
transactions costs in fundamentally different ways. This demonstrates the difficulty of 
analysing costs and prices in isolation from the governance characteristics of the providers.
Second, in allowing a focus on the rules and enforcement mechanisms, it can be seen that 
these are embedded in social institutions since both formal and informal rules, norms and 
sanctions are necessary to support their operation. For example, formal legal property 
rights may be necessary to both formal and informal financial systems. Informal norms of 
trust and morality also underlie their operation. Moreover, this focus offers a systematic 
means through which the relationships of different socio-economic categories of users to 
the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms can be investigated. Since social 
relations influence resource endowments, social status and political position, they also 
determine the way in which socio-economic groups relate to rules and enforcements 
mechanisms. For example, the norm in many societies that women do not legally own 
land means that they are unable to engage in borrowing arrangements with financial 
intermediaries that require land as collateral. Thus a link can be established from barriers 
of entry (or use of specific services) to social structures.
1.4 Outline of the study
The study therefore investigates the extent, nature and origins of fragmentation in 
Mathira’s financial markets and examines whether this conceptualisation of intermediaries 
contributes to a systematic and holistic real market analysis. It proceeds as follows.
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Chapter Two reviews in more depth the policy and theoretical context discussed above. 
Chapter Three then presents an institutional view of financial intermediation expanding the 
brief outline already given. Chapter Four discusses the elements necessary for the 
empirical study of real financial markets and describes how these were carried out in this 
study. It then turns to the context in which the study is set. Chapter Five reviews the key 
elements of social, economic and political structure that underlie this market.
The subsequent five chapters describe and analyse the findings of the empirical study. 
Chapter Six starts by describing the range of financial services on the supply side and 
examines their pricing and profitability. This is followed in Chapter Seven by evidence 
from the demand side survey regarding patterns of financial service use in Mathira. 
Together these two chapters suggested patterns of use with three key features. First, the 
extent of local lending by the banking sector was relatively low compared to other types of 
intermediary; in particular, there were no cases of secured lending against land in the 
demand side sample. Given the importance of land policy for registration and titling in 
Kenya and elsewhere, this merited further investigation and is examined in Chapter Eight. 
Second, the evidence suggested the extensive use of user-owned financial systems, or 
mutuals. This also merited further detailed investigation because, as explained above, 
these financial intermediaries have characteristics that seem to be particularly hard for 
transactions costs approaches to analyse. Chapter Nine explores the reasons for this.
Finally, there was clear evidence that the use of ROSCAs was gendered, with much more 
extensive use by women than men. Chapter Ten develops a gendered analysis of financial 
service use that has two elements. First, the influence of gendered intra-household 
economic relations for the control of income and division of expenditure responsibilities is 
examined. These influence the nature of financial flows that men and women wish to 
intermediate and hence their demand for financial services. Second, it examines the 
explanations of this gendered use given by respondents that exposed the differential effect 
of the informal sanction of shame on the ways men and women were able to engage with 
ROSCAs.
As a whole, this evidence indicates that the two main sources of fragmentation that the 
institutional approach identifies -  that arising from different forms of intermediary and that 
arising from the embeddedness of the rules and enforcement mechanisms in power and 
social relations - were operating in Mathira. Analysis of the relative use of banks and 
mutuals shows how their different characteristics as intermediaries relate to underlying
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social relations. Mutuals are popular because they embody the multi-dimensional 
character of social relationships and their negotiability, which is key to livelihood 
strategies. SACCOs, in particular, allow public legitimacy to be built through inclusionary 
strategies that mobilise social networks and at the same time enable access for leaders to 
wider circuits of patronage and accumulation.
The gender analysis shows how these social relations cause fragmentation in financial 
markets through the ways in which they pattern the demand and supply of funds for 
intermediation. Moreover, the socialisation process of men and women also affects how 
they engage with rules and enforcement mechanisms.
Land plays a key intermediating role in access to financial services through its role as 
collateral. Hence it is the social relations that mediate access to land that also pattern the 
access of socio-economic groups to financial markets.
With this evidence of fragmentation, Chapter Eleven concludes by examining the 
implications for real market approaches and new institutional economics and their 
respective approaches to the study of financial markets. The approach presents a clear 
theorisation of the ways in which power and social relations influence access to financial 
intermediation and provides a basis for understanding how socio-economic groups are 
differentially located in markets. Since “who you are” matters, this results in barriers to 
movement on the demand side which transactions and information costs approaches are 
inadequate in theorising because of the multi-dimensional nature of the relationship 
between social relations and financial intermediation.
Finally, the implications for policy, both generally and in Kenya, are discussed. Further 
research is necessary to examine the financial market in other specific locations and so to 
draw out “middle order generalisations”. However, in order to inform policy, the need for 
a shift away from universal models to an understanding of the inter-linkages between 
different components of the financial system in a specific national context is clear. 
Moreover, approaches to designing pro-poor policy and interventions have to balance the 
need to adapt these to existing social relations or to restructure social relations in order to 
broaden access.
18
Chapter 2 Financial Markets: Theory and Policy
This chapter presents the policy and theoretical contexts in which this study of financial 
markets is located. The primary policy context is that of financial sector policy reform in 
the 1990s. While there is an extensive literature about its operation and impact on the 
formal financial sector, the impact on informal finance is less well researched. Given the 
evidence regarding the ubiquity and extent of informal finance, this is problematic, 
especially because of the importance of informal finance to the livelihoods of poor people.
After providing some background to policy debates over the informal financial sector, 
theories of the financial market are then reviewed. Two main theoretical perspectives are 
considered. First, analysis based in neo-classical theory of the interaction between the 
formal and informal sectors in the context of financial sector reform are reviewed. But it is 
the new institutional economics analysis of information and transactions costs - building 
on neo-classical theory - that has dominated theoretical developments in the analysis o f 
financial markets in the last 20 years. Second, political economy analyses of credit 
markets have provided the contrasting basis for theorising and policy prescription. The 
view of markets as ‘real’ which has been developed in studies of agricultural markets in 
the last decade provides an analytical framework going beyond narrow political economy 
analyses based on class relations to a broader understanding of the variety of social 
institutions that influence market operation.
Following this review of theoretical approaches, two further aspects of the literature are 
reviewed to provide context for the study. First is the emergence of microfinance 
organisations in the 1990s. The greater appreciation of the role of informal finance and the 
understanding of it offered by the NIE has supported this development in lending to poor 
people. Second, the role of informal finance - and in particular group-based systems -  has 
been analysed from the perspective of the ways in which poor people employ risk- 
reducing and sharing strategies.
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2.1 Financial sector reform and informal finance: an overview
Since the late 1980s Financial Sector Reform programmes have become an increasingly 
accepted component of structural adjustment packages, in Africa and elsewhere. These 
programmes drew their theoretical origins from the financial repression thinking of 
McKinnon and Shaw (Fry, 1995). While these programmes have evolved over time (Fry,
1997) and their impact has been extensively debated, their core design remains intact.
The financial repression thesis suggests that measures such as interest rate controls, high 
reserve requirements and directed credit policies impose distortions on financial 
intermediation. Hence that the removal of interest rate ceilings, for example, improves the 
quality and quantity of saving and investment in the economy. On the supply side higher 
deposit interest rates mobilise savings since higher interest rates produce less of a bias for 
present over future consumption. On the demand side, raising the interest rate improves 
the efficiency of investment through deterring low-yielding investments that would 
previously have qualified (and especially in the case where investments may have been 
selected by administrative systems rather than price selection). With improved allocative 
efficiency of the funds invested output growth is generated that further stimulates savings 
as incomes rise (Fry, 1997).
One of the underlying “stylized facts” of the financial repression analysis is that financial 
systems in developing countries are dominated by commercial banks (Fry, 1997). While 
commercial banks are the dominant institutional form within the formal financial sector, 
research has increasingly demonstrated the extensive and pervasive presence of informal 
financial arrangements in low-income economies as a whole (Wai, 1992). Indeed, the vast 
majority of transactions fall outside the regulated formal sector (Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). 
Since informal arrangements are more likely to be used by poor people, the size of 
individual transactions is relatively small. This is another reason why formal sector policy 
has tended to ignore them. Estimates of the size of informal financial arrangements are of 
course difficult, but available estimates suggest that informal arrangements have supplied 
between 30 and 95% of the credit needs of rural or urban populations (Germidis, Kessler et 
al., 1991). These figures also tend to exclude informal arrangements based on reciprocity 
between relatives and friends. If these were included, then the extent and importance of 
informal arrangements would be even greater. But even without these, some evidence 
suggests that the size of flows circulated through informal finance within the household
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and non-corporate sector is substantially larger than flows channelled through formal 
institutions (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998,279).
The ILO first coined the terminology of the informal sector in 1972 to refer to the large 
numbers of self-employed people engaged in small-scale economic activity whose labour 
arrangements, as a result, fell outside of those arrangements that were covered by 
employment law (ILO, 1972). The origins of the sector and causes of its growth are much 
debated (Castells and Portes, 1989). The term has since been used to refer to those parts of 
the economy that fall outside governmental regulation but Castells and Portes point out 
that the term ‘informal economy’ is not characterized by particular activities but by “the 
social definition of state intervention... [whose] boundaries vary in different contexts and 
historical circumstances” (Castells and Portes, 1989:32). In the context of finance, this 
has led to a definition of the informal financial sector which “describes participation in all 
commercial saving and lending activity taking place outside of formal or established 
financial institutions” (Aryeetey, 1995:3) and it is this definition that is adopted here. 
Formal financial institutions are therefore taken here to be those that are set up under 
government legislation that regulates the terms and conditions on which financial 
intermediation is conducted.
There are two views in theory as to the origins of the informal financial sector, although 
these are not mutually exclusive. One view emphasises that it exists because of financial 
repression: in other words, that it has developed as a response to controls and deficiencies 
of the formal sector and is in this sense a reaction to financial regulation and repression. 
Another view proposes that informal arrangements pre-date formal arrangements and that 
in this way the financial sector is intrinsically dualistic. As has been pointed out in the 
literature, these differing understandings drive different policy responses (Germidis, 
Kessler et al., 1991). Where the informal sector is seen as a response to financial 
repression then the need is for institutional and operational reforms via financial de­
regulation. Whereas if its origins lie in inherent dualism then policy focus needs to be on 
the transformation of the informal sector through for example making links between 
informal and formal sector financial institutions.
Ghate draws attention to the efficiency consequences of these differences in origin of the 
informal sector (Ghate, 1988). If the financial sector is intrinsically dualistic then if the 
informal sector provides credit to sector not reached by the formal sector and returns in 
these sectors are high, then it provides an “ameliorating contribution” to efficiency in the
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face of regulation and a second best solution to complete liberalisation (ibid:73).
However, if the government is attempting to address through regulation what it 
understands to be a divergence between private and social returns, for example, by 
reducing the availability of credit for activities such as land speculation, then the informal 
sector only makes this contribute to the extent that the regulatory response is inefficient in 
achieving this. Under these circumstances, liberalisation may therefore only produce 
improvements in allocative efficiency if government has (a) incorrectly identified 
deviations of private and social returns or (b) implemented a sub-optimal regulatory 
response. Liberalisation may therefore itself be a sub-optimal response in terms of overall 
allocative efficiency and the informal sector may instead provide a second-best solution.
If, on the other hand, the informal sector is inherently more efficient than the formal sector 
then it provides a “net additive contribution” even in the absence of formal regulation 
which liberalisation would capture.
In most definitions of informal financial arrangements - as in that above - a dividing line is 
drawn between ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’ forms of finance in which ‘non­
commercial’ arrangements are excluded. However, arrangements based in groups are 
usually treated as part of the definition of the informal sector. This draws on Adams’ 
three-fold distinction (see Callier,1990) between:
(i) non-commercial arrangements based on reciprocity between relatives, friends 
and neighbours;
(ii) commercial arrangements such as those engaged in by moneylenders and 
deposit- takers and
(iii) group arrangements such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs).
The exclusion of an entire set of financial arrangements that are based on reciprocal social 
relations is problematic. As evidence in a range of anthropological studies suggests, 
financial arrangements between friends and neighbours form part and parcel of the web of 
financial arrangements in a community through which people seek to diversify risks, 
develop social insurance or accumulate capital (Platteau and Abraham, 1987). It might be 
proposed that the presence of an interest rate might adequately take account of the 
difference between commercial and non-commercial arrangements. However, Adams 
points out elsewhere (Adams, 1994) that the terms of informal financial contracts, 
especially the costs of borrowing, encompass a range of elements in which the interest rate
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is only one, for example, the presence of tied transactions. He also points out that informal 
contracts may not specify a repayment date or repayment schedule. This suggests that 
distinguishing reciprocity from commercial arrangements may in fact be rather difficult in 
practice. Moreover, as indicated above, group arrangements are usually regarded as part of 
the informal sector, but these also operate in ways that use norms of reciprocity or even 
redistribution with many operating welfare funds for example (Nagarajan, Meyer et al., 
1995, 309).
Similar definitional concerns have been raised by Bell in the context of the All India Credit 
Survey where he takes issue with findings that the banks and co-operatives have 
successfully brought about the downfall of moneylender. He suggests that “the lender’s 
guise is very much in the eye of his clients” (Bell, 1993:190) and might to some be a 
relative, and to others a farmer or trader. This, he suggests, means that it is necessary to 
understand what a category such as moneylenders means in practice, if the influence o f 
public policies on informal lending is to be understood.
Other definitions make distinctions between temporary and ongoing arrangements, for 
example Asian Development Bank (1990). But this also appears arbitrary - especially in 
the context of seasonal and longer-term variability in the surplus of funds. Rather than 
applying a preconceived definition it is important to examine the actual array of financial 
arrangements in evidence before making analytical distinctions between them. This may 
be particularly significant since many of these definitions have been proposed as a result of 
financial arrangements in Asia rather than Africa.
As financial liberalisation policies were being designed and implemented in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s there was some recognition of the importance of the informal sector 
(World Bank, 1989; Asian Development Bank, 1990; Callier, 1990; Germidis, Kessler et 
al., 1991). In particular this was partly borne of a view that given its size and inherent 
strengths, seen as resulting from the flexibility and responsiveness of the informal financial 
sector (Adams and Fitchett, 1992), there was a risk that financial sector reform 
programmes might in fact be frustrated (Acharya and Madhur, 1983). More broadly there 
arose a view that financial systems development and deepening was unlikely to be 
achieved by focusing on formal sector institutions alone (Germidis, Kessler et al.,
1991,15). This gave rise to policy recommendations for:
(i) the development of linkages between formal and informal financial agents;
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(ii) the potential for formal financial institutions to learn from the practices of 
informal agents, and themselves ‘informalise’ or ‘mimic’ them, so creating 
additional competition;
(iii) to transform informal into formal financial institutions;
(iv) to regulate parts of the informal sector in order to improve market structure.
However, while it has been pointed out that an adequate understanding of informal finance 
is a pre-requisite for satisfactory financial policy analysis it does not appear that an 
adequate understanding has yet been established, and especially not in African contexts 
with the need for detailed institutional knowledge and investigation of the transmission 
mechanisms involved, i.e. the means by which changes in price and quantity in one sector 
affect those in the other. (Aryeetey, Senbet et al., 1997; Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). Given 
that financial sector reform has proceeded apace in many countries, clear empirical 
questions arise about the ways in which financial sector reform has in practice affected the 
informal financial sector. Such a concern has a number of dimensions:
(i) the need to identify the nature of informal financial arrangements in particular 
social and economic contexts;
(ii) to understand the inter-linkages between the formal and informal sectors;
(iii) to investigate how prices and quantities in the informal market have been 
affected by formal financial sector policies - to what extent has the informal 
market remained immune;
(iv) to find out how have financial arrangements actually changed - has there been 
increased competition, have linkages between the formal and informal sectors 
been further developed or set back;
(v) to find out how has policy reform which explicitly deals with informal financial 
arrangements been conceived and implemented and with what effect.
2.2 Theories of financial markets
The choice of theoretical frameworks in which to develop an analysis of financial markets 
is two-fold. First, is the framework of neo-classical economics and the new institutional 
economics, which has developed from it to analyse the functioning of economies in the
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presence of imperfect information and transactions costs. Second, is the approach of 
political economy which has extensively considered the operation of credit markets, and in 
particular the way they are linked to output and input markets. This latter approach has 
given rise to ‘real market’ approaches, which embrace the approach o f ‘old’ institutional 
economics more recently brought to the fore by theorists such as Hodgson, but has not yet 
been consistently applied to the functioning of financial markets.
2.2.1 Neo-classical approaches
As was pointed in Chapter One (pi 1), financial repression analysis is based in neo­
classical analysis that assumes that economic agents - households and firms - act to 
maximise their utility in the presence of complete information. This results in an upward 
sloping supply curve for savings in which interest rates reflect savers marginal preferences 
for future over current consumption. A falling demand curve for investment funds reflects 
the declining marginal returns to investment projects open to entrepreneurs in the 
economy. Allowing supply and demand to freely interact will bring about market clearing 
interest rates at which the marginal returns to investment will equate with savers marginal 
preferences for future over current consumption.
The application of these to analysis of the financial market under a situation of financial 
repression where an informal financial sector exists, has required neo-classical analysis to 
propose a dualistic model through which analysts have debated how formal and informal 
sectors will in fact interact.
Acharya and Madhur dispute the view that linkages between the informal and formal credit 
markets can act to frustrate the intended effects of monetary and credit policy due to highly 
elastic supplies of “black” liquidity originating in the informal sector. They set up a model 
in which demand from the formal sector spills over into the informal sector. With this 
assumption, and bome out by evidence based on the Indian financial market, credit 
rationing in the commercial bank sector forces demand to spill over into the informal 
market thereby producing an increase in interest rates in the informal sector also. They 
argue that the “no impact” result will only pertain in certain special cases: first, where the 
supply of informal credit is infinitely elastic and hence shifts in the demand function will 
have no effect on price. Second, where supply in the informal credit market is related to
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the formal market in a one for one inverse relationship so that a contraction in commercial 
bank credit results in an equal expansion of supply in the informal market with no net 
effect on price. Third, where there is absolutely no spill-over effect and hence the supply 
and demand schedules in the informal market are unaffected (Acharya and Madhur, 1983). 
The implications of their analysis for liberalisation are that removing restrictions on credit 
supply will result in a reduction in informal sector interest rates as demand returns to the 
formal market.
Roemer presents a partial equilibrium analysis, which by contrast to Acharya and Madhur, 
allows for a spill-over of supply as well as demand into the informal market. This model 
assumes a segmented market prior to regulation with the informal market demanding a risk 
premium over the formal market. The impact of credit controls which pushes interest rates 
below the pre-existing equilibrium in the formal market then changes both the supply and 
demand for funds in the informal market as a result of both a spill-over of unmet demand 
from the formal market, and a supply of funds for investment seeking returns higher than 
those the formal market can offer.
This model therefore implies that the impact of regulation may, under certain conditions of 
the supply and demand curves, be to lower rates in the informal market. The impact of 
reversing this process through removing controls on interest rates would therefore be to 
raise informal market rates and benefit a) borrowers who have been squeezed out of the 
formal market and therefore can return to the formal market without facing the risk premia 
of the informal market and b) moneylenders who deal only with the informal market who 
would be able to raise rates and capture a larger market share (since there would at the 
same time be a return of funds from the informal to the formal). Liberalisation would hurt 
privileged borrowers who have access to funds at controlled interest rates and borrowers 
with no access to the formal sector who would now face higher rates in the informal 
segment (Roemer, 1986).
The transmission mechanism proposed here assumes that the impact of regulation is to 
drive deposits and other sources of funds available for lending into the informal market. 
Roemer concludes by suggesting that arguments for de-regulation that are made on the 
basis of increasing savings channelled through the formal sector, will only happen at the 
expense of savings channelled through the informal system. But Aryeetey considers 
Roemer’s view that supply will spill-over into the informal market in the same way as 
demand, as unrealistic. First, he argues, that it is often not permitted by law; second, it
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ignores problems of information deficiencies that formal lenders would face in the 
assessment of risk. Third, transactions costs of lending to insecure borrowers would be 
higher and would require a rise in rates in contrast to the fall in informal sector interest 
rates that Roemer anticipates, or alternatively it would significantly reduce the risk 
premium available to lenders (Aryeetey, 1995). This said however, there remains the 
possibility that there can be some supply spill-over in practice by those with funds to invest 
and who may be able to become informal sector lenders.
These theoretical arguments, therefore, present scenarios of prices and quantities in the 
informal market rising, falling or staying the same as a result of liberalisation. The key 
issue here is the empirical question of the extent and nature of the interaction between the 
formal and informal parts of the market on both the supply and demand side. This 
suggests the need to understand the extent to which demand is indeed ‘specific’ to each 
sector or ‘non-specific’ and capable of moving between sectors (Nissanke and Aryeetey,
1998). That is, which borrowers and depositors have the choice to engage in one market 
rather than the other? Ghate, for example, suggests that there is a spectrum of credit needs 
which at the extremes are specific to each of the formal and informal markets. Hence, 
lending for long term fixed capital in the large-scale sector can only be supplied by the 
formal sector, while short term consumption credit needs can only be fulfilled by the 
informal sector. But needs in the spectrum in between these two extremes might be 
supplied by either sector (Ghate, 1988).
On the supply side, the question of inter-linkages also arises. That is, the extent to which 
excess funds can flow from the formal into informal markets e.g. via moneylenders who 
borrow from banks, and the extent to which informal sector providers deposit fimds into 
the formal system for on lending. These types of relationship are termed ‘financial 
layering’ (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991) and although they may raise the costs of 
intermediation in a fully integrated market (Fry, 1995) may present an improvement over 
complete separation.
These views regarding financial markets together suggest that the degree of fragmentation 
of the financial market is the major concern. In order to establish the impact of financial 
sector reform in the informal market, it is therefore necessary to establish empirically the 
extent and nature of inter-linkages between the formal and the informal financial systems 
on both the supply and demand side.
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2.2.2 New Institutional Economic approaches
New institutional economics (NIE) has developed neo-classical analytical tools based on 
methodological individualism particularly fruitfully in relation to credit transactions in 
low-income countries by incorporating an understanding of the influence of imperfect 
information and transactions costs such as those of screening, monitoring and enforcement. 
Akerlof and Stiglitz have developed a very specific strand of analysis arising from the 
theory of imperfect information which sees institutions as substitutes for missing markets 
where risks are pervasive, markets incomplete and information is asymmetric and costly to 
obtain (Bardhan, 1989). On the other hand writers such as Coase, Demsetz, Alchian, 
Williamson and, perhaps most notably, North, have examined the role of transactions costs 
to develop an endogenous theory of institutions and in particular property rights, which 
relaxes rigid assumptions of optimising rationality. Since it is the first strand of the NIE 
that has been most dominant in the study of financial markets, this is first discussed before 
turning to the broader NIE approach associated with North.
The work of Hoff and Stiglitz (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hoff, Braverman et al., 1993) has 
demonstrated how credit markets are subject to particular information, monitoring and 
enforcement problems due to the inter-temporal basis of their transactions. These features 
give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection in credit transactions. Moral hazard is the 
situation in which lending (or more often insurance) affects the behaviour of the borrower 
in that s/he may take less care or take more risks if the funds at stake are not their own, and 
this helps explain the use of collateral as a feature of credit markets. Adverse selection 
refers to the fact that if price alone is used to allocate credit then projects able to produce 
the highest returns are also likely to be riskier hence lowering portfolio quality. This 
problem therefore results in lenders rationing quantity at a given price.
The imperfect information paradigm has been used to explore a number of features of
informal financial arrangements. In this approach, interest rates are understood to
comprise four components: the cost of funds, risk of default, transactions costs of
providing the service and profit, or a monopolistic component dependent on the
•  2alternatives available to the borrower. One key set of proponents - the ‘Ohio School’ - 
argues that informal financial arrangements, especially moneylenders, charge relatively 
high interest rates because they face high risks of default and lack legal means of 
enforcement. They argue that the political economy school has over-emphasised the
2 The Ohio School includes Dale Adams, J D  von Pischke and Douglas Graham.
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monopoly element involved in pricing on the basis that money-lenders usually lend as a  
part of their business and not as their sole business and hence that there often is 
competition in the lending market (Von Pischke, 1991). They further argue that the cost of 
funds in low-income countries is necessarily high due to the general scarcity of liquidity 
and the opportunity cost of funds (Wai, 1957).
This approach therefore suggests that once allowance is made for the costs of obtaining 
information about clients and monitoring and enforcing contracts, along with the costs o f 
loss of funds through default, then returns to lending would be comparable across market 
segments, for example, between moneylenders and banks, so that there is in fact a unified 
underlying market for funds. Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) therefore distinguish between 
a segmented market and a fragmented market on the basis that fragmentation is evident 
when returns adjusted for risks and transactions costs are not comparable between market 
segments. The term segmentation describes a process of normal specialisation between 
products that are evened out once risk-adjusted returns are calculated. Many researchers 
have recognised the segmentation of informal financial markets and suggested that this is 
due to variables such as locality, type of lender, the trade, service or sector being financed 
(Ghate, 1988). Remaining variations in returns are therefore explained in terms of 
imperfections in the market due to, for example, barriers to entry.
Furthermore, the argument is also used from a borrower perspective. It is argued that a 
direct comparison of interest rates between the formal and informal sectors is an 
inadequate comparison of the actual costs faced by borrowers as a percentage of the loan 
amount. Borrowers must incur the physical costs of travel to local banks as well as the 
opportunity cost of time necessary to undertake the trip; the payment of administration fees 
for loan applications; and the likelihood that bribes are necessary to bank officials. Once 
these costs are included, they argue that the relative costs of formal finance rise and the 
seemingly high costs of informal finance represent the price of convenience, proximity and 
flexibility of financial arrangements.
The theory of imperfect information has also been used to help explain informal financial 
arrangements that inter-link transactions between credit and other goods or service markets 
(inputs, outputs or labour) (Braverman and Guasch, 1986; Hoff, Braverman et al., 1993). 
Informal financial arrangements are able to make use of local sources of knowledge and 
specific social mechanisms to overcome screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. For 
example, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSC As) are able to operate due to the
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degree o f ‘insider’ knowledge members have about each other and their ability to enforce 
compliance through the use of local social sanctions, such as non-cooperation in other 
aspects of daily life.
Despite the extensive development of this theoretical approach, the application of the 
theory faces considerable empirical problems and Toye complains that little effort has been 
put into the definition and measurement of transactions costs compared to the “weight of 
theorising which has developed from it” (1995:49). However, it is in the context of credit 
transactions that a number of studies have been undertaken.
Aleem (1990) advances an analysis of moneylenders in Pakistan in which he incorporates 
screening, transaction and default costs into the cost of lending in order to examine 
whether higher interest rates over the formal market are indeed justified. He tentatively 
concludes that lender’s average costs exceed their marginal costs and suggests that a 
Chamberlinian model of imperfect competition can explain this. In this model there are 
few barriers to entry, in fact there are too many lenders, but there is strong product 
differentiation among lenders. This product differentiation, he argues, is caused by 
imperfections in the flow of information on the supply side - in terms of lender’s screening 
processes - and on the demand side because borrowers do not have sufficient information 
about the terms and conditions offered by other lenders. He further explains that 
borrowers find it difficult to move between lenders because of the long screening process 
they would be submitted to (the process tended to be carried out over at least a year with 
the lender observing borrower characteristics with small initial loans); because they could 
not be sure of the outcome of this process and the terms they would eventually be offered. 
Further, since the borrower did not wish to jeopardise his relationship with his existing 
lender by approaching another and borrowing was related to marketing all of the harvest 
through a particular lender, using multiple lenders was not an option. Finally, that they 
would have problems obtaining credit from another lender if their current lender were to 
refuse to give them a loan.
Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), in the context of agricultural credit in the Philippines, 
examine the hypothesis that interest rates reflect transactions costs of lending “as 
determined by the character of personalistic relations between the parties” (ibid: 17). The 
analysis examines inter-linked transactions with other markets. The approach therefore 
attempts to adjust returns on transactions in relation to the related costs involved in other 
markets. They conclude that these “personalistic relations” enable information barriers
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and moral hazard problems to be overcome between particular groups of borrowers and 
lenders. However, these “personalistic relations” are constructed on the basis of social and 
political institutions such as kinship, which they indicate underlie the character-based 
lending that takes place. Information problems are therefore being overcome through the 
use of underlying social institutions.
Examining credit transactions in a village in Northern Nigeria, Udry finds that the majority 
of credit transactions occur within the village and between kin. This enables the moral 
hazard problem to be minimised, as information on wilful default is readily available. He 
also finds that the use of collateral and inter-linking of contracts with other markets is 
hardly used. He concludes that credit transactions in this context are therefore state- 
contingent contracts; that is, the lender can readily verify whether the circumstances 
leading to default are merited due to the failure of the investment as a result of adverse 
shocks. However, the borrower does not tend to be regarded as being in default and will 
pay lower interest rates than if the investment is a success so resulting in a degree of risk 
pooling across households, thereby helping households cope with idiosyncratic shocks. 
However, the village presents a boundary to state-contingent lending of this kind and 
covariant risks faced by the village cannot be dealt with, rather these are diversified 
through long distance trading relationships with traders accessing credit that they on-lend 
locally. Given this situation formal sector lenders cannot compete with lenders within the 
community in making state-contingent loans without the development of forms of 
collateral (Udry, 1993).
In a recent study of informal financial arrangements in four African countries, the view 
that interest rates are higher in the informal sector for reasons of default risk and 
transactions costs is tested on data collected from informal financial providers about their 
methods of screening, monitoring and enforcement and their records of actual default. 
Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) conclude that, contrary to the theory, administration costs 
incurred by lenders (as a proportion of loan size) are lower in the informal sector than in 
the formal sector and that it is therefore difficult to attribute differences in interest rates to 
these . They found that transactions costs were influenced by proximity to the lender and 
the extent of personal relationships, and that the strength of factors such as social cohesion 
and community organisation influenced perceptions of risk. Further that the experience of 
default in these arrangements also resulted in lower costs for these lenders suggesting that 
risk-adjusted returns are not comparable across market segments. They conclude that the 
market for funds is strongly fragmented. They also find little evidence of financial
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layering on the supply side to overcome this fragmentation. The study concludes that 
rather than liberalisation resulting in a reduction in the size of the informal sector as the 
parallelist theory of its origins suggests, the informal sector has shown growth and 
dynamism in responding to increasing demand from the real sector in the context of a more 
liberal economic and political climate. The regulatory environment, amongst other factors, 
has not developed in ways that enable such fragmentation to be overcome.
These studies demonstrate that the analysis of imperfect information and transactions costs 
adds a considerable dimension of understanding to informal financial arrangements. 
Aleem’s study suggests that lenders can develop an information base on borrowers, which 
means that they become locked in and face high exit costs allowing the lender to raise 
prices and extract rent from this information base despite over-supply in the market as a 
whole. Moreover he suggests that methods of information sharing exist between 
moneylenders and present borrowers with problems of movement between lenders. Other 
researchers have also offered evidence of the difficulties clients face in exiting tied credit 
arrangements if they attempt to sell their crop elsewhere (Bell, 1993; Olsen, 1994). These 
tactics along with the heavy inter-linking of arrangements with output markets suggests 
that additional factors may be at work in fragmenting the market, not least the path- 
dependence involved in information accumulation by lenders about their clients over time 
which enables information itself to become an instrument of economic power (Harriss- 
White, 1999:272).
The studies by Floro and Yotopoulos and Nissanke and Aryeetey are more explicit about 
the presence of factors at work in the market that are not explained by their analysis. Both 
studies suggest that residual variation in their results (that is not accounted for by 
transactions, information and default costs) might be explained by the presence of personal 
and social relations. Thus, while the new institutionalists explain the transmission of 
information and reduced transactions costs in informal financial arrangements through the 
presence of social institutions, the costs of conveying information through social and 
personal networks are clearly not open to measurement. Given this problem, focusing the 
analysis on costs to explain risk-adjusted returns presents an incomplete explanation of 
empirical results.
In conclusion, by directing our attention to information, transactions costs and risks, this 
strand of the NIE permits an appreciation of the fact that there are a variety of institutions 
at work which enable information to be transmitted and transactions costs to be reduced.
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Further, a focus on institutions also importantly demonstrates that formal legislated rules 
are only a part of the picture. Having defined institutions as “the rules of the game of a 
society, or more formally, as the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction”, North (1995:23) goes on to distinguish formal and informal rules, that is, 
those which become codified in common and statute laws and regulation and those which 
do not. Analysis of institutional arrangements also shows the ways in which so-called 
informal systems supplement and support the enforcement of formal rules in providing the 
basis of social order (DiMaggio, 1994; Platteau, 1994). This therefore suggests that a 
continuum of institutional arrangements is at work. But as Shipton concludes from his 
study of informal finance in the Gambia, transactions costs are too simple a concept to 
capture the “reasoning behind rural Gambian’s individual or collective decisions about 
entrustments and obligations” (Shipton, 1994:284) and the multi-dimensional nature of 
these social ties and cultural traditions, and that “if these financial systems are to be 
understood as markets, they are certainly not unified or discrete ones” (ibid:311).
The broader strand of the NIE associated with North challenges the narrow rational choice 
assumptions of neo-classical economics to suggest that institutions are a means through 
which actors deal with the information and transactions costs involved in economic activity 
(North, 1990). He suggests that actors may use “mental constructs that can result in 
persistently inefficient paths” (ibid: 8) where transactions costs are not trivial. He also 
allows that bargaining power is important and that behaviour may be influenced by vested 
interests, inertia and lock-in. Thus he argues that it is necessary to understand how 
“institutions alter the price paid for one’s convictions and hence play a critical role in the 
extent to which non-wealth maximising motivation influences choices” (ibid: 26).
While this approach suggests bounded rationality for actors, it does suggest that 
institutions evolve to solve economic problems and that they will evolve efficiently in 
response to changing transactions costs over long periods of time. The analysis then 
consists of finding out which economic problem the institutions exist to solve -  an ex post 
rationalisation (Harriss-White, 1998). As Toye suggests: “there are many reasons why one 
cannot presume that institutions will evolve efficiently, even over long periods of time. 
They are all rooted in the fact that individual can and do choose to address existing 
institutions in a multitude of different ways.” (Toye, 1995:64). North’s account of the 
emergence of institutions has therefore been criticised as narrowly functionalist and 
reductionist suggesting that institutions are what they do, and do not necessarily have 
meaning beyond this. While this approach does allow that behaviour is influenced by
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institutions which reflect rules and norms and that these may evolve in relation to power 
relations, it does not theorise their origins or persistence as arising from a wider set of 
social relations and institutions. As a result according to Toye (1995), the NIE is left 
looking for explanations of residual causes of inefficiency when market outcomes are seen 
to be inefficient once transactions costs have been taken into account. Nor have 
transactions costs, he argues, been adequately defined and measured. To invoke history 
and path dependence at this point is a very broad explanation which needs to be broken 
down as, for example, the result of class power, cultural expectations and so on. As a 
result Toye concludes that “no new predictions” (ibid:64) can be derived from the theory.
A further criticism, as Khan argues, is that "the critical assumption [of North] is that the 
choice of the best formal institutions is independent of the polity.... if the ranking of formal 
institutions depends on characteristics of the polity this would undermine the NIE project 
of attributing performance to institutions and require an analysis of the relative 
performance of institutions under well specified political conditions." (Khan, 1995:76).
He therefore goes on to argue that the "net effects of an institution depend not just on the 
institution and the production technologies it coordinates but also and critically on the 
balance of power between the classes and groups affected by that institution i.e. on the 
political settlement" (ibid:77).
To sum up, the NIE focus on transaction and information costs directs our attention to 
deeper social structures in explaining the operation of financial arrangements, but even the 
broader view of North is inadequate in presenting a systematic analysis of the influence of 
these structures on market operation. To move beyond this point we must turn to political 
economy and ‘old’ institutionalist approaches.
2.2.3 Political Economy, ‘real’ markets and ‘old’ institutional economics
Dilley argues that "whilst the concept [of the market] has become hegemonic, it is also in 
crisis...the functioning of markets in western societies is now recognized as under­
investigated. Quite how, or whether, the market concept should be deployed as a term of 
translation that applies to societies other than those of the west is yet more complex" 
(Dilley, 1992:1). Political economists have been at pains to point out that markets are “the 
hollow core at the heart of economics .. .which has no adequate tradition for analysing
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actually existing markets” (Crow, 1998). They have particularly sought to demonstrate 
that participation in markets is differentiated along axes of class and also recognise the role 
of variables such as gender, space and time -  calling the approach ‘real’ markets 
(Mackintosh, 1990; Alcantara, 1992; Harriss-White, 1999).
In contrast to the explanation that high interest rates result from information, transactions 
and default costs, Bhaduri’s seminal contribution argues that usurious interest rates are 
based on the need for lenders to further accumulate land3 (Bhaduri, 1977; Bhaduri, 1981). 
The political economy approach has given rise to extensive evidence that markets interlink 
and interlock, with powerful agents able to incorporate credit relations into the wider 
exchange and production relations of labour markets, trade, or asset accumulation. This 
has been described as “financial repression from below” by one commentator (McGregor, 
1994).
In highlighting the deviation of these ‘real’ markets from those o f ‘abstract’ neo-classical 
theory, Mackintosh directs attention to four questions in addressing the ‘black box’ of 
markets (Mackintosh, 1990). First, the terms on which people come to market, access to 
resources being a means through which they establish dominant positions; second, who has 
power and control over the terms on which markets operate; third, the social stratification 
of trade relationships; and finally, the way in which markets are suppressed rather than 
developed. Methodologies for the analysis of these ‘real’, or ‘actually existing’, markets 
recognise the complexity of markets in practice. Approaches to their description and 
analysis draw on political economy concerns with the study of power in markets and on 
‘old’ institutionalist approaches that incorporate the work of sociologists, anthropologists 
and psychologists as well as that of economists.
‘Old’ institutionalist economics rejects the methodological individualism of neo-classical 
and new institutional approaches and instead “moves from general ideas concerning human 
agency, institutions and the evolutionary nature of economic processes to specific ideas 
and theories, related to specific economic institutions or types of economy. Accordingly 
there are multiple levels and types of analysis” (Hodgson, 1998:168). For the 
institutionalist, macro phenomena can be investigated by looking for patterns of behaviour 
that demonstrate habitual economic activity. As Hodgson points out this suggests a “great 
deal of imitation, inertia, lock-in and cumulative causation” (ibid: 171). However, this
3 While research has tended to suggest that such arrangements are more common in Asia than Africa, Nissanke 
and Aryeete/s study (1998) reports that inter-linked transactions exist in Tanzania as a means of gaining usufruct 
rights in land in the absence o f a land market (ibid‘.231).
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“habit based conception of human agency [does not] itself provide enough to move toward 
operational theory and analysis. Additional elements are required. In particular, an 
institutionalist would stress the need to show how specific groups of common habits are 
embedded in, and reinforced by, specific social institutions. In this manner institutionalism 
moves from the abstract to the concrete” (ibid: 169). Further, the fact that this is revealed 
does not mean that individual agents all behave in the same way, rather the view is that 
patterns at the macro level can occur through micro variation rather than micro replication. 
Patterns at the macro level are reinforced through positive feedback loops “.. .the 
institutional/zz'/zg function of institutions means that macro-economic order and relative 
stability is reinforced alongside variety and diversity at the micro-economic level”
(ibid: 171). Focusing the analysis on institutions is also validated by the fact that 
institutions are more invariant over longer periods of time, can outlast individuals, and 
most institutions exist before the individuals that relate to them. “We are all bom into and 
socialized within a world of institutions. Recognizing this, institutionalists focus on the 
specific features of particular institutions rather than building a general and ahistorical 
model of the individual agent” (ibid: 172).
The way in which economic processes are embedded in social institutions is familiar to 
economic anthropologists from the work of Polanyi. His view was that developing 
economies had different modes of regulation of exchange which were embedded in non­
economic institutions, including those of religion and culture gave rise to the substantive 
tradition in economic anthropology (Polanyi, 1957). Economic sociologists have 
challenged the dichotomy he drew between the workings of developed and industrialised 
economies taking the view that economic process in industrialised economies is equally 
‘embedded5 in social institutions (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992). An extensive body of 
work in the substantive tradition has sought to identify the influence of social institutions 
on exchange in markets in general, as well as in the study of money and informal finance 
(Bohannan and Dalton, 1962; Parry and Bloch, 1989; Geertz, 1992).
An institutionalist definition of a market is "a set of social institutions in which a large 
number of commodity exchanges of a specific type regularly take place and to some extent 
are facilitated and structured by those institutions” (Hodgson, 1988:176). As Pujo has 
pointed out this suggests that markets can be characterised by (i) a commodity or set of 
commodities; (ii) an exchange process and (iii) institutions that regulate this process. On 
the basis of her analysis of the influence of the social institution of gender on the local rice 
market in Eastern Guinea, Pujo concludes that as well as markets being social institutions
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in themselves, they are embedded in wider social institutions that encompass but are not 
restricted to markets. Hence “markets should rather be defined as exchange processes (of 
commodities, services, money and labour) which are partially determined, regulated and 
perpetuated by a wide set of social institutions” (Pujo, 1996:312).
Hence, in contrast to the NIE, the approach o f ‘old’ institutionalism leads us away from 
analysis of the way agents rationally respond to deficiencies in information availability and 
the presence of transactions costs, to an explicit focus on the range of institutions, 
economic and social, which pervade the operations of the market. Social institutions 
encompass age, ethnicity, gender, class and religion. Economic institutions can be divided 
into two categories (Pujo, 1996): (i) macro level legislated rules which provide a 
framework for economic interaction between agents and (ii) contractual rules and norms to 
which individual agents usually comply.
White builds on these themes to suggest that an analysis of markets needs to involve four 
dimensions of market power: the state, association, economic structure and socio-cultural 
status. These are captured within a four-fold political analysis that examines the politics of 
state involvement, market organisation, market structure and social embeddedness (White, 
1993).
First, in relation to the politics of state involvement, White indicates that the state, apart 
from acting as a player in its own right in many markets, also regulates. But the influence 
of the state is more deep-seated than this. It is ‘pervasive’ and ‘saturating’ (p6) in the 
sense that the way in which state intervention influences a specific transaction derives from 
a myriad of sources and in invisible ways. For example, in the case of finance these 
influences might include the opening hours of banks, the way they are allowed to describe 
their products and to advertise them, the way in which interest rates are calculated, the way 
contracts are drawn up, and the ways in which money is used. This results in what he 
calls 'institutional patterning' (ibid:6) that requires investigation.
Second is the politics of market organisation. This refers to the 'internal' politics of the 
market in which participants are capable, through formal associations and networks, of 
influencing the way in which the market operates to their own advantage. Collective 
action by participants results in the establishment of "rules of the game or institutionalised 
practices" (ibid:7) through processes of co-operation and/or conflict. Third is the politics 
of market structure. This refers to the "relationship between market participants in the act
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of exchange” (ibid:8). The inter-linking and inter-locking of contracts in credit and related 
input and output markets due to unequal power relations are clearly aspects of market 
structure. Last is the politics of social embeddedness, which examines the way in which 
wider structures of social organisation affect market operations.
White’s approach presents us with something of a bridge between the institutionalist and 
political economy approaches. While the domains of market structure and organisation can 
perhaps be regarded as the traditional domains of political economy analysis, by 
incorporating the dimensions of state involvement and social embeddedness the framework 
allows for a clear exploration of the role of institutions. Incorporating the level of state 
involvement in markets enables the legally institutionalised framework to be examined, 
that is, the way in which formal regulation is implemented. By incorporating an analysis 
of the influence of social embeddedness on markets we can also investigate the way in 
which informal rules and norms regulate market behaviour. Further, as Pujo points out in 
her analysis of the influence of gender in markets (Pujo, 1996), there is both an ideology to 
such institutions as well as a practice of the way in which an institution in fact operates, 
and these may diverge in reality. Such a distinction needs to be applied to the 
circumstances of state involvement as much as social embeddedness.
Research into informal financial arrangements in both the political economy and 
substantive anthropology traditions has clearly demonstrated the diversity, complexity and 
detail involved in their functioning. Financial 'landscapes' are understood as rooted in 
agro-ecological conditions, socio-economic relations and political-administrative structures 
(Bouman and Hospes, 1994). There are many studies of informal financial arrangements 
that demonstrate the intricate relationship between these arrangements and aspects of wider 
social institutions (Geertz, 1962; Adams and Fitchett, 1992; Aredo, 1993; Bouman and 
Hospes, 1994; Ardener, 1995). However, attempts to research the way in which social 
institutions influence the functioning of finance at the level of the ‘market’ itself are few. 
Hospes’ study of the financial landscape in Ambon, Indonesia uses Giddens’ actor- 
structure approach. As a result financial systems are viewed as “social systems sustained 
by actors who are not only participants of these systems but also of other social systems, 
such as ethnic community, an extension program, an office, a neighbourhood, a religious 
society, a group of entrepreneurs, that affect or somehow embed ‘financial systems’” 
(Hospes, 1996:13). The result of such a view is that the dualistic divide between ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ needs to be overcome in order to see these institutions, be they club law,
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local government directives, commercial ethic or religious concerns as “regulative 
complexes” (ibid: 10) in which financial arrangements take place.
2.2.4 Theoretical approaches: conclusion
This section has reviewed the contributions of the two main theoretical frameworks to the 
examination of financial markets in low-income countries. Neo-classical analysis 
employs a dualistic model to analyse the interaction between the formal an informal 
sectors and points us to the need to understand the degree of interaction between them. A 
strand of new institutional economics seeks to explain market segmentation through an 
analysis of information, transactions and default costs. However, while recognising the 
role that institutions can play in enabling these costs to be reduced, it is these institutions 
that appear also to cause market fragmentation. If, in the context of financial liberalisation, 
the objective is to remove market imperfections with a view to improving the efficiency of 
markets, it seems necessary to adopt a framework that can theorise and expose the cause of 
these imperfections. While the narrow NIE of Akerlof and Stiglitz therefore clearly directs 
our attention to the role of institutions, it lacks the tools that can enable us to describe their 
origins and theorise how these influence behaviour in financial markets. While the broader 
NIE of North recognises the role of mental models, vested interests and inertia in the 
operation and evolution of institutions, these are still seen as a response to information and 
transaction costs rather than having their origins in a wider range of social institutions that 
operate in social life in practice.
In contrast to new institutionalism, ‘old’ institutionalism permits institutions themselves to 
enter the core of the analysis. In particular, by incorporating an understanding of the 
influence of social and cultural institutions on the market, it gives us the means to begin 
such an investigation. Political economy approaches have directed attention to the 
functioning of ‘real5 markets and White presents a four-fold analytical framework that 
enables the influence of both social institutions and political economy aspects of market 
functioning to be explored. In particular, these approaches recognise that markets are 
‘regulated’ by a wider array of institutions than the state. Hence the conventionally 
defined formal - informal divide may not be the most pervasive influence over market 
activity. Moreover, it is also important to point out that ‘regulation’ by social and cultural 
institutions does not only affect the ‘informal’ sector and stop at the door of the ‘formal’ 
financial sector. Formal financial institutions are equally subject to the influence of social
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and cultural institutions. This can most easily be exemplified by the way the social origins 
of formal sector banks may influence their ‘market’; Asian owned banks in Kenya for 
example (Brownbridge, 1998). Another example is the way religion has influenced 
banking norms and practices be they Christian notions of usury, or Islamic banking 
practices. It is therefore important to move beyond simplistic dualistic notions of financial 
markets if the complexity of ‘real’ financial markets and the means through which they are 
regulated is to be adequately understood.
2.3 Microfinance organisations in the financial market
2.3.1 The emergence of microfinance organisations
Policy discussions of financial reform in the early 1990s also took note of new 
developments in the technology of lending to poor people (World Bank, 1989; Asian 
Development Bank, 1990; Callier, 1990; Germidis, Kessler et al., 1991). At this time, an 
increasingly rich body of detailed research into informal financial arrangements converged 
with insights from the new institutional economics and practical experience of lending to 
poor people (McGregor, 1988). This resulted in a number of key departures from earlier 
thinking. First, poor people can and will pay relatively high interest rates for loans and that 
their concern is for repeated access rather than cost. Second, poor people can and do save, 
and practical experience suggested that ‘compulsory’ savings requirements linked to loan 
access could provide funds for on-lending4. Third, group-based methods (regularly found 
in informal arrangements) could reduce transactions costs and had the potential to ensure 
that large numbers of people could be reached with the services. These developments gave 
rise to hopes that microfinance institutions could expand their outreach, reduce their costs 
as they grew in size, mobilize funds for on-lending independently of donors and hence 
become independently self-sustaining so providing services in the long term (Johnson and 
Rogaly, 1997).
The idea of building sustainable microfinance institutions further converges with financial 
repression thinking. The Ohio School had earlier criticised subsidised lending both
4 Although the capacity o f poor people to save was recognised in this way, this did not lead to the availability of 
flexible savings services by MFOs. This is an area o f current and ongoing debate, although the need for poor 
people to have access to savings services is increasingly recognised. See Rutherford, 1998; Rutherford, 1999; 
Sharif and Wood, 2001.
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through the state in the form of agricultural credit schemes (and later NGOs) taking the 
view that this was ‘undermining’ the market with cheap credit (Adams, Graham et al., 
1984). Along with the proponents of financial repression they argued that subsidised credit 
led to allocative inefficiency and that cheap credit could erode the in-built mechanisms of 
indigenous lending practices (Nagarajan, Meyer et al., 1995). By contrast, the Ohio School 
supported building financial organisations that could cover their costs and be financially 
self-sustaining thereby widening the market for financial services in a sustainable way 
(VonPischke, 1991).
2.3.2 Microfinance organisations in the financial market
While financial sector reform policy sees subsidised credit to users as bad practice, cheap 
capital for the establishment of MFOs is still the norm. Using neo-classically based infant 
industry arguments, Hulme and Mosley argue that subsidies are valid because the benefits 
of developing the technology of lending to poor people involves externalities of knowledge 
which cannot be internalised by the organisation itself (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
However, the case made is a general theoretical one and has not been applied to specific 
financial markets to demonstrate the legitimacy of subsidies in a particular context. This 
would require the development of criteria to be used in assessing what a ‘correct’ level of 
subsidy might be which would avoid undermining already existing financial service 
providers (Johnson, 1998). Thus support to MFOs has been rationalised alongside thinking 
around liberalisation and in this sense moves towards removing the ‘distortion’ of 
subsidised credit to users (Copestake, 1996). Yet their presence and promotion remains 
‘distorting’.
As indicated above, the Ohio School has been a key player in the application of the NIE to 
financial markets and has also considered the role of MFOs in developing the rural 
financial market (RFM) however, they suggest that “the route to better RFM performance 
is not well marked” (Von Pischke, Adams et al., 1983: 12) but a well-functioning rural 
financial market should, according to Von Pishke, have the following characteristics. It 
should:
(i) mobilise rural savings as well as disburse credit;
(ii) grow to meet expanding opportunities without the need for subsidies;
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(iii) expand the array of vehicles for attracting savings;
(iv) offer varied and flexible lending terms and conditions;
(v) have institutions (sic) which are healthy and expanding;
(vi) have active competition among formal and informal borrowers and lenders;
(vii) the costs of financial services should fall as a result of innovation;
(viii) the economically active population should have expanding access;
(ix) the capability of the RFM to take part in larger financial markets should grow.
When considering the shifting of the ‘frontier’ of financial development, von Pischke gives 
further indications as to how the broader impact of a particular project or financial 
organisation on financial development might be established. He asks:
(i) are project instruments innovative?
(ii) have they proved catalytic, novel or trivial?
(iii) do project instruments promote competition and reduce transaction costs? (Von 
Pischke, 1991)).
These are questions which have been considered by those concerned with the outreach and 
sustainability of MFOs (Rhyne, 1994), but while it is relatively straightforward to establish 
whether the instruments offered have been innovative (in the sense, for example, that they 
fall outside the mainstream of banking sector products) it is rather harder to measure and 
assess transactions costs, and methods of doing this have not been significantly developed.
At the level of the financial market, von Pischke concentrates on the question of whether 
projects have successfully lengthened the term structure of the market, i.e. whether they 
have overcome the risks of borrowing short to lend long. Since the role of a financial 
intermediary is to overcome the risk of using funds taken in on relatively short-term 
deposits and turn them into loans for much longer periods of time, the ability to 
successfully manage liquidity and price risks is essential. He proposes means of analysing 
the MFO's assets and liabilities to establish whether this is being achieved.
Additionally, two further questions are posed: first, whether injecting liquidity into tight 
financial markets has a greater impact on these markets than where liquidity is not a 
problem; second, whether the intervention has successfully developed banking habits. Von 
Pischke does not indicate the means of answering these last points. Indeed, it is notable 
that in discussing the assessment of projects on financial market development at the macro­
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economic and macro-financial level, he has more questions than answers about the specific 
approaches and indicators to be used. This framework for impact assessment on financial 
markets concentrates on improving their functioning as efficient allocators of resources for 
investment consistent with the financial repression case. Reducing transaction costs and 
managing risk are the main indicators of whether or not this has been achieved despite the 
inherent difficulties in their measurement.
By contrast, the objectives of credit projects borne of political economy analysis have often 
involved reducing the dependence of borrowers on moneylenders and the nexus of power 
relationships they represent. Political economy analyses of moneylender exploitation were 
a strong rationale for past state-subsidised credit provision which the financial repression 
thesis has attacked (McGregor, 1989). The approach to building self-sustaining MFOs, 
which charge interest rates to cover costs, has challenged this rationale and many credit 
providers have accepted the view that access rather than price is the critical factor for poor 
people (Otero and Rhyne, 1994).
Notwithstanding this development, an indicator that is often used to assess impact is 
moneylender dependence (Proshika, 1997). But such an indicator, if it is to be useful, 
needs to reflect the wider context of the financial market and the underlying power 
relations which moneylending represents, as well as the circumstances of poor people's 
livelihoods (McGregor, 1988; McGregor, 1994; Wood, forthcoming). Questions must be 
asked about whether the market niche of moneylenders is really being eroded, or simply 
being converted or channelled into other types of production and exchange relationship.
Is it as easy as shifting dependence from the moneylender to the MFO? Evidence has been 
presented from Bangladesh demonstrating that households participating in MFO 
programmes borrow as much from informal sources (i.e. moneylenders) as other 
households and cross-finance their debt repayments to either source (Sinha and Matin, 
1998). Bell has also questioned whether market entry by banks and co-operatives in the 
Indian context has really brought about the demise of moneylenders as statistics might 
superficially suggest (Bell, 1993). Moreover, within an environment such as Bangladesh, 
superficial homogeneity belies markets that have been shown to operate quite differently in 
different parts of the country (Crow, 1994). This raises the question as to whether the 
impact of more or less uniform styles of intervention, intended to affect power 
relationships, will indeed have equivalent impact.
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To conclude, the emergence of MFOs as a development intervention intended as a lasting 
feature of the financial landscape involves claims about their impact at the level of the 
market. The sustainability school expects MFOs to expand access, mobilise savings and 
reduce transactions costs, while the approach arising from political economy seeks 
indicators for reduced moneylender dependence . Little research to date has considered 
whether these outcomes are happening in practice, and many MFOs that seek to achieve 
self-sustaining provision face the inherent contradiction that they are using subsidised 
capital to achieve this end.
2.4 Informal finance, risk and social safety nets
Recent developments in the analysis of poverty have explicitly recognised the role that risk 
and vulnerability play in poor people’s livelihoods, and their strategies for dealing with it 
(Ellis, 2000; Wood, 2001). Analysis of informal financial mechanisms has also suggested 
that these can allow for risk management and coping through their roles as informal 
insurance and social safety nets. Platteau and Abrahams argue that the risk managing 
aspects of reciprocal credit, which enable the evening out of income streams with high 
degrees of inter-temporal and inter-personal variability, have been insufficiently addressed 
(Platteau and Abraham, 1987). Ardener notes that group-based financial mechanisms - 
such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) - offer such opportunities 
(Ardener, 1995). This section briefly reviews this literature.
Platteau’s work explores the insurance aspects of mutually based informal mechanisms but 
questions the nature of the insurance they offer (Platteau, 1997). His analysis suggests 
that people in developing countries do not understand insurance in the same way as people 
in developed countries. Insurance in developed countries is a form of ‘conditional 
reciprocity’ where the ex-ante utility of eliminating or reducing the effects of a negative 
event that may occur are valued and understood. In developing countries, he suggests that 
it is a norm of ‘balanced reciprocity’ that is prevalent. Balanced reciprocity can be 
understood through the example of mutual aid in Senegalese fishing communities, where 
Platteau suggests that the variability of income flows on a daily basis offers opportunities 
for members to benefit from each other frequently. By contrast, in agrarian societies, he 
suggests that there is a subtle difference between state-contingent loans (that is, where the
terms of repayment may be adjusted to take account of shocks affecting either borrower or
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lender) and mutual aid. While state-contingent loans can assist in mitigating the effect of 
unexpected shocks and hence act as a risk pooling mechanism, mutual aid tends to operate 
in the case of need. Using Udry’s data from Northern Nigeria, he argues that the state- 
contingent loans that Udry analyses are actually more akin to balanced reciprocity because 
the repayment periods under situations of favourable or unfavourable shocks are little 
different; hence the insurance element of these arrangements is not particularly significant. 
This view therefore argues that agrarian societies prefer insurance based on credit 
transactions because they better embody the ‘balanced reciprocity5 norm.
ROSC As are an example of balanced reciprocity and Platteau goes on to explore the extent 
to which they involve an insurance mechanism that redistributes income among recipients. 
The way in which the fund is allocated in a ROSCA is important. Besley et al. argue that 
‘random ROSCAs’ - where the fund is allocated by ballot at each meeting- are not 
particularly good at buffering against risk because of the unpredictability about when the 
fund is received. They acknowledge that members may pay for each other (through 
bilateral side agreements) but argue that this can only deal with the effects of idiosyncratic 
risks (Besley, Coate et al., 1993). Platteau suggests that ROSCAs that allow the allocation 
of the fund based on need, can be seen to be redistibutive if there is no compensation to 
other members for their patience, especially if the ROSCA is run only once. On the other 
hand, auction ROSCAs -  where a member bids for the fund with a discount that is 
distributed back to the other members - are a means of allocation on the basis of need, but 
at a price that allows other members to be rewarded. However, he also suggests that not 
making deductions from the fund may be preferred because of a sense of fairness and a 
concern not to introduce a more calculative atmosphere.
Platteau’s work is very important in attempting to delineate elements of financial 
intermediation and insurance. However there are a number of aspects of his argument for 
‘balanced reciprocity’ that deserve further examination. First, the literature on micro- 
credit group-based lending involves a discussion of screening mechanisms whose purpose 
is to ensure that only those with the ability to pay join groups. As Ghatak (2000) argues, 
where borrowers have local information about each other, then positive assortative 
matching occurs and safe borrowers will end up with safe partners while risky borrowers 
will end up with risky partners5. Presumably if this is the case for micro-credit groups it is
5 De Aghion and Collier argue that even where local information is not available to members, peer lending can 
still be more efficient under certain circumstances and risky borrowers will be not be able to take advantage o f  
safe borrowers via the interest rate (Aghion and Gollier, 2000). However this is limited to a single period model 
during which borrowers do accumulate information about each other’s risk profile. The problem o f high exit
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sensible to suggest that it is also true of indigenous savings and group-based insurance 
systems. This means that there is a priori selection into ROSCAs on the basis of an 
individual’s risk profile. Their risk profile is, by definition, a consequence of their socio­
economic status. The function of groups intent on financial intermediation is therefore to 
exclude those who are likely to present a “bad risk” to the group and to ensure balanced 
reciprocity rather than redistribution. It is therefore unsurprising that only limited 
redistributive transfers operate within the framework of a ROSCA.
Second, Platteau suggests that reciprocity cannot occur within a cycle. However few 
ROSCAs are based on a single period. If they operate ‘well’ in early periods they are 
likely to persist and people recognise that they have to build up a track record with the 
ROSCA before they make claims on it in terms of need. Where members are slow to pay, 
or do not pay, the member may be ejected, or if a more widespread problem, it is likely to 
collapse. The longevity of the ROSCA may therefore be an indication of whether an 
adequately balanced reciprocity is in operation. But participants face uncertainty when 
entering into the ROSCA and may be careful about the claims they may make in any 
particular group, as they are also uncertain as to their ability to deliver balanced reciprocity 
in the group.
By focusing on ROSCAs themselves as a means to delivering insurance, Platteau’s 
analysis overlooks the social and cultural aspects of their operation.6 Ardener suggests that 
the interaction between social and economic functions is inseparable (Ardener, 1995). 
Velez-Ibanez argues (after Lomnitz) that ROSCAs are an important means “by which 
individuals can successfully counter the basic uncertainty of a marginal existence by 
generating methods of economic solidarity that mobilise available resources efficiently” 
(Velez-Ibanez, 1983:113). In research on ROSCAs in Mexico he maintains that while 
offering the material means to purchase gifts and to enable crucial ritual obligations to be 
met ” [accumulating money to meet such obligations selects for an increased number of 
social links and with that increase more access to favours” (ibid: 114). The favours may be 
reduced prices in the marketplace, an introduction to a job, assistance in childcare or 
medicine for a child and so on. While a feature of these favours may indeed be balanced 
reciprocity, these favours may operate well beyond the bounds of the ROSCA itself. As a
rates in group lending schemes where members do not know each other (see for example Copestake, Bhalotra et 
al., 2001) can be a consequence o f this, and apart from safe borrowers fearing losses, there is an element to which 
borrowers may see such processes as “unfair”, despite their apparent economic efficiency.
6 Although he has also argued that attempts to de-link credit from other social relations when replacing 
traditional mechanisms with formal services, can lead to efficiency losses as the means through which these 
mechanisms reduce information and transactions costs can increase efficiency in the context o f uncertainty 
(Platteau and Abraham, 1987).
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“cultural invention” that allows people to meet both biological and socio-cultural needs 
(Velez-Ibanez, 1983), he describes ROSCAs as adaptive to varied circumstances and 
argues that it is this adaptability that has contributed to their continued use.
To conclude, the potential for informal financial mechanisms to enable poor people to pool 
and diversify risk has been recognised. The potential for specific types of mechanisms - 
such as ROSCAs - to do this has been debated. When analysed in terms of economics their 
potential to provide insurance appears limited, but this approach tends to overlook the 
ways in which social and cultural aspects of these mechanisms operate.
2.5 Conclusions
The policy context of this study is the prevalence of financial sector reform policy in the 
1990s, which sought to remove interest rate and credit controls, restructure state 
involvement in financial markets and remove barriers to entry, while often at the same time 
seeking to improve regulatory and supervisory environments. These policies have 
concentrated on the formal financial sector and concern about the informal financial sector 
tended to focus on whether it could frustrate expected policy outcomes. However, 
evidence suggests that the informal sector is of considerable scale and particularly 
important to poor people. Policy that is interested in expanding access to financial services 
for poor people (see, for example, DFID, 1997) therefore needs to understand and consider 
the implications of formal financial sector reform for the informal financial sector.
The strand of the NEE that sees institutions as a substitute for missing markets has moved 
forward the analysis of financial transactions by highlighting the role that information and 
transactions costs play. This analysis has indicated the importance of a variety of 
institutions, including social institutions, in conveying information. While the approach of 
North recognises the need for actors to have a means of processing information in the 
presence of transactions costs, i.e. mental models, and the role of vested interests and 
inertia, institutions are still fundamentally seen as a response to the existence of 
transactions and information costs rather than having their origins in much wider range of 
social institutions. While directing attention to these underlying institutions, neither 
approach presents a systematic approach to analysing the influence of these social
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institutions in fragmenting the market. For this it is necessary to turn to ‘real’ market 
approaches.
‘Real’ market analysis builds on the insights o f ‘old’ institutional economics and political 
economy and permits institutions to be the core of the analysis. Thus markets are defined 
as “a set of social institutions in which a large number of commodity exchanges of a 
specific type regularly take place and to some extent are facilitated and structured by those 
institutions” (Hodgson, 1988:176). This approach to market analysis suggests the 
importance of a range of institutions and regulative mechanisms ranging from the state, to 
social and economic relations of class, gender, age and ethnicity.
This review confirms the two main objectives of the study given in Chapter One. First, to 
develop an holistic analysis of financial markets which makes institutions core. Second, 
that it is necessary to examine the influence of social regulation and embeddedness in a 
systematic way. The next chapter proposes an approach to conceptualising this.
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Chapter 3 Financial intermediation: an institutional approach
Chapter Two concluded by suggesting that institutions be made central to the analysis o f 
real markets. This chapter therefore develops a conceptual framework for understanding 
financial intermediation based in an institutional approach.
Financial intermediation is the process of converting savings into loans. This requires a 
means through which people with excess savings and people with demand for loans can be 
co-ordinated: this is the role o f institutions. Institutions have rules, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. The approach taken here first discusses different forms of 
financial intermediary -  banks, co-operatives, parastatal lenders, and informal groups -  and 
then examines the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that enable them to 
operate.
The formal rules of financial intermediaries can only function with the support of informal 
mles moulded by underlying social, economic, political and cultural relations. Hence, a 
thorough analysis should also explain how financial intermediation is embedded in a 
broader set of social institutions. This in turn allows the differential access of socio­
economic groups to be theorised and investigated.
The chapter concludes by considering the implications of this approach for the imperfect 
information and transactions costs analysis of financial markets. It suggests that 
fragmentation in the financial market can arise as a result of the nature of the financial 
intermediaries involved, and due to the implications this has for who is able to use 
particular types of intermediary.
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3.1 Institutions and financial intermediation
In the broadest possible sense, people require rules of engagement to structure their 
interaction. Hence North describes institutions as “the rules of the game of a society, or 
more formally, as the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction”
(North, 1990:3). He goes on to distinguish formal and informal rules: those that become 
codified in common and statute laws and regulation and those that do not, with informal 
rules often being referred to as norms. Thus the range of institutions stretches from the 
rules of etiquette to criminal law. Organisations, on the other hand, are seen as the players 
of the game.
Before proceeding further a note on terminology is needed. The breadth of North’s much 
used definition of institutions means that the term can be used to describe many things. 
Common usage can further confuse this. In the context of finance, banks are often referred 
to as financial institutions. For clarity the term financial intermediary is used to describe 
different ways in which savings are converted into loans. These intermediaries are 
organisations.
The term social institution has already been used in Chapter Two, and this encompasses a 
diverse range of rules and norms such as those that exist within forms of social 
organisation such as marriage, the family, and the church as well as those that operate 
within social relations such as those of age, gender, ethnicity and class. The main concern 
of this study is the way in which social relations influence behaviour so that this term is 
used as far as possible to refer to these rules and norms.
The first step in this approach is to recognise that financial intermediation requires a means 
of collaboration or collective action. Ostrom points out that theories of the firm and the 
state each provide a solution to the collective action problem (Ostrom, 1990). The firm 
operates by allowing an entrepreneur to negotiate and co-ordinate activity through 
contracts with a range of participants, which specify the ways in which they will act. In 
deciding whether or not to participate (assuming voluntary participation) each participant 
gives up some choices and as a result of this the entrepreneur can pay each of the agents 
and retain residual profits (or bear losses). The implication of this model is that the 
entrepreneur is motivated to organise the activity efficiently and maximise profits.
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The state is another and particular solution to the collective action problem. The state by 
having a monopoly of the use of force can impose rules and enforce them using sanctions. 
Hence the state can organise a range of activities for collective benefit (or harm).
A third set of solutions is where a group of individuals organise themselves. This is the 
case that is the focus of Ostrom’s analysis of common property resources that are not 
managed by the state. Indeed the collective action literature stemming from Olson (1965) 
concentrates on the case of collective action involving public goods that are non­
excludable and non-rival in consumption because it is in these cases that there are free­
rider problems. This is less the case for financial intermediation where the product is rival 
and excludable, and it is the theory of club goods that is relevant to this case (Comes and 
Sandler, 1986).
These three main types of institution for collective action - the state, the firm7 and club 
based solutions -  are the basis of the forms of financial intermediary present in most 
contexts. Thus parastatals, banks and co-operatives are evident in most countries.
However, the actual range of financial intermediaries that exists involves other types of 
mechanism also and it is necessary to locate these within this context of solutions to 
collective action. In particular, two other forms of financial intermediary are evident in 
many developing country contexts -  see Table 3.1.
First are the range of microfmance organisations that have originated in NGOs8. MFOs, 
along with parastatal lenders are special cases of intermediation. Neither raises their funds 
as deposits. Parastatal lenders may on-lend funds allocated through the government 
budget. NGO originated MFOs usually start lending funds granted to them by donors -  
whether public or private - and only later in their life may they raise deposits or borrow to 
on-lend. Thus these funds often represent a transfer. MFOs may use group-based lending
7 There can also be definitional confusion over the use o f the term firm. Coase’s focus on the firm was bome of  
his interest to study the predominant mode in the modem capitalist economy because the structure o f firms 
involves resource allocation decisions that are not made via the price mechanism, i.e. a market. The market 
instead involves the functioning o f atomistic individuals acting in their own rational self-interest. There is 
however some ambiguity over what it is that in fact defines the firm. In attempting to clarify this in Coase’s 
theory, Hodgson suggests that he was referring to "any firm involving multiple agents organised together in 
some manner - hierarchical, co-operative, participatory or whatever - but not through the market" (Hodgson, 
1999:203). Common usage o f the term ‘firm’ refers to the modem capitalist firm and neglects other "non- 
market’ forms o f organization. Here I will also use the term to apply to the modem capitalist firm.
8 The term MFO is often now used to refer to many different forms o f organisation offering finance to poor 
people, for example, credit unions. Here I distinguish between MFOs that originated in NGOs and other 
forms.
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methods and so impose mutual liability on borrowers as a condition of lending, but this 
does not put them in the category of mutuals as they are not owned by their users.
The second additional category I call direct lending. This involves cases of moneylenders 
and reciprocal borrowing between friends and relatives. In these cases contracts are bi­
lateral and therefore are not cases of collective action.
Ostrom indicates that “'’Institutions" can be defined as the sets of working rules that are 
used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are 
allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be 
followed, what information must or must not be provided and what payoffs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions... All rules contain prescriptions that 
forbid, permit or require some action or outcome” (Ostrom, 1990:51). This indicates that 
the next step in this analysis is to consider the rules involved in these different financial 
intermediaries along with the procedures that are necessary to monitor conduct and enforce 
compliance.
Ostrom (1990) proposes that rules are nested in three levels:
1) constitutional rules affect operational activities and results through their effect in 
determining who is eligible and determining the specific rules to be used in crafting the set 
of collective choice rules that in turn affect the set of operational rules. Any group that is 
going to undertake collective action has to agree a constitution in which the collective 
action and operational rules are embedded. The constitution in turn, has a set of rules 
about how it can be changed.
2) collective choice rules which indirectly affect operational rules - these are the rules used 
in making policies and the management and adjudication of policy decisions;
3) operational rules that affect day to day decisions regarding access to resource units, 
monitoring and sanctions and the operational level therefore involves processes of 
appropriation, provision, monitoring and enforcement;
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Table 3.1: Classification of financial intermediaries by form of collective action
Form of 
collective action
Type of financial 
intermediary
Description
FIRMS Banks / NBFIs Financial intermediaries that operate according to 
the theory of the firm. They can take savings and 
give loans independently of each other because 
saving and borrowing from the bank are 
essentially independent contracts with the bank. 
The bank’s objective is to intermediate funds and 
make profits for owners / equity shareholders. 
Ownership may be by the state or private 
investors. State-owned banks fall in this category 
as they raise deposits from the public and operate 










Similar to co-operatives, they are group-based 
mechanisms, their main difference with SACCOs 





Intermediates funds on behalf of the state - which 
may be a transfer of tax revenue - thus an indirect 
form of financial intermediation that does not 
involve taking deposits. Their rationale has 
usually involved an analysis of “market failure” in 
lending to particular sectors of the economy. The 
parastatal’s remit and ability to make profit is in 
part a function of the incentive structure imposed 
upon it by the state.
NGOs
Transfer based
MFOs owned by 
NGOs
NGO based MFOs usually intermediate funds 
from donors and often use group-based lending 
thus imposing a collective action solution on 
borrowers but their origins as NGOs are in a 
completely different type of institution, such as 
privately owned charities.
Direct lending 
i.e. does not 
involve collective 
action
Moneylenders Private individuals, who lend their own money. 
These are not a collective action institution 
because they do not take savings. Alternatively 
they may be formal companies but in this case 
they usually operate under the theory of the firm 
with the objective of making profits. However 
their function as a financial intermediary is 
limited to their intermediating shareholder funds, 
as they do not take savings to on-lend.
Lending to friends 
and relatives 
(reciprocal lending)
Private agreements, between friends and relatives 
that are bi-laterally negotiated and are therefore 
not collective action institutions.
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These rules are accompanied by rules which determine how mechanisms for monitoring 
and enforcement will operate, i.e. the means through which it will be known whether the 
rules have been broken and how transgression will be punished. Thus the rules, monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms under which financial intermediaries are constituted can be 
examined: Table 3.2 outlines these for the five main types of financial intermediary that 
have been identified.
Thus banks are a specific form of financial intermediary that operate as firms. Shareholders 
appoint management to monitor performance. They have specific additional legislation 
because they are firms who can take other people’s money as deposits so that banking law 
is largely concerned with creating a legal framework within which to monitor and enforce 
this activity. Banks involve two sets of rules. First are those related to its operation as a 
firm, and second, banking law. Hence it is the management appointed by shareholders 
who design loan and savings services with the intention of making profits for the 
shareholders from this service. The means of monitoring and enforcement relate to saving 
and especially borrowing, and are the responsibility of the management of the bank but 
may be detailed in law also. For example, requirements to lend against collateral and the 
means of enforcement, involves the management of the bank in using contract law to 
realise collateral in the event of non-payment. These are fundamental aspects of the 
nature of the service that banks can offer as financial intermediaries.
In contrast to banks, the members of savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) are both 
the owners and managers of the organisation. In most countries co-operative law governs 
their operations and this involves the election of a management committee from the 
members and a range of other sub-committees to oversee operations. It is these 
committees that formulate the operational rules and monitor their implementation. In 
larger SACCOs the management committee may appoint professional and paid managers 
to undertake operational tasks, but responsibility for management decisions ultimately lies 
with the members through the structure of committees and annual general meetings. It is 
through these mechanisms that the members can directly influence the services that are 
provided.
54
Table 3.2: Rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for different types of financial intermediary
FIRMS MUTUALS




Banking laws -mainly to 
protect depositors 
Company law
Co-operative law No legislated rules. Maybe 
a written constitution but 
this may be more heavily 
based on members implicit 
understanding of a set of 
rules.
No legislated rules. May 
be a written constitution 
but this may be more 
heavily based on 
members implicit 




Made by shareholders and 
Board within constraints of 
legal framework
Made by members (who 
are savers) -  AGM etc 
which can modify the 
constitution and monitor 
management
Members (savers) -  election 
of group officials
Members (savers) -  
election of group officials
Operational rules Eg lending policies made by 
Board and management
Made by Management 
committee but proscribed 
bylaw
Members may be in 
everyday operational rule 
implementation as well as 
officials
Members may be in 
everyday operational rule 




Externally monitored by 
central bank
Profitability monitored by 
shareholders 
Management has 




committee meetings. In 
larger SACCOs may have 
a paid manager and staff 
for day to day operations.
Monitoring via regular 
meetings at which 
repayments made and loans 
made, very easy to know 
when someone hasn’t paid.
Monitoring in ROSCAs 
very easy as know when 
someone hasn’t paid 






Regulations imposed by 
Central Bank
Profits/losses to shareholders 
Loan enforcement backed by 
contract law for realisation 
of collateral
For late/non payment: 
Use of guarantors, which 
is related to peer pressure 
and reputation 
Attachment of shares
For late/non payment: 
Possibly financial penalties 
Seizure of assets 
Exclusion from group 
and/or social sanctions such 
as shame/ reputation
For late/non payment: 
Possibly financial 
penalties 
Seizure of assets 
Exclusion from group 
and/or social sanctions 









Constituted by act of 
parliament
Constituted under charity or 
NGO laws
May be national law which may specify 
operational rules to extent of pricing (eg 
laws against usury) and legitimate 
mechanisms for enforcement 




None - Management 
appointed by 
government -  
accountability laid 
down in Act
Board appointed by invitation 
-  in turn they appoint 
management
None (unless involves a private 
shareholder company)
None
Operational rules Operational rules made 
by management
Operational rules made in 
accordance with overall vision 
and mission set by board.
For lending -  programmes 
designed and rules set by 
management
Set by moneylender -  borrower enters into 
an agreement which may be verbal or 
written.
Usually set by mutual 








Monitoring of loans by 
management
Monitoring of the NGO by eg 
Charity Commissioners 
Monitoring of lending is 
internal only







backed by contract law 
for realisation of 
collateral
May use social sanctions to 
discipline borrowers in group 
based finance systems
May use law courts to enforce contract if 
written; may use informal enforcement 
mechanisms eg seizure of items or social 
sanctions (such as damage to reputation)
May use law or more likely 
to use social sanctions
In the mutual sector the key difference between SACCOs and group-based systems is the 
lack of formal registration with government -  in this sense they are ‘informal’. Some 
ASCAs may operate very similarly having committee systems. ROSCAs are the simplest 
form of financial intermediation with mutual ownership and range from well organised and 
established groups to extremely loosely run systems.
The mechanisms for enforcement of payment in these informal mutually-owned 
intermediaries may depend on a range of other formal and informal rules and norms. For 
example, they may use civil law to recover debts. However it is often the case that the cost 
or requirements for this type of action are high and instead they may depend on a range of 
other types of sanction, for example, the seizure of member’s assets, or informal sanctions 
such as shame and reputation.
Parastatal lending institutions are distinct from state-owned banks because they do not 
usually raise savings in the form of deposits. Instead the state uses its powers of taxation 
to raise funds that it can then intermediate through the lending institution. The 
management is appointed by the government and is accountable to government through the 
mechanism of its Act and whatever aspect of legislative rules that may also apply. The 
enforcement of repayment of loans depends on the legal framework as it does for banks.
NGO based microfinance offers financial intermediation on the basis of transfers9, which 
are on lent to their target populations. With the growth of ‘market driven’ thinking in the 
NGO microfinance sector there are moves underway in many countries for MFOs to shift 
from the NGO sector into either the Banking sector -  or in some cases to create a new 
regulatory category to cover MFOs. However it is most likely to be the case that these will 
be positioned within the banking sector operating as firms -  the difference with banks will 
be in the nature of their capitalisation and related regulatory requirements. Some 
institutions within this category can be seen as in the process of transition from this 
category into either banks or a new category still to be determined.
Analysing financial intermediation in this way highlights two important points. First, the 
ownership of the intermediary and what this means for rule setting. Thus, for banks those
9 It is the case that in some countries, Bangladesh being the prime example. NGOs have taken and on-lent 
savings. This is illegal with respect to constitutional rules o f NGOs and banks but is allowed to happen due to 
regulatory forbearance and aptly demonstrates how the way in which these institutions operate is a function o f  
the wider environment.
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who own the bank set the rules and enforce them are not necessarily those who save or 
borrow from it. In mutuals, by contrast, the members own the intermediary and have 
‘voice’ in setting and enforcing the rules (Hirschman, 1970). For parastatal lenders the 
rules are set and enforced by the state. For NGO originated MFOs, the rules are set by the 
owners of the NGO. In the case of direct lending the rules may be set by the lender in 
direct negotiation with the borrower.
Second, this analysis highlights the link between savers and borrowers in each type of 
intermediary. For banks, savers and borrowers may be entirely different people - in 
mutuals they are the same people. In MFOs saving is usually a requirement for borrowing 
but it is not these funds that are usually on lent. This is also the case for parastatals where 
the ‘depositors’ are usually taxpayers. In cases of direct lending it is the lender who on- 
lends his, or her, own funds.
These two factors together allow the origins of both price and ‘non-price’ features of the 
financial services that intermediaries offer to be recognised. Prices for bank products are 
set by managers, primarily in the interests of their owners; but in mutuals prices are set by 
members and this can be done in consideration of their own interests. Thus the way in 
which prices are set becomes a feature of the service. The requirements of banks for 
physical collateral usually arise because bankers may encounter moral hazard and they are 
lending their depositors funds so that they must be protected. In SACCOs or ASCAs, on 
the other hand, a member’s loan can be secured against her own savings (or shares) and the 
shares of between two and four other members who act as guarantors.
This section has analysed financial intermediaries into five categories dependent on the 
way in which they solve the collective action problem of bringing savers and borrowers 
together. Institutions have rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and this 
approach highlights the differences between them for different intermediaries. In doing so 
it highlights the relationships between owners and users and between savers and 
borrowers.
The next step of the analysis is to further explore the ways in which formal rules are 
supported by informal rules, norms and sanctions.
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3.2 The role of formal and informal rules, norms and sanctions
The previous section indicated that formal rules such as banking and company law play a 
role in the operation of banks and other ‘formal financial institutions’. Monitoring and 
enforcement of these rules usually involves organisations such as Central Banks, 
government agencies set up to regulate co-operatives and so on. These intermediaries are 
also dependent on a wider set of formal rules such as property rights, inheritance laws, and 
employment law, and the enforcement of these laws through the formal legal system.
But formal laws are also supported by informal norms in providing the basis of social order 
(DiMaggio, 1994; Platteau, 1994). Hodgson argues in his critique of transactions cost 
approaches, and following Durkheim that "whenever a contract exists there are factors not 
reducible to the intentions or agreements of individuals that have regulatory and binding 
functions for the contract itself... there exists a binding set of rules to which there is not 
explicit or detailed reference by the parties involved... [A] 11 market based and contractual 
systems thus rely on essentially non-contractual elements - such as trust and moral norms - 
to function" (Hodgson, 1999: 252).
For example, the ability of shareholders and government to effectively monitor the 
performance of banks and parastatals is underpinned by the honesty and probity with 
which lending and monitoring is carried out within the intermediary: managers are 
expected to act in accordance with the interests of shareholders rather than customers. 
Further, wider social views of debt and repayment obligations can affect the approach 
people take to repayment of loans and may differ between types of lender. Thus even 
though shame may not be a mechanism through which repayment of bank loans is formally 
enforced, it may be a contributory factor in ensuring payment from borrowers.
Informal financial intermediaries, are only informal in the sense that their form and
constitution is not laid down in legislated law but this does not mean that they don’t
necessarily use the formal legal system to support their operation. For example, written
agreements between moneylenders and their clients may be used which are enforceable in
courts of law and hence depend on a basic framework of formal property rights. Although
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informal systems may use the courts they also rely on a range of other norms which are 
enforced through sanctions such as guilt, shame and informational sanctions which may for 
example damage someone’s reputation (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). Such norms and 
sanctions are largely based in social and cultural meaning and practice, including for 
example moral and religious values.
The importance of such norms and sanctions based in social and cultural meaning and 
practice is that they have independent motivating power to cause action to take place and 
exist outside the domain of rationality (Elster, 1989). Hence such norms do not need 
external sanctions to be effective, as they can be internalised and followed even if 
violations are not observed or exposed. Shame, or the anticipation of it, can be a sufficient 
internal sanction. As a result, these play a key role in enforcing rules, but actors do not 
respond to them as part of an optimisation process, though they may use them to ex-post 
rationalise self-interest.
While the existence of such norms and sanctions has been recognised for the key role they 
play in enforcement, and enabling trust to be generated and malfeasance in economic 
relationships to be limited, one of the key questions has been how to theorise their origins 
with one view being that they arise from their embeddedness in social relations.
3.3 The role of social relations
As Granovetter says “[h]ow behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations is 
one of the classic questions of social theory” (Granovetter, 1992:53). This is the formalist 
-  substantivist debate of anthropology (Wilk, 1996) and the agency- structure debate in 
sociology. Rational choice sociologists assume that agents are motivated by individual 
self-interest and insignificantly affected by social relations. In contrast the structuralist 
position tends to emphasise the embeddedness of individual action in social relations so 
heavily limiting the scope for independent action.
The challenge for economists who assume rational self-interest has been the question as to
why agents are not more opportunistic in their interaction with others, and why trust exists.
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This debate has led some economists to suggest that the existence of trust and the 
limitation of malfeasance can be explained through the emergence of ‘generalized 
morality’ although how this happens is unclear (Granovetter, 1992; Platteau, 1994). The 
view of new institutional economics that institutions arise to solve economic problems *as 
i f  rational self-interest is the driving factor has been criticised above (p33) as functionalist 
and reductionist suggesting that institutions do not have meaning beyond what they do.
The embeddedness argument, on the other hand, is that social order arises from personal 
relations and social networks which enable information to be conveyed and social aspects 
of these relationships to be built (Granovetter, 1992). But Granovetter is concerned not to 
simply replace one functionalist argument for another, i.e. to reject the idea of generalised 
morality simply to replace it with the view that social relations provide the basis of order. 
He suggests this can be done by recognising that the embeddedness thesis is “less 
sweeping than either alternative argument, since networks of social relations penetrate 
irregularly and in differing degrees in different sectors of economic life, thus allowing for 
what we already know: distrust, opportunism, and disorder are by no means absent” 
(ibid:62). He argues that while social relations may be a necessary condition for trust, they 
are not a sufficient condition and can provide the basis for malfeasance on a larger scale.
As Scott demonstrates, the social relations of class produce differential effects on rich and 
poor of sanctions such as reputation (Scott, 1985). In investigating the ways in which the 
weak resist the power of the strong to impose a symbolic order that will "create and 
maintain a certain view of what decent acceptable human behaviour ought to be... The 
implicit purpose of these competing ideologies is not just to convince but to control... To 
the extent that they succeed in shaping behaviour they achieve a class purpose as well" 
(ibid:22). He goes on to discuss the point that tales that adjure people to protect their 
reputation and forego their immediate material interests are not neutral "what is the cost of 
a bad name? The answer unfortunately depends a great deal on who you are, for the cost 
of a bad name hinges directly on the social and economic sanctions that can be brought 
into play to punish the bearer...The politics of reputation is... something of a one sided 
affair" (ibid:24). Hence, the rich may be insulated from the effects of a bad name because 
they need nothing from the poor. However, he argues that while the rich may be relatively 
immune to the material sanctions that the poor can impose they cannot "escape symbolic 
sanctions e.g. slander, gossip, character assassination... [B]ut even on this small terrain the
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contest is unequal" (ibid:24) as a poor person is likely to be demeaned to his face where a 
rich one is only slandered behind his back.
Granovetter concludes that it is necessary to investigate the role of social relations in 
structuring economic action and that these are a necessary component in understanding the 
link between macro and micro level theories. Thus a number of studies have sought to 
examine the embeddedness of economic action in social relations: for example, Rogaly 
with respect to labour hiring arrangements in West Bengal; Harriss-White with respect to 
grain traders in Tamil Nadu; and Pujo with respect to the influence of gender on rice 
trading in Guinea (Harriss-White, 1996; Pujo, 1996; Rogaly, 1997).
Power derived from social relations such as class, gender and ethnicity, is not limited to the 
micro level but patterns entire sets of market operations and so influences the entire 
economy. The rules that are set and enforced in the financial sector as much as any other 
will be influenced: for example, regulatory forbearance by Central Bank regulators may be 
the product of these relations. In commencing an analysis of the performance of financial 
intermediaries in practice, it is therefore necessary to identify social relations that allow 
power to be exercised and examine their influence on the formation and implementation of 
rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
3.4 Financial intermediation and market fragmentation: revisiting NIE analysis
Before proceeding to use the conceptual framework of financial intermediation and its 
embeddedness in social relations in the investigation of financial markets, the imperfect 
information and transactions costs approach is reviewed in the light of this analysis.
This suggests that the costs of lending by a financial intermediary have four components: 
(i) the cost of funds; (ii) transactions costs incurred in making loans; (iii) the costs of 
default; (iv) profit. In the light of the above analysis of different forms of financial 
intermediary, we can consider how these costs differ according to the form of the 
intermediary involved -  see Table 3.3.
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First, the cost of funds raised by these financial intermediaries will differ depending on the 
form of the intermediary. In the direct lending case of moneylenders and reciprocal 
lending, there are no costs associated with raising funds for on-lending as these only 
intermediate their own funds, therefore the cost to the moneylender is the opportunity cost 
of those funds in alternative uses. NGO based MFOs and parastatal lenders operate by 
transferring resources raised through taxes domestically, or internationally through private 
donations or taxpayers in other countries. Both sources of funds are costless to the 
institution receiving them. At a minimum the parastatal has to meet its accountability 
requirements to government and NGOs have to meet accountability requirements to public 
and private donors (Copestake, 1996). The cost of raising this money is therefore borne by 
taxpayers domestically or internationally and by private donors.
In mutually based organisations it is the members who determine the costs of funds. Since 
members are both the savers and the borrowers, they can decide on the trade-off between 
the return on their savings and the cost of their loans. The cost of funds, if taken to be the 
dividend paid, is often a residual -  effectively similar to profits rather than a given cost of 
funds. This can change as SACCOs grow, since some offer a fixed rate of interest on 
deposits over and above a member’s share contribution.
By contrast, banks raise their funds from savers through offering interest on deposit 
accounts. The deposit rates they offer to attract savings depends on the savers assessment 
of the risk they are incurring in making deposits. As Ndii (1994) points out, the quality of 
a bank’s assets is private information. Although the legal regulatory framework has the 
responsibility to supervise and provide information, detailed and timely information may 
not be publicly available. To the depositor therefore, good banks are not necessarily very 
easy to distinguish from bad ones and the average deposit rate does not contain sufficient 
information about quality. In this context they therefore resort to other methods to signal 
the quality of their product through e.g. corporate image or investing in high visibility 
assets such as smart banking halls and large buildings. Thus overheads are integral to the 
cost of raising deposits alongside costs of complying with Central Bank regulations 
through reserve and related reporting requirements. Thus the cost of raising a unit of 
savings in each type of intermediary will differ depending on its form.
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Second, the form of the intermediary affects the transactions costs of lending. The way 
this has been operationalised (see, for example, Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998) has been to 
examine the percentage of loan amount invested in screening and monitoring of borrowers 
by lenders. But again the different forms of intermediation give rise to different cost 
profiles. The cost of screening a loan for a bank is likely to be higher than for example a 
moneylender. Staff are likely to be more highly paid than the moneylender and thus the 
cost of his time in carrying out an appraisal of the borrower is influenced by their different 
relationships to the employment market. Similarly, as argued above, the overhead costs 
that banks incur relate to the way they are accountable to shareholders through the internal 
monitoring mechanisms that the bank puts in place. The cost of appraising a loan is 
therefore a function of the need to comply with the policies and procedures of the bank. 
The moneylender on the other hand is accountable only to himself for his lending 
decisions. By contrast SACCOs are often run with volunteer labour in committees and if 
they do employ staff, the salaries they are likely to earn are probably closer to that to those 
of the public sector than the banking sector.
In the case of mutuals, the transactions costs of making a loan in terms of screening 
borrowers have usually been dealt with through the way in which the intermediary has 
actually been formed. Once someone is a member and they comply with the conditions, 
there is no reason to deny them a loan if funds are available. SACCOs are usually formed 
on the basis of common bonds (i.e. a common interest) and these are often based on 
income source, though can also be formed on the basis of neighbourhood. As a result the 
nature of the income stream is already known and for a specific borrower there is a past 
contribution record as well as an existing collateral in the institution based on savings (or 
shares).
Transaction costs also relate to collateral requirements. Thus banks and parastatals need 
physical collateral to secure the loan because of the moral hazard problem. They then 
incur costs related to the verification and charging of this collateral even if the lawyers fees 
and related costs are passed on to the customer. Mutual institutions by using savings and 
the guarantees of other members can avoid many of these costs.
Different types of intermediary deal also with the costs of default differently. In the case 
of SACCOs, the loan is usually entirely guaranteed by the shares of the borrower and her
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guarantors. Recovering the loan in the event of default therefore involves a series of book 
entries. By comparison a bank or parastatal trying to realise collateral will incur 
administration costs and legal fees in taking the process to the courts. Although many o f 
these may be passed on to the defaulter, the loan may not be fully realised. Parastatals and 
moneylenders may incur similar costs.
Different intermediaries also have different approaches to the profit component. Thus the 
expectations of a bank’s shareholders for returns to their equity are a part of their cost 
structure built into their pricing. On the other hand, parastatals and NGOs are often non­
profit making organisations. Mutually owned organisations are essentially not seeking 
profit. Dividends are returns to savings rather than returns to equity investment. For 
moneylender the cost of funds is an opportunity cost of his own funds rather than an actual 
cost and profits are therefore the entire return to his investment.
While the transactions costs approach is to compare costs across governance structures and 
deem that those with the lowest costs are the most efficient (Hodgson, 1999:258), this 
analysis suggests it must at least be done very carefully as the incidence of transactions 
costs differs between forms of financial intermediary. Comparing these costs across 
different types of institution at the point at which loans are taken (as in the analysis by 
Nissanke and Aryeetey (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998)) is too narrow because it ignores 
the fact that these costs depend on which type of intermediary is involved. It is not 
therefore surprising that this analysis finds financial markets to be fragmented because this 
fragmentation is due to the different ways in which intermediaries solve the collective 
action problem of turning savings into loans.
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Table 3.3: Components of transactions costs for different types of financial intermediary
Type of financial 
intermediary
Cost of funds: interest and transactions costs on 
raising funds
Screening: transactions costs of making loans Default costs Profits
Banks /  NBFIs Offers interest to attract deposits.
Transactions costs: expenditure to signal quality 
of institution; cost of complying with Central 
Bank regulations including reserve and liquidity 
requirements and reporting requirements.
Bank staff professionally trained, overhead 
costs of visits etc high (eg use of vehicles). 
Cost of screening and monitoring systems 
used to ensure accountability to shareholders. 
Admin costs of charging collateral.
Administration and legal costs of 
pursuing defaulters. Particularly high 
if legal system problematic.
Dividends expected by 
shareholders.
SACCOs Members decide dividend ie interest on savings 
usually ex post.
Transactions costs: usually start in low cost 
offices, deposits often deducted at source eg 
payroll, crop payments etc.
At outset usually no full-time staff, allowances 
paid to credit committee for meetings only.
As professionalise costs of staff, but usually 
cheaper than bank staff.
Screening and collateral based on shares and 
income alone, no need for visits etc. Charging 
not necessary.
Recovery of collateral essentially a 
paper transfer of shares of borrower 
and guarantors. No legal costs 
incurred.
“Profits” paid as 
dividends -  ie return to 
shares and hence cost of 
funds. No equity return.
ASCAs Members decide dividend.
All labour voluntary, overheads minimal.
Members decide at meetings. Input of time 
voluntary. Use own knowledge of borrower 
behaviour.
Recovery of assets for sale may incur 
costs, but admin etc low.
No equity return. 
Dividends on shares only 
ie cost of funds.
Parastatal lending 
institutions
Funds received from tax may be zero cost to the 
institution, if borrowed may be low cost as 
backed by government.
Staff and overhead costs usually lower than 
banks.
Costs of screening and monitoring systems to 
ensure accountability. Costs of charging 
similar to banks.
Administration and legal costs of 
pursuing defaulters. Particularly high 
if legal system problematic.
Para-statals not usually 
expected to make profits. 
Surplus may be re­




No cost to MFO of funds raised through 
charitable donation.
Staff and overhead costs usually lower than 
banks but outreach may raise costs. Screening 
and monitoring costs in part transferred to 
other clients through joint liability.
Costs of default transferred onto other 
borrowers and savings can be 
attached if necessary.
Non-profit making while 
NGOs. MFOs become 
profit makers when turn 
into banks.
Moneylenders No cost of raising deposits, opportunity cost of 
own funds only
Accountable only to self for lending decisions. 
Minimal overheads in terms of premises. 
Opportunity cost of time dependent on relation 
to labour market.
May incur legal costs, may sell 
collateral if taken eg household items 
etc.
Profits equivalent to cost 




No cost of raising deposits, opportunity cost of 
own funds only
No overheads. Decisions made on basis of 
existing knowledge.
None. None
Moreover, in Chapter Two it was noted that those who have applied the imperfect 
information and transactions costs approaches found that personal relations seemed to 
explain elements of fragmentation: the analysis developed here allows the reasons for this 
to be understood. It is perhaps surprising that this approach to information and 
transactions costs has been applied in such a narrow way to the study of financial markets 
when its origins in the work of Coase and Williamson focused precisely on the question of 
how organisations, such as firms, evolve to manage the transactions costs involved in 
formulating, monitoring and enforcing contracts. These alternative forms of collective 
action, or non-market organisation, of necessity manage transactions costs in different 
ways.
3.5 Conclusions
The view of financial intermediation proposed in this chapter starts by suggesting that the 
task of turning savings into loans is a collective action problem -  although one that does 
not involve public goods or free-rider problems. The types of intermediary that arise, in 
the form of banks, mutuals and parastatals, reflect the three main ways in which this 
collective action is generally solved: the firm, co-operatives, and the state. In order to 
encompass the recent arrival of MFOs and the existence of reciprocal lending and 
moneylenders, I have added two categories to this core framework.
These intermediaries can be analysed in terms of the rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms through which they operate. This approach highlights the relationships 
between owners and users in the setting and enforcement of rules. In doing so it takes us 
beyond a neo-classical analysis of savings and loans that sees them as independent of each 
other, to a better understanding of the relationships between savers and borrowers in an 
intermediary.
This approach therefore suggests that, in order to understand how these financial 
intermediaries operate in any particular context it is necessary to investigate how the rules, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are actually implemented. Moreover, it is clear
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that formal rules are only part of this analysis and informal norms and sanctions are critical 
to the creation of order and the enforcement of rules. But this in turn raises the question of 
how such order is created. One view is that this arises from the role of social relations in 
creating networks and trust. However by suggesting that social relations are important this 
does not necessarily require that structure is the sole determinant and that there is no scope 
for agency within social relations.
With this view of financial intermediation it can be proposed that social relations such as 
those of gender, age, ethnicity, caste, religion, and wealth can be expected to influence the 
ways in which economic agents relate to the rules and enforcement mechanisms of 
financial intermediaries. As a result we would expect to see that patterns of use are 
differentiated by these socio-economic characteristics. The next chapter discusses how this 
can be researched.
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology
This chapter reviews methodologies for the investigation of real markets and describes 
how these have been developed in this study to analyse a particular local financial market. 
The key feature of a methodology for this investigation that it seeks to identify the 
influence of social institutions on actual procceses of exchange.
First, two approaches to investigating markets ‘in practice’ are reviewed: the structure- 
conduct-performance approach drawn from industrial economics and the commodity chain 
or filtere approach. Recent studies of real markets have combined elements of the two 
approaches to investigate the structure of markets and the influence of social institutions. 
The chapter then considers the relevance of these methodologies to the study of real 
financial markets. Choices of data collection techniques are then discussed before 
describing how the data collection and analysis was carried out.
4.1 Research methodologies for investigating real markets
This section discusses two methods that have been used in empirical research on markets. 
First is the structure -  conduct -  performance analysis of industrial economics whose 
approach does not directly allow for the investigation of the role of social institutions but 
which has contributed to the development of elements within the jiliere or commodity 
chain analysis, which is then discussed. This approach has been used in the study of 
agricultural markets in developing countries and been adapted to allow the analysis of the 
embeddedness of exchange in social institutions.
Research in industrial economies has used a three-stage analysis of structure, conduct and 
performance (SCP). ‘Structure’ concerns a description of the agents and firms involved, 
their number, size and degree of integration, along with barriers to entry, product
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differentiation and the effect of policy on market structures. ‘Conduct’ describes how 
agents behave in the market, especially how they compete (on price, quality, brand and 
advertising for example) and is in particular concerned with the possibility of agents 
colluding to attain an advantage. ‘Performance’ examines profitability, efficiency growth 
and welfare (Hay and Morris, 1979). Efficiency in neo-classical economics concerns both 
productive and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency is concerned with the 
evaluation of the marketing chain by examining prices and margins to establish whether it 
is lowest cost, for a given technology. Allocative efficiency concerns the role of relative 
prices in resource allocation.
The categories of White’s four-fold political analysis of markets (see Chapter Two, p37) 
concerning state involvement; market organisation; market structure and social 
embeddedness offer some similarity with the ‘structure-conduct-performance’ (SCP) 
approach of industrial economics. Aspects of structure and conduct within SCP present 
clear similarities with White’s concern for the politics of market organisation or the 
behaviour of agents in the market. For White the aspect of state policy falls under a 
distinct category but is also clearly relevant to an analysis of market structure and conduct 
since public policy is often concerned with regulating entry and behaviour. However, SCP 
clearly does not recognise the potential role of social embeddedness in affecting structure, 
conduct or performance.
This therefore suggests that an essential element in market analysis is a description of those 
involved in the market and an analysis of their conduct. But the analysis of performance 
within the SCP is more problematic. Allocative efficiency in a market system can only be 
achieved under perfect competition. It is because competition is imperfect that the SCP 
analysis was conceived; yet in the absence of perfect competition second best conditions 
result and cause deviations from optimality in all markets. Hence it is not clear what can 
be concluded from an analysis of performance (Harriss-White, 1999). Furthermore, in 
empirical work, as Harriss-White points out, performance has usually been reduced to an 
analysis of price that encounters serious empirical problems in both definition and the 
techniques used in analysis.
Problems in the analysis of performance also become apparent as a result of the approach 
to financial intermediation proposed in Chapter Three (p63). If performance is to be
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examined through an analysis of prices, then Section 3.4 (p showed how the costs involved 
in different forms of financial intermediation were a result of the form of collective action 
that the intermediary represents and these also determine the products it is able to offer, the 
mechanisms of price formation and actual prices resulting would differ accordingly. It is 
not therefore clear what a comparison between them would indicate about performance. 
Moreover, since necessary information is also conveyed through social relationships 
involved in enabling the financial intermediaries to function and these costs are not open to 
measurement then comparative analysis of costs is also problematic. Even if these costs 
could be calculated it would also be necessary to take account of who gained access, since 
once social relations are involved their incidence cannot be equal.
The filiere method is a particularly useful empirical approach which examines the “path 
the good takes and the way those goods are transformed along that path both by 
qualitatively distinct forms of exchange and by intervening productive and spatial 
changes” (Crow, 1998:6). The approach has usefully been applied to the analysis of grain 
markets in South Africa, Guinea and India (Bernstein, 1996; Harriss-White, 1996; Pujo, 
1996) . Filiere analysis is helpful in its focus on exchange relationships along the supply 
chain but also needs to take adequate account of the context of exchange at any particular 
point, since exchange relationships at any stage can present a high degree of variety and 
complexity. Pujo’s analysis goes further to combine filiere and SCP approaches with an 
analysis of the implications of gender relations for the organisation and performance of the 
market, so exploring the embeddedness of rice production and processing in gendered 
household economic relations.
For the purposes of analysing financial markets, the filiere concept is useful but not 
directly applicable. Filiere analysis highlights the relationships between different agents 
along the supply chain as a commodity is transformed. The purpose of financial markets is 
to transform savings into loans and hence is concerned with exchange relationships 
involving time-based financial obligations rather than payments and receipts for goods and 
services. The analysis of financial intermediation in Chapter Three resonates strongly 
with the ftliere approach because it is concerned with the nature of exchange relationships 
in the process of this transformation. However by contrast to the supply side emphasis of 
the filiere, analysis of financial intermediation must take account of both the supply and 
demand for financial services at the same time, as it is their interdependence that is key.
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This suggests the need for an analysis of demand or use of financial services, alongside an 
analysis of the supply side.
Filiere analysis further suggests the need to be aware that particular sub-sectors of the 
economy are characterised by particular types of financial arrangements that underlie these 
trading relationships (Bouman and Hospes, 1994; Harriss-White, 1996). So, for example, 
financial relations within the grain trade, or even in different sub-categories of grain 
trading e.g. rice, maize etc, may take different forms. The demand for financial services 
results both from trade and production relationships. Hence the determinants of agent’s 
participation in financial markets are a result of their participation in various markets and 
sectors of the economy e.g. for labour, coffee, education and so on.
This review suggests that in approaching the analysis of financial markets ‘in practice’ it is 
necessary first to identify the structure of the market by looking at the agents and firms 
involved, their number, size and degree of integration, along with barriers to entry, product 
differentiation and the effect of policy on market structures. Moreover, the structure of the 
financial market will be influenced by production and trade relationships. Second, patterns 
of behaviour in the market must be examined and can be used to identify the role of 
underlying social relations. In the case of financial services it is necessary to analyse both 
the supply and demand for both deposits and loans because the process of transformation 
via financial intermediaries depends on this interaction. Finally, when examining 
performance through prices and profitability it is necessary to examine how prices are 
formed and what they represent.
4.2 Research design for the investigation of a real financial market
The previous section suggested the main analytical elements necessary to investigate a real 
financial market. This section goes further to develop a research design for this study 
drawing on the conceptual approach to analysing financial intermediation outlined in 
Chapter Three and the empirical work on real markets by Harriss-White, Crow and others 
(Raikes, 1993; Pujo, 1996; Crow, 1999; Harriss-White, 1999; Robson, 1999).
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First, the key methodological features of research into real markets in contrast to abstract 
markets is their substantive concern with the identification of social institutions and the 
analysis of their influence on actual processes of exchange. The methodology is therefore 
inductive in seeking to move from the specific to the general (Wilk, 1996) rather than 
deductive. Moreover, it is interpretive in that it is concerned with the meaning of action in 
relation to a given social and cultural context.
Before proceeding to a discussion of data collection techniques, it is necessary to establish 
some parameters for the study. First, studies of agricultural markets benefit from being 
able to physically identify a commodity and market places in which transactions take place 
and these are usually geographically defined. In the same way it is necessary to delineate 
a geographical area for this study to capture an array of formal and informal financial 
arrangements. In order to make this manageable, this suggested the need to focus on a 
small town and its economic hinterland where financial service providers in the town were 
likely to be the providers for the area around it. The need to be able to identify a local 
economy and the financial relationships related to it suggested that the choice of an urban 
environment in a large city would be problematic due to the complexity that it was likely to 
produce since agent’s financial transactions were much more likely to be spread across a 
range of financial intermediaries. The choice of location was therefore largely determined 
by the ability to identify a small town with an array of formal as well as informal financial 
service providers with an identifiable hinterland to which its services related.
Second, the above discussion has indicated that studies of markets ‘in practice’ must first 
consider their structure and may then advance to an analysis of market behaviour and 
performance by examining prices and returns. As an initial study of a financial market in 
this approach, this study will focus on market structure and behaviour and makes little 
attempt to analyse performance due to the inherent problems this involves, as discussed 
above.
Third, social relations that have been shown to be important in other market studies to date 
are class, caste, ethnicity, religion and gender. Studies of markets and agrarian change in 
South Asia have highlighted clearly the role of class - the relationship to the means of 
production in terms of land and labour - as an axis of social and economic differentiation 
and its critical role in relation to interlinked financial transactions (Bhaduri, 1977; Bhaduri,
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1981). The role of class and gender in the analysis of African agrarian change has been 
demonstrated by Sender (1990) and Mackintosh (1989). This study did not seek to make a 
priori assumptions about which social relations might be most important. It was therefore 
necessary to conduct research that would enable the importance of a range of social 
relations to emerge by investigating various socio-economic characteristics. Land and 
assets have been incorporated as key variables. The position of the household in terms o f 
labour has also been analysed using main income sources.
In addition, in an African context, social systems related to age are historically strong in 
their operation through age-sets, especially for men. The analysis was therefore aware that 
this might emerge as an important factor. It was however thought likely that age would 
operate as a reinforcing institution with class, wealth or other social structures. Ethnicity 
was unlikely to emerge as an axis of differentiation since the location of the study was 
geographically small and based in a relatively homogeneous ethnic context. Moreover, the 
area was also strongly Christian with other religious groups in a tiny minority.10 Finally, 
existing literature made clear that gender relations would be a major consideration, as 
discussed in the next section.
4.2.1 Investigating the role of gender
Studies of real markets have paid attention to the role of gender in structuring markets 
(Pujo, 1996; Crow, 1998; Harriss-White, 1998; Robson, 1999). Insights from gender 
analysis suggest the need to look inside the household and not to treat it as a ‘black box’ 
(Guyer and Peters, 1987). This research was also concerned to ensure that the role of 
gender was investigated in ways that would ensure that it could emerge as an important 
institution, while making no assumption that it would emerge as such. It was therefore 
necessary to undertake the data collection in ways that would allow this. In the case of 
finance and money management it was particularly important to adopt data collection 
techniques that would enable gender differentiation to emerge. As a result husbands and 
wives were interviewed separately as one part of the research and this is explained further
10 In the first round survey o f  150 households, there was one Kenyan-Asian household and one Moslem 
household. The first declined to be interviewed in the first round survey; the second — headed by a widow — 
refused to be interviewed in the second round survey.
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below. Since the empirical research did find that it was necessary to examine the role o f  
gender in depth, this section explains in more depth the analytical approach used in 
Chapter Ten.
In developing a methodology to investigate the influence of gender on the rice market in 
Eastern Guinea, Pujo (1996) detects three key aspects of household level economic 
relations as requiring a gendered analysis: the division of labour, control over productive 
resources and the intra-household distribution of income. She then considers the need to 
examine both what she calls the “stereotypes” about these gendered institutions and actual 
observable behaviour in relation to them. Here the term “stereotypes” is used to mean the 
social and cultural norms on which gender ideologies are constructed. The framework 
then directs attention to investigating the influence of gender relations in these three areas. 
First, the influence of these three aspects as a whole on market organisation - conditions of 
entry; concentration of economic actors; competition and cooperation; the diffusion of 
market information. Second on market performance: the influence of the gender division 
of labour on the gendered distribution of income within the market, level of employment; 
the influence of gendered control of productive resources on productive efficiency, 
aggregate levels of production, and the gendered intra-household distribution of income. 
Finally, the influence of the intra-household distribution of income on the gendered 
distribution of income from income generating activities. This is done through the 
description of the rice flliere - the numbers and types of traders involved at different 
stages; the collection of price data for all stages of the filiere and consequent estimates of 
rates of return to different activities in the filiere.
Of course these three aspects of gendered economic relations - the division of labour, 
control over productive resources and the intra-household distribution of income - are 
interdependent. The gender division of labour is central to the way that intra-household 
relations are structured and can be both a cause and consequence of gendered resource 
control and the distribution of income within the household. The gender division of labour 
is both a cause and consequence of the distribution of financial rewards in the household - 
as the literature on intra-household bargaining suggests (Jones, 1986; Sen, 1989). But the 
relationship between the two is complex, being determined by both implicit economic and 
cultural factors as well as the potential for explicit bargaining (Johnson, 1988).
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Despite these inter-linkages between analytical components of gendered economic 
relations, their separation is useful for examining their influence on financial transactions. 
The gendered control over resources, especially over productive assets and land has long 
been understood to be a constraint to women’s participation in formal sector borrowing 
which requires collateral and in this way clearly influences access to services. The intra­
household distribution of income and expenditure responsibilities is key as these will 
determine the savings that men and women have available for intermediation, their demand 
for loans, and the terms and conditions (in terms of price and term) on which these funds 
enter the market. The analysis in Chapter Ten therefore investigates the intra-household 
division of labour and financial responsibilities in order to determine the influence of 
gender.
Sender and Smith also indicate the importance of revealing the gender relations of female- 
only households in agricultural accumulation processes (Sender and Smith, 1990). It was 
an awareness of this need to capture different household structures that led to the 
purposeful sampling approach involving marital status that is described below. Moreover, 
insights from feminist research suggest that there can be important differences in 
relationships between and among women, and between and among men themselves 
resulting from age and status in the family and household (White, 1992; Robson, 1999). 
This will also be incorporated through analysis by age and marital status. Robson 
(1999:295) also suggests that gender aware research design should include the attitudes 
and interpretations of both male and female subjects, an aspect that was also included.
4.3 Data collection: choosing techniques
Crow concludes from his work on grain markets in Bangladesh this his findings justify an 
“open-ended method of investigating markets which seeks to study the whole chain of 
transactions between producer and consumer.. .the full range of forms of transactions 
... and the social conditions that regulate and sustain those transactions” (Crow, 1999:149). 
Such an “open-ended” approach is necessary for a study that is inductive, substantive and 
interpretive in its methodology, and clearly requires a wide range of data. It must therefore
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use a similarly open approach to both qualitative and quantitative data collection 
techniques.
Quantitative data is necessary to establish the value of transactions involved in the market 
and to give perspective on the relative use of different types of services and by whom they 
are used. This must be done on both the supply side when surveying providers and the 
demand side when surveying users of services.
Data on prices and quantities, transactions costs and risks must be interpreted in relation to 
the terms and conditions of the product or service. Hence data on loan term, repayment, 
guarantees and sanctions, tied transactions and implicit aspects of contracts must be sought 
out (Adams, 1994). As discussed in Chapter Three, the characteristics of financial services 
(especially non-price factors) differ due to the nature of the intermediary offering them.
At the outset then it is necessary to capture the terms and conditions of financial services.
However, it is clear that data collection techniques of a study such as this must also put 
qualitative data collection methods in a primary role if patterns emerging from more 
quantitative data are to be adequately understood. The objective is to explore the ways in 
which norms of behaviour based on social relations regulate the interaction of agents in the 
market. Chapter Three has emphasised the need to understand the role of rules, monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms involved in financial intermediation and how they operate in 
practice, and qualitative methods are essential for this. Studies elsewhere have also found 
qualitative methods appropriate to the study of the way financial relationships are 
structured. For example, Hospes notes that, having attempted to collect information on 
household income and expenditure patterns as a means towards the identification of 
households ‘credit needs’ in Indonesia, “potential borrowers seem to think in terms of 
credit relations and their past, present and/or future dimensions rather than instant credit 
needs” (Hospes, 1996:120).
Further, the methodology of (old) institutional economics allows for the extensive use of 
qualitative research methods as a legitimate mode of enquiry in uncovering people’s own 
explanations of their behaviour. Where the rational behaviour assumption concerns itself 
only with whether agents act “as if ’ they were behaving rationally, institutionalism allows 
people to explain the habits and rules that influence their behaviour (Zein-Elabdin, 1996).
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Therefore it is also necessary to seek agent’s explanations of their behaviour. Further, and 
as Harriss-White indicates, the study of power in markets is problematic as it “...cannot be 
measured in the way numbers and types of intermediaries, prices or quantities can.. .Power 
has to be observed mainly through the vicarious process of conversing about it” (1998: 
277). She observes that such approaches involve the agent and researcher in conversations 
in which the agent is involved in presenting images of themselves and their businesses. 
Therefore this approach also requires that the researcher be continually reflexive in 
interpreting the meaning of data drawn from such sources.
A range of criteria and characteristics have been suggested for checking the trustworthiness 
of data obtained through the use of qualitative research methods (Pretty, 1994):
•  prolonged engagement with users so that trust can build up over time;
• observation both of users’ behaviour in relation to the services and of the context in 
which this happens;
• cross-checking (triangulation) of information by using multiple sources of information, 
multiple ways of finding out that information, and a number of investigators;
• analysis of difference: allowing a wide range of perspectives to be brought into the 
analysis and not necessarily seeking consensus;
• making use of negative findings: allowing findings which do not meet with expectations 
to revise the results and reformulate the expectations, rather than dismissing such findings as 
exceptions;
•  peer checking: exposing analysis to colleagues not involved in the enquiry at an early 
stage and continuing to do so in order to expose biases or assumptions which might remain 
implicit;
•  checking the data with users: after collecting information using participatory techniques, 
checking the interpretation with those from whom the information was collected and so 
establishing its credibility as representing users’ actual views;
• giving reports explaining hypotheses about impact and the context in which they have 
been developed, and using direct quotations of people's personal experiences and detailed 
descriptions of context to substantiate these reports;
• keeping reflexive journals: recognising the central role of the investigators themselves, 
these journals are used by investigators to record information about themselves, their feelings,
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and decisions; they need not be shared with others but can be used at a later stage to 
remember the immediate reasons for methodological decisions and interpretation of data;
• conducting an inquiry audit: this should be carried out by someone unconnected to the 
inquiry who looks at the process followed and the results to confirm that the findings are 
supported by the data and are internally coherent.
Harriss-White (1998:281) also reflects on the way in which it is important to take 
opportunities of ‘disorder’ as a further means of gaining insights into the way power 
operates. She suggests such insights can arise out of contexts in which agents reveal 
resentments or jealousies; reveal privileged information or give unexpected answers; and 
that the researcher can take the opportunities which arise as a result of developing trust and 
understanding with those involved; challenge agents accounts with other accounts drawn 
from elsewhere and support their hypotheses through observation of behaviour revealed 
through participation in chance events.
Given the scale and nature of the study and the number of researchers involved, it was not 
possible to use all of these means of data verification. Prolonged engagement, cross­
checking (especially across transactions and between borrowers and lenders), observation, 
making use of negative findings and analysis of difference have been used. In addition, 
triangulation between different aspects and approaches to data collection is a strong 
feature.
This study has therefore sought to identify patterns of provision and use on both the supply 
and demand sides of the market using quantitative methods. Key patterns emerging from 
the analysis of the demand side data using variables such as gender, age, marital status and 
so on have then been investigated in greater depth using the qualitative data collected and 
supported by secondary anthropological material. By these means triangulation across a 
number of sources has been achieved.
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4.4 Data collection in practice
4.4.1 Research location
The research was undertaken in the Central Province of Kenya, based in a small market 
town called Karatina, the Divisional Headquarters of Mathira Division, and involving two 
rural sub-locations in Mathira. The reasons leading to this choice of this location were as 
follows.
First, the nature of this study to investigate real markets suggested that the researcher’s 
own familiarity with Kenya, where she lived and worked in the late 1980s, would be a 
particular asset as this meant that she already had a basic familiarity with political, 
economic and social structures. Second, since one of the interests of the researcher was to 
understand the dynamics of the involvement of microfinance organisations in the financial 
market, the fact that this sector was well established in Kenya was a further advantage.
The choice of location within Kenya was determined by a number of specific criteria: first, 
the need to bound the market geographically in a small town with an identifiable economic 
hinterland in order to bring a degree of consistency and convergence between supply and 
demand. Second, the town needed to have a number of formal financial service providers 
that could be studied. Many small towns may have only one bank branch, it was thought 
useful to choose a location with more than a single bank branch and a slightly more 
developed financial sector. Third, an interest in understanding the role of MFOs within the 
financial market suggested the need for such a town to have a number of MFOs that had 
been operating there for at least three years. The three-year cut off was thought useful 
since it invariably takes time for users to understand the nature of new types of financial 
service and much confusion can be caused in the early years of their presence in an area. 
Thus presenting the potential scenario where interviews would tend to present a lack of 
understanding of services available rather than an actual pattern of use.
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A number of options in Kenya were considered and Karatina appeared to best fit these 
criteria. Ultimately this was particularly appropriate since the researcher’s prior 
experience in Kenya had been of a very similar agro-ecological and socio-economic 
context - Embu on the other side of Mount Kenya. In retrospect, the choice of a research 
area where there was a detailed anthropological, sociological and political literature has 
also been important. The purpose of the study to capture an intermediate level of analysis 
that sought to explore the social embeddedness of market relations would not have been 
possible without this detailed background to draw from.
4.4.2 Fieldwork
The fieldwork was carried out during three visits to Kenya:
• September to December 1999: a 2-3 week rapid appraisal of production sectors and 
financial service providers followed by detailed investigation of the supply side of the 
market
• May to August 2000: investigation of demand side through a first round of household 
livelihood surveys, followed by individual interviews
• January to February 2001: follow up on aspects of the supply side and emerging 
issues, focus group discussions to establish broad understanding of gender division of 
labour and financial service use.
At the outset, two fieldwork visits had been planned. The rationale was to capture
differences caused by seasonal activity. In practice this only occurred on a broad level
since the first visit concentrated on the supply side survey and the second on the demand
side survey. However, the three visits over a period of 15 months, did serve an important
purpose in two ways. First, relationships with some of the respondents were developed
over the period, which allowed greater insight into financial market operations. Kikuyu
culture, as in many instances in Africa, is one that appreciates the development of
relationships and thus returning to see informants again invariably improves the quality of
data and the ability to interpret it. Second, the financial market in Karatina is very
dynamic and a number of changes occurred over the 18-month period that allowed deeper
insight into market dynamics. Third, the gaps between visits allowed time for analysis of
data collected and design of follow up work. Indeed, it was in the period between the first
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and second rounds of fieldwork that the approach to financial intermediation in Chapter 
Three was developed. The filiere approach led to the recognition that members of 
SACCOs and ASCAs were borrowing back their own savings and that the prices they set 
could not be explained using transactions costs analysis.
Subsequent visits were used to explore the applicability of the approach further, and 
patterns emerging from the data to be followed up in greater depth.
Research assistants were recruited to assist with all stages of the research. In the first 
three-month period of field research, my research assistant was a Kikuyu from Nyeri who 
had worked for a local MFO and recently finished his Masters degree in Development 
Studies at Bath University. His local contacts - both personal and professional - were 
very helpful in facilitating interviews. He also conducted most of the key informant 
interviews involving participants in group-based arrangements and moneylenders.
For the first round household survey, I recruited two assistants locally - one male and one 
female. Both had first degrees in social sciences, one had experience as an enumerator in 
the national population census of 1999, and the other had undertaken some local market 
research. In the second round survey, which involved detailed and semi-structured 
interviews, a further assistant was involved. He was in his late thirties, had a degree in 
economics and had worked for an MFO in Nyeri for a number of years. He was recruited 
specifically for this interviewing stage because of his greater knowledge of the issues 
involved, his age and social skills. These were factors I thought would be important in 
ensuring high quality information from men who might otherwise be uncomfortable 
discussing their financial situation with a young man.
Interviews were mostly carried out in Kikuyu, and where I was the interviewer a research 
assistant acted as interpreter. There are clearly limitations involved in carrying out 
interpretive research concerned with context and meaning, through an interpreter (whether 
professional or not). I considered taping and translating interviews to assist in overcoming 
some of these problems, but the resources required to do this were not available to the 
study. Where these issues arise in the analysis, triangulation between multiple 
interviewees and with secondary sources has been carried out. Interviews were carried out 
in English where it was clear that the respondent was entirely comfortable in the language.
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This was mainly the case with the formal financial service providers and key informants 
who were officials.
4.4.3 Data collection in practice: the supply side
The research started with a period of three weeks during which a rapid economic survey of 
the area was undertaken. During this period, as many of the formal and informal financial 
service providers as possible were identified. Interviews were carried out with traders in 
and around Karatina market, business people and other key informants such as officers in 
the local administration to broadly identify the core sectors of the economy and their 
underlying dynamics, and in particular to identify financial service provision for example 
in trade and business relationships. After this initial list of financial service providers had 
been established, a survey of the supply side of the market was undertaken.
Formal financial service providers
Formal financial service providers including microfinance organisations, parastatals, and 
local government were interviewed using a semi-structured survey instrument. This 
instrument contained two sections. A section covering general information asked 
questions about: organisational origins and legal structure; services available covering 
details of all accounts and services offered including terms and conditions; marketing 
strategies including information on the client base, lender preferences by sector; view of 
the local financial market and impact of liberalisation; nature of relationships with other 
financial institutions (i.e. to establish the extent to which there is layering in the market 
with financial institutions borrowing and lending to each other). A second part was treated 
as confidential information with questions about branch performance over the last 10 years 
in terms of the value of deposits and loans; numbers of savings and loan accounts; 
portfolio outstanding; performance data on the loan portfolio and costs and profitability at 
branch level.
Information was sought from 37 formal financial service providers through 71
interviewees, some of whom were interviewed more than once. Permission to interview
branch managers of formal providers usually had to be sought from their headquarters in
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Nairobi, often involving a number of visits to their offices. However this paid off because 
once this permission was obtained managers were extremely co-operative. Many local 
managers also appreciated the rare opportunity to talk about their business to an interested 
and informed outsider. Relationships during the research period were maintained and a 
number of the managers were re-interviewed about changes in the market during the final 
round of data collection. However, quantitative data - especially historical data -  was 
extremely hard to obtain. This was for at least two key reasons. First, in many cases 
organisations did not keep or have adequately accessible data that was more than three 
years old. Second, data on costs and profitability in particular were invariably calculated 
in different ways by different organisations for the branch level. Not only was this 
information highly sensitive and difficult to obtain, but meaningful comparison between 
branches of different organisations would have required detailed financial analysis beyond 
the scope of this study. As a result, discussion of these aspects with bank and other 
officials sought broad indications of trends in quantities of funds mobilised and on-lent and 
profitability, and some officials were candid in their evaluation of branch financial 
viability.
Informal financial service providers
Since informal financial arrangements are not immediately visible in the same way as 
banks for example, I used a snowballing approach to interviews seeking to reveal informal 
financial activity. We started with traders in the open-air vegetable market and business 
people in the town who were interviewed to find out about the financial services they used, 
to identify key actors in their provision and seek introductions to those actors. The first 
rounds of these interviews were highly open-ended seeking to develop relationships and 
identify different types of financial service. As key actors were then identified, semi­
structured interviews were used to collect information on the characteristics of these 
financial services and their use. By building open-ended relationships with informants we 
were able to continue conversations about financial services with them on a number of 
occasions over the period of the research. While some informants were not as co-operative 
as others, the degree of openness and co-operation of many was a surprise to the researcher 
who had anticipated the opposite.
85
The semi-structured interviews with members of groups made use of the field guide 
attached to Ardener’s 1964 article. This seeks to identify the membership, organization, 
contributions, management of the fund, order of rotation, interest, deductions, sanctions 
and origins of groups. Where individuals were interviewed about their own group 
involvement they were asked about the number of groups to which they belonged, the 
contributions and their frequency, the reasons they joined particular groups and the group’s 
origins.
Kev informants
Apart from the 71 interviewees involved in the formal sector, 162 people were 
interviewed, some more than once. These comprised a wide range of people who included 
the following:
• members of informal financial mechanisms such as ROSC As, ASCAs, moneylenders
• local business people both men and women
• local officials in the tea and coffee industries; lawyers and auctioneers; and officials in 
the administration of land boards
• senior bank officials in Nairobi
• officials in government and trade organisations such as the Ministry of Co-operative 
Development, Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya Bankers Association, World Council of 
Credit Unions, Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-operatives, Kenya Tea 
Development Association, Coffee Board of Kenya.
Some of these were interviewed using semi-structured survey questionnaires; other 
interviews were open-ended since they were motivated by the need to follow up specific 
issues such as how rules and enforcement mechanisms actually operate and what 
experience people had of them. All data was written up as narrative field notes even where 
semi-structured questionnaires had also been completed.
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4.4.4 Data collection in practice: the demand side
The demand side survey was undertaken in two stages. The first round of survey work 
sought to establish basic data on the livelihood systems in the area. The second round 
survey was carried out with a sub-sample of the first round households in which adults 
were interviewed about their own financial service use. The two-stage approach was for 
two reasons. First, to build up trust between the research team and the informants before 
potentially sensitive questions about financial service use were broached. Second, the 
respondents in the second round were sampled on the basis of particular socio-economic 
categories in order to ensure adequate representation of what might otherwise be under­
represented groups.
The first round survey involved a sample of 50 households in each of three areas giving a 
total of 150. These areas represent the key livelihood profiles in the locality with their 
selection also being guided by their degree of accessibility to Karatina town:
• Gatundu sub-location: a coffee growing area, close to the main Nairobi road some 3- 
5km from Karatina town. Transport to town costs KshslO though many people walk.
• Chehe sub-location: a tea growing area further up the slopes of Mt Kenya, some 13km 
from Karatina town with the bus fare to Karatina being Kshs35.
• Karatina Town: where the main livelihoods are wage employment both in local and 
national government offices as well as local businesses and services, and small scale 
business.
In these areas 50 households were randomly sampled as was pragmatic and feasible and 
the sampling approach therefore differed for each area. In Gatundu sub-location the Sub- 
Chief11 had a household list for the whole sub-location, which he updated for this research. 
Some problems arose in that the household list, even when updated, had some 100 
households less than the 1999 Census indicated. He revised the list again but it remained 
about 60 short of the census number.
Chehe in the tea zone was a large sub-location with some 1500 households according to 
the Census. Six of the 13 sub-areas were randomly selected although this was not on the
11 Sub-chiefs are local administration officials under the Office o f the President responsible for a sub-location, a 
Chief is responsible for a Location.
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basis of probability proportional to size as the household numbers in each of the sub-areas 
were not available. Then household lists were drawn up with the help of the Sub-Chief by 
walking through the sub-areas.
In Karatina Town household lists were not available, so three sub-areas out of seven in the 
town were sampled using probability proportional to size based on approximations of 
household numbers given by the Chief. Then I started with the intention of using a 
random walk approach in each of these areas. However, in practice such an approach was 
hard to implement due to the way housing estates are constructed with blocks of houses 
making it hard to follow a route in a particular direction. Of the three areas in the town -  
one estate called Muthua had approximately 600 houses; another in Blue Valley 
approximately 200 houses; and the market centre district approximately 140 houses. In 
Muthua I therefore divided the estate into blocks, estimated the number of houses in each 
block and selected one of four blocks again on the basis of probability proportional to size. 
I then counted all the houses in this block, and took every nth house. In the other two areas,
t hBlue Valley and the Market Centre, we simply counted all the houses and took every n 
one -  simply using the next house as a replacement if contact could not be made or the 
householder was not willing to be interviewed. The main concern about the town sample 
is that it did not deliver a very diverse sample as the areas sampled tended to house neither 
the poorest or wealthiest households.
Data collected in this first round comprised information on household composition, age, 
education, farming activities and land holdings, business and employment, housing and 
asset holdings, and gave initial indications of financial service use. This enabled a 
livelihood profile for each sub-location to be established and confirmed the limitations of 
asking one person in the household about the financial service use of others.
The second round survey comprised detailed interviews with individuals about their own 
financial service use. This was done with a sub-sample of individuals in first round 
households. The rationale here was two-fold. First, splitting the interviews in this way 
would make the interviews more manageable at perhaps an hour each rather than one long 
interview. Second, I wished to interview all adults in the household identified in the first 
round and not make assumptions about financial service use at the household level. This 
meant that husbands and wives were not expected to be mutually informed about each
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other’s finances, and also allowed the potential for gendered differences to emerge. I 
started with the idea of interviewing all adults in the household including young men and 
women who had not yet left home. This proved difficult since young women often proved 
very reluctant, and young men were often not available. These interviews were therefore 
not continued, however the analysis does suggest the position of young men in financial 
markets is worthy of further exploration.
In sampling households to follow up in the second round, the concern was to ensure that a 
range of financial service users was represented and hence sampling was undertaken within 
purposefully defined categories. The initial plan was that the household profile would 
determine the categories, but these did not emerge clearly from the initial analysis. The 
approach adopted was therefore to use the research hypotheses to generate the categories 
for selection. The hypothesis of social embeddedness suggested that gender and age would 
be important parameters and the initial round also suggested that it was important to 
capture households of varied marital status, especially female-headed households. Table
4.1 guided the selection of households.




















Man/Wo man -  Old 




4 4 4 12 24
Male Only HHH 4 4 4 12 12
Female Only HHH 4 4 4 12 12
Total 16 16 16 48 72
It is important to explain this decision. Had I taken a random sub-sample of households 
from the first round for more detailed interview some types of households would have been 
in very small numbers, if represented at all. Table 4.2 gives the numbers of households by 
category in the first round. This would have made it hard to gain sufficient data about the 
ways in which the financial service use of individuals in these types of household differed. 
While cell numbers of four are small, this gives representation of twelve households across 
the three areas. The research therefore faced the trade-off between breadth and depth in
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the face of limited research resources. Since the overall objective was a detailed 
qualitative understanding of financial service use decisions, the objective of depth of 
explanation was prioritised. Since data is not available to weight these categories for the 
whole sample the data collected from this sub-sample is not randomly representative o f the 
whole population.
Marital status of households was the first parameter of categorisation. Since married 
households are a much higher proportion of the overall sample, this category was 
subdivided by age. The hypothesised influence of age is particularly through attitudes to 
land sub-division. The sample was divided on the basis of the median age (39) of male 
household heads in married households across the whole sample. Interviewing both 
women and men in married households and ensuring both male and female only 
households were represented, would then capture gender dimensions.












Man/Woman -  Old 
(Old = >39) 14 25 10




Male Only HHH 3 3 4
Female Only HHH 12 11 18
Total 50 50 50
Interviewing female-headed households in Gatundu met with dismal success due to two 
factors. First, four were old women who were not able to answer the questions. Second, 
five women refused. Refusals were partly related to concerns that the research team were 
somehow linked to devil worshippers, about whom there has been controversy in Kenya in 
recent years, and with whom Europeans are often linked.12 This problem also converged 
with some local political issues that affected the research. I had unknowingly selected two 
research assistants whose families were from one end of the same sub-location and it
12 Devil worshippers are rumoured to leave money for people to pick up and then follow those who have picked 
it up and take their children for human sacrifices. Europeans who are generally perceived to have money may 
therefore be linked to devil worship.
90
emerged that there were political differences between this area and other parts of the sub­
location. 13
In-depth interviews on financial service use followed a questionnaire which explored: 
recent changes in livelihood circumstances; details of the individuals income; household 
financial decision making; household expenditure; individual asset holding and decision 
making; savings services used in the last two years with detailed information on each 
account used; loans taken in the past five years with detailed information on each loan 
taken. For each of these interviews narrative field notes were also written up after the 
interview to give a fuller version of information and link together different aspects of the 
interview.




















Man/Woman -  
Old
(Old = >39)
4 4 4 12 24
Man/Woman -  
Young
(Young = <39)
4 4 4 12 24
Male Only HHH
31 22 4 9 9
Female Only 
HHH 33 4 4 11 11
Total
Households 14 14 16 44 68
Notes:
1 -  there were only three households in this sub-category in the first round sample
2 -  four in original sample but one got married and wife of another returned between first and second round 
interviews
3 - 1 2  households in original sample but many old women refused to be interviewed and others were 
inappropriate interviewees (see text)
In this round of interviews the older male research assistant interviewed men and I 
interviewed women with the assistance of a female interpreter. It became clear that this
13 One clear political issue was concerned with the local coffee co-operative. The Co-operative consists o f three 
factories. There was an ongoing dispute about the Chairman - who was from the factory at the end o f the sub­
location that refused to participate — with the challenge coming from the two other factories. This appeared to 
be symptomatic o f deeper social divisions.
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did produce good results, as women were often very forthcoming about issues in household 
financial management and the knowledge their husbands had of their financial transactions 
and vice versa. Male interviewees were, for example, forthcoming early on in interviews 
about the existence of second wives.
Interviews were carried out in private and respondents were assured of the confidentiality 
of their responses. It was particularly important to assure married women respondents that 
their responses would not be discussed with their husbands. Explanations to men for 
needing to interview their wives included the fact that women were involved in groups and 
hence had a legitimate domain to discuss about which they knew little. A point learnt 
during this work was that it was important to first gain the approval of the male household 
head in married households before the woman was interviewed. In a couple of cases in 
households where the man was rarely available - usually because he worked out of town - 
the woman had been interviewed in the first round survey and willingly participated in the 
second round. However when her husband was approached it was found that he knew 
nothing of the first round survey refused the interview and was annoyed that she had 
participated in the research.
The final component of data collection involved focus group discussions to explore the 
gendered division of labour, control of income and assets and expenditure responsibilities. 
These focus groups also involved discussions about gendered financial service use that 
were emerging from earlier stages of data collection and analysis. It was planned to hold 
twelve focus group discussions with men and women, ‘better-off and ‘less well-off in 
each of the three locations. Twelve focus groups were conducted but we were unable to 
carry out such a discussion with ‘better-off men in town simply because of the difficulty 
of getting men in town together. Groups contained a minimum of three and a maximum of 
eight participants. We also found it useful to sub-divide the ‘less well off men in town 
into a group of married men and unmarried men. The ‘better-off and ‘less well-off 
categories were loosely constructed with the broad distinction being that the ‘better-off 
had more than 200 coffee trees or more than an acre of land, while the less well-off had 
less than 200 coffee trees or less than an acre of land.
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4.4.5 Data analysis
Quantitative data from the supply side analysis has been aggregated to give perspective on 
the value of funds managed by different forms of intermediary. The difficulties of 
collecting historical data have made it difficult to analyse trends. However, it has been 
possible to compare and contrast these patterns on the supply side with the reports of users 
from the demand side. Demand side data on frequency of access and the value of loans 
and deposits has been analysed using cross-tabulations and significance testing.
Given the approach to the demand side survey described above, it is important to discuss 
the limitations this imposes on the analysis of the data. Given that the underlying data 
cannot be weighted in relation to the overall population, it has been necessary to analyse it 
un-weighted, using cross-tabulations and logistic regressions. The approach taken has 
therefore been to seek out patterns in the data that appear strong enough to require further 
analysis. Logistic regressions have been used to further confirm these patterns. Logistic 
regressions cannot compensate for the purposeful nature of the selection criteria, but the 
model is able to examine the relative importance of different socio-economic factors in 
affecting the likelihood that a service is used. However, the small numbers of observations 
in some categories of financial service has also limited the use of this approach.
In Chapters Six and Seven patterns drawn from the broad based analysis on the supply and 
demand sides of the market are described. These patterns are then explored in more depth 
in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. These Chapters use the wide range of qualitative data14 
collected to explore the reasons for the patterns identified. It is therefore this combination 
of statistical and qualitative approaches supported by secondary sources that seeks to make 
the analysis robust.
Some further aspects of the data collection and its analysis should be mentioned. First, 
respondents were asked to enumerate the savings services that they had used in the last two 
years and the loans that they had taken in the last five years. Since the research was 
seeking to examine and understand patterns of use rather than simply the static situation at
14 Qualitative interviews are referenced differently in the text depending on their origin. Second-round survey 
respondents are referred to by their household number and whether the respondent was the husband(H), wife 
(W), female headed (FHHH) or male only (MO), and references therefore for example take the form HH 90W. 
Other qualitative interviews use a code for the respondent and the interview number eg. EJN,142.
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the time of the research use over a period was more likely to offer greater insight. The 
difference in time periods was arbitrary but bom of the view that loans were likely to be 
less frequent events than saving which was more likely to be ongoing.
Second, in interviewing both men and women in the same households the analysis faced 
dilemmas about how to analyse the data in relation to indicators of expenditure and assets. 
Both men and women were asked to estimate household expenditure but these estimates 
diverged, in some cases quite significantly. Individual’s estimates of household 
expenditure have therefore been used as a poverty indicator for the individual concerned. 
Since gender aware research is concerned about differentiation within the household it 
would be contradictory to then attempt some means of establishing a household based 
indicator that would be entirely arbitrary -  for example, averaging household expenditure 
as reported by husband and wife. These differences and the reasons for them are discussed 
in Chapter Ten.
Similarly in the case of household asset data and land holdings, this data has been taken 
from the first round survey and gender distinctions about the nature of access and control 
have not been made in the analysis in Chapter Seven. However, the gender issues in 
relation to land are discussed in Chapter Eight.
A limitation of the study is that it does not adequately capture financial transactions of 
small and medium scale businesses in Karatina. While at the outset it was planned to 
include the business sector, the resources of the research ultimately could not 
accommodate this. It is likely that it is this sector that in the main has been borrowing 
from the banks in Karatina and would help explain the disjuncture between the supply and 
demand side data relating to bank borrowing.
4.5 Conclusions
The research methodology for this investigation into the embeddedness of a real financial
market has drawn from SCP analysis and the growing literature on commodity chain
analysis for agricultural markets and sought to develop its methods for use in the context of
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financial intermediation. This requires a substantivist, interpretive and inductive 
methodology that seeks to identify the influence of social relations, is concerned with their 
context and meaning, and seeks to establish detailed anlaysis from which higher order 
generalisations may subsequently be drawn.
While a range of detailed studies of financial mechanisms have been carried out, the 
challenge for this study is to develop an holistic understanding of their role and interaction 
at the level of the market. In order to analyse the social embeddedness of this market in a 
systematically, it is necessary to describe and analyse the differential use of financial 
services by different socio-economic groups. In seeking to take this more holistic 
approach to a financial market, the data collection methods developed have also been 
innovative since other studies of this nature have not been identified. The study has 
combined quantitative and qualitative methods and seeks to achieve rigour through their 
analytical interaction.
Data collection methods focused on the supply and demand sides of the market. 
Geographical focus allowed formal financial providers to be identified and interviewed.
On the demand side, the approach has been to survey users through a combination of 
random and purposeful sampling. This combination was arrived at through the need to 
obtain depth within the limits of the resources available, while obtaining coverage of key 
variables hypothesised by the research to be important.
Interviews of key informants were qualitative, and second-round interviews on the demand 
side were also recorded in narrative form allowing them to be analysed qualitatively also. 
This allowed informants to explain their choices and detailed descriptions of behaviour to 
be compiled. Analysis of this data has been used to understand the detailed ways in which 
users interact with the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of intermediaries.
This study has sought to balance the combined need for quantitative evidence that would 
reveal patterns of use and provision, and give explanation of these patterns, within the 
limits of available resources. Inevitably more data could have been collected but the 
challenge for any researcher is the careful use of the data with a keen awareness of the 
limitations of the process of its collection.
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Chapter 5 Mathira in Context
While much has been written on both the Kenyan economy and politics, and on Kikuyu 
history and anthropology, the purpose here is to provide this context in a way that is most 
appropriate to the exploration of real financial markets in Mathira. Chapter Four indicated 
that research into real markets was concerned with the identification of the influence of 
social relations such as gender, age, ethnicity and class on exchange processes. This 
chapter therefore seeks to identify patterns of power and social relations that have been 
pervasive and persistent in influencing resource allocation and which can therefore be 
expected to structure current patterns of access and use.
The chapter starts by locating Mathira and its people in the historical and anthropological 
context of the Kikuyu. This identifies two specific features of Kikuyu social relations - 
lineage and age -  which are particularly important to structuring access to land and hence 
engagement in financial markets through its use as collateral. Intra-household gender 
relations surrounding the division of labour and control over income are also briefly 
reviewed as background to a detailed discussion in Chapter Ten. The importance of the 
relationship between lineage and land is underlined by the role of Mau Mau in the 
achievement of independence. However, an account of the underlying dynamics of Mau 
Mau exposes its moral economy. This leads to a broader discussion of the way in which 
social relations influence access to resources, and political power is legitimised through 
self-help activities at the local level -  a feature that is also reflected in national political 
processes. This provides the context for the discussion of mutuals as a form of self-help 
activity in subsequent chapters.
The chapter then presents a profile of households and livelihoods in Mathira based on data 
collected during the first round survey. This examines household composition, land 
holdings, main income sources, consumption poverty and household assets. It 
demonstrates the prevalence of land access via lineage relationships and dependence on tea
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and coffee as cash crops in rural area. Incomes from enterprise and employment dominate 
for those who live in Karatina Town.
The third section then moves on to place Mathira, and the Kikuyu people, in the broader 
context of Kenya’s economy and politics in the 1990s. The relationship between politics, 
ethnicity and class in Kenya has been debated at length in the literature but the persistence 
of forms of patron-client relations has become even more apparent with the shift to multi­
party politics in the 1990s. An investigation of real financial markets in Mathira would be 
incomplete without a discussion of this political economy. The Kikuyu were central to the 
achievement of independence. The political settlement that this produced under the 
presidency of Kenyatta was favourable to Kikuyu access to markets and resources. The 
Moi era has been characterised by attempts to restructure the basis of political and 
economic power away from the Kikuyu.
This discussion of the dynamics of the wider political economy is essential to an 
understanding of the current patterns of market access both for the Kikuyu in relation to 
the economy as a whole, and in particular in the financial sector. The chapter therefore 
reviews the performance of the banking sector and the AFC in this light. Finally, given the 
importance of tea and coffee to livelihoods in Mathira, the structure of these industries and 
recent changes are examined.
5.1 Mathira: local economy and society in historical perspective
5.1.1 Land and people
The Kikuyu have historically inhabited the area between the Mt Kenya and the Nyandarua 
Range (Aberdares), extending southward towards the Ngong Hills just south of Nairobi. 
Karatina town and Mathira Division are in the northern part of Kikuyuland at an altitude of 
between 1200 and 2000m on the south-western slopes of Mt Kenya. The agro-ecology of 
this area with its deep red volcanic soils and plentiful rainfall means that agricultural 
production potential is strong. However the terrain is characterised by ridges and valleys,
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which has meant that the potential for large-scale mechanised agriculture is limited and 
hoe cultivation on smallholdings has remained dominant.
Muriuki describes the migration and settlement of groups that became the Kikuyu as a 
process of absorption of groups such as the Maasai (largely through intermarriage) and 
Athi, which were only stopped by the arrival of the British (Muriuki, 1974). He suggests 
that by the end of the nineteenth century the people in Mathira had almost become a sub­
tribe with a particularly distinctive dialect that set them apart.
The Kikuyu gained land from the Athi through land transactions. These required a process 
of mutual adoption into their kin groups and made the transaction part of ongoing 
relationships, likened by Muriuki to those of marriage. An individual could also acquire 
land through clearing forest and establishing it as belonging to a small group of closely 
related people. Their descendents came to see this as ancestral land to which they were 
both economically and religiously attached through the pouring of libations and offerings 
to the ancestors (Muriuki, 1974). This pattern led to the basic mbari or sub-clan system of 
land holding and its importance as a social institution. Principles of access in this system 
were that mbari members had rights to use the land as long as no one else had claimed it 
and the mbari head was informed. When land was purchased by an individual from 
another mbari, it could not be sold on to another buyer without first referring back to the 
original mbari who would first make efforts to redeem it.
Individuals would encourage warriors and young men who were landless to settle on their 
land as ahoi (tenants) in order to gain both physical protection for the mbari and its 
members since it could be located at a distance from other mbari and/or be at the frontier 
of the settled area, in both cases being potentially vulnerable to raiding by neighbouring 
tribes. At the same time the mbari would gain labour to assist in the arduous work of tree 
clearing to extend the cultivated area. Lonsdale argues that the collective effort of forest 
clearing was central to the debate about the relationship between individual and 
community (Lonsdale, 1992) and that through these means there was complementarity 
between rich and poor, as the rich prospered further by giving opportunity to the poor. 
Tenancy was a route for many men to buy land eventually through hard work, and all 
sought to achieve this (Leakey, 1956). But this process of expansion was stopped by the 
arrival of the British and the ahoi suffered most through the land shortage that resulted.
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Muriuki describes the social and political structure of the Kikuyu at the end of the 
nineteenth century as being “patriarchal, uncentralised and highly egalitarian” (Muriuki, 
1974:110). This was a function of two key social institutions. First the mbari (sub-clan) as 
the basic family structure under the headship of a father. All mbari traced their ancestors 
to one of the ten Kikuyu clans mythically founded by the daughters of Gikuyu and his wife 
Mumbi, giving the Kikuyu a segmentary lineage structure with no centralized authority. 
However, clans were a more or less effective means of organising depending in part on 
their size and hence alliances within and between them were mutable and manipulable. As 
a result, according to Lonsdale “big men controlled the politics of kinship by keeping 
decisions at the lowest level of alliance that could guarantee effective action.. .Kikuyu 
politics was much smaller than ethnicity” (Lonsdale, 1992:341).
The second social institution of importance is riika or age-sets, which were the basis of 
recruiting and initiating men into groups that cut across lineage or territorial groupings for 
political purposes. Muriuki suggests it was this system that bound the Kikuyu together as a 
single people although it no longer operates (Muriuki, 1974). Riika refers to four groups 
according to age and status: children; young initiates; warriors and elders. Initiation 
through circumcision led to membership of age-sets given specific names, of which a man 
remained a member throughout his life. Seniority was a result of the promotion of the 
group, though appointment as elders also depended on personal character. Riika involved 
women as well as men though the initiation of women was more regular than that of men. 
The initiation process had a key role in educating children regarding traditions, folklore, 
adult behaviour, taboos and sex. Members of an age-set demanded co-operation, mutual 
help and solidarity. The immediate purpose of initiating young men was to create warriors 
but they also had responsibilities for carrying out community wide public functions such as 
policing markets and arresting criminals. However, according to Lonsdale, these did not 
provide a basis for strong solidarity once men got married (Lonsdale, 1992). For women 
initiates the purpose was to learn proper behaviour with the senior women instructing the 
junior women. Behaviour codes were strict and fines could be imposed resulting in 
ostracism in extreme cases.
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5.1.2 Gender and intra-household economic relations
Anthropological sources suggest that in Kikuyu agrarian society it was the responsibility of 
men to allocate land to their wives but men and women exercised full control in terms o f 
managing their plots and control over the product that resulted. The grain would also be 
stored in separate granaries over which they each had complete control (Fisher, 1954). For 
a woman, Fisher reports that this granary was an extremely private domain and no-one was 
allowed to take food without their permission. It was also a place in which a woman could 
“.. .“hide” treasured possessions which she wishes to conceal from her husband or other 
members of the family ... it is not the custom for a man to know about his wife’s food 
stores” (paragraph 875). The woman’s grain was used for food, while the man’s produce 
was used to provide for visitors and the family when the wife’s granary ran low.
Moreover, provided the wife had sufficient food to provide for her family she could sell the 
surplus although she had no right to sell the whole crop. The proceeds from such sales 
were under her own control also and would usually be spent on, for example, household 
utensils, implements and seed, clothes, and gifts. The proceeds from the sale of the 
husband’s food crops were generally used for the running expenses of the household.
Kershaw suggests from her research in the 1950s and 1960s that men and women’s 
decision-making roles had changed since the “traditional” period and notes differences 
depending on the household’s position in a land-based stratification. Women in 
households with the smallest plots, or with no land, she saw as having gained decision­
making power. This was because both husband and wife had the responsibility of 
providing food for the family in a situation of land scarcity and where the woman’s labour 
therefore made a significant difference to the household’s survival. In instances where the 
husband migrated for work, Kershaw argues that the wife would have even greater 
influence, but notes that this power may not necessarily have been seen as legitimate and 
may have created problems as a result. She describes a middle land stratum as those who 
had adequate land to grow basic food, and suggests that in this stratum the traditional 
decision making roles remained more intact. If the woman went to earn money then this 
was seen as “her crop” and the earnings were fully under her control. This in turn gave her 
a degree of independence. Husbands in this group were more likely to have retained 
greater traditional social and ritual roles in the mbari (sub-clan). In the case of households 
which had more than seven acres of land, Kershaw suggests that women lost some of their
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direct independence to men, but gained in indirect influence and control through their 
involvement in other affairs of the community, while her husband was likely to have 
gained in influence in newly emerging social, ritual and political institutions. (Kershaw, 
1975:190-1).
Stamp argues that the changes underway in the 1950s and 1960s, while they may have 
reduced the responsibility of husbands to wives, also led to greater independence for 
women from their husband’s control (Stamp, 1986). The absenteeism of men who were 
away working led to greater responsibility for women to provide for their families. As one 
of her informants commented of her husband who was away working: “He helps us by 
paying school fees for the children and buying clothes for us and pocket money for what 
we need in the house. [But] he keeps the money... and I never know what he earns, and I 
dare not ask if he provides us with enough” (ibid:27). However this also meant that 
women had greater control over their own income and affairs, and men would not ask 
about their wives earnings either. Clark reports an instance where she heard a woman who 
had refused to obey her husband say: ““Who are you to tell me what to do? I have 
money”” (Clark, 1980:358).
In summary, while men controlled the allocation of land to women, their role in food 
provision has historically given them a domain in which they control some subsistence 
resources. With the increased absence of men due to land pressure and migration, women 
have assumed increasing responsibility for household provision and at the same time 
extended this control to sources of cash income. These themes are explored further in 
Chapter Ten.
5.1.3 The origins and significance of Mau Mau
The arrival of the British in the late 19th century and the appropriation by them of land for
settlement, ultimately led to the Kikuyu-led Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s that
contributed to the achievement of independence. Land was central to the course of events
but was not the sole factor. Kanogo identifies two periods of white settlement (Kanogo,
1987). In the first of these leading up to the First World War land was plentiful and
squatters who worked on settler farms - many but not all of whom were Kikuyu -were able
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to cultivate land and keep livestock themselves. Indeed, many Kikuyu understood this as a 
process of tenancy similar to being ahoi that would eventually result in them establishing 
their own rights to this land. However, during the second phase - in the inter-war period - 
not only did settler numbers expand but the pressure was on them to become more 
productive and reduce the cost of the colony to the British government. Conditions for 
squatters became much harsher with the introduction of labour controls and the banning of 
livestock for squatters at the end of the Second World War. This led to many squatters 
attempting to return to the Reserves. But land pressure in the Reserves had also risen with 
population growth and the alienation of land by the British. After years of absence, the 
squatters had difficulty in gaining access to land, in part because subsidiary categories o f 
land claims such as ahoi became devalued and mbari claims dominated (Throup, 1988). 
This process led to resentment of the chiefs and headmen who were loyal to the British. 
Moreover, many of those who lost out in the process migrated towards Nairobi and as 
destitute vagrants were mobilised by Union activists in militant opposition to the 
government, later becoming part of the nationalist campaign (Throup, 1988).
Farmers in the reserves were also part of the picture. During the depression and war years, 
when the colonial government put pressure for Kenya colony to be self financing, 
production by African producers was encouraged and unleashed what Throup calls African 
“proto-capitalists” (Throup, 1988: 239). But after the war, the government saw these as a 
threat to colonial rule, and the settlers saw them as a threat to their own positions since 
they could produce cash crops (such as wattle and coffee) with less state support than 
many settlers. Loyalist chiefs also saw this as a threat since their economic superiority 
depended on their continued domination of Local Native Councils with the opportunities 
for clientelism that this offered, and these economic advances among African farmers 
therefore presented the potential for the development of alternative economic elites. One 
of the responses of the colonial government concerned about the ecological consequences 
of rising land pressure was to introduce terracing campaigns involving compulsory labour. 
This was one factor that led to the Peasant’s Revolt in Murang’a in 1947 and another 
contributory factor to Mau Mau.
While there is much debate about the precise origins of Mau Mau, it is important to 
recognise that it can be interpreted as an intra-Kikuyu conflict as much as having elements 
of an anti-colonial one (Sorrenson, 1967; Muriuki, 1974). The main division was between
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those loyal to the British, whose interests were to protect the power base that this patronage 
allowed them, and those who felt excluded from land and resources. Throup’s analysis 
suggests that there were two distinct groups here also. First an alternative African elite that 
wanted to displace the loyalists and gain access to state resources, and second the bulk o f 
the peasants, in whose interests the alternative elite did not operate (Throup, 1988).
Lonsdale argues that these dominant materialist accounts of Mau Mau have been externally 
constructed views and take insufficient account of Mau Mau’s internal dynamics 
(Lonsdale, 1992). He argues that for the Kikuyu, public authority came from private 
achievement - wealth was equated with leadership -  but private ambition should also serve 
the public good (ibid:337). Those who wanted to progress without effort were scorned: 
“male mastery in the home proved ability to manage public affairs ...women’s roles in 
cultivating wealth and reproducing labour earned them civic virtue too” (ibid:326). All 
were regarded as having the potential to become virtuous. Poverty was seen as delinquent 
and charity was scorned. Rather, Lonsdale suggests that reciprocity between the rich 
themselves was in fact lauded.
The purpose of Mau Mau, according to Lonsdale, was “to regain the stolen land and to 
become adult” or “self mastery through land” (ibid:326). Thus the purpose of Mau Mau 
directly linked these private and public domains. But in doing so this raised the complex 
issue of whether moral maturity alone offered sufficient legitimacy to share in the gains of 
collective action. Those who were poor and did not have access to land turned to age-sets, 
but by then neither of the key concepts of community - mbari or riika - could ensure adult 
rights for all. Due to the heterogeneous origins of the Kikuyu, whom “toil and argument 
forged into what they and others recognized to be a people” (ibid:333), Lonsdale argues 
that the material change that Colonialism precipitated provoked a public moral debate 
about the relationship between work and achievement that was never fully resolved.
These last two sections highlight a number of points relevant to this study. First, the 
Kikuyu themselves were not homogeneous as an ethnic group and as a result solidarity 
tends to operate among those whose interests converge and could be turned into action. 
Second, that hard work was praised and while opportunities might be given to the poor e.g. 
through tenancy relationships, mechanisms for direct redistribution were not promoted. As
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a result, the rich entered into reciprocal relations with their peers rather than with the less 
fortunate.
Third, the importance of land is apparent to both the social structure of the mbari and to 
politics more broadly. For the Kikuyu, land was a source of wealth through the expansion 
of the area under cultivation but required scarce labour. This was therefore achieved 
through patronage relationships with tenants who would, in turn, gain their own land. 
However, once the land frontier was closed, the claims of tenants were eroded and access 
to new circuits of accumulation was more pressing. Hence divisions between the 
alternative elite and loyalists focused on access to the resources of the state.15
Yet Lonsdale’s exploration of the deeper meaning of Mau Mau suggests that while 
individual accumulation was one route to public power, there was a complex relationship 
between this individual wealth and the social basis on which claims to civic virtue and 
hence political power could be made. The next section discusses this further.
5.1.4 Social relations and the politics of self-help in Kenya
The complexity of the relationship between social identity and material wealth has led 
analysts such as Hyden to propose the existence of the “economy of affection” which 
“denotes networks of support, communications and interaction among structurally defined 
groups connected by blood, kin, community and other affinities such as religion” (Hyden, 
1987:119). He argues that these result in different ways of constructing trust and meaning 
and result in means of regulating power which tend to be overlooked by conventional 
analyses.
Similarly, Berry argues for the need to re-conceptualise the dynamics of African agrarian 
change (Berry, 1993). Her study spanning four African contexts, including Central Kenya, 
argues that the interaction of colonial power with African society involved debates over the 
meaning of customary rules and practices and that ability to influence the colonial order 
required engagement in these debates. As a result she suggests that:
i5 The characteristic that accumulation tends to occur through off-farm circuits is further discussed in Chapter 
Eight.
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“negotiability is not just an inconvenience .. .but a pervasive feature of social and 
economic processes which calls for reconceptualization ...In rethinking African 
agrarian change we need to begin with historical and anthropological literature which 
represents law as social process, transactions as subject to multiple meanings and 
exchange as open-ended and multidimensional rather than single-stranded and
definitive If rules, transactions and values are ambiguous and negotiable, then
economic activity cannot necessarily be explained in terms of decisive choices or 
efforts to gain exclusive control over goods and resources. If access to resources 
depends on one’s ability to negotiate, people may be more interested in keeping options 
open than cutting them off, and in strengthening their ability to participate in and 
influence negotiations rather than acquiring exclusive control over resources and 
severing connections which are not immediately profitable.” (ibid: 13-14).
As a result the construction of political power requires a continual negotiation of social 
inclusion to establish legitimacy and exclusion to make access to resources worthwhile.
The self-help movement in Kenya seems to exemplify these underlying yet contradictory 
pressures.
Harambee, meaning “Let’s pull together” in Swahili was the rallying slogan of Kenyatta’s 
presidency. These self-help activities can be characterised as local initiatives for 
development -  often involving the building of small-scale local infrastructure such as 
schools and clinics. They involve local committees who draw on politicians and elites to 
contribute and assist in mobilising external resources -  often from the state. Hyden argues 
that it is only through detailed and careful analysis of processes such as that of self-help 
that the dynamics of peasant leverage and wealth accumulation and redistribution in Kenya 
can be understood (Hyden, 1987). Holmquist suggests that self-help in Kenya is 
characterised by “class alliance and class conflict” and cannot be seen as simply an 
instrument of either the state or the peasantry since all find something to benefit from in a 
process that “embraces the major contradictions of the political economy” (Holmquist, 
1984:73).
Thomas concludes from her detailed research on the distribution of contributions to, and 
benefits from (i.e. in terms of those who were able to use facilities), harambee shows that
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it encouraged the transfer of resources from richer to poorer households and from urban to 
rural areas as elites contributed generously. It allowed a means through which private 
wealth could be “put to public use in ways which are considered socially and ethically 
appropriate... Yet the institution of Harambee, in the broadest sense, is used by all to justify 
the accumulation of wealth in an economic system which fosters great inequities. It is also 
used to legitimise the amassing of power because it serves as a key instrument whereby 
those who are most powerful can best aid their local communities” (Thomas, 1987:477).
On the basis of her research undertaken in 1978-79 - at the very end of the Kenyatta era - 
Central Province was one of the largest beneficiaries receiving one third of the resources 
generated and suggesting that the Kikuyu were particularly successful in using these 
mechanisms.
This rapid growth in self-help activities included an expansion of the co-operative sector 
with SACCOs becoming a feature of this expansion in the 1970s. The links between co­
operatives, state intervention and politics are well documented and constitute core aspects 
of the pathological account of co-operative performance (Robert, 1983; von Pischke,
Adams et al., 1983; Hyden, 1987). However, Zeleza suggests that rather than analysing 
them as “alien institutions” (ibid:68) and examining the extent to which they achieve 
standards of bureaucratic and productive efficiency, it is important to assess their role in 
accumulation and understand the political economy of their relationship to the state 
(Zeleza, 1990). According to Zeleza, independence produced new competition and 
accountability for political roles and made politicians “potential community patrons in the 
self help process” (Zeleza, 1990:73 quoting Holmquist). Politicians who resorted to 
forming co-operatives did so in order to enhance their economic and social interests.
5.1.5 Conclusion
This section has established key features of Kikuyu social relations and their relation to
broader processes of political economy. It has indicated the importance of lineage and its
relationship to land, which provides important context to the discussion of land in the next
section and in Chapter Eight. Second, it has indicated that age relations were historically
important as crosscutting structures of social relations among both men and women. This
aspect of women’s social relations will be discussed further in Chapter Ten. Discussion of
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intra-household gender relations suggests that women have historically had control over a 
limited range of intra-household resources -  especially their food crops -  and have 
extended their control over cash incomes in the absence of men. For men, however the 
pressures of land shortage, which in part precipitated Mau Mau, resulted in the 
prioritisation of lineage relations over age-sets, but age has remained important in the way 
it offers milestones of maturity.
Lonsdale suggests that Mau Mau precipitated a debate among the Kikuyu over the moral 
economy, which centred on the relationship between private wealth and public status. This 
is also reflected in other analysts’ discussion of the relationship between social relations 
and processes of wealth accumulation and distribution. In the pursuit of private wealth 
individuals seek to gain access to wider circuits of patronage and accumulation. To 
achieve this requires inclusive strategies that legitimate political power and public status 
and may require the distribution of private resources. Thus creating a complex articulation 
between social networks with the deployment of economic resources, which are 
characterised by apparently contradictory pressures.
Self-help activity embodies these dynamics. Hence, the importance of this discussion lies 
in its relevance to the way in which different types of organisations relate to these 
underlying dynamics: self-help forms of financial service provision and co-operatives in 
particular embody these pressures. However, before returning to the role of coffee co­
operatives later in the chapter, it is first necessary to provide a profile of household and 
livelihoods in Mathira.
5.2 A profile of households and livelihoods in Mathira
Mathira’s location on the slopes of Mt Kenya means that it has fertile volcanic soils and
good rainfall. Indeed, the First Report on Poverty in Kenya suggests that when rains are
good then there is no absolute poverty in Nyeri District (Government of Kenya, 1998).
But, in recent years rainfall has been erratic with floods associated with the El Nina
phenomenon in 1997 and poor rains in two subsequent seasons in 1998 and 1999. The
industrial and service sectors are little developed and mainly informal. The research was
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carried out in three areas of Mathira Division selected to represent what were anticipated to 
be the key livelihood types: first, the sub-location of Chehe in the tea zone; second, the 
sub-location of Gatundu in the coffee zone; and third, Karatina Town where livelihoods are 
more heavily based on enterprise and employment. The tea and coffee zones are divided 
by altitude with tea doing well on the cooler upper slopes and coffee requiring warmer 
lower slopes of Mount Kenya. This section uses data from the first round random survey 
of 150 households and expenditure data from the second round survey of 68 individuals to 
present a profile of households and livelihoods in Mathira.
5.2.1 Household composition
Men head 77% of rural households (Chehe and Gatundu) and 58% of town households. Of 
the 23% of rural households headed by women, 19% were widows. However in Karatina 
Town 42% of households were headed by women and none of them were widows. This 
represents a clear trend to the establishment of households by young single women in 
town. The mean age of household heads in town is much lower than that in the rural areas 
-  averaging 34 years with only small differences between men and women heads. In the 
rural areas, the mean age of male households heads was 50 years in Chehe and 44 years in 
Gatundu. Female household heads in rural sub-locations had an average age of 56 years, 
reflecting the widowed status of most of these women.
Mean household size is rather lower in Karatina at 2.8 than in the rural sub-locations at 4.2, 
with households in Gatundu tending to have slightly more dependents (under 15) than 
households in Chehe. These figures are consistent with 1999 Census Data for Nyeri16 as a 
whole which gives average household size as 3.94, but suggests that these households are 
smaller than the Kenyan average of 5.56 persons (1994 data) (Government of Kenya,
1998).
The education levels of household heads in the rural areas averaged seven years of 
schooling, with a median of seven years in Gatundu and eight years in Chehe. This 
suggests that the majority completed primary school under the earlier education system.17 
Some 15% had not attended school at all, while 35% in Gatundu and 30% in Chehe had
16 Data obtained from the District Offices in Nyeri.
17 The education system was changed to 8-4-4 in the late 1980s, having previously worked on the basis o f 7-5-3.
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completed 12 years, that is, secondary school. In Karatina town only 13.5% of household 
heads had less than 12 years of schooling, suggesting that the majority had completed 
secondary school. These education levels, although based on household heads, appear 
high. However, Mathira is known locally as “Mathira of the educated” and people in this 
area were some of the first to benefit from the mission schools set up by the British. The 
role of education in gaining access to off-farm employment has long been highly valued.
5.2.2 Land holdings and ownership
Table 5.1 shows that 15% of households in the sample had no land at all and the majority 
of these were households in Karatina town. Only one household in Gatundu had no land18. 
The mean landholding size in Chehe was higher than in Gatundu (significant at 1%) and 
Karatina.
Table 5.1: Total landholding size of households in Mathira* (percentages)








No land 0 2.0 44.7 15.1
<1 acre 28.6 38.0 4.3 24.0
1-3 acres 28.6 48.0 29.8 35.6
3-5 acres 24.5 10.0 17.0 17.1
>5 acres 18.4 2.0 4.3 8.2
Total 100 100 100 100
Mean land area 2.33 1.72 1.32 2.12
* data from first round household survey
Two-thirds of the total landholding area of these households was land owned by household 
heads (Table 5.2) but only 39% of households had access to land with a direct title. Table
5.3 further indicates that where household heads owned land, only 29% owned holdings of 
more than one acre and only 6% owned holdings of more than five acres. The average 
size of owned land in Chehe (2.15 acres) was more than double that in Gatundu (1.06 
acres), and a smaller proportion of households actually owned land there - 34% in Chehe 
compared to 54% in Gatundu.
18 This was a very old blind lady who, while living in her own home, was provided with food by her sons in 
rotation. Since members o f the family cooked the food in her home in turn, she fitted the definition of a 
household as based around a cooking pot. But she had already allocated her land to her sons.
109







No of hhs 
with access to 
this type of 
land 
(%)
No of hhs 
with access 
to only this 
type of land 
(%)
Total land area 309.4 100 128 (85)
Land owned by hh head 208.1 67 58 (39) 44 (29)
Land owned by father of 
hhh 53.0 17 53 (35) 32(21)
Land in name of 
deceased husband 7.75 2.5 3(2) 2(1)
Rented 10.2 3.3 17(11) 3(2)
Borrowed 0.25 0 2(1) 1(1)
Road reserve 0.2 0 1(1) 0(0)
Forest land 12.45 4.0 21(14) 2(1)
Other 16.4 5.3 10(7) 6(4)
Table 5.3: Land owned by household head (percentages)









None 66 46 71 61
Land owned 34 54 29 39
of which: 
=<1 acre 4 22 4 10
1-5 acres 18 30 21 23
>= 5 acres 12 2 4 6
Mean holding 
size 2.15 1.06 1.0 1.41
Table 5.4: Land owned by father of household head (percentages)




None 53 57 82 64
Land owned 47 43 18 36
of which:
=<1 acre 31 39 8 24
1-5 acres 14 4 10 11
>= 5 acres 2 0 0 1
Mean holding 
size 0.59 0.24 0.25 0.36
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While land owned by the father of the household head accounts for only 17% of the land 
area (Table 5.2), 35% of households had access to this type of land and 21% of households 
only had access to this type of land. 39% of households in Gatundu and 31% in Chehe had 
holdings of less than one acre of such land (Table 5.4). Moreover, the mean land area in 
Chehe for households where the head’s father owned the land was 0.59 acres and 0.24 
acres in Gatundu. This demonstrates the prevalence of sub-division resulting in smaller 
holdings held by the next generation19 -  these holdings being approximately 25% of the 
size of those where the household head owns the land.
The data also illustrates a variety of other land arrangements. Table 5.2 indicates that three 
widows had access to land through the title of the deceased husband. The category termed 
‘other’ involved cases where another member of the family owned the land. Five of the 
ten cases were those of female-headed households where the land was owned by a father- 
in-law, uncle, or the deceased husband’s parents. In a further two female-headed 
households, one husband had emigrated and his land had been lent out; in the other, it 
appears that it was the husband’s land and the couple were separated i.e. in neither case 
was the woman using that land. For the remaining five male-headed households the land 
was owned by a grandfather; by mother’s in two cases20; by the wife’s parents21; and in the 
last case a polygamous husband aged 76 had formally divided and registered his land to his 
two wives, presumably to ensure clarity in subdivision on his death. Rented and 
borrowed land, and land in the forest and on road reserves were the only types of land to 
which 4% of households had access.
Household cultivated area was also larger in Chehe (3.4 acres) than Gatundu and Karatina 
town (1.5 acres).22 Moreover, 18% of households in Chehe had more than 5 acres of land 
under cultivation compared to 2% in Gatundu; and 24.5% of households in Chehe were
19 Pressure on smallholdings and the need to provide opportunities for the absorption o f Kenya’s rapidly growing 
labour force provoked calls for land reform in the 1970s (Hunt, 1984).
20 Although it is probably the case that the tide deeds were still in the names o f their deceased husband’s.
21 In this household, the wife is 65 and the husband 49, this may indicate a second and late marriage and the 
wife had already acquired cultivation rights on her parents farm which had not been relinquished on her late or 
re-marriage.
22 The Chehe figure includes two households who had land holdings in Kieni and Laikipia - areas to the north of  
Karatina which are quite different agro-ecologically being semi-arid and which represented an area o f expansion 
in the 1970s through land buying companies. However even removing these from the data produces a mean 
cultivated area o f 2.8 acres for Chehe.
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cultivating between 3 and 5 acres compared to 10% in Gatundu. Cultivation tends to take 
place across a number of plots with the maximum number of plots cultivated being five in 
Gatundu, four in Chehe and three for households in town. However 64% of town-based 
households did not cultivate at all. By contrast 52% of households in Chehe cultivated 
more than one plot -  in part due to access to plots in the forest -  while in Gatundu only 
34% cultivated more than one plot.
The overall pattern then appears to be that the majority of households (81%) had access to 
land through family relationships - but only 39% had a title. 15% had no land at all and 
4% had access only through borrowing, renting and other similar arrangements. Holdings 
in the tea zone tended to be bigger than in the coffee zone, but a higher proportion of 
household heads own their plots in the coffee zone than in the tea zone. Sub-division is 
resulting in ever-smaller holdings, and mean holding sizes of 0.24 acres for households 
heads whose fathers still own the land are insufficient for subsistence. The implications of 
these patterns of land holding for financial service use are discussed in Chapter Eight.
5.2.3 Income sources
Respondents were asked to name and rank their three main household income sources. In
Gatundu, 52% of households (see Table 5.5) indicated that coffee was their primary
income source with a further 16% indicating it as a secondary source and 6% as a tertiary
source. Hence 74% had coffee as a main source of income. Horticultural crops were a
further important agricultural income source (18%) as the sub-location is on the main
Nairobi road enabling access to both local and Nairobi markets. Piped water from the
Rupingazi River has been extended to many parts of the sub-location either as part of rural
water projects or to serve coffee factories. Some farmers had been able to extend these to
their farms for sprinkler irrigation systems and produce kale (sukuma wiki), tomatoes,
sweet peppers and egg-plants. 16% indicated that wage employment was their primary
income source and 8% were mainly dependent on small business. Only two households
(4%) were primarily dependent on casual labour, although a further 18% indicate it as a
second or third main source. Other agricultural incomes included milk and food crop sales
but these were the primary source for only one household (2%). Dairy cows are usually
kept under a system known as “zero-grazing” with fodder being cut and brought to the
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animals in a stall. This predominates in Gatundu, however in Chehe some cows can be 
seen grazing in fenced fields while others are grazed in the Mt Kenya Forest.
Table 5.5: Primary income sources by sub-location (percentage of households)
Primary Income Gatundu Chehe sub­ Karatina
source sub-location location Town
Coffee 52 2
Tea 58
Horticultural crops 18 4
Other farming 8
Employment 16 10 52
Small business 8 4 40
Casual labour 4 16 2
Other 2 4
Total 100 100 100
In Chehe, 58% of households are dependent on tea as their primary income source with a 
further 18% having it as their second or third most important source, giving a total of 76% 
for whom tea is an important source. Horticulture in this area is less developed than in 
Gatundu with fewer having access to irrigation. By contrast to the coffee zone some, 16% 
of households were dependent on casual labouring as a main source of income. This 
reflects the fact that tea picking continues all year round and apart from smallholder tea 
farms, the Nyayo Tea Zone is a major source of casual employment. The Nyayo Tea 
Zone is a 100 metre wide strip of land on the perimeter of the Mt Kenya Forest virtually 
circling the mountain. Moi ordered the forest to be cut and planted with tea in the late 
1980s. The company that runs it is the Nyayo Tea parastatal. Some parts of Chehe close 
to the forest are home to a number of households who, until 1990, lived in the Mt Kenya 
forest. They were forced out by the Government and re-settled themselves along road 
reserves but are still allowed to cultivate and graze animals inside the forest. It is many of 
these that also provide much of the casual labour in tea picking. Employment and small 
business are the main source of income for only 14% and second or third income sources 
for another 22%. Horticultural crops and income from milk and food crops are the primary 
incomes for the remaining 12%.
In Karatina town, 52% of households derived their main income through employment and
40% from small business. A small proportion of these households have land and farming
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activities while being based in town but the diversity of income sources is notably lower 
for town households reflecting their smaller size and lack of land.
5.2.4 Consumption poverty
Data on household expenditure was collected during the second round survey of 68 men 
and women in 44 households. As indicated in Chapter Four above, the issue of how to 
combine household expenditure estimates from husband and wife that do not agree is 
problematic. Data has therefore been treated as indicating poverty at an individual level.
Table 5.6 indicates the position of individuals with respect to the poverty lines for both 
food poverty and overall poverty based on the methodology used in the Government of 
Kenya’s Second Welfare Monitoring Study (Government of Kenya, 1998) (see Annex One 
for a more detailed explanation). This suggests that twelve individuals faced food poverty 
but only seven lived in overall poverty. This is somewhat contrary to expectations since it 
would be more likely that, putting food first, more people would be in overall poverty than 
food poverty. This may be a result of the unusually high price of food at the time of the 
survey23 as a result of both the 1999 drought and the conduct of the survey just before the 
harvest when food is more scarce (July). While food expenditure was collected for the 
previous month, some components of expenditure were collected on an annual basis 
(school fees, health expenditure and clothing) and averaged for monthly expenditure so 
that these amounts are likely to have been less affected.
Table 5.6: Poverty status of individuals in the second round sample
Food poverty Overall poverty
No. % No. %
Below poverty line 12 18 7 11
100-200% of poverty line 30 46 22 33
200-400% of poverty line 23 35 20 30
>400% of poverty line 1 2 17 26
Total 66 100 66 100
At the other end of the poverty scale, the number of households with expenditure of more 
than four times the poverty line increases from one in the food poverty categories to 26 for
23 The price o f a 2kg packet o f maize flour was over Kshs70 at this time, by comparison the price at the end o f  
1999 was Kshs55.
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the categories of overall poverty. This is no doubt the result of the fact that food accounts 
for a smaller proportion of expenditure for better off than poorer families.
The extent of agreement between the estimates of men and women in married households 
has been assessed on the basis of whether their estimates put them in the same or different 
poverty categories as described above. Of the 24 married households, in ten their estimates 
put them in the same poverty group; in nine their estimates were one category apart and in 
four they were two categories apart. The differences suggest the extent to which men and 
women control income and expenditure in the household and this is very important when it 
comes to the demand for financial services, as will be discussed in Chapter Ten.
Since this data was collected in the context of poor rains, the overall picture here is 
consistent with the conclusion of the Government’s poverty report, that Nyeri has very 
little or no absolute poverty in a year when the rains are good. Indeed, with some 52% 
with expenditure levels of more than twice the poverty line, this supports the view that 
Nyeri is one of the districts with the least incidence of poverty in the country as a whole 
(Government of Kenya, 1998).
5.2.5 Housing and household assets
82% of households in Chehe and Gatundu lived in informally constructed buildings. These 
mainly took the form of wooden walls and an iron roof. Only one widow in Gatundu lived 
in something more akin to a traditional hut. Even those in Chehe who have built their 
houses on road reserves say that they own them so indicating a degree of confidence in 
their rights to stay there. In town by contrast the majority were renting accommodation in 
formally constructed housing usually with brick walls, iron sheet roofs and cement floors. 
In town most households had electricity (94%) that they at least used for lighting, whereas 
very few do in the rural areas.
The first round survey asked whether households possessed any of seven assets: radio
(81%), sofa set (75%), TV (40%), table and chairs (32%), bicycle (26%), electric cooker
(19%), car (7%), fridge (5%), other vehicle (1%). The electrical items were of course
concentrated in town where there was electricity. Town dwellers owned approximately 1.5
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more assets than rural dwellers -  with no difference between Gatundu and Chehe on the 
asset count.
5.2.6 Livelihoods in Mathira: summary
This data on households and livelihoods suggests that Mathira households are smaller than 
the national average and that household heads tend to have relatively high levels of 
education. National poverty data suggests that Nyeri is one of the districts with the lowest 
incidence of poverty. The proportion falling below a nationally defined poverty line in this 
research is also relatively low (less than 20%).
Households in Karatina Town present some distinct characteristics compared to rural ones: 
they are likely to be smaller, household heads to be younger and more educated, are more 
likely to be headed by single women and less likely to cultivate or own land.
Rural households are heavily dependent on cash crops of tea and coffee, while those in 
Karatina are more likely to be employed or be in business. However, land holdings are 
becoming ever smaller with sub-division demonstrate growing fragmentation and holdings 
in Gatundu generally being smaller than in Chehe. In addition, 81% of households had 
access to land through family (or lineage) relationships but only 39% actually held titles to 
this land.
5.3 Kenya’s economy and politics in the 1990s
This section builds from the previous discussion of political economy to describe the 
national political context of the 1990s. This serves to demonstrate the persistent and 
pervasive nature of patterns of patronage and accumulation. Further it explains two 
important aspect of the background to financial markets in Mathira: the position of the 
Kikuyu in national level politics and how this relates to developments in the banking and 
parastatal sectors.
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The dynamics and logic of Kenya’s politics, based in ethnicity and class, have been 
debated (Nyangira, 1987). Cowen and Kanyinga argue that it is those with economic 
interests and their search for political representation that make the links between the local 
and national in Kenyan politics. This is expressed through communal forms of identity 
linking territory, culture and sources of economic subsistence and accumulation (Ogachi, 
1999; Cowen and Kanyinga, 2002). Politics is therefore more than simply a tribal game. 
Throup argues in a similar vein that “politics is held together both at the national level o f 
competition between its ethnic subnationalities and in the districts by a complex series of 
interlinking patron-client relationships” (Throup, 1987:48).
The most important aspect of change in Kenya in the 1990s has been the shift to a multi­
party political system. Pre-independence a number of small parties mobilized in 
opposition to the Kenya African National Union (KANU) led by Kenyatta and dominated 
by the Kikuyu and Luo. By 1960 the small parties had merged into the Kenya African 
Democratic Union (KADU). KADU represented a range of smaller ethnic groups from 
the Rift Valley and Western Kenya who feared the Kikuyu - the main instigators of the 
Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s -  and were to some degree supported by settlers who also 
wanted a means to resist their hunger for land (Kanyinga, 1998). KADU demanded a 
federal system of government (majimbo), which by offering greater power at local level 
would have better enabled local groups to manage claims for land.24 However, the 
constitution did not take this form and by 1964 KADU requested to be wound up and 
incorporated into KANU. In 1966, rivalry over leadership of the Luo within KANU 
between Oginga and Mboya led to Mboya’s formation of the Kenya People’s Union with a 
strong socialist agenda. The government proscribed the party in 1969 due to the popularity 
of its views on the land question (Kanyinga, 1998). As a result Kenya became a de facto  
one party state although the Constitutional amendment (Section 2A) that legitimised this 
situation was not actually passed until May 1982.
During the late 1980s, pressure for a multi-party political system was propelled forward by 
both domestic and international events. After an attempted coup in August 1982, Moi 
moved to consolidate his position in a range of ways, including the systematic persecution 
of opposition (Chege, 1994). A further means was the institution of queue voting in the
24 Kanyinga argues that the centrality o f  land to the constitutional structure o f Kenya is illustrated by the 
arguments over regionalism that occurred at independence and again in the 1990s as political liberalisation 
became inevitable, and was floated as a means to gain control over resources belonging to particular ethnic 
groups (Kanyinga, 2000).
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1988 elections, which was extremely unpopular. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
Kenya’s position as a bulwark of the west against communism in East Africa also 
crumbled and with it the access to aid that this position had conferred. In 1991 the Forum 
for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) attempted to hold rallies in Nairobi, but its 
leaders were arrested and the 7th July riots (“saba-saba”)  resulted leading to international 
censure. The rising pressure resulted in the repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution in 
December 1991 and Presidential and Parliamentary elections in December 1992. Moi won 
the 1992 and 1997 elections due election malpractice and the proliferation of opposition 
parties that split the opposition vote (Chege, 1994; Southall, 1998). Moreover the 
condition that any Presidential candidate must win at least 25% of the vote in five of eight 
provinces also ensured that numerically dominant and geographically concentrated ethnic 
groups would have great difficulty winning - especially the Kikuyu in Central Kenya and 
the Luo in Western Kenya.
Since the ‘Kenya debate’ of the 1970s, which discussed the existence of an indigenous 
African capitalist class, the importance of the state to accumulation under the patronage of 
the Kenyatta regime has come to be accepted (Leys, 1996; Cowen and Kanyinga, 2002). 
That the Kikuyu dominated these accumulation processes came to be a source of 
antagonism for others25 who perceived their own exclusion. Moi set about reversing these 
processes and enabling access to state resources by the minority tribes he represented after 
his succession to the Presidency on Kenyatta’s death in 1978 (Throup, 1987; Ogachi, 1999; 
Southall, 1999; Cowen and Kanyinga, 2002). “On both economic and political grounds, 
President Moi has had to depend more upon the state as an arena for the primary 
accumulation of capital and, to retain political support, has centralised political patronage 
to a far greater extent than was apparent during the Kenyatta years” (Cowen and Kanyinga, 
2002, 136). According to Cowen and Kanyinga this was a result of the different 
international economic and political environment which increased the political opposition 
faced by Moi and made it more important to use ethnic politics to retain control over state 
power, a key dimension of which was the ability to dispense economic patronage.
25 It is important also to recognise the ways in which ethnicities such as the Kikuyu or Kalenjin are a product of  
political and social process and not necessarily pre-existing. The Kalenjin is an alliance o f small groups including 
the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen and others but in much everyday debate is used as if it indicated a single tribal 
grouping. “The conversion o f negotiable ethnicity into competitive tribalism has been a modem phenomenon. It 
mirrored the growth o f the state. Tribe was not so much inherited as invented” (Lonsdale, 1992,329).
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This trend helps explain the pattern of economic policy over the 1980s and 1990s. Kenya 
was the first African country to receive a Structural Adjustment loan from the International 
Financial Institutions in 1980 but the record of reform was not positive, rather a pattern 
emerged in which the Government was able to take the money and avoid implementing the 
policy conditions attached (Mosley, 1991). Collier reports that the Kenyan Government 
“sold the same set of agricultural reforms to the World Bank four times, each time 
reversing it after the receipt of the money” (Collier quoted in (O'Brien and Ryan, 2001, 
530)). As has been found elsewhere, it was relatively straightforward to implement 
changes in monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies under central control but reforms to 
the civil services, parastatals and other government organisations are much more difficult 
to implement because of their implications for reduced patronage. Prior to the December 
1992 elections, concern over the political situation and the difficulties encountered by the 
IFIs in promoting reforms, especially government restructuring, led to the suspension o f 
balance of payments support (O'Brien and Ryan, 2001).
The record of economic policy reform after the 1992 election continued to be erratic. 
Inflation had spiralled in the period leading up to the elections as the government was 
forced to borrow domestically through Treasury Bills and to print money. Aid resumed in 
mid-1993 and efforts were made to get inflation under control. While more progress was 
made in areas such as price decontrol and tariff reform, reform of the civil service and of 
state owned enterprises was still problematic. Aid was again suspended in 1997, prior to 
the December 1997 election. Despite apparent progress with liberalisation in many parts 
of the economy, this has also been a mechanism through which elites have been able to 
consolidate their economic and hence political positions. Privatisation has been 
characterised by a lack of transparency in the valuation and sale of assets and hence their 
sale to members of the political elite was a means of rewarding them (Tangri, 1999). It 
took some time for a new agreement to be negotiated in August 2000 with what were 
reported to be the most stringent conditions ever imposed in Africa (Holmquist and Oendo, 
2001). Richard Leakey - a White Kenyan and political opponent of Moi whose 
appointment as Head of the Civil Service in 1999 was a great shock to many Kenyans - 
led the negotiations. Despite Leakey’s attempts at civil service reform and the 
rationalisation of ministries, the implementation of anti-corruption measures that were 
conditions of the agreement stalled in December 2000, leading to the further suspension of 
lending in January 2001 (Holmquist and Oendo, 2001). The late 1990s have been a
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period of macro-economic decline with official figures indicating that year on year growth 
has declined steadily from 4.6% in 1996, to 1,4% in 1999 and turning into negative growth 
of 0.3% in 2000 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2001). Agricultural growth in 2000 had declined 
more rapidly to negative 2.4%.
Southall describes Moi’s regime as kleptocratic and argues that these processes have, in 
turn, undermined the economy. He argues that the resources of the state used for 
patronage and accumulation by the elite are either consumed or poorly invested, hence 
undermining the economy’s productive potential: government revenues for example have 
been redistributed away from the more productive central Kenyan region to the less 
productive areas (Southall, 2000). Moreover, Klopp argues that increased patronage 
resources have been needed at a time when they have been declining, since political 
liberalisation has increased the bargaining power of politicians by giving them the option 
of defecting to the opposition (Klopp, 2000). Thus Southall identifies Moi’s strategy in 
relation to the IFI’s as being to tackle public expenditure and corruption concerns 
sufficiently to regain support and replenish the dwindling sources of patronage. Coming to 
the end of his constitutionally allowed two-term tenure as President in early 2003, Moi 
faces the key dilemma of how to structure a succession plan that protects the ruling elite 
when both domestic and international actors see them as the source of Kenya’s problems 
(Southall, 2000: 209).
Multi-party politics in Kenya has deepened the division between the Moi government and 
the Kikuyu as the key opposition group. Their domination of both politics and the 
economy in the Kenyatta era has led to attempts to redistribute resources towards minority 
groups who are part of Moi’s coalition. The coherence of this alliance has required 
increasing patronage resources under the multi-party system, which has resulted in 
increasingly unproductive patterns of resource allocation that have marginalized the 
Kikuyu.
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5.4 The political economy of financial sector development in Kenya
This section links these broad trends in the political economy of Kenya to financial sector 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s. First, financial sector policy to liberalise interest rates can 
be seen against the backdrop of broader pressures for economic reform. Second, the 
origins and evolution of the formal financial sector are reviewed with particular attention 
to the ways in which these relate to access to financial services for the Kikuyu.
5.4.1 Interest rate policy
The main change to financial sector policy has been the liberalisation of interest rates. In 
the 1980s nominal interest rates, while still controlled, were gradually increased and finally 
deregulated in 1991. Control over lending fees and charges were removed in 1990 
(Brownbridge, 1998). Further developments in the early 1990s were the removal of credit 
ceilings, the liberalization of foreign exchange markets and allowing commercial banks to 
deal in foreign exchange and accept it as deposits, alongside the adoption of a floating 
exchange rate in 1993.
The decontrol of interest rates does not appear to have had significant positive effects 
either on deposit mobilisation, or the efficiency of intermediation in which spreads are 
driven down by competition (Ngugi and Kabubo, 1998). Rather, Ngugi and Kabubo 
calculate that positive real interest rates were not achieved until 1993, with negative real 
lending rates occurring in half of the years between 1972 and 1993. Although interest rates 
have been driven up in the 1990s by monetary and fiscal policy, especially the trends in 
Treasury Bill rates, spreads have widened rather than narrowed. This, they argue, has been 
a result both of the level of uncertainty arising from inflationary expectations (due to 
elections) and exchange rate depreciation, and the oligopolistic nature of the market among 
the main commercial banks in which they have little incentive to compete for deposits.
121
5.4.2 Developments in the banking sector
The formal banking sector in Kenya has its roots in the British owned banks of the colonial 
period: Barclays, Standard Chartered and Grindlays. In the post-independence period, 
government-owned banks were established through start-up and nationalization since the 
internationally owned banks were seen as too concentrated on the white-settler economy 
and international companies and not responsive to the needs of African business. The 
National Bank of Kenya (NBK) was established in 1968. In 1970 the Government bought 
60% of Grindlays in a nationalization initiative and it became Kenya Commercial Bank 
(KCB). The Co-operative Bank was founded in 1965 as a bank for the co-operative sector. 
While not owned by the government, its formation was also a move to enable the banking 
sector to better serve African economic interests. Four banks - Barclays, Standard 
Chartered, KCB and NBK - dominate the formal banking sector accounting for 50% of the 
deposits of all formal banks in 2000 (Market Intelligence, 2001) - down from 70% in the 
mid-1990s (Brownbridge, 1998). In 1999 there were 53 commercial banks with 465 
branches although many banks have branches in main cities only.
Kenyan post-independence policy towards the financial sector was extensive but not 
especially repressive in Brownbridge’s view, as the banking system expanded both in 
terms of institutional diversity and the value of assets and liabilities in the system 
(Brownbridge, 1998). He indicates that the government’s effort in directing the system 
mainly involved setting up government owned banks, non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs) and development finance institutions and did not directly interfere in the 
operations of the international commercial banks. Thus while commercial banks were 
required to lend some 17% of deposits to agriculture, such a target was never attained 
(Shipton, 1992; Ndii, 1994). Controlled interest rates and credit ceilings were used, but 
within these bounds, the international commercial banks could lend on commercial criteria.
Over the 1980s and 1990s the formal financial sector has been characterised by a series of 
banking crises and increasing instability involving both local banks and NBFIs. The first 
of these crises occurred in the period 1984-9, during which some twelve NBFIs failed.
The NBFI regulatory requirements were more liberal than those for banks with lower 
minimum capital requirements and higher interest rate ceilings on both deposits and loans 
(Johnson, 1994). The expansion of this sector in the late 1970s and early 1980s was again
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spurred by a concern that the commercial banks were not serving the interests of 
indigenous business and especially the small-scale enterprise sector (Brownbridge, 1998). 
Brownbridge categorises the NBFIs into three: first, what are called ‘political’ banks 
because they had a prominent politician amongst their shareholders; second, Asian-owned 
and independent of politicians; third, independently African-owned. The African and 
Asian owned NBFIs were set up by businessmen who had accumulated sufficient levels of 
capital through commercial activity and who had a potential market amongst their own 
communities. A number of these- both the ‘political banks’ and some of the African 
owned independent NBFIs - were connected to Kikuyus.
Brownbridge reports that the banking crises have been due to a number of factors. One 
feature has been that the “political” banks used their connections to government to obtain 
deposits from the public sector. This in turn resulted in lending decisions that were 
controlled by a family or individual and were either fraudulent or imprudent. Then poor 
management and the failure of borrowers to repay in the context of Central Bank 
capitalization requirements, which had been evaded, soon jeopardized their viability. 
Lehman argues that the mid-1980s crisis that mainly affected NBFIs was caused by a 
political dispute between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin and the President had the Ministry of 
Finance and state companies withdraw their funds from Kikuyu owned banks so 
precipitating their collapse (Lehman, 1992). Ogachi goes as far as to call this part of Moi’s 
“economic war against the Kikuyu” (Ogachi, 1999:97; see also Throup, 1987).
Some of the 1993-4 bank failures were probably also a result of fraud in relation to the 
1992 election campaign: the Goldenberg26 scandal being the biggest and most audacious 
of these. The scale of these problems also increased. Brownbridge calculates that the 
NBFIs that were closed in the mid-1980s represented approximately 2% of commercial 
bank and NBFI deposits and those closed in 1989 approximately 1%. Those closed in the 
1993-4 period probably represented in the region of 10% of deposits.
The banking business of KCB and NBK also has strong public sector links, with 30 to 50% 
of deposits and a significant proportion of NBK’s loan portfolio being public sector 
business (Brownbridge, 1998). NBK has emphasised the agricultural sector while KCB’s 
focus has been in the commercial sector. Brownbridge notes that the deposit of public
26 The Goldenburg scandal involved the alleged fraud o f a huge sum in export compensation via the Exchange 
Bank. The amount involved accounted for 6% o f GDP. (Brownbridge, 1998)
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sector funds and unviable lending decisions were often government directed, and has 
resulted in particular problems for NBK.
The late 1990s has seen the further development of these trends with the malaise now 
moving to the main commercial banking sector and affecting both KCB and National 
Bank. Total NPLs in the banking sector increased dramatically from Kshs56bn in 1997 to 
Kshs97bn in 1999 (including the portfolios of 30 banks under liquidation), with the most 
serious problems for the main banks being faced by KCB (42%) and NBK (70%) (see 
Chapter Six, Table 6.2). The increased level of NPLs reported has been brought about by 
two factors, first is the poor overall performance of the economy, but second, the CBK 
introduced much stricter guidelines on loan classification.
The liquidity crisis at NBK and the potential threat of its collapse in 1998 was extremely 
serious since NBK’s deposit base (Kshs20bn), accounted for approximately 7% of total 
deposits in the banking system. This was not the first time that NBK had required 
assistance. It was given an injection of funds by the government in the late 1970s and 
restructured in the early 1990s, but at the same time the underlying problem of political 
interference was not addressed (Brownbridge, 1998). The 1998 crisis and the NPLs of the 
NBK have been strongly linked to the List of Shame published in May 2000. This was a 
report by the Public Accounts Committee that sought to expose and publicly shame 
politicians and members of the elite who had not paid their debts and who had acquired 
resources through fraudulent means:
“The root causes of the problems at NBK were political interference and 
mismanagement. The bank has been used to prolong the lives of non-viable 
parastatals. It is political interference that caused the bank to give big loans to 
insolvent companies belonging to privileged borrowers. In many cases, some of the 
privileged borrowers have been allowed to take new loans to service old 
ones.. .convinced that the board of the bank would not have the guts to foreclose on 
their assets and companies” (Weekly Review, 1999:12).
A discussion also took place in the press as to whether KCB’s debtors should be “named 
and shamed”. KCB was expected to undertake a huge restructuring with the closure of a 
lot of its branches (East African Standard, 2nd November 1999). The Managing Director of
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Barclays Kenya was appointed to run KCB in May 2000 and by mid-2001 was predicting 
its return to profitability in the wake of this restructuring.
The pattern of manipulation of the banking sector for political ends has occurred 
repeatedly over the last twenty years and the situation at NBK has been contained, but at 
considerable cost. Despite the overt recognition of these causes by the Central Bank 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 1998), its ability to reverse the trend has not yet been clearly 
demonstrated.
5.4.3 Development Finance Institutions: The Agricultural Finance Corporation
After independence the government established specialised development finance 
institutions (DFIs) as part of its strategy of support to the development of African 
agriculture and business. Examples of these are the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
(AFC) and the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). The ICDC 
has been successful in supporting the development of African owned businesses through 
equity stakes. While it has operated loan programmes these have been relatively small in 
both loan capital and numbers of loans. However, here the AFC is discussed because o f its 
importance to the rural sector.
The AFC was formed under the Agricultural Credit Act of 1963 and then restructured 
under the AFC Act of 1969 when it took over the Land and Agricultural Bank. It is 
described as a specialized non-depository institution and is exempt from both the 
Companies and Banking Acts. Its remit is to assist the development of agriculture and 
agricultural industries and loans were secured against land. It has been funded by soft 
loans and grants from international agencies to the Kenyan government. In 1989 it owed 
88% of its capital to the government. Although it was not expected to be profit making it 
was expected that to become self-reliant. During the 1990s, as donors withdrew support, 
its portfolio has been declining in size and quality. Its interest rates vary by loan scheme 
but are always below commercial bank rates but, unlike the banking sector, its rates were 
not liberalised in 1991.
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The role of the AFC in relation to political objectives has also been evident (Leys, 1975; 
Johnson, 1994). Leys argues that eviction (i.e. repossession of land used as collateral) due 
to non-payment was less likely where borrowers had political connections, than for those 
who had fallen from political favour or who lacked political protectors. For the 
government this served the dual political purposes of strengthening its own position and 
appeasing the foreign creditors on whom it depended. However, this approach did not 
appeal to large farmers and “it was only a matter of time before they used their political 
influence to try to reduce their debt burden by manipulating the structure of control” (Leys, 
1975:102).
Patterns of credit allocation have also been seen to be linked to politics, with Shipton 
noting that after the death of Kenyatta the overall amount of loans to Central Province 
declined (Shipton, 1992). In the early 1990s the distribution of seasonal credit for maize 
and wheat was heavily biased to the North Rift and Western Kenya (Otima, 1994:127). 
Otima found that large farms had higher default rates than small farms and those with off- 
farm incomes were less likely to default than those without. While Otima does not provide 
a headline proportion of non-performing loans to advances for AFC as a whole, the 
proportion of accounts in default ranged from 45% to 65% by area. In 1990 arrears in the 
Credit IV portfolio (World Bank loan funds received in 1987) were 8.4% with a collection 
rate of 69.5% (Otima, 1994). By the end of the 1990s inflation and the low collection rate 
had resulted in the AFC having few funds to lend. At the same time being unable to 
restructure itself because of the costs this would incur.
5.4.4 Conclusions
This section has explored the political economy surrounding the banking sector. It has 
highlighted its colonial origins and the way in which this gave rise to national banks to 
serve African interests. These operated alongside internationally owned banks in a 
financial sector that was not overly repressed, and controls were removed - including 
those on interest rates -  in the early 1990s.
However, political interests have been key factors in the performance of both the national
banks and NBFIs. During the 1980s people with political connections set up banks and
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were able to mobilise deposits from public sector institutions. Their mismanagement and 
corrupt lending decisions resulted in a series of banking crises which were also precipitated 
by the withdrawal of public deposits because of their Kikuyu links. The malaise of 
mismanagement and corruption has now spread to the national banks -  NBK and KCB - in 
the late 1990s. The underlying shift in resource distribution away from the Kikuyu is also 
apparent in the performance of the AFC.
5.5 Cash crop marketing and financial services
In Mathira, the main productive activity is smallholder agriculture and coffee and tea have 
been shown to be key to household livelihoods. Given the importance of these cash crops, 
this section uses secondary material and key informant interviews to explain key aspects of 
change in the 1990s in these industries in the division, in particular how this has affected 
the provision of financial services.
5.5.1 Coffee production and marketing in the 1990s
In the ten years after independence there was a huge growth of the co-operative sector in 
general and particularly in relation to agricultural marketing. Small-scale coffee farmers 
were only allowed to market their coffee through coffee societies. The structure of coffee 
co-operatives in Kenya from the mid-1960s to the 1990s consisted of primary societies 
formed into higher Co-operative Unions usually at the District Level (Hedlund, 1992).
This had the proposed benefits of enabling economies of scale in the carrying out of certain 
tasks such as book-keeping and accounting, and bulk purchasing of inputs. But this 
consolidation also allowed for increasingly centralised government control (Zeleza, 1990). 
The coffee processing system then moved parchment coffee (i.e. once it has been washed 
and dried) produced by the local factories, to the Kenya Planters Co-operative Union 
(KPCU) that milled the coffee to remove the parchment before the Coffee Board of Kenya 
sold it at auction.
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In Nyeri there were so many factories in the District that primary societies were 
incorporated into Divisional level Co-operatives and then the District Co-operative Union. 
Mathira Coffee Co-operative Society was itself constituted of primary societies to which 
farmers belonged. By the early 1990s, Mathira Farmers Co-operative Society had 
approximately 26,000 members belonging to 36 factories and was known as “Mathira 
Giant” because of its size as certainly the largest coffee society in Kenya.
The government also encouraged the formation of the Co-operative Bank to provide co­
operative societies with financial services and, by the end of the 1970s, it had over 1000 
co-operative societies as members (Zeleza, 1990). The Co-operative Promotion and 
Credit Scheme (CPCS) initiated in the 1970s to provide agricultural credit to the small 
scale farming sector (Heyer, 1976) also provided credit to coffee farmers. At the same 
time, a scheme that enabled coffee payments to be credited to farmers accounts in the 
Union rather than being paid in cash, demonstrated the need for savings facilities (von 
Pischke, 1983). This led to the establishment of Union Banking Sections (UBSs) 
managing savings accounts, usually within DCUs. The system allowed member’s savings 
to be mobilised for on lending and the UBSs could also raise funds from the Co-operative 
Bank to lend to their members (Alila and Obado, 1990). Credit facilities were developed 
that used the hypothecated crop as collateral and these have played a critical role in the 
sector and are described further in Chapter Six.
The coffee co-operative system has been in a state of transition in the 1990s. Two 
components of this transition are relevant here. First, from the early 1990s the influence of 
the Ministry of Co-operative Development in the management and administration was 
gradually rolled back culminating in the revision of the Co-operative Societies Act in 1997 
that allowed them to run their own affairs. Second, in the late 1980s there had been a 
series of co-operative collapses due to mismanagement. By 1987, the government 
expressed the view in its “Sessional Paper on Renewed Growth” that these banking 
sections should become autonomous SACCOs with their own boards, separated from the 
District Co-operative Unions out of which they had arisen (which also operate input supply 
and marketing functions) (Alila and Obado, 1990). The rationale given was for the need to 
“streamline and harmonize the development of a viable co-operative banking system 
capable of safeguarding their money at the same time” (ibid: 11). This policy was in part 
motivated by concerns raised by a series of late 1980s high-profile DCU failures. Since
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Union Banking Sections of DCUs were usually highly liquid they were sources of funds 
for other DCU input supply and marketing functions and put member’s savings at risk.
This shift in policy has been an important aspect of the evolution of the UBS system in the 
1990s, with this separation, unsurprisingly, causing much tension within DCUs.
In Nyeri, the DCU did not finally agree to separate out the UBS until 1997. It started 
selling shares in the SACCO in late 1998 and held its first election for officials in early 
2000 .
In the context of liberalisation, pressure rose from primary level societies to reject the role 
of the secondary District Co-operative Unions. This level in particular was renowned for 
mismanagement and corruption. In 1996 the primary societies in Mathira voted to “split” 
themselves from the “Giant Mathira” society and run their own affairs. They split 
themselves into 13 small co-operative societies managing between one and four coffee 
factories each. Such splits in the coffee co-operatives were not in fact new, they had 
started in the early 1980s in Muranga and Meru districts. Nevertheless Mathira was the 
first to do this in the newly liberalised environment of the 1990s. However, this split has 
produced a major question over the viability of these societies due to the loss of economies 
of scale in administration - now each factory is having to run an entire administrative 
structure including paying for vehicles and an entire committee to run it rather than just 
one member of the wider committee. The process of voting in ‘splits’ such as this has been 
highly political. In the neighbouring divisions of Tetu and Mukurweini, which voted to 
split in 1999 and 2001 respectively, the internal politics led to violence between ‘pro’ and 
‘anti’ split factions with some deaths resulting.
Mathira Division produced some 14m kg of cherry in 1996/7, 8m kg in 1997/8 rising again 
to 15m in 1998/9. However these levels are far below the peaks that were reached during 
the late 1970s boom of some 30m kg. This is ascribed to low prices and the escalating 
costs of inputs. In early 2001, farmers were expecting to receive final payments - net of 
the costs of processing by the factories and their own advance payments and inputs -  of 
less than five shillings per kilo in some factories in Gatundu. The level and volatility of
27coffee prices in international markets and difficulties with the liberalised milling system
27 The liberalisation o f the milling system allowed private sector millers to compete with KPCU. This has created 
overcapacity in milling at a time when production has been low and according to Karanja has not therefore 
resulted in the expected cost savings (Karanja, 2002). The main new key player is Thika Coffee Mills that milled 
coffee for a number o f societies in Nyeri. These societies complained that they had not received payments for
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have resulted in some farmers cutting their coffee back to the stumps and planting 
horticultural crops instead.
5.5.2 Tea production and marketing
Compared to the coffee sector, the tea industry has been relatively stable during the 1990s. 
One tentative explanation for this is that tea is grown in Western as well as Central Kenya 
and that it is a crop that is therefore important to Moi both personally -  he has a tea estate -  
and politically. Smallholder tea farmers deliver their picked tea to the Kenya Tea 
Development Authority (KTDA) at local collection points -  tea-buying centres. This is 
then transported to the nearest tea factory for processing and sold into the international 
market via the KTDA tea auctions. In 2000 the Kenya Tea Development Agency took 
over the assets of the parastatals Kenya Tea Development Authority, and its shareholders 
are now the 45 tea factories in the country. Smallholder tea farmers own the factories.
The factories are now run through management contracts that delegate management and 
operational control to KTDA. Little therefore has changed as far as farmers are concerned, 
but the factories now have more leverage over KTDA that in the past.
Unlike coffee co-operatives, the KTDA has not developed financial services for farmers. 
Since tea picking is a year-round activity, farmers receive a monthly payment of around six 
shillings per kilo of picked tea delivered. In November they receive a bonus payment 
based on the actual price the factory has received for their tea, net of costs incurred. It is 
because of the lack of financial services provided through this marketing structure that tea 
farmers have started to form their own SACCOs during the 1990s. This is discussed 
further in Chapter Six below.
their cofee from TCM. As vet there are no clear analyses o f these dynamics and key informants accounts were 
insufficiently consistent to venture an assessment here.
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has offered a context for the analysis of real financial markets by providing an 
overview of livelihoods in Mathira and reviewing those elements of social relations and 
political economy that demonstrate persistence and pervasiveness in historical processes of 
power and accumulation.
First, in reviewing the historical and anthropological background to the Kikuyu and Mau 
Mau, the nature of two social institutions- mbari and riika -  were explained. Land access 
and control is based in lineage systems and these are key to the use of land as collateral, as 
will be examined further in Chapter Eight. Claims to land through lineage relations were 
prioritised after the closure of the land frontier and this resulted in the erosion of subsidiary 
claims. While Mau Mau must be understood as rooted in a conflict over land, this account 
has also reviewed Lonsdale’s interpretation that it contained an inner debate about the 
Kikuyu moral economy. He suggests that the debate centred on the relationship between 
private ambition and public roles, since the latter required a social basis.
This dynamic of relations between land or material wealth and the social basis of claims is 
reflected in broader analyses of African social relations, which emphasise the role of 
networks based on ethnicity, kin and other social ties on access to wealth and processes of 
accumulation -  especially patronage opportunities. In Kenya, the explosion of self-help 
activities after independence - of which co-operatives were part -exemplifies these 
processes. Hence self-help forms of service provision - such as SACCOs -  are embedded 
in these social relations.
The overview of livelihoods in Mathira demonstrates the reliance on smallholder 
agriculture in the rural areas, and particularly on tea and coffee as cash crops. Data on land 
ownership also demonstrates the ongoing importance of lineage relationships for land 
holding with 81% of households having access to land through family relationships but 
only 39% owning a title deed.
Placing Mathira and the Kikuyu in the wider context of recent economic and political 
developments, makes it apparent that social relations underlying the political economy of
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Kenya since independence have been more starkly evident in the 1990s. With the move to 
a system of multi-party politics, Moi’s position as President has required that he keep 
together an alliance of politicians with origins in minority ethnic groups in opposition to  
the Kikuyu. While elite politics has been characterised by the patronage of the state, the 
1990s have required added resources as political liberalisation has given politicians more 
room for manoeuvre.
In the light of these political economy developments, the formal financial sector has been 
reviewed in order to explain the background to some of the financial service providers 
operating in Karatina. The creation of nationally owned banks with the intention to serve 
African agriculture and business was a response to the perceived embedded bias of British- 
owned banks in serving the interests of white settlers and colonial trade. Those with 
strong commercial interests, especially the Asians and the Kikuyu, led the growth of 
NBFIs in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some are overtly discussed as ‘political banks’ 
having prominent politicians who were able to ensure large-scale deposits from 
government institutions. The banking crises that centred on the NBFIs in 1980s and 1990s 
are partly a symptom of their use for political patronage. By the 1990s, this pattern had 
spread to the main commercial banking sector and led to serious levels of non-performing 
loans in NBK and KCB. The pattern of performance of the key financial parastatal serving 
the rural sector, the AFC, can be similarly interpreted in political economy terms with 
loans and their non-payment being a means of patronage.
Finally, the structure of the coffee and tea industries was reviewed because of their 
importance to livelihoods in Mathira. The co-operative system has also been undergoing a 
process of liberalisation and changing patronage relations during the 1990s, with the 
gradual relaxation of the role of the Ministry allowing new competition for roles and 
resources. This has resulted in the transition from Union Banking Sections to SACCOs in 
the coffee sector that is discussed further in Chapter Nine. By comparison the tea industry 
has remained relatively stable.
This chapter has sought to identify dynamics of social relations that can be seen to have 
had a pervasive and persistent influence on access to resources. A key feature of this 
political economy is the complex way in which public and political legitimacy requires
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strategies of inclusion based on social relations and identity in order to gain access to wider 
circuits of accumulation and state patronage.
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Chapter 6 Financial Intermediaries in Mathira
The methodology outlined in Chapter Four explained the need to examine both the supply 
and demand sides of financial markets as evidenced through patterns of provision and use 
of financial services. This Chapter therefore describes how the supply side in Mathira is 
organised. The following chapter then examines the use of financial services from the 
demand side and investigates how these are embedded in social relations.
The first section of this chapter therefore describes the rich variety of financial 
intermediaries in Mathira, the types and numbers of intermediaries, the values of deposits 
and loans involved and the number of people using them, the products they offer and an 
account of the ways in which they have been competing. The second section then goes on 
to examine prices and profitability.
As a result of this description and analysis, the relevance of the conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter Two can begin to be assessed. The framework emphasised the 
importance of the form of the intermediary and the rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms necessary for intermediation. It was argued that these differences have clear 
implications for the nature of the products intermediaries can offer and their pricing and 
profitability. The evidence presented in this chapter enables these differences in products, 
pricing and profitability to be evaluated.
6.1 An overview of financial intermediaries
Mathira has an array of financial intermediaries spanning both the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
sectors. The survey presented below uses the categorisation developed in Chapter Two. 
Data was collected from 32 intermediaries. First, the banks, building societies and NBFIs
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are described, followed by the parastatals, SACCOs and microfinance organisations. Next, 
the ‘informal’ sector, ROSCAs, ASCAs, insurance groups and money lending are 
explained, but data on membership and values of funds intermediated for these could not 
be collected in the same way. During the fieldwork, trade credit arrangements were 
investigated but not found to be sufficiently frequent to merit further exploration. Hire 
purchase arrangements for consumer durables operated in some local branches of Nairobi 
based shops but these were also not common.
6.1.1 Banks, NBFIs and Building Societies
Banks dominate in terms of their overall share of the value of funds mobilised and lent. 
Table 6.128 shows that the banks accounted for 73% of deposits by value, 55% of 
outstanding loans by value and 24% of the number of savings accounts. It is Karatina’s 
past vibrancy as a market centre that has attracted a variety of formal financial 
intermediaries to the town and four of the five main national banks now operate there: 
Barclays, Kenya Commercial, National Bank and Co-operative Bank. Standard Chartered 
closed its branch in 1995. The NBFIs and building society, while dealing with a much 
smaller proportion of deposits by value (7%) and loans by value (9%) (though data was 
incomplete and estimates were made), held 25% of the number of savings accounts. This 
large number of savings accounts with low amounts by value is mainly due to the Equity 
Building Society, which targeted small savers. The NBFIs were Consolidated Finance 
and the Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya (HCFK) based in Nyeri. The 
intermediaries are discussed in turn.
During the late 1990s the international banks, Standard and Barclays, restructured their 
operations, resulting in Standard’s closure and the Barclays branch becoming a sub-branch 
of Nyeri. Two main factors were driving these moves. First, banks were more clearly 
defining their market segments to concentrate on the corporate sector and on “high net- 
worth” individuals within the personal banking sector. Karatina lacks such a customer 
profile. Second, macro-economic conditions of the mid-1990s were characterised by high
28 The data is presented by type o f financial intermediary rather than by individual organisation to preserve the 
confidentiality o f  data obtained. This required the amalgamation o f NBFIs and building societies into one 
category as there was only one building society.
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and volatile treasury bill rates which were the primary influence on commercial bank rates 
and which meant that people were depositing and not borrowing, leaving a high net interest 
expense.
The main way in which this move to market segmentation has affected customers has been 
through the raising of minimum balances on deposit accounts. The minimum balance is 
that which is required to avoid incurring administration charges (a fixed monthly fee per 
account) and an even higher balance is required to earn interest. As minimum balances 
increased, more account holders were in a situation where they could see charges cutting 
into their savings and this provoked much resentment. Customers are not individually 
informed about this, they find out when they visit the branch or see an announcement in 
the newspapers. If they are unaware of this procedure they can return months later to find 
their savings considerably eroded.
When Standard first raised minimum balances in 1993, Barclays responded by lowering 
theirs and attracting Standard’s customers. This led Standard to reverse the move. When 
Standard raised its minimum balances again in 1999, Barclays followed suit and other 
main commercial banks followed during 2000. However, Barclays experienced a lot of 
bad publicity since, as a bigger player in the market than Standard, this meant that a range 
of middle income professionals such as teachers, nurses and civil servants could no longer 
afford to maintain accounts there. By 2001 the minimum balance issue had turned from a 
race upwards to a race downwards -  with Barclays re-designing its approach and most 
other banks (except Standard) lowering the balance considerably. By this time, the banks 
had sacrificed much customer good will and confirmed a reputation of being arrogant and 
unresponsive to customers needs.
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Table 6.1: Value of outstanding loans and deposits for financial intermediaries in Karatina, Kenya 19981
No.
(Kshs’OOOs) of orgs Deposits % o f  Members/ No. % o f  Loans % o f  Number Average Loan-
Form al sector: (by value) total Of savings accs total (by value) to ta l of loans loan size deposit%
Banks 4 1,148,593 73 24,543 24 429,995 55 n/a n/a 37
NBFIs & Building societies3 3 113,973 7 25,663 25 70,995 9 n/a n/a 62
Parastatals4 4 0 0 0 29,961 4 232 129 n/a
Sub-total 11 1,262,566 80 50,206 49 530,951 68 42
SACCO s:
Cash-crop SACCOs 3 168,449 11 37,283 36 53,495 7 6,255 9 32
Employee SACCOs 5 90,150 6 2,277 2 80,117 10 1,888 42 89
Transport/Business SACCOs 6 12,560 1 396 0 11,448 1 164 70 91
Sub-total 14 271,159 17 39,956 39 145,060 18 8 ,307 17 53
M FO  sector:
Mainstream MFOs5 4 18,629 1 1,958 2 28,411 4 1,387 20 153
Management service MFOs6 3 43,184 3 10,329 10 82,050 10 7,230 11 190
Sub-total 7 61,813 4 12,287 12 110,461 14 8 ,617 13 179
TO TA L 32 1,576,909 101 102,449 100 786,471 100 50
Notes:
1. Data was collected for deposits and loans outstanding at the end of the last financial year for which the organisation could give information.
2. This data aggregates the numbers of accounts in each intermediary; users may of course have accounts in more than one intermediary.
3. Data for these institutions is incomplete and some estimates have been included.
4. Data for Post Office Savings was not available, as balances are not held at a branch level.
5. Mainstream MFO's deposits are in the main mobilised by the MFO but deposited in the bank so are excluded from total deposits
6. This total has been estimated based on averages from a sample of groups of one of the organisations.
On the lending side both Standard and Barclays attempted to develop products for 
unsecured lending to the personal sector for the high net-worth individuals whom they 
target. When these products were first introduced by one of the banks they failed because 
the credit scoring system for assessing applications was known to the branch staff, who 
then adjusted applications and advised customers in order to maximise their chance of 
success. These products were reintroduced using online loan assessment systems that 
enable the scoring system to be kept secret. As one bank official put it “there is no 
humanity facing that market” [053, SAM], Another explained that the purpose of these 
procedures was to ensure a standardised level of service across all branches in the country 
so that “it is not dependent on knowing the manager” [059,UIK]. He explained that 
“...scoring is very depersonalised and customers are not used to that.. .they feel we are 
being impersonal and don’t want to listen.. .the form can’t say everything” so that while 
there had been a degree of customer resistance he felt that “customers are now starting to 
understand” [059,UIK; 076,UIK].
Due to the crises at KCB and National in 1998 and 1999 there was hardly any new lending 
activity going on at the time of the survey. KCB is able to attract accounts because of its 
profile as a bank backed by the government and the extent of its branch network 
throughout the country. But in Karatina it is Equity Building Society in particular that has 
been gaining customers, in part due to the fact that it has maintained a low and stable 
minimum balance.
The Co-operative Bank has an historically specific position in the market. Set up as banker 
to the co-operative sector and owned by it, it is registered under both the Banking and Co­
operatives Acts. There has never been a restriction as to where co-operatives could bank 
but with the liberalisation of the Co-operative Act in 1997, the bank is more aware that the 
co-operatives are likely to start shopping around. It has therefore started to seek a more 
active role in the personal and business sectors. As banker to savings and credit co­
operatives (SACCOs) it has done a significant amount of work in assisting their 
development, especially through the establishment of their basic banking services (so 
called “front office services”) for non-members (see below). This means that the Co­
operative Bank does not see these providers as competition for personal customers but 
rather as a means of taking pressure off their own banking hall services. This is one of the 
clearest instances of financial layering at work. In seeking out new business opportunities, 
it started a scheme for lending to small and micro businesses with donor technical
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assistance though the funds are the bank’s own. This was targeted at customers who often 
borrow from microfmance organisations but offered individual rather than group loans. A 
bank manager in Karatina believed that the small business loans they offered were 
attracting savings accounts (as this is a condition for getting a loan) and increasing its 
market share since he thought that customers would move their account if they could see 
the prospect of getting a loan.
Equity Building Society is incorporated under the Building Societies Act. It is owned and 
managed by Kikuyus having originated in Muranga in the early 1980s and to date only 
operates branches in Nairobi and Central Province. It faced closure in 1991 when it did 
not meet liquidity requirements and, according to the CBK, depositors’ funds were being 
used to meet operating expenses and shareholders funds had been fully eroded.
Recognising that building societies were a “borrowed concept” [226,IGW] it set about 
restructuring its operations and defining itself as serving a low-income customer base. It 
received some donor funds for lending from the EU and has also received support for 
computerising and upgrading its management information systems.
Equity’s basic services are virtually indistinguishable from those of a bank although it is 
not able to offer chequebooks for its current accounts because it is outside the clearing 
system. It has become a very aggressive player in Karatina. Not only has the manager 
taken a very personal approach to recruiting customers by going out to tea and coffee 
factories, local institutions such as schools and so on, but he maintains an open door policy 
if people want to see him without an appointment. This approach is very much appreciated 
by customers in a culture where being listened to is important, even if the answer is “no” 
and is a huge contrast with the other banks where getting an appointment to see the 
manager was extremely difficult. A related means through which he recruited business in 
the low economic climate was to offer advances against salaries and tea payments, and this 
is apparently acceptable due to a number of amendments to the the Building Societies Act 
(Planet Rating, 2001). By moving into the tea farmer market, Equity presented significant 
competition to Mathira Tea Growers SACCO (see below).
Two NBFIs were surveyed. First, Consolidated Finance, which had emerged from bank 
failures of the early 1990s, was only operating deposit accounts in 1999 and had closed by 
the end o f2000. Also relevant is the Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya (HFCK), 
which has a branch in Nyeri. It was included in our research because it was the only 
formal sector intermediary that had a branch in Nyeri but not in Karatina. It has a small
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remaining shareholding by government but is now a public company with a 30% 
shareholding by CDC. It offers deposit accounts and provides long-term housing loans. It 
had some borrowers in the Karatina area who were mainly salaried professionals such as 
teachers.
This evidence suggests that the banks are major players in terms of the value of deposits 
that they mobilise and lend, and that they serve a significant proportion of users.
However, the two internationally owned banks have made deliberate attempts to target 
their services towards the corporate sector and higher-income earners - both on the savings 
side by raising minimum balances, and with unsecured lending products. This has resulted 
in the closure and downgrading of their branches in Karatina. The nationally owned banks 
followed the trend on minimum balances, and KCB and NBK have been limited in their 
new lending due to their bad debt problems. In this context, the Kikuyu owned building 
society Equity has stood out locally as particularly dynamic in seeking the business of the 
small savers and borrowers who are most abundant in Karatina.
6.1.2 Parastatals
Financial intermediaries under government origin or ownership are the PostBank, 
Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC), Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation (ICDC), Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE) and Joint Loans Board run by the 
Ministry of Trade and the Local Authority. Data on savings mobilised by PostBank was 
not available, but parastatal lenders accounted for approximately 4% of loan value 
outstanding (Table 6.1).
The PostBank is a Government owned savings bank that has separated from the Post 
Office in 1978. It exists to mobilise funds for investment in Government paper thus giving 
a 100% guarantee on deposits. It has a variety of savings products in the branch in Nyeri, 
but in Karatina the Post Office provides the service and this means it is limited to a basic 
savings account. PostBank savings accounts allow deposit and withdrawal at any PO in 
the country, an aspect of the service that make these accounts particularly useful for people 
on the move. By comparison, withdrawing funds from a bank branch other than one’s own 
can be slow and costly.
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The Karatina branch of the AFC was closed in 1999 and transferred to Nyeri. The Nyeri 
office is a large echoing building with 24 staff with little to do, as it has no funds to lend. 
The Karatina branch had not made a new loan since 1997 when it made 30 small piggery 
project loans and the outstanding loan portfolio is very small.
Government-backed loan provision to industry and commerce is via three routes that are 
targeted at different segments of the market. The ICDC in Nyeri has a small program o f 
commercial loans (Kshs200k to lm) and a very small number of clients (3) in Karatina. 
Second, Kenya Industrial Estates started life as a subsidiary of ICDC to help develop 
medium scale industry. It established its programme for the informal sector in 1988 
(Buckley, 1996) and is still Government owned. It offers loans of Kshs300-500k on an 
individual basis and for which collateral is required. It had a portfolio of about 75 loans 
outstanding and, in Karatina, regards its main competitors as the NGO-based microfinance 
organisations. Third, the Joint Loans Board (JLB) is a practically moribund organisation 
for providing loans to micro-entrepreneurs. The fund does not revolve as there are few 
resources to follow up default and repayment is predictably low. The inflow of new funds 
from the Ministry and Local Authority is minimal. The last time the board met to allocate 
loans in 1997 it lent Kshs3.8m in 104 loans, an average ofKshs36,000 per loan.
In terms of lending, parastatals are of little importance in Karatina. Data for PostBank was 
not available. It will be therefore be necessary to further assess the importance of 
parastatals from the perspective of users in Chapter Six.
6.1.3 Savings and Credit Co-operatives
The SACCO sector accounted for 40% of savings accounts by number, 17% of deposits by 
value and 18% of loans by outstanding value. In terms of the number of savings accounts 
it is clearly dealing with a significant proportion of the market, and compares well with the 
49% of deposit accounts held by the banks, building societies and NFBIs. This profile of a 
large number of accounts but with low values suggests that this sector is particularly 
important to small-scale savers and borrowers.
SACCOs in Kenya are called ‘rural’ or ‘urban’. The urban SACCOs are mainly those that 
are employee-based SACCOs, while ‘rural’ refers to SACCOs mainly linked to
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agriculture. Here, to ensure clarity, they are referred to on the basis of the common bond 
that they use and three categories can be identified: those based on cash crops; those based 
on employment; and a new and growing set of SACCOs based on business and especially 
the transport sector.
Cash crop SACCOs
Cash crop SACCOs dominate the SACCO sector in Mathira, with 11% of deposits by 
value and 36% of the number of savings accounts. This is a result of the extensive 
production of coffee in the division and the coffee marketing system in which farmers 
received payments through the Union Banking Section of the District Co-operative Union 
(see Chapter Five).
The UBS was the key provider of credit to coffee farmers in the past. Three loan products 
were developed to respond to farmers needs (Hedlund, 1992). First, a medium-term loan 
for up to three years was to enable capital investment in farm development. Second, a 
short-term loan for up to 18 months and third, a welfare loan often also used for school 
fees. This was usually referred to as an advance as it was assessed in relation to the value 
of the produce that a farmer had delivered to the society but which had not yet been paid 
for. All loans were based on past production levels and required guarantees from other 
members of the primary society. Repayments were deducted from coffee payments as they 
were received.
It was explained in Chapter Five how the coffee marketing system has been restructured. 
One of the changes has been the transformation of the Union Banking Sections (UBS) into 
SACCOs, and the second was the ‘splitting’ of the Mathira Society into 13 primary 
societies. These changes have occurred at a time when coffee prices have been in decline. 
As a consequence some farmers have found ways to evade their debts, and for others, low 
revenue has meant that they have not been able to repay. Some did this by setting up an 
account in the name of another family member in a neighbouring society and selling their 
coffee through that society so that repayments to their loans could not be deducted through 
the original account.29 The situation has also been exacerbated by instances where primary 
societies distributed advance payments in cash rather than paying them through farmer’s 
UBS/SACCO accounts. This was in order to ensure that the farmers receive the money
29 A farmer might also have decided to open an account in another society because coffee revenue was higher as 
this depends on the volume and quality o f  coffee produced in a given society and its efficiency in processing and 
marketing.
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whatever their indebtedness to the UBS/SACCO. A third problem has been the 
distribution of inputs on credit. In the previously unified system, credit for inputs took 
account of the ability of farmers to pay. With the changes, some primary societies issued 
inputs on credit and sought repayment via the farmers’ advances, which they control.
These factors have left the UBS/SACCO in a situation in which it has high arrears on loans 
issued under the old system and less ability to deduct payments at source. At the time o f  
the survey the UBS needed to clean up its balance sheet for the transition to becoming a 
SACCO and hence was concentrating on collecting old loans, having little basis on which 
to provide new credit. In the new SACCO, farmers will borrow against their shares rather 
than against their coffee income.
The KTDA tea marketing system has never provided tea farmers with credit facilities in 
the way coffee co-operatives have. The first tea SACCO was set up in the neighbouring 
district of Kirinyaga in the late 1980s. There are now two tea SACCOs in Mathira:
Mathira Tea Grower’s SACCO which was established in 1990 and started offering “front 
office services” from 1997; and the Nyeri District Tea Growers SACCO which opened an 
office in Karatina in 2001 although it had been registered and operating in the area since 
1992. These two SACCOs are competing for the membership of 7000 tea farmers in the 
Division.
The services offered by the tea SACCOs are based on lending against savings that 
comprise shares and withdrawable deposits. Purchases of SACCO shares are deducted 
from the annual tea bonus that is paid in November (see Chapter Four) and the remains of 
the payment is a deposit as are the monthly tea payments. They operate three loan types. 
First, a long-term loan for between two to four times the value of shares with a two-year 
repayment period and deductions made annually from the bonus. The amount to be 
borrowed is also gauged in relation to the farmer’s level of tea production and the loan 
repayment should not be more than two-thirds of the expected bonus. Emergency loans for 
up to Kshs10,000 and school fees loans of up to Kshs20,000 were also available and 
payable from the annual bonus. The linking of repayment to the annual bonus creates 
significant liquidity problems for Tea SACCOs. Loan availability may be limited to the 
early months of the year up to April and this also means that borrowers may be rationed to 
one and a half, or twice, their shares.
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Employee SACCOs
Employee SACCOs represent 6% of deposits by value, 10% of outstanding loan value and 
2% of the number of savings accounts (Table 6.1). Employee-based SACCOs may be 
local or national in their coverage. There are four employee SACCOs operating within 
medium-sized local employers such as the Town Council and local independent school and 
hospitals which had between 50 and 300 members each. Nyeri Teacher’s SACCO caters 
for primary school teachers throughout the district. Large private and public sector 
employers, such as ministries and companies such as Securicor, usually have SACCOs for 
their staff. The Office of the President’s “Harambee” SACCO which includes staff in the 
local administration, is the largest SACCO in the country. For the purposes of this study I 
have focused on the smaller local employee SACCOs as it was not possible to include all 
of the nation-wide employee-based SACCOs in the survey.
Employees save by buying shares on a monthly basis through an at-source deduction from 
salaries. They then borrow against their shares with guarantees against the shares of 
fellow members to provide collateral for the full loan amount. Repayments are then made 
from their salaries on a monthly basis and deducted by the employer. The loan amount is 
also restricted by the extent of salary deductions that the employee faces in order to ensure 
that the employee still has a sufficient proportion of the salary to take home. The three 
main loan products in this model are a ‘development loan’, a ‘school fees’ loan and an 
‘emergency’ loan. Development loans are usually up to three times shares, payable over 
two or three years. School fees and emergency loans have upper limits usually in the range 
Kshs10,000 to 20,000 and are payable over a year.
The model generally works well and the SACCO sector has expanded as salaried jobs have 
expanded. In small SACCOs most of the labour input is voluntary and subsidised by the 
employer as is the infrastructure of offices and stationery. Committee members are often 
paid a ‘sitting allowance’ for each meeting. As they grow they usually take on 
professional managers. However some of the large ones such as Harambee and Nyati 
reportedly have serious management problems. Retrenchment of civil servants in the 
1990s has also created default problems for some SACCOs.
“Front office services” have been a new development of the late 1990s. This is a facility 
for both members and non-members to open deposit accounts through which they can
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receive salaries and make deposits or withdrawals as they wish. This development 
responded to the need for people such as rural teachers, who were far from banks, to have a 
means through which to receive their salaries. This service was often provided by the 
UBS, which has always had “front office services” through which to pay farmers. The 
development of front office services has occurred with support from the technical advisory 
department of the Co-operative Bank but has gone almost untouched from a regulatory and 
supervisory point of view since there was no deposit protection for non-members at the 
time of the survey.
Transport and Business SACCOs
SACCOs in the transport and business sectors are a new development if currently small in 
scale -1% of deposits by value, 1% of outstanding loans and less than 1% of the number of 
savings accounts. These have grown out of self-help associations of matatu owners 
operating on particular routes. In Karatina there were four at different stages of 
development. The most organised have a system where employees at the bus stage collect 
fares from passengers and this is immediately passed to a SACCO employee. This revenue 
is used to buy shares, pay fees to the association for organising the stage, and make loan 
repayments, the remaining revenue is kept for the owner of the vehicle.
Two business SACCOs also operate in the area. Biashara SACCO is based in the Nyeri 
Chamber of Commerce and its intention was to enable entrepreneurs who had difficulty 
getting access to bank funds to get loans. The other was initiated by a local stockbroker in 
which the common bond is ownership of shares in the Nairobi Stock Exchange. This 
SACCO enables people to borrow against the security of their shares and guaranteed by 
other members rather than having to sell their shares to realise cash. A feature that these 
two SACCOs lack in comparison to thos based on cash crops, employment and transport is 
the ability to deduct repayments on loans at source and their performance is 
correspondingly problematic.
In summary, cash crop SACCOs and especially the coffee SACCO, dominate the provision 
of financial services in this sector. Tea SACCOs have developed in the 1990s and, with 
liberalisation, tea and coffee SACCOs now see the possibility to compete for each other’s 
members, although with low coffee prices tea farmers are the most attractive. Employee 
SACCOs are small in terms of their membership but provide some 10% of loans. With the 
development of front-office services in both employee and tea SACCOs, they are just
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beginning to compete with the banks for ordinary deposit accounts. SACCOs in the 
transport sector have also emerged in the 1990s. While this is a small sector, it is an 
example of self-help provision.
6.1.4 Microfinance Organisations
The microfinance sector in Mathira can be split into two. First is what we might call the 
‘mainstream’ MFOs whose origins lie in NGOs that have had donor support. These 
provide 4% of loans outstanding and mobilise 1% of deposits that are banked rather than 
on lent since MFOs are by law not permitted to on-lend savings that they mobilise. The 
data in Table 6.1 indicates that they had approximately 2,000 members with around 1400 
loans at the time of the survey. Members use these organisations to borrow rather than to 
save so that while their outreach on the savings side does not appear strong, their outreach 
in terms of lending is more significant. Second, is an alternative microfinance model 
operated by three organisations in which women form groups and on-lend their own 
savings to each other - essentially an ASCA -  with the process being managed by the 
NGO. This model provides 10% of outstanding loan value, mobilises 3% of the value o f 
deposits and deals with some 10% of the number of savings accounts.
‘Mainstream’ MFOs
There are four of these ‘mainstream’ MFOs: the Kenya Women Finance Trust; FAULU; 
the Small and Micro Enterprise Programme (SMEP) of the National Council of Churches 
of Kenya (NCCK); and K-REP which registered as a bank in 1999.30 They operate very 
similar programmes based on the group lending microcredit model in which members must 
first save and when taking loans provide their savings as collateral for the loans of other 
members. The main product is very similar across the organisations and consists of a loan 
usually for 50 weeks, repayable in equal instalments with either weekly or monthly 
repayments. Apart from KWFT, the programmes work with both men and women.
It is only in the late 1990s that MFOs have started to compete with each other more 
actively. Initially they thought borrowers should only belong to a single organisation with 
concern that multiple membership was likely to result in over borrowing and default
30 Because this had only just occurred at the time o f the survey, it is treated here as an NGO based MFO.
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(Oketch and Wachira, 1996). While they have at times sought to collaborate to crosscheck 
lists of borrowers, this has rarely been effective in practice. It is partly because of multiple 
memberships that there is a view among MFOs that Karatina5 s market is saturated.
MFO managed ASCAs
The model originated with an NGO called Partnership for Productivity (PFP). When 
donors withdrew their support for a range of activities with women's groups in 1994 PFP 
decided to work with those groups that had been saving and developed a model in which 
they assist it to manage its funds. There are now two organisations operating this model 
alongside PFP which were started up by ex-PFP staff: the Women's Enterprise 
Development Institute (WEDI) and Small Enterprise Development Institute (SEDI).
In this model, members save (called shares) and the money saved is lent out to other 
members. There are two types of loans: advances which are for a month but may be rolled 
over if the interest is paid (gubasho); and loans which are for any period between about 
five and 24 months. The advances are taken for a month and charged at 10% per month. 
The loans are taken for between 15 and 24 months and charged at 17% flat per year, repaid 
in equal monthly instalments. PFP’s role is simply to manage the group's finances, in 
particular to manage default. For this service the MFO charges 1% per month of the value 
of the revolving loan fund to a maximum of Kshs2,500 per month (or roughly Kshs 100 
per member). In this model the interest on loans goes back into the fund and at the end of 
the year a dividend is calculated and accrues to the members, usually in the form of 
additional shares. Groups must register with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. 
The organisations have a very few men's groups but reported that they found it easier to 
work with women.
Approximately 10,000 women belonged to these organisations in Mathira, and this is 
evidence of the rapid growth of this model between 1995 and 1999. Entry costs to the 
business are very low as there are virtually no fixed costs: staff use public transport, offices 
are rented, bookkeeping systems are predominantly manual and salaries are low. Once the 
technology of the model is understood anyone can start up offering these services, hence 
the way in which ex-staff have established new organisations of their own. However, 
caution with the membership figures is necessary. When default in groups becomes 
serious, the income of the MFO starts to fall as their service fee is related to the funds 
available. In order to retain income the MFOs therefore form new groups and old ones
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tend not to be disbanded so that figures probably over-estimate the number of active 
clients. There are minor differences in their models and intense rivalry between them. But 
between them they had a total of approximately 29,000 members in July 2001, with 
outreach extending to Laikipia, Nanyuki, Othaya and Kerugoya. .
In the MFO sector, the managed ASCA model had approximately five times as many 
members as the four main MFOs, and has mobilised three times the value of deposits and 
made two and half times the value of outstanding loans. By comparison to mainstream 
MFOs it has not benefited from donor funding, and it is relatively unknown even by their 
local managers, who do not perceive that they are competing for the same clients. While 
the main MFOs tend to concentrate on people with businesses, the managed ASCA model 
accommodates a much wider range of female clients including employees and farmers.
6.1.5 ROSCAs and ASCAs
Mathira abounds with group based financial arrangements, called “iteti”, a term which 
applies to both ROSCAs and ASCAs. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs) are the most common model in which members save on a regular basis and one 
member takes the fund in the order in which their names are balloted.31 This system 
particularly thrives in and around the open-air vegetable market where women often 
belong to a number of them. The oldest ROSCA we found in operation was one that 
started in 1976 and the ballot (kwamba) of members, which allocates a number in the 
rotation, has never been re-drawn. A more unusual feature of the operation of many of the 
ROSCAs in the open-air market was that in some cases members do not know each other 
and the group never meets. A “collector” collects the money, and as members leave, 
people who are introduced to the collector replace them. New members are very often put 
at the end of the list as it may not be known how trustworthy they are in making 
contributions. From this position they cannot upset the cycle by not paying once they have 
received their payout. There are benefits which the collector can gain from taking on this 
role: being first in the ballot; being able to make their own contribution on the contribution 
day as late as possible (important in the market if business is slow); and status in the 
community.
31 While there are a number o f  systems o f allocating the fund including auctions, only ballots and allocation on 
the basis o f need were found to be operating here.
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Rurally based gitetis are more likely to involve a meeting of members on a weekly or 
monthly basis. Attendance may be compulsory depending on the by-laws. Many groups 
based in town also meet regularly although some members may never actually attend, 
instead sending their contribution via another member. Some people who save in ROSCAs 
may be invisible to the group because they are being “carried” by other members - called 
“gukuud’ which literally means “being carried on the back”. A member may take a stake 
in a ROSCA for which someone she knows, but whose name does not appear on the list, 
makes the contributions. Some groups say that they do not encourage this because it 
increases risks, but it is not possible to guard against it completely.
The abundance of groups that we encountered appears to imply the ease with which 
ROSCAs are formed and operate. Yet many ROSCAs fail and people may lose their 
money. When a ‘stake’ becomes available in one of the established ROSCAs it is often 
taken up by an existing member because she wants to be able to save more and because the 
members do not want the risk of bringing in new members.
The character of the groups can also vary in terms of the degree of strictness with which 
contributions have to be made with some charging fines for late contributions. Others are 
“patient” (kurekera) and if members are a day or two late with their contributions, they are 
not penalised if it is for a ‘genuine’ reason. But if this behaviour is seen as laziness the 
person will be pushed out of the group at the end of the cycle. It was not apparent what 
factors produce these differences in the character of groups.
Compared to ROSCAs, ASCAs are fewer in number. In these, members save in a fund 
which they lend to each other. Interest is accumulated into the fund and used to pay out a 
dividend. Some of these systems are time-bound with the pot being divided up and paid 
out at an agreed date. The funds were loaned out at between 3% and 5% per month 
depending on the rate agreed on by the members. The main difference between SACCOs 
and ASCAs is that the former are regulated and members are required to have a common 
bond, i.e. a basis of common interest. Other aspects are very similar: a number of the 
ASCAs work on the basis of giving loans as a multiple of two, three, or four times savings; 
they also used the shares of other members to guarantee loans. In some cases household 
assets were also pledged.
Due to their informality, it was not possible to estimate the numbers of ROSCAs and 
ASCAs or the value of funds they handle for comparison with the figures in Table 6.1.
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However, many informants reported that both types of group had become increasingly 
popular since the mid-1990s.
6.1.6 Insurance groups
A further group-based system that operates at village level is a system of mutual aid or 
insurance groups. Members are usually households whose head comes from the same 
mbari (sub-clan). Members contribute a set amount on the death of a member and the 
groups are usually between 100 households and up to about 300 households. It is the 
household head’s responsibility to contribute, and single mothers are able to join. The 
level of contributions is usually low and was reported to be in the region of Kshs20 to 50. 
These collections take place on the death of a member but may also be made to cover 
circumstances such as serious hospitalisation case or a house being burnt down.
Some of these groups had however shifted from ad hoc contributions in the event of a 
problem to regular contributions. This they explained was due to the difficult economic 
situation, since when problems actually arose it was often found that households did not 
have the funds available to contribute. Regular contributions allowed funds to be 
collected, put in a savings account and to be paid out when the need arose. A number o f 
groups operating ROSCAs and ASCAs were also operating these insurance systems with 
some being quite sophisticated having specified levels of payout for different eventualities 
such as death of the member or close relative and hospitalisation. This is discussed further 
in Chapter Eight.
6.1.7 Moneylending
The money-lending business carried out by individuals in Karatina is relatively small. We 
identified and interviewed seven active moneylenders, one who had retired and one who 
had gone out of business. Apart from two who had clients in their villages, they mainly 
operated in Karatina town. The total value of their combined portfolios did not exceed 
Kshslm (£8,500).
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The seven active moneylenders fell into two groups. Three were employees of a security 
company and were relatively recent entrants to the money-lending business in Karatina. 
Two of these were men who lent to colleagues and people in town including to employees 
of the banks where they are guards, and the other was a woman employee of the same 
security company.32 The other category was four elderly men who started money lending 
in the 1970s and 1980s. These all gave consistent accounts of the changing money-lending 
market in the 1990s. They reported that it was in 1997, when the economic situation 
deteriorated and repayment became difficult, that they started to become cautious and take 
collateral. However their methods differed. One preferred not to take collateral such as 
radios, bicycles and TVs, preferring instead to lend to employees and tea farmers against 
their savings book. This allowed the lender to assess what amount to lend and when the 
money was received in the account, the borrower had to go to find the moneylender to get 
the bank passbook in order to withdraw and he would get his repayment at the same time.
6.1.8 Conclusion
This survey of financial intermediaries has demonstrated that all of the forms of 
intermediation discussed in Chapter Two exist in Karatina. While banks dominate in terms 
of their shares of deposits and loans, when it comes to accounts they have only some 24% 
of the total number. It is one particularly dynamic Kikuyu-owned building society that 
results in the NBFIs having an almost similar share of accounts as it has actively pursued 
low-income clients. The SACCO sector, dominated by the coffee SACCO, has a much 
larger proportion of members than deposits and loans and this also suggests its importance 
for poorer people. The mainstream MFOs were also found to have a smaller market share 
than MFO managed ASCA programmes.
A particularly interesting feature of this survey was that most managers perceived that their 
competitors were the intermediaries that were most like them in terms of organisational 
form, hence banks looked at other banks, and mainstream MFOs looked at the performance 
of other MFOs when comparing their products and performance. The exception was 
competition between Equity Building Society and the tea SACCOs for tea farmer’s 
accounts. This suggests that managers themselves perceived the market to be strongly 
segmented.
32 This woman did not lend against collateral as she feared that people might come and steal it from her house. 
She also charged 5% less per month than her male colleagues.
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While data for the informal sector is not available, there is an abundance of ROSCAs and 
ASCAs in Mathira. Moreover, the MFO managed ASCAs demonstrate a high degree o f 
popularity. Chapter Two categorised SACCOs, ROSCAs and ASCAs as all forms of 
mutually based financial intermediation. Putting the data on SACCOs and managed 
ASCA programmes together suggests that these involve 21% of deposits, 28% of loans and 
49% of users. The implication is that mutually-based forms of finance involve more than 
half of financial service users, and that these mobilise and on lend between 20% and 30% 
of funds. But this is even before any account is taken of independent ROSCAs and 
ASCAs which are clearly abundant. This evidence therefore suggests that the mutual 
sector -  both formal and informal -  is an important form of financial intermediation.
A further contrast between the banks and mutuals can be seen in the loan to deposit ratios 
in the final column of Table 6.1. The banks had on lent 37% of their deposits locally, 
while NBFIs and building societies had on-lent 62%. The ratio for the whole of the 
SACCO sector is 53%. The low level of 32% for cash-crop SACCOs reflects the 
difficulties that the coffee SACCO has had in making new loans since 1997. However, for 
employee and transport SACCOs, these figures are at around 90%. The figure for the 
managed ASCA programmes is even higher at 190%. This reflects the fact that fimds in 
ASCAs grow rapidly as high rates of interest are charged and paid into the fund, hence the 
fund available for lending is higher than the share capital alone. This difference in ratios is 
indicative of the fact that these local organisations must on-lend locally to their members 
whereas the banks have the option of moving deposits to other branches. Since, as one 
manager commented, savers are likely to put their savings where they have a chance of 
taking loans, this makes SACCOs and ASCAs more attractive places to save than banks.
6.2 Pricing and Profitability
This section analyses the interest rates offered by financial intermediaries on savings and 




Ordinary savings accounts offered by banks, NBFIs and SACCO front office services33 
offer simple annual interest rates34 of between 3% and 8% per annum. However these 
rates in SACCOs may often be paid retrospectively on the basis of what the SACCO can 
afford. Fixed deposit account returns tend to peak for 3 month periods as the financial 
institutions tend to invest in 3 month Government Treasury Bills (TBs). Since TBs are 
usually three-month investments, rates on fixed deposit accounts for 6,9 or 12 months fall 
off, as this relies on the banks re-investing the fimds and TB rates are highly variable. 
ROSCAs and current accounts carry a nominal interest rate of zero.
Dividends on SACCO shares lie between 0 and 5% annually and must be invested for at 
least a year before shares are eligible for dividends. SACCOs that are in their first five 
years of operation are very unlikely to offer savers any kind of dividend during this period; 
indeed they may well have made losses during this period (see below). The situation was 
different for the coffee UBS/SACCO in the period to 1997. The UBS offered an interest 
rate of approximately 10% on deposits. This was a means of ensuring that savers obtained 
returns since the DCU might otherwise use income from the UBS to cross-subsidise other 
less profitable businesses, and farmers were then unlikely to receive dividends via their 
primary societies.
Dividends to ASCA members (MFO managed ASCAs and independent ones) ranged from 
15% upwards. Since these are annual dividends it is again necessary to invest in the 
ASCA for at least one year. These returns may continue over time and some managed 
ASCAs offered dividends of over 50% on savings per annum.
The range of potential returns is therefore significant -  from 0% (nominal) in current 
accounts and ROSCAs to 50% and above in ASCAs, with returns to SACCO shares 
requiring long-term investment in the SACCO.
33 SACCOs with front office services such as Nyeri Teachers and the cash crop SACCOs offer a deposit rate on 
these funds which is independent o f  the return to shares via dividends.
34 It would be better to compare effective rates that take into account the various charges that might be incurred 
— as has been done for loans below. However, the differences in conditions on savings accounts and the charges 
they incur along with the constantly fluctuation o f minimum balances over the period meant that this was hard 
to do, and so nominal figures are presented.
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Interest on loans
In order to examine the interest rates that borrowers actually pay it is necessary to calculate 
effective declining balance interest rates taking into account the terms and conditions of 
the service on offer. An internal rate of return (IRR) method has been used and the 
interest rate calculated for a standard loan size over one year, including all of the 
application and related transaction costs which the financial intermediary levies. Where 
members are required to hold a stock of savings or shares and/or to continue saving while 
repaying the loan this is also taken into the IRR calculation to establish the full financial 
cost of the loan to the borrower. This method therefore establishes an interest rate for the 
net additional liquidity gained through borrowing (see Annex Two).
Lending interest rates are schematically represented in Figure 6.2. Starting with the 
highest rates, moneylenders were mainly charging 30% per month (360% p.a.) and are by 
far the most expensive funds available. One had raised his rate from 40% to 50% in 2001 
seeking to find out whether customers were “serious”. Since there are no fees or 
compulsory savings, and collateral may or may not be required depending on the lender.
MFO managed ASCAs offer advances at a rate of 10% per month and members can 
borrow twice their savings. This therefore computes to 20% per month and a declining 
balance rate o f240% per annum. Loans for periods of between six and twelve months 
from either mainstream MFOs or MFO managed ASCAs offered interest rates in the 
region of 60 to 120%. But this is also the source of high dividends or returns to savings as 
noted above. Individual enterprise lending involves KIE and the Co-operative Bank’s 
lending programme for small business and these organisations charge effective interest 
rates of between 40% and 62%.
Bank interest rates were between 28 and 32%35 at the time of the research. However these 
effective annual rates include fees charged by the bank but do not include other fees 
involved e.g. in valuing and charging land which can in practice considerably raise the 
costs of bank borrowing. Evidence from a small number of bank borrowers who had gone 
through the process of charging land to the bank, suggested that the costs ranged from a 
nominal amount charged by Barclays (which had internalised the charging process and 
were at that time considering charging customers for the service), to Kshs 20-40,000 for
35 After the first round o f fieldwork, bank base rates dropped substantially and stood at 18% in late 2001. If 
bank margins over base are included comparable rates are now 20-25% .
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loans from other banks where loans were in the range Kshs 200-400,000. These charges 
therefore represented in the region of 10% of the loan amount. However, even if this is 
included in the calculations for a loan of, for example, Kshs500,000 over three years, it 
does not raise the interest rate significantly.
SACCO interest rates were controlled at 12% per annum declining balance until the 1997 
Co-operatives Act. Figure 6.2 demonstrates that the effective nominal interest rate on 
SACCO borrowing is approximately 30%. This was therefore about the same as the cost 
of bank borrowing once the opportunity costs of non-withdrawable shares and ongoing 
saving were taken into account. A small number of SACCOs had raised their rates after 
liberalisation but most were still charging a nominal 12% per annum. The financial costs 
in terms of lending fees are usually very low and the application process is very simple, 
requiring only a form and the signatures of guarantors. One effect of this level of interest 
rates is that SACCOs find it hard to borrow from banks to supplement their funds for on 
lending.
Cash crop SACCOs were charging 16-18%, and again worked on multiples of shares, 
which, for the local tea SACCO was two. This therefore approximately doubled the 
interest rate. Past loans in the coffee sector through the Union Banking Sections were on 
the basis of the past three years coffee payments so that at that time they were a much 
cheaper source of credit (since they did not involve compulsory savings). The cheapest 
loans potentially available were medium-term agricultural loans from AFC at 17% 
declining balance but, as indicated above, this source has had very few funds to lend in the 
1990s.
The only source of loan funds for more than five years was mortgages from HFCK. These 
rates were lower than for bank loans and computed to effective annual interest rates of just 
under 20%.
Hence borrowing from SACCOs - especially employee SACCOs -  did not carry a much 
lower interest rate than borrowing from banks and NBFIs once the opportunity cost of 
ongoing savings requirements are taken into account. This is contrary to the common 
perception of borrowers who perceived SACCO lending to be much cheaper because they 
did not take into account the opportunity cost of their savings.
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An important dynamic of banking sector interest rates in the 1990s has been their level and 
variability. Figure 6.3 shows monthly weighted average deposit and loan rates for the 
1990s. From July 1991 to July 1993, both deposit and lending rates were gently drifting 
upwards, but from mid-1993 they rose rapidly. From early 1994 deposit rates started to 
fall quickly resulting in a substantial increase in spreads. Spreads rose from approximately 
five per cent in the early 1990s to levels of 12% to 15% from mid-1994 onwards. This 
increase in spreads was accompanied by increased variability in the level of lending rates 
that is apparent from 1993 onwards. Moreover, when examined in real terms, lending 
rates moved to unprecedented levels in the period 1998 to 1999 having actually been 
negative in the early 1990s. This was largely a result of Treasury Bill rates (Figure 6.4). 
With the government borrowing via TBs, the banks had the option of investing in these 
securely rather than the uncertainty of investing in the economy. Thus their lending rates 
were usually higher than TB rates. But these high and volatile rates produced added risk 
and uncertainty for bank borrowers.
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By contrast SACCO rates are very sticky. Changing the interest rate in a SACCO, or an 
ASCA, requires that members vote at the AGM to do this. The fact that SACCOs have 
not, on the whole, changed their interest rates demonstrates this point. Especially in 
employee SACCOs where the majority of members have loans at any one time, it is 
unlikely that members would vote for interest rates to rise.
Figure 6.4: Treasury Bill and Inflation Rates 1989-2001
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Source: International Financial Statistics (various years); Central Bank of Kenya, 2001
Conclusion
This analysis shows that interest rates on both the deposit and lending sides are extremely 
diverse and the result of different dynamics in the different intermediaries. Bank rates 
have been heavily influenced by the macro-economy and especially by Treasury Bill rates. 
SACCO rates were regulated until 1997 and since then it is mainly the cash crop SACCOs 
that have raised rates. In employee SACCOs members are usually debtors and unlikely to 
vote for a rise.
The convergence of SACCO and bank rates in this analysis is coincidental since bank rates 
fell soon after the survey was undertaken, to around 20%. In fact the high levels of interest 
rates and profits recorded by the banks precipitated a reaction in parliament when a private 
member’s bill - the “Donde Bill” - was tabled in 2000 to limit interest rates on loans to 4% 
over the TB rate, and ensure that the banks paid 70% of the TB rate on deposits. The bill’s
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passage into legislation was controversial and the means of its implementation 
problematic. But the important point here is that the bill represented a backlash against 
some of the banks in the wake of their reporting high profit levels in a context of overall 
poor macroeconomic performance.36
But the influences on interest rates clearly do not result from the regulatory environment 
alone. Moneylenders are unregulated and can decide what to charge. MFO lenders 
charge a wide range of rates and ASCA members can decide what to charge themselves. It 
is hard to justify these differences on the basis that the market is in any sense 
homogeneous. Rather, these differences do appear to be rooted in the nature of the 
organisations undertaking the financial intermediation. This argument is further explored 
in the next section where the profitability of these different organisations is examined.
6.2.2 Profitability
This section examines the profitability of the different financial intermediaries. As was 
discussed in Chapter Three, obtaining data on profitability for branch operations in 
Karatina was very difficult. The analysis here is therefore based on data available.
First, the profitability of the main banks in Kenya is examined at the aggregate level. 
Figure 6.5 shows trends in return on capital employed37 (ROCE) for the period 1983 to 
2000. ROCE is the ratio of profits before tax to shareholder’s funds and net assets, and 
reflects how well both owners’ and creditors’ funds are being used to generate income.
The figure shows highly variable returns over this period ranging from near zero returns in 
the mid-1980s to reasonably stable returns in the early 1990s (30-50%) with these 
widening hugely in the period 1993 to 1995 when Barclays earned over 100%. However 
the period 1995 to 2000 has seen a dramatic decline in returns with the Co-operative Bank 
and NBK plummeting to negative 150%, while Barclays and Standard Chartered have 
managed to retain positive and relatively high levels of returns.
36 A more cynical interpretation is that it represented an attempt by many politicians at self-preservation as their 
debts spiralled out o f control.
37 Return on total assets and return on equity were also examined, but all show very similar trends so return on 
capital employed was selected as the key indicator o f profitability as it could be examined for other types of 
intermediary also.
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Source: Maroko Investment Advisory Services (2000); Market Intelligence (various years)
This performance can be explained by two main factors: the Treasury bill market and the 
heavy non-performing loan portfolios of the national banks. As was highlighted in Chapter 
Four, the government used treasury bills in the 1990s to fund its budget in the absence o f 
donor funds. Since the main sources of funds to purchase them were bank deposits, the 
banks bought TBs on a large scale. The returns on TBs between 1995 and 1998 were 
secure and high, since deposit rates remained low and banks were not competing on 
deposit rates for customer’s funds, (see Figure 6.5). This was therefore an easy means of 
making profits without the risk of investing in an increasingly uncertain economy.
It was to a large extent the high TB rates that resulted in the high levels of profits earned 
by Barclays and KCB in the period 1993-5. By the late 1990s TB rates started to fall, but 
the internationally owned banks were able to maintain their returns because of their well- 
established lending to the multinational business sector. A senior banker did admit that 
bank failures had also weakened competition and that they had seized the opportunity for 
increased profits in the mid-1990s. According to him there has subsequently been 
increased market segmentation for corporate and high worth personal customers, which has 
reduced their ability to cross-subsidise other aspects of their business (OG,234).
Moreover, national subsidiaries of internationally owned banks have to satisfy the return 
requirements of the parent group, which necessarily requires the targeting of the most 
profitable segments. While the nationally owned banks also suffered a decline in returns 
from TBs, their underlying problems were much worse as a result of their non-performing 
loan portfolios, which for KCB, NBK and Co-operative Bank38 started to rise dramatically 
(Table 6.2). The causes of this were explained in Chapter Four.
Table 6.2: Non-Performing Loans in the Banking Sector
Total NP L/Total Advances (%)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Barclays 4.34 9.29 9.55 9.24
KCB 7.96 16.8 34.29 42.18
Standard 19 23.96 15.06 14.88
NBK 0 56.03 68.27 70.21
Co-operative 0 8 34.65 48.64
38 The problems at Co-operative were not a result o f  mismanagement and political influence. Their portfolio - 
which is heavily agricultural via the co-operatives - suffered from variable weather conditions which brought 
excess rains in 1997 followed by drought, and the bombing o f the American Embassy in Nairobi in 1999 when 
their officers were also severely affected.
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By contrast the profitability of the SACCO sector is subject to an entirely different set o f  
influences. As was pointed out in Chapter Two, the dividends on shares in the SACCO 
sector do not represent a return on equity in the same way as a bank. Rather dividends are 
returns on savings and are usually calculated at the end of the year. These dividend rates 
were compared with bank deposit rates in Figure 6.1. In order therefore to present 
comparable data, the return on capital employed has also been calculated for the small 
number of local SACCOs for which data was available and this is presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Return on Capital Employed39 in Local SACCOs (%)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Wikio 3.1 5.7
Mt Kenya Investors -2.1 -3.0 -1.9
MRM -3.5 -0.4 -0.5
2NK -1.8 2.8 2.7
Nyeri Teachers 5.15*
Mean -2.5 0.6 1.5
* - Nyeri Teachers offers a retrospective fixed rate on all deposits that has been included in this calculation.
The pattern of returns in Mt Kenya Investors, MRM and 2NK appears to be common to 
small SACCOs in their first few years of operation. None of the first four SACCOs in the 
table has more than 200 members. These small SACCOs operate on high levels of 
voluntary inputs of labour and resources to get them going. In the case of employee 
SACCOs, the employer usually indirectly supports overheads. For example, Wikio 
SACCO for the 142 employees of Karatina Town Council, benefits from skilled employees 
such as accountants who manage the SACCO; deductions are made from salaries at source 
and it does not need to rent offices, pay for utilities and so on. This SACCO consistently 
makes positive nominal returns and has paid out dividends of between 2% and 5% to 
shareholders in the period since 1991. By contrast the transport SACCOs (MRM and 
2NK) are struggling to develop a viable infrastructure since they must rent offices and 
employ staff at the bus stage. Nevertheless Committee members provide a lot of voluntary 
input at the early stages and costs are kept as low as possible. In that they can make 
deductions at the stage, transport SACCOs have greater prospects for success than a 
SACCO such as Mt Kenya Investors that has to rely on members to repay loans by coming 
to the office. Members of small SACCOs are prepared to withstand losses in the short 
term in view of the anticipated benefits of taking loans in the future. Losses made may be
39 The ROCE calculated here is based on earning over end year capital employed rather than on average capital 
for the year. This would in general result in a slight understatement o f returns since capital is generally increasing 
year on year.
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recovered in subsequent years and once these are covered dividends may be paid out. The 
Nyeri Teacher’s SACCO on the other hand, is much bigger. With 6,700 members in Nyeri 
District overall, it has been operating since 1976 and has 17 staff. While the returns of 
Wikio and Nyeri Teachers are low compared to the banking sector, these also reflect a 
return on shares of approximately 5-6% which is roughly equivalent to bank deposit rates.
For the cash crop SACCOs there are sufficient volumes of funds involved that they can 
afford offices and staff but the data to analyse their returns was not available. However, 
returns to share capital are also usually negative in the early years of operation before 
becoming low and stable.
For the parastatal sector, the accounts for AFC were not available, however some 
secondary data was available for the early 1990s. The high levels of default were noted in 
Chapter Four. Otima reports that between 1984 and 1990 operating costs stood at 13.34% 
of portfolio outstanding comprising 7.14% cost of fimds and 6.2% cost of loan 
administration. Excluding the cost of default and considering only interest charges, AFC 
was operating at a loss of 1.5% since the weighted average lending rate stood at 11.84% 
(Otima, 1994). This situation is unlikely to have improved in the late 1990s, as the 
collection rate remained low, and AFC was unable to raise new funds for lending.
In the MFO sector, only K-REP has become a commercially viable operation. It turned 
itself into a Bank in 1999 and was registering a 2.7% return on capital employed in 2000 
(Market Intelligence, 2001). However at the same time, shareholder funds stood at 189% 
of total deposits reflecting the high level of minimum core capital that K-REP required to 
register as a bank and the relatively low levels of deposits that it had by then mobilised.
None of the other main MFOs were commercially viable but were supported by donor 
fimds. However their operations in the Karatina area are of differing degrees of 
profitability. Faulu, K-REP and KWFT reported that their branches in the Mt Kenya 
region were cost covering. In most cases this transition to local level profitability had 
occurred in the previous two years, and these branches were helping to cross-subsidise 
operations in other parts of the country.
Return on invested fimds, see Table 6.4, is the available indicator that is most closely 
comparable to return on capital employed. This shows negative returns although they are 
reducing over the period. Overall these figures reflect the origins of MFOs as donor
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funded organisations and whether they can become commercially viable is still 
unanswered. However, it is clear that the costs of these organisations are higher than 
SACCOs and MFOs managing ASCAs, and this helps explain the levels of interest rates 
that these organisations charge.
Table 6.4: Profitability and Sustainability of Two Kenyan MFOs
Indicator KW FT FAULU
1997-8 1998-9 1998 1999
(August)
Operating self- 
sufficiency 73% 77% 75% 85%
Financial Self- 
sufficiency 57% 64% 62% 74%
Sustainable 




67% 85% 63% 86%
Source: DFID-BPED Output to  Purpose Reviews h ovem ber 1999
Data for rates of return on ASCAs is very difficult to obtain. One independent ASCA 
called the Microenterprise Development Association (MEDA) and run by a group of 
businessmen in Karatina, operated by funding operational costs directly from member’s 
contributions. For example, the rent for the room where they met was raised from all the 
members when it was due. Thus no costs were deducted from the loan fund for operational 
expenses. At the end of 2000, the return on shares distributed to members was 9%. While 
this figure is effectively an interest rate on shares, it is also virtually equivalent to a return 
on capital employed. However, similarly to the small SACCOs, dividends had not been 
paid in earlier years. However, if there is no default (as in fact there had not been), the 
organisation cannot operate at a loss.
The profitability of money lending operations is extremely difficult to assess. Although we 
monitored the portfolio of three moneylenders over a period of four to five months the 
ways they were operating their businesses were very different and made it difficult to be 
confident about conclusions that might be drawn from an analysis of the data. It was clear 
that the portfolio of one was in a very poor state and it is likely that it was our interview 
with him that made him realise this. He had many radios and bicycles at his house but did 
not want to sell any of them until he had met with the borrower and agreed this. The 
following month he had stopped giving loans and was concentrating on collection.
Another moneylender experienced serious default in 2000 and pursued the debtors through
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the courts, as they were large loans. The debtors spent time in civil jail but at the end o f  
2001, they had still not paid him.
To conclude, the implications of this analysis of profitability are, first, that returns to 
different types of financial intermediary are quite different and determined by very 
different influences. It is clear that returns in the banking sector tend to move in the same 
direction and be subject to similar influences. Returns have varied from positive figures of 
over 100% for Barclays in the mid-1990s to negative returns for other banks in the late 
1990s. The influences on these returns have been strongly related to the macro-economic 
and wider political environments.
By contrast, the SACCO sector, especially local SACCOs operate at low levels of ROCE. 
In general they present losses in the early years of their operation but stabilise over time 
and then generally produce returns that are low and stable but negative in real terms. 
ASCAs on the other hand appear to produce higher returns than SACCOs, since they are 
equivalent to the dividend on shares. The AFC, by contrast, has become moribund due to 
its inability to raise interest rates without government agreement, its chronic default 
problems and its lack of funds for re-structuring. It cannot be liquidated either under the 
banking or companies act but must be specifically dealt with by government. It has 
therefore remained in existence but is an insignificant player.
MFOs have been a feature of donor-funded finance in the 1990s, reflecting the shift of 
donor support from government, and in this case parastatal lenders, to the NGO sector.
Only K-REP had become self-reliant and it is not yet clear whether the other MFOs will 
achieve this, though they are under heavy pressure from donors to do so.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter set out to describe the way in which financial intermediation in Mathira is 
organised and to assess the relevance to its analysis of the conceptual framework set out in 
Chapter Two. A wide array of financial intermediaries has been reviewed and some of the 
influences affecting their operation, pricing and profitability have been discussed.
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First, the data on deposits and loans outstanding by value suggests that banks dominated 
but held only 24% of the number of accounts. The dynamic Kikuyu-owned Equity 
building society had a large number of accounts although this sector of the market 
mobilises fewer deposits. However, the evidence particularly demonstrates the importance 
of the mutual sector. The data on SACCOs and managed ASCA programmes showed that 
these accounted for 21% of deposits, 28% of loans and 49% of accounts - also suggesting 
that their customers tend to be those with small amounts to save. However this data does 
not capture the informal mutuals -  the ROSCAs and ASCAs - whose abundance suggests 
that this sector is likely to be more important in terms of outreach than the evidence 
presented here suggests. MFOs were found to represent a small proportion of lending and 
accounts.
Despite the dominance of the banking sector in deposit mobilisation, the data suggests that 
it performs relatively poorly in terms of the proportion of its deposits lent locally. This is 
especially the case in comparison to managed ASCAs and SACCOs which lend higher 
proportions of their subscribed funds since profits are built up in the fund and can also be 
lent.
Simple nominal rates on deposits were compared and lending rates were converted into 
effective nominal annual declining-balance rates. Rates on savings accounts were found to 
be highly diverse ranging from zero in bank current accounts and ROSCAs to returns to 
shares in ASCAs of around 10% and above. On the lending side rates ranged from 
moneylenders charging 360% to AFC rates of 17% that are still controlled even if funds 
are not available.
The argument of the new institutional economics is that in order to understand differences 
in lending rates it is necessary to take into account the transactions costs incurred by 
lenders in raising funds, making loans, covering default and making a profit (or return to 
capital employed). The analysis here incorporated the financial transactions costs incurred 
by borrowers in taking a loan as a result of its conditions but did not attempt to analyse the 
cost to the financial intermediaries of actually making loans. Nevertheless, the discussion 
clearly illustrates that the processes of price formation differ significantly between these 
types of intermediaries. The section on profitability also confirms with examples the 
discussion of the different cost elements involved in lending that were laid out in Table 
3.3.
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The analysis of profitability examined rates of return on capital employed. For the main 
banks these have been high and volatile over the 1990s. The explanation concerned the 
role of macro-economic factors. Treasury Bills provided safe investments and high 
returns in the mid-1990s. But the poor lending performance of the nationally owned banks 
became dramatically apparent when CBK provision rules changed (see Chapter Five, 
pl21) and income from TBs started to fall.
By contrast, SACCOs (and especially the small local ones) are relatively immune from 
these macroeconomic influences. Historically law has determined SACCO interest rates, 
but even with liberalisation only some have increased their rates. This reluctance to raise 
rates can be understood because most members are borrowers -  especially in employee 
SACCOs - and this means that they are unlikely to vote for the rate to rise. For ASCAs on 
the other hand, higher interest rates can more quickly and easily be seen to benefit 
members because the interest produces more funds to be lent and dividends paid to 
members can be very high. For both SACCOs and ASCAs, costs can be kept low through 
high levels of voluntary and subsidised input, and members decide on the level of interest 
rates. Returns in these mutual intermediaries therefore result from both their internal 
structure and the wider policy environment.
The similarities of organisational form between AFC and MFOs are also apparent -  
Chapter Two referred to them as “transfer-based” forms of intermediation. Both have been 
dependent on donor funds, as they cannot raise deposits. AFC, despite its losses cannot be 
liquidated without government agreement and it has been a tool of political patronage. 
MFOs are also loss making, apart from K-REP. The remaining MFOs are the subject of a 
donor experiment to establish self-sustaining lenders and hence can carry losses while they 
can sustain donor support.
The lack of financial layering in the market could also be seen as evidence of 
fragmentation and this is caused by specific constraints to interaction between 
intermediaries. Thus it could be argued that the difficulties SACCOs face in borrowing 
from the banks stem from the fact that they do not charge nominal interest rates that would 
enable them to cover the cost of funds from the bank because past legislation has prevented 
it. However, there is no reason why this could not continue even in a liberalised 
environment and examples show that it does.
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An analysis of information and transactions costs would regard these differences in returns 
as evidence of fragmentation since risk-adjusted returns are not comparable. However, the 
argument here is that this fragmentation is a function of the organisational form of the 
financial intermediary and the evidence presented here strongly supports this. The way in 
which intermediaries in Mathira operate demonstrates that different forms are subject to 
different sets of influences -  both internal, for example, in decisions over interest rates; and 
external, in terms of the regulatory and macroeconomic environments. Thus while banks 
have been directly affected by government monetary policy, SACCOs have not. By 
contrast SACCOs and ASCAs can isolate themselves from these influences and their 
objective may indeed be this isolation. Thus there is no reason why risk-adjusted returns 
should equilibrate between different types of financial intermediary.
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Chapter 7 Financial Service Use in Mathira
This chapter goes beyond the supply side examined in Chapter Six to investigate the use of 
financial services in Mathira. The conceptual framework in Chapter Two proposed that the 
rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of types of financial intermediaries 
differed and that social relations of gender, age, class, ethnicity and religion were likely to 
influence how agents related to them. This chapter therefore explores the data to test the 
view that social relations cause market fragmentation.
This chapter analyses the second round survey data on financial service use collected from 
68 individuals in 44 households. The sample was purposively selected in order to ensure 
representation of socio-economic characteristics of age, gender, marital status and location 
(see Chapter Four). The data has been pooled for the analysis and is first cross-tabulated 
by socio-economic characteristics to examine the use of particular financial intermediaries. 
The sample was homogeneous in terms of religion (Christian) and ethnicity (Kikuyu). The 
analysis therefore concentrates on analysis by age, gender, marital status, education, 
location and income source, with various indicators of wealth based on expenditure, 
landholding and household assets.
Logistic regressions have also been used to find out whether patterns identified in the 
cross-tabulations could be further substantiated. These regressions examine the relative 
importance of different socio-economic factors affecting the likelihood that a service is 
used. While they cannot compensate for the purposive selection criteria, the objective was 
to identify patterns in the data that required further explanation and the regressions assist in 
achieving this. Subsequent chapters then use qualitative data to provide further evidence 
and explanation of the patterns found here. The details of the regressions can be found in 
Annex Three.
First, the analysis examines respondent’s use of savings services in the last two years. This 
is analysed by intermediary and how this relates to socio-economic characteristics. Then it
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considers the amounts individuals saved in them. The chapter then goes on to examine the 
sources from which respondents borrowed and the amounts and frequencies involved.
7.1 Savings services
7.1.1 Use of savings services by financial intermediary
48.5% of individuals in the sample used ROSCAs (see Table 7.1). These were closely 
followed by bank and building society accounts at 45.6%. Insurance groups were used by 
39.7% - whether making regular contributions (17.6%) or irregular contributions (25%). 
33.8% had an account in a cash crop SACCO. All remaining services were used by 10% 
or less of the sample.
Table 7.1 cross-tabulates the use of financial services by socio-economic characteristics. 
Chi-square test results are indicated in cells that produced significant results. However, 
given the nature of the sample, sub-sets were in many instances too small to render 
expected cell values high enough for significance tests to be valid. It is therefore important 
to examine patterns even where significance is not indicated. The derivation of the 
poverty variables related to expenditure and assets is explained in Annex One.
As the most widely used service, ROSCAs were used by more women (65.7%) than men 
(30.3%), and this result is significant both in the cross-tabulations and the logistic 
regressions (see Annex Three, Table A3.1). Other than this difference by gender, use 
appears to be evenly spread by characteristics such as age, education and location. Half of 
those without a main income source also used ROSCAs. This was because they were 
married women who used money saved from housekeeping given them by their husbands 
for ROSCA contributions. Marital status shows some variation, suggesting greater use by 
those widowed (i.e. both men and women) and no use among those separated or divorced. 
However, this sub-sample is very small. Using an expenditure-based measure of poverty 
indicates lower use among the poorest and richest in the sample. This pattern also appears 
in the data by landholding sizes where use falls to lower levels for those with less than 0.25 
acres and is highest in the group with access to one to five acres. However, those who had 
no land used ROSCAs as frequently as the average. This is because most households
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without access to any land live in town (see Table 7.1) and none were below the poverty 
line.
By contrast, the socio-economic characteristics that are related to the use of a bank or 
building society account are quite different. Table 7.1 indicates that those with a 
secondary education were more likely to use a bank account than those with a primary 
education. Those in employment or business were most likely to have bank accounts 
compared to those with no main income source or who relied on casual labour or 
agriculture. Employment was a mildly significant factor in the logistic regression (Annex 
Three, Table A3.2) and this is not surprising as employees often receive salaries through 
the banking system. Those living in Karatina town used bank accounts more than those 
living in the rural areas; those living in Chehe - the sub-location farthest from the town -  
used them least. Those with no land were most likely to have a bank account, and this is 
due to them being more likely to live in Karatina. Bank account use was positively related 
to wealth levels using indicators of expenditure, assets and landholding and the logistic 
regression also suggested the importance of expenditure levels.
While proximity to the bank therefore appears to be an important factor this is more likely 
to be related to the fact that those in town were most likely to be in business or in 
employment. Many in the rural areas commented that the costs of travelling to Karatina 
meant that using a bank or post office account to make small deposits was too expensive, 
yet tea and coffee farmers who received their income through their cash crop SACCOs, 
whose offices were in town, rarely complained about this cost.
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Overall 68 45.6 33.8 10.3 8.8 48.5 8.8 5.9 7.4 39.7 17.6 25.0 2.9
Gender: * **
Men 33 51.5 45.5 3.0 12.1 30.3 9.1 0 9.1 36.4 21.2 21.2 0
Women 35 40.0 22.9 17.1 5.7 65.7 8.6 11.4 5.7 42.9 14.3 28.6 5.7
Marital status:
Married 49 44.9 28.6 12.2 10.2 49.0 10.2 4.1 8.2 40.8 18.4 24.5 2.0
Single 9 66.7 11.1 11.1 0 44.4 11.1 11.1 11.1 33.3 11.1 33.3 11.1
Sep/Divorced 3 66.7 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Widowed 7 14.3 100.0 0 0 71.4 0 14.3 0 57.1 28.6 28.6 0
Age: ***
<40 39 48.7 12.8 12.8 10.3 53.8 10.3 5.1 7.7 35.9 12.8 25.6 5.1
>=40 29 41.4 62.1 6.9 6.9 41.4 6.9 6.9 6.9 44.8 24.1 24.1 0
Education: +
Primary & less 29 17.2 44.8 0 10.3 48.3 6.9 3.4 0 41.4 13.8 27.6 0
Secondary & 39 66.7 25.6 17.9 7.7 48.7 10.3 7.7 12.8 38.5 20.5 23.1 5.1
higher
Location: **♦ *♦
Gatundu 22 31.8 54.5 13.6 13.6 50.0 9.1 0 0 45.5 22.7 22.7 0
Chehe 22 13.6 36.4 4.5 4.5 45.5 4.5 4.5 0 40.9 9.1 31.8 0
Karatina Town 24 87.5 12.5 12.5 8.3 50.0 9.5 12.5 20.8 33.3 20.8 20.8 8.3
Individuals
mam income:
Agriculture 21 23.8 76.2 0 9.5 47.6 4.8 4.8 0 52.4 23.8 28.6 0
Business 19 78.9 21.1 0 5.3 47.4 21.1 10.5 26.3 42.1 26.3 26.3 10.5
Employment 12 83.3 16.7 58.3 25.0 50.0 8.3 8.3 0 25.0 8.3 16.7 0
Casual labour 12 8.3 8.3 0 0 50.0 0 0 0 25.0 0 25.0 0








































Exp poverty group: 66 47.0 33.3 10.6 9.1 47.0 9.1 6.1 7.6 37.9 18.2 22.7 3.0
Below PL 7 0 28.6 0 0 28.6 0 0 0 57.1 14.3 42.9 0
100-200% PL 22 27.3 40.9 9.1 4.5 54.5 9.1 4.5 4.5 31.8 13.6 14.3 4.5
200-400% PL 20 50.0 30.0 15.0 15.0 60.0 10.0 15.0 5.0 40.0 15.0 23.8 5.0
>400% PL 17 88.2 29.4 5.9 11.8 29.4 11.8 0 17.6 35.3 29.4 20.0 0
By asset score: 
0-5
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25 16 40.0 12 8 48.0 8 0 0 36 8 28 0
6-10 9 33.3 44.4 0 22.2 44.4 0 0 11.1 33.3 11.1 22.2 0
11-20 19 57.9 42.1 5.3 10.5 52.6 5.3 15.8 0 42.1 21.1 21.1 10.5
>21 15 86.7 6.7 20 0 46.7 20.0 6.7 26.7 46.7 33.3 26.7 0
By landholding: 67 44.8 34.3 10.4 9.0 49.3 9.0 6.0 7.5 40.3 17.9 25.4 3.0
No land 6 100 0 33.3 33.3 50 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 0
<0.25 acres 4 0 25 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.25-0.99 15 6.7 26.7 0 13.3 66.7 0 0 0 60 26.7 33.3 0
1 -2 .9 9 26 61.5 46.2 11.5 7.7 50 11.5 11.5 7.7 23.1 7.7 15.4 7.7
3 - 4.99 8 50 62.5 12.5 0 37.5 12.5 0 12.5 100 50.0 62.5 0
>5 acres 8 37.5 12.5 12.5 0 37.5 12.5 0 12.5 37.5 12.5 25.0 0
By landholding: 
No land 6 100 0 33.3 33.3 50 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 0
< 1 acre 19 5.3 26.3 0 10.5 57.9 0 0 0 47.4 21.1 26.3 0
1-5 acres 34 58.8 50 11.8 5.9 47.1 11.8 8.8 8.8 41.2 17.6 26.5 5.9
>5 acres 8 37.5 12.5 12.5 0 37.5 12.5 0 12.5 37.5 12.5 25.0 0
By land ownership: 
No land
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6 100 0 33.3 33.3 50.0 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 0
Own land 33 57.6 42.4 12.1 0 42.4 15.2 6.1 12.1 39.4 21.2 21.2 3
Family land 25 20 36.0 4.0 16.0 52 0 0 0 44 16.0 28.0 0
Rented/borr’d 4 25 0 0 0 75 0 25 0 50 0 50.0 25
Note -  the level of significance is indicated for the cell as a whole on the basis of the chi-square statistic for the cross-tabulation; 
+ - significant @ 10% level; *- significant @ 5% level; ** - significant @1% level; *** - significant @ 0.1% level
45.5% of men and 22.9% of women used cash crop SACCOs. This is because men are 
more likely to have control of cash crop income than women. Use was also significantly 
higher among the older age group and those with a primary rather than secondary 
education. The logistic regressions also confirmed the significance of age and gender 
(Annex Three Table A3.3). These patterns can be explained as follows. The mean age of 
household heads in the two rural sub-locations is significantly higher (at the 1% level) at 
49 years, than in town at 34.5 years, and it is the rural households that have cash crops. 
These age differences result from a number of factors. First, people who have worked in 
employment or business return to the rural areas when they retire. Second, with the extent 
of land division, young people are now less able to derive an adequate income from the 
small farms they may be allocated (see Chapter Eight), and are forced to seek employment 
or business opportunities elsewhere.
A pattern related to marital status was also apparent: all of the widowed in the sample had 
cash crop SACCO accounts because they all lived in the rural areas and had cash crops. 
Data from the first round random sample survey indicated that 75% of female-headed 
households in the rural locations were widows while all of the female-headed households 
living in town were single. There is a tendency for widows to live rurally rather than in 
town and to have inherited cash crops from their deceased husbands.
The wealth indicators of expenditure, assets and landholding, suggest that cash crop 
SACCO use was lowest amongst the poorest categories, rose in the middle groups and 
declined again in the wealthiest categories. This reflects a middle wealth stratum for 
whom cash crops are an important income source, but those with the smallest landholdings 
have insufficient space or insecure tenure (see Chapter Seven), and the wealthiest are 
unlikely to be dependent on cash crop income. Also, tea farmers are not restricted to 
receiving their tea income from tea SACCOs but can also receive it through bank accounts 
so that the wealthiest are more likely to receive it this way.
39.7% of the sample contributed to an insurance or mutual aid group making either regular 
or irregular contributions. As discussed in Chapter Six, these groups assist members in the 
event of emergencies, and especially death. Men in the rural areas often belong to these
176
groups via mbari and women’s groups in the rural areas often also make these 
contributions. Ad hoc contributions for emergencies are also a common feature of many 
town-based ROSCAs.
Landholding sizes produced the most noticeable pattern in relation to use of insurance 
groups. None of those with less than 0.25 acres (but not landless) belonged to such a 
group whereas all of those with three to five acres contributed. The logistic regression also 
indicated that landholding was mildly significant. The explanation for this is not entirely 
clear, but as a result of small holding sizes all of these individuals were casual labourers 
and the variable nature of this income may have contributed to their decisions not to join 
clan-based insurance groups, although this pattern does not appear from the data on main 
income source.
The savings services used by less than ten per cent of the sample in some cases also offer 
clear patterns although in most of these cases chi-square tests and logistic regressions 
could not be used to confirm these. They are discussed in turn.
Employee SACCOs are obviously only accessible to those who are employed. The seven 
individuals in the sample who were members were all employees of local or national 
government: teachers, civil servants and a local council employee. Five employees (all 
men) did not have access to SACCOs via their employment: they were drivers, a teacher in 
a private school and a pastor in an independent church. Thus, all who had access to an 
employee SACCO joined it. The greater use by women compared to men reflects the fact 
that all of the women were in employment that had SACCO access.
The use of a Post Bank savings account was low at 8.8% of the sample. These accounts 
were used slightly more by men than women; by those married than not married; those 
under 40 and with less education; and by those in Gatundu and Karatina rather than Chehe. 
Those in employment also used them more often, along with those without land -  a feature 
that links to those who live in town and are employed. It was perceived as convenient and 
cheap for those who wanted to deposit small amounts and are living or working in the 
town. A reason two respondents gave for having a Post Office account was the ease with
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which withdrawals could be made at any branch in the country. Thus, for those who travel 
regularly, this can be a particularly useful feature.
Six individuals used independent ASCAs -  three men and three women. Two men were 
members of the same men’s ASCA in Gatundu that developed out of a lineage insurance 
group. Members were saving regularly for emergencies and then found that the savings 
fund was big enough to start giving loans. Another young man was a member of an ASCA 
based at the casual labour market in town. The three women belonged to different 
ASCAs: two in town and one in Chehe had a family ASCA.
Despite the extensive outreach of the MFO managed ASCAs that was documented in 
Chapter Six, only 6.1% of this sample were members and all were women. All of these 
women had expenditure levels above the poverty line and were in the top two categories of 
asset ownership.
Use of MFOs, on the other hand, was by those who were educated to secondary level or 
higher, in Karatina town and in business. Having a business is usually a criterion for 
membership. Saving in these groups is compulsory in order to access loans. Only 7.4% 
(5) of the sample used these services. The proportion by gender shows slightly more men 
than women (3 men and 2 women). Of the four MFOs, it is only the KWFT programme 
that is women only.
Finally, there were two women who participated in groups that were only for saving. One 
was saving with her sisters in a bank account with a view to possibly buying land with 
them in the future. Another was a single woman who traded vegetables in the market and 
belonged to a market-based group of some 300 individuals who were saving together to 
buy property in future. She felt that if she did not participate in this group then market 
traders would not assist her in case of emergency, as it was also an irregular insurance 
group.
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Table 7.2: Frequency distribution of number of places in which people save (%)









0 29.4 39.7 13.2
1 39.7 25.0 19.1
2 23.5 13.2 27.9
3 7.4 10.3 14.7
4 0 4.4 10.3
5 0 5.9 7.4
6 0 1.5 4.4
7 0 0 1.5
8 0 0 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean 1.09 1.38 2.46
Mean by gender: **
Men 1.24 0.88 2.09
Women 0.94 1.86 2.80
*- This includes saving in insurance groups which is regular 
** - Significant at the 1% level
Before moving on to examine the amounts of money individuals saved in these 
intermediaries, Table 7.2 analyses the number of financial intermediaries in which people 
saved. These are broadly categorised between the formal sector - including banks and 
building societies, SACCOs and the Post Office - and all of the group-based systems.
A higher proportion saved in the formal sector (70.6%) than in the informal sector 
(60.3%). 13.2% (10) used none of these savings services. However, individuals were 
likely to use a higher number of group mechanisms than formal sector accounts with the 
highest number being six. But those with the most were likely to be people who also had 
access to formal sector accounts since the highest number of savings accounts used by any 
individual was eight.
The mean number of formal sector accounts in which women saved was lower (0.94) than 
for men (1.24), but women used significantly more group-based mechanisms than men:
1.86 compared to 0.88. When these differences were examined for ROSCAs alone, 
almost equivalent proportions of men (24.2%) and women (25.7%) belonged to one
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ROSCA. But the mean number of ROSCAs that women belonged to was significantly 
higher than for men: 1.34 compared to 0.42.
Ten individuals had no savings account of any kind (not including insurance groups). Of 
these, three were in Gatundu, seven in Chehe and none lived in town. Of the seven who 
lived in Chehe five were tea pickers, and all of these were under 40 years of age. One was 
a very old woman who relied entirely on her husband for money and another was a young 
man who was a carpenter making furniture using timber from the forest. In Gatundu those 
who did not have any savings accounts included a married woman who had left two groups 
in the last three years; another was a retired civil servant who claimed that all the accounts 
were in the name of his wife. The third in Gatundu was a young woman of 21 who was a 
housewife and whose husband also handled all of the household’s money. Three of those 
with no savings account reported expenditure below the poverty line and all of these were 
women, with two of the three being tea pickers in Chehe. The remaining seven were 
distributed across the expenditure groups, one in the highest category (the retired civil 
servant) and three each in the middle two categories. The reasons for not having an 
account therefore include gender relations as well as poverty.
In Chapter Six it was found that the mutual sector accounted for approximately 49% of the 
number of savings accounts and 21% of savings by value. Figure 7.1 further examines the 
use by individuals of savings services of different types using the categories of formal 
banks, formal mutuals (i.e. SACCOs) and informal mutuals. Saving in an MFO has been 
excluded on the basis that savings is compulsory for getting loans, and post office savings 
accounts have been amalgamated with banks into the formal banks category for 
convenience. This analysis excludes insurance groups, as these are not financial 
intermediaries.
Figure 7.1 shows that 14.7% were only using formal sector banks or the post office, but 
33.7% were using these accounts in conjunction with accounts in formal or informal 
mutuals. While only 5.9% used formal mutual services (ie SACCOs) alone, 27.8% used 
formal mutuals alongside formal banking and informal group savings systems. In all some 
70.6% use some kind of mutually based savings service, with 36.7% using only mutuals
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and 52.8% using an informal group based service. This data both confirms the findings of 
Chapter Six in terms of the relative importance of mutuals, and further underlines the 
extensive use of group based savings mechanisms that were not captured in the supply side 
survey.











7.1.2 Savings flows and balances
This section analyses data collected on savings balances and flows in order to examine 
patterns of use in greater depth. Data on balances was easiest to obtain where accounts 
were held in formal institutions. For group-based systems -  especially ROSCAs -  it is 
very hard to analyse savings as a stock, and therefore data on contributions to these groups 
was collected.
Balances held in formal accounts are shown in Table 7.3. Employees held balances in 
SACCOs that were almost twice the level of balances held in banks although the range 
held in banks was much wider. This is partly because SACCO shares are difficult to 
withdraw. When asked, respondents said that they were saving in order to get a significant 
loan in the future for a large project such as building a house, or for their retirement. By 
contrast, balances in cash crop SACCOs were much lower. This is probably because these 
accounts are the means through which farmers receive cash crop income which is 
withdrawn for household use and are less likely to be used as a means of long term saving. 
Post office savings balances were slightly higher than those held in cash crop SACCOs.








society 31 6 24268 15000 500 200000
Cash crop 
SACCO 23 4 5726 700 0 30000
Employee
SACCO 7 0 41857 40000 28000 60000
Post Office 5 1 8440 1200 500 30000
Overall 66 11 18950 0 200000
* Values were missing usually because people could not recall their balances
Examination of these balances by socio-economic gender and marital status (Table 7.4) 
shows that unmarried men held higher savings balances in formal sector institutions than
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married men, and these were ten times higher than the balances held by unmarried40 
women. Conversely married women tended to have higher savings balances in formal 
institutions than married men, and also much higher balances than unmarried women. The 
difference in savings balances held by married and unmarried women is significant at the 
5% level.
Table 7.4: Formal sector savings balances held by all individuals (Kshs)
Mean (Kshs) Men Women Overall
Married 14537 17661 16248
Not married* 34589 3286 20894
Overall 20982 14307 17530
* Not married includes all men whether widowed, single, separated or divorced.
Turning to informal groups, contributions are shown in Table 7.5. Mean monthly 
contributions to ROSCAs were Kshs342, with a range of Kshs50 to 1200 and a median of 
Kshs200. The mean monthly payout was Kshs2,551, with a range from Kshs 100 to 
11,000. Mean length of the cycle was 8.8 months, the shortest cycle was one month and 
the longest 30 months.
By contrast, the amount saved in managed ASCAs was higher at Kshs925 per month than 
for other types of groups -  even MFO groups. This can probably be explained by the fact 
that these contributions to shares enabled members to build up their loan entitlement in the 
group. However the numbers of observations are small except for ROSCAs and regular 
insurance. In the latter case the mean contribution was Kshs 107 but ranging from as little 
as Kshs20 to Kshs200.
40 The term unmarried is used here to include single, separated or divorced, and widowed.
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Table 7.5: Contributions into group based savings mechanisms (Kshs/month):







ROSCA 61 2 342 200 50 1200
Independent ASCA 8 0 141 150 30 200
Managed ASCA 4 0 925 600 500 2000
Regular insurance 
group
14 2 107 100 20 200
MFO group 7 1 600 600 400 800
Other savings gps 2 0 300 300 100 500
Overall 95 5 335 20 2000
It was found above that women were significantly more likely to use a ROSCA and also to 
belong to significantly more groups than men. Contributions are therefore also examined 
by gender and marital status in Table 7.6. Women’s overall contributions to group savings 
were significantly higher than men’s. The difference between married men and married 
women’s contributions is significant at the 1% level.
Table 7.6: Mean monthly contributions to group savings mechanisms








** Row difference significant at 5%
Further analysis of formal sector savings among married women revealed that those in 
Karatina town held significantly higher (at 5%) balances than those in rural areas:
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Kshs32,750 and Kshs9,613. Similarly married women in town made significantly higher 
(at 5%) contributions to group mechanisms than rural women: Kshs1,249 and Kshs327.
A link was made above between those who were rurally based, less well educated and 
older compared with town based, better educated and younger. Table 7.7 (overleaf) shows 
that while formal savings balances for younger people were lower than those for older 
people, group contributions were higher. By location formal balances and group savings 
contributions were higher in town than in the rural areas and similarly for those with 
secondary education compared to primary. As would be expected both balances and 
contribution levels rise in relation to expenditure grouping, and also for asset groupings. 
The fact that those with no land had the highest formal savings balances is again due to 
those in town having no land. However their savings group contributions were on average 
lower than those with land. That those with family land have the lowest levels of group 
contributions reflects that they are mostly rural.
7.1.3 Savings use: conclusions
First, this analysis has further underlined the findings of Chapter Six in indicating the 
importance of mutual sector savings mechanisms both formal and informal. While 45.6% 
used bank and building societies, the analysis suggests that most of these also had accounts 
in mutuals. 52.8% of individuals made use of group-based savings mechanisms, with 
48.5% using ROSCAs - the single most used service. 33.7% used the formal mutual 
sector, although only 5.9% used only these services. 14.7% did not use any of these 
savings services.
Second, the evidence shows that gender influences participation in ROSCAs. Not only 
were women more likely to be members of ROSCAs than men, but also they were likely to 
join a significantly higher number. While women also contributed more to them, the 
contributions of married women in town were much higher than those in the rural areas.
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Mean level of monthly 








By education: *** *
Primary or less 4496 198
Secondary or more 27403 601
Poverty group: 
Below poverty line 100 68
100-200% PL 7122 393
200-400% PL 19717 668
>400% PL 39257 411





By land ownership 
category:
No land 75875 450
Own land 19064 520
Family land 9264 193
Rented, borrowed 1250 365
land
The service most used by the poorest (by expenditure) was insurance groups, but these are 
not strictly financial intermediaries. After these, cash crop SACCOs and ROSCAs were 
the only services that they used. There are strong underlying dynamics which link being 
rurally based, less well educated and older; or younger, better educated and in town. This 
is reflected in the use of services in that the better educated and town-based tend to have 
higher savings balances and contributions to groups. It is these individuals who are more 
likely to use banks and MFO services. All of those who did not use a savings service were 
in rural areas.
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Analysis by marital status has also produced interesting findings. Rurally based female­
headed households are mostly widows who have inherited cash crops, while female-headed 
households in town tend to be young single women. The balances held by single women 
were much lower than those held by married women. Their contributions to savings 
groups were lower but not significantly so. For unmarried men, on the other hand, their 
balances in the formal sector were much higher than those held by married men and their 
contributions to savings groups were also higher, though not significantly. This suggests 
that married women save higher amounts in both the formal and group mechanisms, while 
unmarried men make heavy use of the formal sector but also use groups more than married 
men.
7.2 Loan use
This section examines patterns of loan use. First it looks at access by intermediary and 
related socio-economic characteristics in a similar way as for savings. It then considers the 
relationship between savings and borrowing in the same financial intermediary. Finally, it 
examines the frequency and amounts borrowed from different sources in relation to 
particular socio-economic characteristics.
7.2.1 Loan services by financial intermediary
Respondents reported the sources from which they had taken a loan in the last five years. 
Overall, cash crop SACCOs are the most frequently used (19.1%); followed by friends and 
relatives (17.6%); employee SACCOs (8.8%). Banks, MFOs and MFO ASCAs are equal 
at 7.4%, followed by independent ASCAS (5.9%), employers (2.9%) and parastatals
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(1.5%). Some of the socio-economic patterns underlying this use are similar to that for 
savings use and will not therefore be repeated 41
The socio-economic characteristics related to borrowing from cash crop SACCOs are 
similar to those for saving in them: that is, age and education, but gender is not significant 
in the cross-tabulations. However a logistic regression does suggest that being a woman 
does reduce the likelihood of borrowing (see Annex Three Table A3.5).
The second most important source of borrowing was from friends and relatives (12 loans) 
and the socio-economic characteristics that appear to be associated with this are gender, 
age and education. Those who borrowed from their friends and relatives were more likely 
to be men than women; to be younger and more educated. The logistic regression results 
(Annex Three Table A3.6) indicate that of these factors, education most increases the 
likelihood of borrowing while being older and a woman reduces the likelihood. This 
result is rather interesting because it suggests that young educated men make more use of 
this source and although the sample size is small, this is an unexpected result. Part of the 
explanation is likely to be that young men have limited access to land and cash crops with 
which to borrow from banks and cash crop SACCOs.
Borrowing from employee SACCOs strongly mirrors the savings results. 8.8% borrow 
from employee SACCOs while 10.3% were saving in them. Only one of the seven people 
saving in an employee sacco had not borrowed. A well-known feature of employee 
SACCOs is that all members tend to borrow. One SACCO analyst explained that members 
feel safer when they have a loan and tend to take loans continuously. This was certainly 
the case with respondents interviewed here. For example, a wife and her husband who 
were civil servants had taken loans one after another from their employee SACCOs to 
build a house. Because of this, employee SACCOs tend to experience liquidity problems. 
Members may start to limit their savings once they have reached a certain level of shares, 
because they may have reached the borrowing ceiling so that there is little incentive to save 
more in terms of loan access (COW, 230). By contrast cash crop SACCOs tend to be
41 The small proportions borrowing from sources meant that chi-squared significance testing of the results 
was very heavily limited by small expected values.
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much more liquid - as the figures in Table 6.1 also indicated - with a lower proportion of 
savings outstanding in loans compared to employee SACCOs.
Five individuals (7.4%) had borrowed from a bank or building society. It is important to 
examine these five loans in turn, since none of them involved land being formally used as 
collateral. Two individuals had borrowed from the Equity Building Society. One of these 
was a loan to a teacher (HH141W) against her salary. Short term loans against future 
income, usually salaries and tea payments, were a method of lending that Equity was 
using. The other was a loan to buy land (HH39H) using an existing title deed. However 
the title deed was not charged, it was simply deposited at the Building Society. The loan 
was for Kshs30,000 which is a relatively small sum against which to use a title deed. Both 
the borrower and lender explained that the costs related to charging the land would have 
been far too high in relation to the sum being borrowed.
Two loans were from the Co-operative Bank under its microfinance “Biashara Loans” 
scheme. This gave loans to business people of up to Kshs200,000 using stock and 
household items as collateral. These loans directly compete with MFO lending and one 
MFO was concerned about losing their best members to the Bank, as most people preferred 
individual to group lending. However, while two of the respondents had received loans, 
one of these complained about the process of getting it, which had involved her in many 
visits to the bank over a six-month period.
The fifth bank loan was an overdraft from a national bank without security and appeared to 
have been given because the woman was introduced to the manager by a friend. This was 
not secured but given against the income that the respondent received through her account 
from her husband who was overseas. Hence none of these bank loans were either long 
term or formally secured against major assets such as land.
The profile of those borrowing from MFOs and MFO ASCAs obviously reflects the 
compulsory savings explored above. Education, location and main income source as the 
key factors for MFO loans and women were the only users of MFO ASCAs.
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Overall 68 7.4 19.1 8.8 7.4 7.4 5.9 0 17.6 1.5 2.9
Gender: ♦
Men 33 6.1 24.2 3.0 6.1 0 6.1 27.3 0 3.0
Women 35 8.6 14.3 14.3 8.6 14.3 5.7 8.6 2.9 2.9
Marital status:
Married 49 8.2 12.2 10.2 8.2 6.1 6.1 14.3 0 2.0
Single 9 0 0 11.1 0 11.1 11.1 55.6 0 11.1
Sep/Divorced 3 33.3 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 0 33.3 0
Widowed 7 0 85.7 0 0 14.3 0 0 0 0
Age: ft** *
<40 39 10.3 2.6 10.3 5.1 5.1 7.7 25.6 0 5.1
>=40 29 3.4 41.4 6.9 10.3 10.3 3.4 6.9 3.4 0
Education: ♦* *
Primary & less 29 0 34.5 0 0 6.9 3.4 6.9 0 6.9
Secondary & 39 12.8 7.7 15.4 12.8 7.7 7.7 25.6 2.6 0
above
Location:
Gatundu 22 4.5 36.4 13.6 0 0 4.5 13.6 0 0
Chehe 22 0 22.7 4.5 0 9.1 0 27.3 0 4.5
Karatina Town 24 16.7 0 8.3 20.8 12.5 12.5 12.5 4.2 4.2
Individuals
mam income:
Agriculture 21 4.8 52.4 0 0 4.8 4.8 14.3 0 0
Business 19 15.8 0 0 26.3 15.8 15.8 10.5 5.3 5.3
Employment 12 8.3 8.3 50.0 0 8.3 0 16.7 0 0
Casual labour 12 0 8.3 0 0 0 0 33.3 0 8.3



















f  Tiend / 
Relative
Parastatal Employer
Poverty group 66 7.6 18.2 9.1 7.6 7.6 6.1 18.2 1.5 3.0
by exp.: 
Below PL 7 0 14.3 0 0 0 0 14.3 0 14.3
100-200% PL 22 4.5 31.8 9.1 4.5 4.5 9.1 22.7 0 4.5
200-400% PL 20 0 10.0 15.0 5.0 20.0 0 10.0 0 0
>400% PL 17 23.5 11.8 5.9 17.6 0 11.8 23.5 5.9 0
By asset score: 
0-5
68
25 0 36 12 0 0 4 24 0 4
6-10 9 0 22.2 0 0 0 0 22.2 0 0
11-20 19 10.5 10.5 0 5.3 21.1 0 15.8 5.3 5.3
>21 15 20.0 0 20 26.7 6.7 20 6.7 0 0
By landholding: 67 6.0 19.4 9.0 6.0 7.5 6.0 17.9 0(1) 3.0
Noland 6 0 0 16.7 0 16.7 16.7 33.3 0 0
<0.25 acres 4 0 25.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
0.25-0.99 15 0 20.0 0 0 0 0 33.3 0 0
1 -2 .9  9 26 3.8 26.9 11.5 7.7 11.5 7.7 15.4 0 3.8
3 - 4.99 8 25.0 25.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 0 0 0 0





6 0 0 16.7 0 16.7 16.7 33.3 0 0
Own land 33 12.1 15.2 12.1 15.2 9.1 9.1 6.1 3 3
Family land 25 4 32.0 4.0 0 0 0 24.0 0 4
Rented/borr’ed 4 0 0 0 0 25 0 50.0 0 0
land
Notes: (1) The respondent who had borrowed from the parastatal was unwilling to give her landholding although she certainly owned and had access to land hence she has 
dropped out of the data here. (2) For analysis by poverty group and total land holding, there are 66 and 67 cases respectively so percentages for overall access in these groups 
are stated across the first row of these cells. (3) The level of significance is indicated for the cell as a whole on the basis of the chi-square statistic for the cross-tabulation;
+ - significant @ 10% lev e l; *- significant @ 5% level; ** - significant @ 1% level; *** - significant @ 0.1% level
None of our sample reported borrowing from moneylenders. Two respondents reported 
borrowing from employers. One was a single woman in Chehe who was a tea picker and 
had taken advances from her regular employer against her wages. The other was a young 
married man in town who had borrowed from his employer in the past, but was no longer 
employed.
There was only one case of borrowing from a parastatal. This was a loan from Kenya 
Industrial Estates to a businesswoman running a secretarial college. This loan was for 
Kshs100,000 and had been secured against land. She estimated that the total costs of 
taking the loan had been Kshs7,320. This consisted of a 4% administration fee 
(Kshs4,000), registration, stamp duty and swearing fees (Kshs870), and land board fees of 
Kshs2,450. The interest rate on the loan was 24% declining balance over two years. In 
the event she repaid the loan in one year and hence the transactions costs represented 
approximately an additional 7% on the interest rate.
7.2.2 Comparison of saving to borrowing by source
In Chapter Six, the ratio of saving to loan value was examined to indicate the extent to 
which funds mobilised locally were lent locally (see Table 6.1). Examining the extent to 
which the sample saved and borrowed from an intermediary can complement this analysis. 
Note that ROSCAs have only been included on the savings side but would present a 100% 
ratio as all but the last member in the cycle is a net borrower.






Bank / building society 45.6 7.4 16.2
Cash crop SACCO 33.8 19.1 56.5
Employee SACCO 10.3 8.8 85.4
MFO 7.4 7.4 100
MFO ASCA 5.9 7.4 125.4**
Independent ASCA 8.8 5.9 67.0
* * This is caused by someone borrowing in the last 5 years from this source but no longer saving there.
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MFOs give a figure of 100% because, as pointed out above, individuals join in order to 
borrow and the savings component is compulsory in order to achieve this. The ratio for 
MFO managed ASCAs is over 100% because an ex-member reported borrowing but no 
longer saves there. The ratio for independent ASCAs is also high at 67%. Employee 
SACCOs at 85.4% of members give the highest ratio in the formal sector followed by cash 
crop SACCOs at 56.5% of members are borrowing. The lowest figure at 16.2% is for 
banks and building societies.
The ordering here closely reflects the ratios and patterns found in Chapter Six. It confirms 
the view that banks and building societies tended to be used for saving, but few borrowed. 
On the other hand access to funds in SACCOs is more reliable and is highest in the MFO 
sector and in group-based financial mechanisms.
Figure 7.2 shows the proportion of individuals borrowing from particular forms of 
financial intermediary. Formal mutuals were used by 28%, while informal mutuals - 
excluding ROSCAs - were used by 13.2%. If ROSCAs were included here then clearly 
they would become the most important source from which loans were received. 19.2% 
took loans from other individuals whether these were employers, friends or relatives - 
making these an important source. These loans are usually interest free and with a flexible 
repayment agreement. By contrast, 5.9% had taken loans from formal banks and 
parastatals. In particular, Figure 7.2 shows that respondents had not made use of as many 
different types of loan service as they had savings services -  although the data for savings 
services for two years rather than five.
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and 1.5% overlap \  





7.2.3 Borrowing frequency and amount
The size of loans by source is reported in Table 7.10. This data is derived from the 52 
most recent loans that individuals had taken. The single parastatal loan was the largest in 
the sample. By comparison bank loans were relatively small, demonstrating the 
implications of being short term and unsecured. Employee SACCO loans were relatively 
large at a mean of Kshs63,333 and much larger than cash crop SACCO loans. MFO loans 
were the third largest and these figures are more than double the mean loan size in Table 
6.1. But this is easily explained since outstanding loans are always smaller than the 
original loan amount. However the broad ordering of sizes is relatively consistent between 
the supply side and this data. Independent ASCA loans averaged Kshs27,250 for the four 
individuals who had taken them, while managed ASCA loans were smaller at Kshsl0,000. 
Loans from employers, relatives and friends are in the region of Kshs4,000.





Bank/building society 5 25000 20000 10000 50000
Cash crop SACCO 13 11561 8000 1500 45000
Employee SACCO 6 63333 75000 10000 120000
MFO 5 55000 50000 20000 120000
Managed ASCA 4 10750 10000 3000 20000
Independent ASCA 4 27250 28500 2000 50000
Relative/friend 12 3487 1750 200 20000
Parastatal 1 100000 100000 100000 100000
Employer 2 4000 4000 1000 7000
Total 52 23694 200 120000
Table 7.11 examines the numbers of sources from which respondents have taken loans 
rather than the number of loans they have accessed. Again it excludes ROSCAs.
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Column percentages Row percentages
No 1 2 3 No 1 2 3
loans loans
Overall 68 35.3 48.5 11.8 4.4 35.3 48.5 11.8 4.4
Gender:
Men 33 50 42.4 87.5 0 36.4 42.4 21.2 0
Women 35 50 57.6 12.5 100 34.3 54.3 2.9 8.6
Marital status:
Married 49 87.5 60.6 75.0 66.7 42.9 40.8 12.2 4.1
Single 9 4.2 21.2 12.5 0 11.1 77.8 11.1 0
Sep/Divorced 3 4.2 3.0 0 33.3 33.3 33.3 0 33.3
Widowed 7 4.2 15.2 12.5 0 14.3 71.4 14.3 0
Age:
<40 39 62.5 57.6 37.5 66.7 38.5 48.7 7.7 5.1
>=40 29 37.5 42.4 62.5 33.3 31.0 48.3 17.2 3.4
Education:
Primary & less 29 58.3 39.4 25.0 0 48.3 44.8 6.9 0
Secondary & 39 41.7 60.6 75.0 100 25.6 51.3 15.4 7.7
above
Location:
Gatundu 22 33.3 36.4 25.0 0 36.4 54.5 9.1 0
Chehe 22 37.5 33.3 25.0 0 40.9 50.0 9.1 0
Karatina Town 24 29.2 30.3 50.0 100 29.2 41.7 16.7 12.5
Main income:
Agriculture 21 29.2 36.4 25.0 0 33.3 57.1 9.5 0
Business 19 20.8 24.2 50.0 66.7 26.3 42.1 21.1 10.5
Employment 12 12.5 18.2 25.0 33.3 25.0 50.0 16.7 8.3
Casual labour 12 25.0 18.2 0 0 50.0 50.0 0 0
None 4 12.5 3.0 0 0 75.0 25.0 0 0
Poverty grp : 66
Below overall
poverty line 7 17.4 15.6 0 0 44.4 55.6 0 0
100-200% PL 22 21.7 43.8 25.0 0 23.8 66.7 9.5 0
200-400% PL 20 39.1 25.0 50.0 0 42.9 38.1 19.0 0
>400% PL 17 21.7 15.6 25.0 100 33.3 33.3 13.3 20.0
By asset score: 68
0-5 25 29.2 45.5 37.5 0 28.0 60.0 12.0 0
6-10 9 20.8 12.1 0 0 55.6 44.4 0 0
11-20 19 37.5 24.2 12.5 33.3 47.4 42.1 5.3 5.3
>21 15 12.5 18.2 50.0 66.7 20.0 40.0 26.7 13.3
By land 68
owner-ship:
No land 6 8.3 9.1 12.5 0 33.3 50.0 16.7 0
Own land 33 50.0 36.4 75.0 100 36.4 36.4 18.2 9.1
Family land 25 37.5 45.5 12.5 0 36.0 60.0 4.0 0
Rented, 4 4.2 9.1 0 0 25.0 75.0 0 0
borrowed land
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Those who had not borrowed from any source in the last five years were evenly split 
between men and women and were just over one third of the sample. While slightly more 
women than men had borrowed from one source, a higher proportion of men than women 
had borrowed from two sources, but only women had used three sources. Among these 
one had borrowed from two MFOs and an independent ASCA; another had borrowed from 
an MFO, the Co-operative Bank microfinance scheme and a parastatal, while the third had 
borrowed from two SACCOs of which she was a member via her employment as a teacher, 
and the Equity Building Society.
Married individuals formed the majority of those who had not borrowed at all. When 
further examined by household, only in four households had neither partner borrowed. In 
eleven households one of the partners had borrowed: the husband in seven and the wife in 
four. In nine households, both husband and wife had borrowed. This may suggest that 
borrowing is jointly organised with the borrowing being undertaken by the partner who has 
access to the source thought to be most appropriate. There was some evidence that 
discussions of this type took place.
To explore these patterns of borrowing within married households further, Table 7.12 
examines loan sizes and outstanding debt by gender and marital status (for the most recent 
loan from a source). The loan sizes that women had received were, overall, roughly 
equivalent to those received by men. Married women had received loans that were 74% of 
the mean value of loans received by their husbands. However, outstanding debt among 
married men is twice the level for married women, although this result is not significant. 
This may suggest that women take shorter-term loans or pay them off more quickly. But 
unmarried women had received loans more than double the sizes of unmarried men 
(significant at 10%). Men who are unmarried had much lower levels of outstanding debt, 
both compared to married men and compared to unmarried women. Earlier it was found 
that unmarried men also had high savings levels. However, by comparison, the difference 
between outstanding debt levels for married and unmarried women was small.
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Table 7.12: Mean loan sizes and outstanding debt by gender and marital status
(Kshs) Marital status Men Women All
Loan size Married 34131 25255 29258
Not married 8381 19021 13701
Overall 24321 22988 23639
Debt Married 38154 16993 26818
outstanding
Not married 2538 19911 11224
Overall 24585 18008 21147
It has been noted above that the use of banks as a savings source, and MFOs and friends 
and relatives as loan sources, was related to higher educational levels. While use of cash 
crop SACCOs is related to lower education levels. It is not surprising that those living in 
the rural areas have lower levels of education - this is confirmed by the first round data 
which shows that on average those in town have had 11.3 years of schooling whereas those 
in rural areas have had 7.3 years (first round survey, significant at 1% level). Table 7.11 
suggests that 58.3% of those who had not borrowed were educated to primary level. Only 
those with secondary level education had borrowed from three loan sources. Furthermore, 
the mean loan size (for those who had taken loans) with secondary education is 
Kshs30,724 while for those with only a primary education the mean is Kshs 10,413 
(significant at 5%), reaffirming the view that this is an important pattern in the data.
Age does not suggest a clear pattern. Although a greater proportion of the younger group 
had not borrowed, almost half had taken at least one loan -  similar to the older group. 
Location does not offer a marked pattern either for those who had not borrowed or who 
had taken one loan, but a higher proportion of those with two or three loans were based in 
Karatina town.
The patterns in relation to the poverty indicators of expenditure, assets and landholding are
intuitive. Those below the poverty line have either borrowed from one source or none at
all, while those with two loan sources were all above the poverty line and those with three
loan sources are in the richest group. The majority of those just above the poverty line
had borrowed from one source while those in the category o f200-400% of the poverty line
were almost equally distributed between those who had borrowed from one source and
those who had not borrowed at all. Table 7.13 examines loan sizes and levels of
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outstanding debt and reveals, as would be expected, that these increase as individuals move 
up through the expenditure groups.
Table 7.13: Loan size and outstanding debt by poverty indicator




poverty line 7,066 1,391
100-200% PL 16,953 7,784
200-400% PL 30,590 13,075
>400% PL 31,962 28,176







No land 13,000 3,333
Own land 40,079 26,401
Family land 9,431 1,569
Rented, 4,000 0
borrowed land
Among the poorest by asset score, most had borrowed from one source. Again the pattern 
is partly as would be expected with those with higher asset counts tending to have 
borrowed from more sources. The surprising feature is those with between 6 and 10 asset 
points, who were the majority in each case, had not borrowed at all. In the 11-20 point 
asset group again almost half had not borrowed. It is only in the poorest and richest groups 
that the proportion who had not borrowed is considerably lower. This is also supported by 
the data in Table 7.13, which indicates that those with the highest asset scores had the 
highest mean loan sizes and levels of outstanding debt. However there is an oddity in that 
those with the lowest asset scores appear to have higher levels of debt and loans than the 
next group. This was caused by a young couple, both of whom had borrowed heavily from 
their employee SACCOs to build a house. As a result they had few household assets at the 
time of the interview.
Those who owned their land had borrowed from the most sources. However they were all
women. For two of them the land was household land and they had borrowed from MFOs.
It was only a separated woman who had her own land against which she had borrowed. In
the other two cases land belongs to the household head but the borrowing is from MFOs.
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The size of loans taken and level of outstanding debt was highest among those with their 
own land. Those who had no land follow, since many of these were business people in 
town. Those with access to family land and then no secure land access, unsurprisingly 
borrowed less.









No source of repayment 4 4 1 9
Fear of repayment problem/loss of 
assets
3 3 1 7
Husband1 s agreement/disagreement 6 6
Don’t need a loan 3 1 4
Interest/cost too high 3 3
No assets/collateral to use 1 1
Other 1 1
No response 1 1 2
Note: More than one reason could be mentioned.
Those who had not borrowed at all were asked why this was the case, Table 7.14. The 
reason most mentioned was that their income was not strong enough to manage the 
repayment of a loan. The second most frequent reason was a concern about the fear of 
having a repayment problem and the possible loss of assets that might result. Third, some 
married women explained that they were dependent on the agreement of their husband to 
borrow. In some cases this concerned the pledging of household assets, but in others 
husbands had simply refused to let their wives borrow.
7.2.4 Loan use: conclusions
The first conclusion is that borrowing from cash crop SACCOs was the single most 
common source of loans. This obviously mirrors the extent of cash crops in the area, but 
also indicates the relative ease of access that these mutuals offer as over 50% of those who 
saved in a cash crop SACCO also took a loan.
Second, employers, relatives and friends represent the second most frequent source of 
loans at 19.2%. Moreover, it was found that being educated, young and male increased the
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likelihood of borrowing from this source. It was also found that unmarried men tended to 
receive smaller loan sizes and have lower levels of outstanding debt than married men, or 
compared to women whether they were married or not. Their access to formal sources 
tended to be restricted by their lack of access to cash crops and land, and they do not 
appear to make significant use of group based mechanisms for borrowing either.
The number of places in which people save tends to be higher than the number of places 
from which they borrow. However, ROSCAs have been excluded from this analysis. A 
higher proportion of women than men have used one loan source in the last five years, 
whereas more men than women had used two sources. It is only women who have used 
three loan sources and two of the three women were members of MFOs. While there is 
some association that demonstrates that the better off (those with higher expenditure and 
asset levels) had access to more loan sources, higher proportions of both the poorest and 
richest groups had actually borrowed. However, the poorer groups tend to borrow less. 
Those who had not borrowed at all were distributed across groups.
While there is some association between borrowing and expenditure poverty groups, the 
result is not as strong as might be anticipated. Indeed this data suggests that quite high 
proportions of the better off did not take loans. This result is further supported in the asset 
score results, where the second and third categories show relatively high proportions of 
people who had not borrowed. These results are further underlined by the data on land 
ownership type. People who owned land seem to have been as likely not to borrow as 
those who had no land. Indeed it is those without assured access to land who were most 
likely to have borrowed (although the sub-sample is very small). An explanation is that the 
better off do not need to borrow small amounts and do not have access to large amounts 
unless they are in employee SACCOs or the rare cases that they might have access to 
parastatals and banks. However, loan sizes from banks were shown to be low compared to 
other sources suggesting that the banking sector has not been an important means of 
borrowing significant amounts.
These results can be interpreted in either of two ways. Either that the financial market is 
serving those who are poorer and in need of loans quite well; alternatively that the market 
seems to be failing those whom we would most expect it to be able to serve, that is, the less 
poor and those with assets and more secure access to land.
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7.3 Conclusions
A number of patterns have emerged from this analysis of saving and borrowing among the 
individuals surveyed. First, this data exposes the role of informal group-based savings 
mechanisms and informal borrowing, which was not captured by the supply side data in 
Chapter Six. This demonstrates that group-based savings systems are extremely important 
savings mechanisms to a wide variety of people. ROSCAs are used by 48.5% and group- 
based savings mechanisms as a whole by 52.8%. On the borrowing side, ROSCAs were 
not included in the data, but if they were, they would alsobe the single most important 
source of loans. In addition to these, 11.7% borrowed from informal groups.
Alongside this, the data for SACCOs demonstrates the importance of mutually based 
financial intermediaries both in the formal and informal sector with 70.6% of individuals 
using mutually based savings services. 48.5% of individuals used a formal bank or 
parastatal in which to save, but most used other savings mechanisms alongside these 
accounts.
By contrast, individuals tended to borrow from only one source and few had borrowed 
from formal banks or parastatals. The loans from banks were small, unsecured and smaller 
than loans available from employee SACCOs, MFOs and independent ASCAs. By 
comparison the importance of borrowing from SACCOs is clear although cash crop 
SACCO loans are relatively small. When comparison is made of the extent to which 
respondents borrowed from the intermediaries in which they saved, the banks performed 
least well compared to mutuals. As sources of loans, employers, friends and relatives were 
also an important source.
ROSCAs were the most used service and women made significantly more use of them than 
men. Not only were they more likely to be members, but they also joined more groups, 
and saved more in them -especially married women in town. Further, married women had 
higher savings balances than married men. But unmarried men had much higher savings 
balances in formal accounts than the rest, and also saved more than married men in groups.
A further finding is that those who borrowed from friends and relatives were most likely to
be educated, young men. This implies that they were not able to borrow from the formal
sector even though they did save in it. This may be due to their lack of access to land and
cash crops. They were also less likely to use groups to borrow. At the same time the size
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of loans taken from friends, relatives and employers was low, at approximately Kshs4,O00. 
It could be suggested that women were able to get loans for these amounts through 
ROSCAs where the average payout was Kshs2,551.
Based upon the evidence presented here, there is little basis for suggesting that mainstream 
MFO services were reaching groups who were previously excluded. The small numbers 
among our sample were based in the town, had a business and a secondary education.
None of the MFO clients were poor using an expenditure measure. All had access to more 
than one type of savings service and half had also had access to other loan sources.
Patterns of use of particular types of intermediary did not appear to be strongly related to 
indicators of wealth based on expenditure, household assets and landholding suggesting 
that class relations are not central. Rather, the underlying dynamic that characterises the 
region is that older and less educated people live in the rural areas and have access to land 
and cash crops. This affects a number of dimensions of financial service use. Cash crop 
SACCOs were most used by these people, including widows, who tended to live in rural 
areas.
The following chapters investigate three key aspects of these findings in greater depth. 
Chapter Eight investigates the use of land as collateral as a means to understanding the 
poor lending performance of the banks. Chapters Six and Seven have demonstrated the 
importance of the mutual sector on to both saving and borrowing, and the reasons for its 
importance are explored in Chapter Nine. Finally, in Chapter Ten, the gender dimensions 
of financial service use are investigated in order to understand more fully how they are 
embedded in gender relations.
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Chapter 8 Land and Loans
"Nganga was rich. He had land. Any man who had land was considered rich. I f  a man had plenty 
o f  money, many motorcars, but no land, he could never be counted as rich. A man who w ent w ith 
tattered clothes bu t had at least an acre o f  red earth was better o ff than the m an with money."
Weep N ot Child, Ngugi W a Thiongo, 1964
In Chapter Two, it was argued that the collateral that a financial intermediary requires is 
related to the nature of its organisational form. Thus banks and other formal lenders, such 
as parastatals, usually require assets that can be used to secure the entire value of the loan 
and in many societies the most available and valuable asset is land. In Chapter Seven it 
was found that lending by the banks in Mathira was unsecured and limited both in terms of 
the number and size of loans. This chapter explains why.
The explanation relates to three issues. First, the evidence on land ownership in Mathira 
demonstrates that it is deeply embedded in social relations - especially those of age and 
gender. This constrains the use of land as collateral by borrowers. Second, land has 
important cultural meaning and this further adds to the unwillingness of borrowers to use it 
as collateral. Third, reasons why lenders have also become reluctant to take land as 
collateral are explored. These reasons include the problems of selling land in the event of 
default in the face of local resistance. Land is central to politics in Kenya, and this has 
affected the land market in the 1990s through the use of land as a patronage tool and the 
“ethnic clashes” of 1992 and 1997. These developments are also explained.
The chapter demonstrates that the constraints that both borrowers and lenders face in using 
land as collateral are deeply embedded in social, political and cultural relations -  both local 
and national. These relations fundamentally constrain the ability of borrowers to comply 
with the rules of banks, and of bankers to enforce them. This contributes to explaining the 
limited role of banks in rural lending.
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8.1 Land rights in Kenya: a brief review
Land has been central to Kenyan politics since its appropriation by the British colonial 
government. Pressure on land eventually resulted in the Mau-Mau uprising and 
contributed to Kenya gaining independence (see Chapter Five). Relative to other areas, 
the Kikuyu had evolved a system of individual land claims, but the British view was that 
tenure was communal and therefore that its seizure did not merit individual compensation 
(Kenyatta, 1961; Sorrenson, 1967). The precise nature of the customary system has been 
difficult for historians and anthropologists to reconstruct but, as noted in Chapter Five, a 
Kikuyu pioneer who first cleared land or purchased it, established an ithaka (estate) and 
founded a mbari (sub-clan), effectively had an individual title to the estate which was 
passed to his relations on his death.
However, these individual claims differed from Western perceptions in that the transfer of 
land was not entirely free of encumbrance. Land sale could involve the potential for the 
land to be redeemed on payment of the original price, but this differed between areas of 
Kikuyuland (Fisher, 1954; Barber, 1970; Mackenzie, 1993). Leakey comments on the 
Kikuyu as being particularly prone to trying to borrow money and reports that they did 
raise loans against land which were redeemed by paying back. But land was no longer 
acceptable as security in the 1950s, rather a signature on a piece of paper was used 
(Leakey, 1956).
Mackenzie argues that while core anthropological texts on the Kikuyu such as Kenyatta 
and Leakey (Leakey, 1956; Kenyatta, 1961) described Kikuyu land rights as clearly laid 
down and immutable, an alternative understanding sees the situation as a complex of 
interlocking rights and interests mediated through the sub-clan and reciprocal obligations 
(Mackenzie, 1990). As Mackenzie explains, customary rights to land were never frozen 
but were “malleable and manipulable by individuals or groups, thus subject to continual 
construction and reconstruction in the resolution of conflict (and therefore) were part of the 
process of legitimation of individual material interests and thus social differentiation” 
(ibid:609).
It can be argued that the land reform brought in by the British in the highlands in the mid-
1950s had three contradictory objectives. The first was to create titles and secure claims to
land in order to end the uncertainty of customary tenure that had been created by colonial
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land appropriation. Second, it aimed to provide the basis of an agricultural revolution 
through land consolidation that would enable the introduction of cash crops and improved 
farming techniques. In this context land reform would allow exclusive titles and hence the 
means to raise loan capital - the essence of the 1954 Swynnerton Plan. Third was the 
political objective to create a stable middle class built around Kikuyu loyalists who would 
not be led into further political subversion. In the Kikuyu areas, the Mau Mau uprising and 
the state of emergency that was declared in 1952 precipitated land reform, although this 
had already started in some other parts of the country. The origins of Mau Mau were 
reviewed in Chapter Five, and it was a factor that precipitated movement towards land 
reform, over which the government had prevaricated for some time. Once the tactic of 
villagisation had overcome support for Mau Mau and softened Kikuyu resolve, the 
opportunity for land consolidation arose and it was undertaken with some urgency 
(Sorrenson, 1967).
Sorrenson’s account indicates that there was a trade off to be sought between economic 
and political objectives (Sorrenson, 1967). He shows that the objective of agricultural 
growth, which required the creation of economically viable holdings, conflicted with the 
political objective of creating a politically stable and loyal Kikuyu middle class. The 
government understood that attempts to prevent fragmentation conflicted with the 
customary inheritance system and the desire for land in old age. Further, the colonial 
government had realised that offering credit against land could be seen as a direct attack on 
land rights if foreclosure was used. Early attempts at providing credit had therefore been 
based on the formation of credit co-operatives (Throup, 1988:209).
Another political dimension to the process of land reform is that loyalists were rewarded 
with their plots being consolidated and registered before those who had been detained were 
released (Sorrenson, 1967; Leo, 1984; Haugerud, 1989). This was one reason why the land 
issue was not revisited in the early years of independence despite calls from radicals 
(Sorrenson, 1967). Kenyatta was successful in “freezing” the debate over land, in part by 
bringing KADU, which had lobbied for decentralised government because of the land issue 
(see Chapter Five) into the KANU fold.
As Sorrenson pointed out in 1967, it is unusual that most studies of land reform in Kenya 
had investigated its economic effectiveness rather than its political dimensions. There is 
now a substantial literature exploring the economic effectiveness and impact on agriculture 
(see Platteau, 1996 for a survey). This literature suggests that there is little evidence that
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the policy, as proposed by Swynnerton in the case of Kenya, has had any significant effect. 
While some commentators argue that the Swynnerton Plan produced large increases in 
production and more than met some of its targets in the 1960s (Thurston, 1987), others 
argue that the adoption of cash crops and use of increased inputs did not depend on titling 
(Haugerud, 1995). The evidence that titling was instrumental in mobilising credit for 
investment is weak. Pinckney and Kumuyu (1994) report from their research in Murang’a 
that only two out of 115 households had an outstanding land-secured loan at any time 
during 1991. Place and Migot Adholla (1998) carried out their research in two areas of 
Kakamega District and two areas of Nyeri District in the 1990s. They found that the 
proportion of land parcels which had ever been used formally as collateral in the two areas 
of Kakamega District were 27.9% and 4.3%, while data on one area of Nyeri showed it had 
been used in 19.9% of cases. Shipton also reported that borrowers from commercial 
banks had been few in the districts he had visited (Shipton, 1992).
With this lack of borrowing from the formal sector for mortgages, research finds little 
impact of land titling on agricultural growth and hence the policy seems to have failed in 
meeting its objectives. In their analysis, Place and Migot-Adholla found that title had 
virtually no impact on the use of title to obtain credit nor did it contribute to longer loan 
maturities or higher amounts. They also found that neither of the specified regression 
models showed high explanatoiy power, suggesting that “our understanding of this market 
is poor” (Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998:368). Pinckney and Kimuyu find that entitlement 
did not increase security of tenure or create increased investment incentives. Nor was there 
evidence to suggest that the selling out of inefficient farmers had operated in a way that 
increased ownership inequality (Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994).
The lack of impact on increased security of tenure has to be seen in the context of the 
complex legal situation that statutory attempts at titling had created. The reality was that 
the attempt to introduce titles on the English model, which were finally brought into law in 
1959, has been imposed on top of existing customary land law but has not displaced it. 
Some analysts describe this as a situation of legal pluralism (Coldham, 1979; Mackenzie, 
1996; Wanjala, 2000).
Coldham documented the extent to which the land register deviated from the situation on 
the ground in the 1970s as a result of sub-division, sale and succession not being 
registered. He concluded that there was considerable divergence between what he termed 
the “law in books and the law in action” (ibid:627). Haugerud finds similar evidence and
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argues that u[i]n spite of the system of formal titles, individuals continue informally to 
have overlapping and competing claims to the same parcels of land. Access to land was 
defined less by title deeds than by relations of descent, affinity, patronage and friendship” 
(1989:66).
Coldham explains that one of the reasons for this divergence was the role of Divisional 
Native Land Control Boards which were set up to oversee the transfer of land through sale, 
charge, or subdivision and to “ensure the system’s acceptability at the grassroots” 
(Coldham, 1978:64). Land boards were decentralised and separate from the courts42 and 
these features of the system are still in place (Kanyinga, 1998). The overall objective o f 
the Boards was to further economic development, through preventing uneconomic 
fragmentation and the unproductive accumulation of land for speculative or prestige 
purposes. They also needed to take account of social concerns to prevent indebtedness and 
landlessness whether greater productivity resulted or not. Coldham explains that the 
circumstances under which Boards should refuse consent were never clearly laid out and 
the balance between economic and social objectives was never articulated. From his 
research it appears that social objectives dominated over economic ones in the decisions 
that Land Boards made. While guidelines were laid down to prevent uneconomic 
subdivision, in practice judgements about declining productivity due to sub-division were 
hard to make43 and refusal on these grounds was rare. Rather, social objectives seemed to 
be in the ascendant with concern that the applicant and his family should not be rendered 
landless or without sufficient land to meet their needs. He reports that the records were 
full of cases where applications were deferred to await dependants’ views of the sale, or 
confirmation of whether an applicant had land elsewhere. He notes that applications were 
generally rejected if the applicant had no other land to go to or his family objected (see 
also (Haugerud, 1989:78)). Indeed, the Secretary to a Land Board interviewed during this 
research described the raison d'etre of the Land Board as the protection of family interests 
(NUD,222). Coldham further maintains that these concerns had their basis in customary 
law, where land alienation was not possible without the consent of the clan elders. In this 
way the Land Control Boards were playing the part formerly played by these elders. It is 
not surprising that Board members perceived their role in traditional terms as it was the 
values of the local community which they were expected to reflect in their decisions (see 
also (Okoth-Ogendo, 1976). As Okoth-Ogendo observes, land law has been continuous in
42 Members ate appointed by the Minister on the advice o f local District Officials. It is chaired by the Divisional 
officer and the members, according to Coldham, were drawn from the local elite.
43 In fact research, has suggested that small farms may be more productive than Large farms -  the “inverse- 
relationship”. See Hunt for a discussion o f this in Kenya (Hunt, 1984).
208
its evolution with independence seeing no significant shift in the way land was distributed 
and allocated (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991).
Berry’s study of African agrarian social relations explains these underlying social 
dynamics well and is worth quoting at length. Her findings drawing on data from Central 
Kenya and elsewhere in Africa:
“In practice.... land tenure rules have remained ambiguous, and rights in land were 
subject to ongoing reinterpretation. The significance of ambiguous land rights for 
agrarian change is not so much that land rights were insecure and land use, therefore, is 
inefficient, but that people’s access to land depends on their participation in processes 
of interpretation and adjudication as well as on their ability to pay. Rising land values 
and intensified patterns of land use had certainly fostered the emergence of exclusive 
forms of control over land. However, to muster sufficient authority to exercise and 
enforce exclusive land rights, African landholders seek, inter alia, to expand the 
number of their supporters. Authority, in other words, rests partly on inclusionary 
strategies which are undermined when authority is used for exclusionary ends.
Because of these contradictory pressures, claims on land have tended to multiply over 
time. .. .People’s ability to exercise claims to land remains closely linked to 
membership in social networks and participation in both formal and informal political 
processes. Membership in social networks does not guarantee anyone access to land, 
but it does tend to blur the impact of legally sanctioned processes of exclusion.” (Berry, 
1993: 103-4).
Therefore, while an examination of the economic objectives of Kenyan land reform tends 
to dominate in the literature, the political objectives were clearly critical and social claims 
have been entrenched through the system of Land Boards. This lays bare the 
contradictions of the policy: the primary purpose was to give the Kikuyu (and Kenyans in 
general) land security in the context of the insecurity that colonial settlement had 
provoked. The economic objective of agricultural development through mortgaging land 
then depended on ascribing to these same people a fundamental willingness to risk this 
right by surrendering it to institutions over which they had little control (i.e. banks and 
parastatals).
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8.2 Patterns of land access and control: ownership, age and gender
In this section the evidence on landholding in Mathira that was presented in Chapter Five 
is further examined in order to understand how social relations of wealth, age and gender, 
influence access and control. Through this analysis, the constraints different socio­
economic groups of borrowers face in using land as collateral are explored.
8.2.1 Land ownership and accumulation in Mathira
In Chapter Five a number of characteristics of landholding in Mathira were outlined. The 
mean landholding of sampled households was 2.12 acres with Chehe households having a 
significantly higher mean of 2.33 acres compared to that of Gatundu at 1.72 acres. 
However, only 39% of households held a title to their land with a further 42% gaining 
access via another family member and the majority of these household heads (35%) 
gaining access through their fathers to lineage land. Where land was held in the name of 
the household head, the mean owned holding size was 2.15 acres in Chehe and 1.06 acres 
in Gatundu. By contrast, where the father of the household head owned the land, holdings 
averaged 0.59 acres in Chehe and 0.24 acres in Gatundu suggesting that fragmentation is 
resulting in ever-smaller holdings.
An acre of land in Chehe in 2001 was worth approximately, Kshs400,000 with tea and 
Kshs200,000 without. In Chehe the mean holding size owned by the household head (see 
Table 5.3) was 2.15 acres. Hence the approximate market value of an average holding, on 
the basis that it was all under tea was Kshs800,000. In Gatundu, land with coffee trees was 
approximately Kshsl .5m per acre and Kshsl .3m without. The mean landholding owned 
by a household head was 1 acre, and hence the approximate value was Kshsl.4m. Land in 
Gatundu is more valuable than Chehe because of its proximity to the main road and 
Karatina town, and hence markets and services such as electricity and water. Gatundu land 
is also fertile and some areas have access to water for irrigation. Given that banks were 
likely to offer loans to approximately half the value of land used as collateral, these 
landholdings might permit loans of some Kshs400,000 in Chehe and Kshs700,000 in 
Gatundu. The latter sum of money would finance the purchase of a second-hand
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reconditioned mini-van from Japan, while the former would purchase a second-hand 
pickup in good condition.
It was reported in Chapter Seven (ppl84 & 187), that only two of the sample of 68 
individuals44 had taken a loan from a formal financial intermediary using land as collateral 
in the previous five years. In one case the title had not been formally charged but simply 
deposited in the bank with signed transfer forms. However, it is doubtful that this title 
could have been foreclosed in practice as the Land Control Hoard had been bypassed45. 
Since the loan was for much less than the value of the land, the title was simply being held 
to ensure payment. This technique had also been used by a moneylender who explained to 
us that in the 1970s and 1980s he took title deeds, not in order to try and obtain possession 
of the land, but because people’s attachment to it is such that they would always come to 
get the title
back and find a means of paying him. As a form of collateral for the moneylender it also 
had the advantage of being easy to hide.
The second loan was from KIE for Kshsl00,000 and the title was formally charged. The 
borrower was having problems in repaying the loan the first time she was interviewed. She 
was interviewed again six months later, and by then she had frilly repaid the loan because 
her business was uncertain. She explained that:
HH4, 190 (a single business woman in her forties): “Ifyou lose your land today then 
the chances o f getting another plot are minimal...how else can you acquire land [i.e. 
other than inheritance]... The hope you had is gone...Ifyou live in town then you are 
not going to live in town fo r ever. When you can't pay the rent and there is no one to 
take care o f you then you can go andfeed yourself on your small land ”
While access to and control over land is important in terms of social status it is not 
necessarily seen as the key to accumulation. Leakey explains that land was not purchased 
as a means of wealth accumulation but, due to the importance that was attached to its 
possession, “this ambition is an incentive to acquire the wealth which will enable [a 
Kikuyu] to buy land” (Leakey, 1956:175). Haugerud suggests that the circuit is one in 
which the wealthy accumulate through their connections to non-local markets and
44 In addition one o f the first round sample had borrowed from the AFC in the early 1990s.
45 As Coldham, explains without any transaction relating to agricultural land gaining the consent o f the 
appropriate land control board it is void for all purposes (Coldham, 1978).
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institutions. This can enable land accumulation -  what Kanyinga has called “accumulation 
from above” (Kanyinga, 2000:60)- through purchases and then through access to loans.
But Haugerud argues that land is accumulated for speculative purposes and reports that, 
among those who had purchased land in her sample, only some two-thirds of it was under­
cultivation at the time of her research. She further argues that success (even simply 
survival), in competition over economic resources such as land, education and 
employment, “is investment in social relations with kin, neighbours, bureaucrats and 
politicians” and that rural land rights remain important to all economic classes “as a means 
of affirming descent group membership and securing access to other resources” (Haugerud, 
1989:74&78).
Hence, a number of researchers argue that accumulation in Kenya is not usually the result 
of agriculture but requires diversification into off-farm income sources, and particularly 
employment. Indeed, Collier and Lai suggest that it is through off-farm employment that 
the failings of the rural credit market were being overcome since remittances from urban 
wage employment enabled risks related to agricultural income flows to be managed 
(Collier and Lai, 1984). Further, that those wealthy people who get access to loans 
through their land were likely to divert these into education, housing, trade and 
consumption (Shipton, 1992).
In summary, only in 39% of sampled households in Mathira did the household head hold 
legal title to land. By contrast 35% had land that was still owned by the household head’s 
father and had much smaller plots making them hardly viable as collateral even if the title 
deed is obtained. While holdings in Chehe were larger than those in Gatundu, the value of 
land was lower. However, secondary sources suggest that land is usually purchased as a 
result of accumulation from off-farm income sources rather than a cause of wealth. Never 
the less, land subdivision is producing landholding sizes that are now too small to 
adequately support a family without other income sources.
8.2.2 Age and land rights
Land inheritance is patrilineal in Kikuyu culture and ownership passes through the male 
line. The customary system of ownership is that young men are usually given a portion of 
land on their father’s plot to cultivate (Coldham, 1979; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994). As
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Coldham points out customary law determines the way a father or household head divides 
land. Among the Kikuyu and Luo this involves the allocation of land to a man when he 
reaches adulthood or marries, on which he could cultivate and build a house. While the 
land allocated was rarely revoked, the son would remain subject to the father’s authority 
and hence decisions over that land were constrained (Coldham, 1979:617). The father’s 
ability to decide how the land would be distributed among his sons was also a means of 
influencing and controlling their behaviour (Haugerud, 1995). The allocation may include 
a portion of the cash crop i.e. a number of coffee trees or tea bushes. With this endowment 
a son is able to register for a licence, for example to grow tea, and then to join a SACCO or 
marketing co-operative. However, this allocation rarely involves the registration of the 
subdivision or consequent issuing of title to the land.
Table 8.1 shows that this age-based stratification of landholding persists. For male 
household heads there is a statistically significant difference in the ages of those having 
title to their land and those who do not yet have i t . Table 8.2 further indicates that in the 
tea-growing area, the age of male household heads with access to tea is significantly higher 
than those without tea, whereas for coffee there was no significant difference in ages.
Table 8.1: Mean age of male household heads owning land





HHHs holding title 42 48.45
HHHs not holding 
title
49 40.35
*M ean ages were statistically different a t 5%  level.
Table 8.2: Mean age of male household heads having cash crops
Cash crop Sample size Mean age
Tea in Chehe sub-location: *
- had tea 7 33.00
- do not had tea 29 53.76
Coffee in Gatundu sub-location:
- had coffee 5 34.40
- do not had coffee 29 45.45
* difference in means significant at 5% level
This age stratification of landholding is the result of social institutions surrounding age that
were explained in Chapter Five. These are still important in the way that they influence
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perceptions that young men are not responsible and will sell land. This was evident from 
the qualitative interviews:
HH86H (age 52): explained that he is the eldest o f three sons and each o f them has 
been allocated 1000 tea bushes. His mother and father passed away some time ago 
but he has refused to subdivide the land with titles because one o f his brothers is 
not responsible enough and he feared that his brother might sell his portion if  he is 
given the deed.
HH8H (age 60): said that he would not want to give his title deed to young men 
because they were likely to sell the land He himself only got his land from his 
father shortly before his father ’s death.
HH98H (age 33): said that he had, as yet, no title deed to his land though he fe lt 
that he would manage it better i f  it was his property. But he said that his father 
fears that he would sell the land if  he gets it when he has a young family. Since he 
got married in 1996 he said he has been more careful with his money since he has 
a family to care for.
The cost of registering titles when land is subdivided is one reason that it is not done. Key 
informants quoted a cost of approximately Kshs20,000 to subdivide and re-register titles 
into between four and six separate plots (AMP, 13 8; DUN, 222). But cost is not the only 
constraint. For some it is not acceptable to divide land while the father is still alive (AMP, 
138). A local sub-chief explained that he himself, as a man of over 40 years, had not yet 
obtained the title to his land from his father.
“ndungiga uri mwoyo mdugakue narua” literally translated means “you cannot 
give out what you have so that you may not die quickly ” (AMP, 173)
Another informant said that dividing the land was like “wishing you were dead”, and so 
old men tended to leave it to the last minute to do this (DUN,222).
A situation where land is subdivided and cultivated by sons is problematic if one of the 
sons wishes to use the title to secure a loan. He may obtain the permission of the father to 
use the land as collateral, but it is necessary that he also obtain the permission of his 
brothers. They too have the opportunity to register an objection at the Land Board.
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Haugerud further argues that changing household composition which results from 
interpersonal conflict, migration, birth, marriage and death, creates situations that official 
land law is less flexible in managing than customary law (Haugerud, 1989). She goes 
further to suggest that “the formal system of freehold titles itself already threatens 
subsistence security and provokes conflict over control of land title deeds” (ibid: 80). The 
cases in our sample where land access was through relatives other than fathers, particularly 
underlined this point.
This section has further explored the system of subdivision and land inheritance and the 
ways in which age relations influence it. Notions of maturity and responsibility towards 
landholding are a feature of the relations which persist in regulating access to land. These 
relations result in younger household heads being much less likely to have title deeds 
against which loans might be borrowed. However, we now examine gender relations to 
see whether title deeds could in fact be used in this way.
8.2.3 Gender and land rights
As already described, Kikuyu land inheritance is patrilineal and women rarely have direct 
access to titled land. However, because rights are based in a pluralistic legal system both 
men’s and women’s rights are complex, negotiable and contested. Hence the fact that 
women lack exclusive control over land does not mean that they do not have power in land 
relations.
Mackenzie’s detailed study of gender and land rights in the neighbouring district of 
Murang’a demonstrates some of the dimensions of gender-based struggles over land. 
Indeed, she explains that women had a structurally important position as the head of a 
nyumba (hut) and the main agricultural producer. This gave her usufruct rights guaranteed 
by the mbari. The land she was traditionally given was a portion of the land cultivated by 
her mother-in-law. As one of Mackenzie’s informants explained “‘The man could only get 
land when he married, so without a woman there is no land’” (Mackenzie, 1990:619).
In the context of increasing land pressure Mackenzie argues that women in Murang’a 
appealed to their customary rights as a means of negotiation. She reports the case where a
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woman married a female ‘husband’ to secure full rights to the land of her husband and 
prevent her brothers-in-law from snatching it. This is a situation where a widow without 
sons marries another woman, who may then have sons. She is then able to allocate her 
husband’s land to the sons on their marriage. However, in another case a woman without 
sons who had a title deed wanted to register the land in her daughters’ names. But her 
brother-in-law argued that the land was his by right of succession, and that the land risked 
being alienated from the mbari when her daughters married. Mackenzie argues that mbari 
social organisation is a particularly important form of male solidarity through which men 
can pursue their interests and in this case running contrary to the rights theoretically 
guaranteed by holding a title deed. However, from these examples it is clear that both men 
and women could use customary law to legitimate their claims.
A key means through which women have also sought to protect their interest has been the 
Land Control Boards, which became operational in the 1960s. Mackenzie reports that 
increased land sales in the late 1970s and 1980s resulted in the courts of chiefs and sub­
chiefs being “assailed by women unable to support themselves, or their children, the land 
on which they had lived having been sold, often without their prior knowledge” 
(Mackenzie, 1993:200). This partly refers to what Bassett calls “the apocryphal story of 
land loss in Kenya” 46, which was also recounted during this research (NUD,222). 
According to this account, in the 1960s and early 1970s when land was very cheap, men 
out drinking in bars were swindled out of their land by signing transfer forms using a 
thumbprint. Whether this is in reality tme or false, it is certain that the government issued 
directives that sought to ensure that the whole family, and not just the title-holder, agreed 
to the land being sold or used as collateral. Sources differ as to when this took place. 
Pinckney and Mackenzie give differing accounts of the directives issued which might 
suggest that a number were issued during the period (Mackenzie, 1993; Pinckney and 
Kimuyu, 1994). The important point here is that Land Boards subsequently took family 
interests in land more seriously.
As a result, women and children in particular have the means to prevent land being used as 
collateral for loans and this was also found in interviews with local officials in Mathira 
(see also Haugemd, 1989). However it was not easy to find evidence that Land Boards 
rejected claims on this basis (see also Coldham, 1978). But this does not account for 
situations in which the application might never have actually got as far as being lodged. A 
local sub-chief explained that a man wishing to charge his land for a loan had to bring the
46 Ellen Bassett, personal communication based on doctoral research, 9th October, 2001.
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form to the sub-chief to sign. It was the sub-chiefs responsibility to confirm that the 
family were in agreement with the transaction. He reported that there have been numerous 
occasions where the man has brought the form, and he has been told to return with his wife 
and family in order that he can ask them whether they agree with the transaction. He noted 
that in a number of cases the man did not return and he had later seen the man’s wife who 
told him that she could not agree to signing the form (AMP, 13 8).
In one of the focus group discussions carried out in this study, I asked a group of better-off 
women in Gatundu sub-location whether they would allow their husbands to take the title 
deed as collateral for a loan. They said that they could not because:
FGD12: “Men mind mostly about their friends and can go and drink the money. ” 
They reported that there had been several cases in the area where families had lost 
their land in this way.
Women in the second round survey were also asked whether they had ever prevented their 
husband’s land being used as collateral, but none said that they had. While I attempted to 
further investigate this it is probably more the case that the men now know that their 
families are not likely to agree and hence they do not even try to do this.
This therefore suggests that while women usually do not own land they can intervene to 
prevent its sale or mortgage. But as indicated above, a woman who owns a title deed 
might also be constrained by customary law in exercising her exclusive legal rights.
Finally in this section, the survey data on women’s landholding is reviewed to establish the 
extent to which women owned land (Table 8.3).
Female-headed households who owned land were mainly widows. This is confirmed by 
the data in which the mean age of women household heads owning land was significantly 
higher at 59 years (n=l 1) than for those not owning land - 37 years (n=26). However, 
there was no significant difference in the mean size of landholdings held by female-headed 
households compared to the whole sample (Table 8.4).
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Table 8.3: Land ownership and female household heads by sub-location
Ownership type Gatundu Chehe Karatina
Town
Total
No. of Female HHHs 12 11 21 44
Female HHHs with no land 1 0 14 15
Female HHHs with land 
of which:
11 11 7 29
Owned by hhh 6 6 2 14
Owned by father of hhh 2 1 0 3
Owned by deceased husband 1 2 0 3
Land owned by father in law 1 0 0 1
Rented 0 0 2 2
Borrowed 0 0 0 0
Road reserve 1 0 0 1
Forest Land 0 5 0 5
Other 2 3 1 6
Table 8.4: Landholding sizes of female headed households
Number of hhs Chehe Gatundu Karatina Total
No land 3 1 * 14 15
<1 acre 2 4 1 8
1-3 acres 3 6 1 9
3-5 acres 3 1 2 6
>5 acres 0 0 0 3
Total 11 12 18 41
Mean land area 2.55 1.58 0.5 1.36*
* - the mean landholding sizes for male and female headed households were not significantly different.
However the qualitative interviews demonstrated that while widows may have had a title 
deed, they faced complex situations in which their children -  primarily sons -  were party 
to any decision over its use. Thus when asked about the use of their land as collateral, they 
responded:
HH4FHH: a widow o f 60 with three acres o f land to which she had title, and for 
whom coffee had been a main source o f income. She said that she would have to 
consult the children i f  she wanted to dispose o f a major asset. I f  they refused to let 
her sell the item then they would have to provide her with the money she needed.
HH88FHH: a widow o f 54 who discussed her finances with her children, especially 
her sons who lived in the compound She said that she did not make any decisions
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fo r herself In using the assets, she explained that i f  her sons did not agree then she 
could not use the assets as collateral or sell them.
KMJ, 149 (a widow who declined to complete the individual interview): explained 
that she could not use the land or any o f her assets to get a loan, or even sell them 
i f  she needed the money because her children would refuse and they would have the 
final say in the matter.
This evidence confirms the pluralistic and complex nature of land rights in Kenya. In this 
context women do not usually have their own titles because of patrilineal inheritance 
systems. However, the Land Control Boards have created a situation in which women can 
prevent men from risking their title deeds by using them as collateral. But customary law 
invoked by Land Control Boards cuts both ways and men may also use them to contest 
women’s claims. Finally, where widows control family land, this is heavily constrained 
by lineage relations and suggests that they are in a sense holding the land in trust for their 
sons.
8.3 The cultural meaning of land
The previous two sections have suggested that individuals actively use social and financial 
resources to gain rights to land. It seems contradictory therefore to believe that they would 
be prepared to risk losing them by using them as collateral. Rather the evidence suggests 
that there is a strong aversion to this risk.
Pinckney and Kimuyu reported that many farmers in their sample would never accept a 
loan secured against land if there was any possibility of losing it (Pinckney and Kimuyu, 
1994). Indeed they concluded from research in the Murang’a area of Central Province and 
the Moshi area of Tanzania that “considerations for social insurance for immediate family 
members appear overriding in the land ownership arrangements in these communities” 
(ibid: 10). They also argued that, in the absence of supply, it is difficult to assess the 
importance of demand side factors, such as concern over loss. Shipton, on the other hand, 
argues that the Luo historically pledged a range of assets such as livestock, buildings or
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machinery, but never land. Hence the small number of land-secured loans in evidence was 
not entirely due to inadequate supply (Shipton, 1992:374).
Respondents in Mathira also expressed a general and widespread concern about the 
potential loss of land if used as collateral, explaining:
HH19W: “It is not good to use assets to secure loans” and she compared this to a 
SACCO that could only take her salary in the event o f her default
HH12H: He said that he feared loans because he had seen other people lose their 
household items and their land. He explained that he would rather ask his 
employer fo r a loan or withdraw money from his business.
HH53W: She said that she and her husband (a retired agricultural officer) had 
never discussed taking a loan against land because loans bring problems even to 
the children, since it is they who will suffer i f  you cannot pay. She also expressed a 
concern that it is easy to get into problems because although you might take a 
small amount o f money it could become a big debt and people will come for the 
things that you used to secure the loan. She said that she preferred women’s 
groups because i f  you are unable to pay you tell them when you can pay and they 
accept.
Yet it is not simply the loss of land that is important but its cultural meaning. In the case 
of the Luo, Shipton explains that there was broad scepticism among the Luo about the land 
market, that it was deemed a betrayal to alienate ancestral land for money, and that money 
gained from selling land for personal gain was regarded as evil (Shipton, 1992). He also 
reports the cultural importance of being buried in the family homestead since reference to 
ancestral graves justified cultivation rights and claims to belonging. “Among the Luo, as 
among many other peoples with segmentary lineages, farmers identify a place on the 
ground with any ancestors buried there, and with a place in the social order. Land is 
considered a permanent family asset, essential to lineage survival and never to be let go of 
lightly... mortgaging the land is mortgaging the ancestors (original italics), and gambling 
against kinship and the social fabric itself’ (ibid:375).
Considerations of misfortune and evil were also apparent among informants in Mathira. 
One respondent explained that he was unable to use his land as collateral because his
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father had put a curse on it telling him that he should never use his title deed to borrow a 
loan, rather he should only borrow against his coffee crop (HH23H). Another informant, 
who was the secretary to a divisional Land Control Board, explained how such curses were 
believed in relation to the disposal of land for money reporting that his cousin had sold a 
piece of land to pay his son’s university fees. Later when his cousin was walking along the 
road, a tethered cow kicked him and injured him severely and this was interpreted locally 
as the result of the curse (NUD,222).
Informants also cited the role of burial in family land as an issue. Burial in a cemetery 
meant being considered a pauper. Being buried in family land meant that the deceased was 
brought back to where his parents were buried and hence where he belonged.47 There was 
also a related belief that when someone was buried in their own land, they were still there 
looking after their family (NUD,222).
The importance of burial in ancestral land was underlined at a national level in 1986 by the 
famous S.M. Otieno case. This involved a dispute between Otieno’s widow, Wambui 
Otieno, a Kikuyu, and Otieno’s brothers who were Luo. Otieno’s widow wished to bury 
him at their home in Ngong on the outskirts of Nairobi - a farm that had been bought and 
developed by them. Otieno’s clansmen wanted to bury him at their home in Nyalgunga, 
Siaya District. Otieno’s clansmen eventually won the case on appeal to the High Court 
(Ojwang and Mugambi, 1989; Cohen and Odhiambo, 1992). This provoked heated and 
widespread debate because the issues did not solely concern the Luo. Lonsdale maintains 
that there have been equally symbolic cases of Kikuyu burial. He refers, for example, to 
the case of Chief Koinange - a Kikuyu chief in the 1920s and 1930s - whose grandfather’s 
bones were exhumed in 1933 to prove the extent of his mbari's land lost to white 
settlement: "[pjast Kikuyu corpses have been every bit as eloquent as Luo remains” 
(Lonsdale, 1992:110).
This section has demonstrated further constraints affecting borrowers’ willingness to use 
land as collateral. People fear losing land because of its cultural meaning and symbolic 
importance. Using land to gain money could risk the wrath of ancestors and invoke the 
power of curses, and burial in ancestral land has meaning in terms of identity and 
belonging.
47 Both Leakey and Sorrenson report that Kikuyu who originally bought land from Dorobo hunter-gatherers 
underwent a joint ceremony which adopted the Kikuyu into the Dorobo tribe and vice versa in order that the 
departed spirits o f the two families would not object to the deal, mutual adoption being the only means of 
placating their belief in the power o f  the ancestors’ spirits (Leakey, 1956; Sorrenson, 1967).
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8.4 Wider constraints to land as collateral in the 1990s
The previous sections have examined social and cultural constraints to the control of land 
and its use as collateral for borrowers. This section reports why banks have problems in 
taking rural land as collateral.
For the banks, rural land has become increasingly unviable as a form of collateral since the 
late 1980s and during the 1990s. As one official reported, there is a “silent norm” that the 
banks avoid using agricultural properties because realising them in the event of foreclosure 
is a problem. As he put it “you never make money in realisation, it is a nightmare of a 
process” (AMA, 227). There were three main reasons for these increased difficulties. 
These reasons apply more generally and did not particularly emanate from Mathira, but are 
also relevant to the situation there.
First is the increased likelihood that local communities will oppose the auctioning of land. 
This problem started to emerge in the 1980s after banks had extended their operations 
upcountry. Okoth-Ogendo (1976) reports that the AFC rarely got beyond threats to 
foreclose, and Haugerud (1989,quoting Moris) suggests that banks found courts reluctant 
to allow them to do this. Yet Shipton also reports the difficulties that the AFC, and other 
lending bodies, encountered when attempting to foreclose on land, since relatives and 
neighbours of defaulters would arrive at the auction with machetes and clubs, to threaten 
prospective buyers. This led lenders to realise that land auctions were “potentially 
explosive” (1992:375).
While sale of land with vacant possession is the norm, purchasing a plot at a land auction 
may not guarantee vacant possession and there were reports of cases where buyers had to 
remove existing occupants of the property, themselves. Understandably therefore, it is 
unlikely that people from outside the area would want to get involved unless they could 
take possession of the property without having to resort to force. Furthermore, the use of 
force would be unlikely to result in good relations with neighbours, who are likely to be 
relatives of the defaulter. Shipton reports a case where the buyer eventually moved away, 
leaving the original owner on the land (1992:377). Thus, the market for rural land tends to
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be limited to local buyers and these also tend to be unwilling to buy if the family is 
resisting the sale.
The foreclosure process is not only problematic for the bank, but is also extremely costly 
for the borrower. The cost of auctioneers and the process of disposal means that the debt 
grows, as fees, charges and interest accumulate.48 At the same time the value that is likely 
to be realised for the asset is likely to be low. One informant explained how he had bought 
a piece of land from his neighbour just a few days before it was to be auctioned in payment 
of a bank debt (UAM,132). He explained that the process of auctioning is hugely 
disadvantageous as a way of repaying because the bank is only interested in covering the 
debt and the costs, regardless of the value of the land. The bank will sell the whole plot as 
it has the entire title, even if a portion of the land might be sufficient to cover the debt. As 
a result it is much better for the defaulter to find a buyer privately and divide the plot, 
which is what he had done with his neighbour in this case. Indeed, Fisher reports in her 
1957 account of land tenure that when land was used as security, then the debtor might 
give a plot of land commensurate with the debt, but that generally he would sell in order to 
repay the creditor and “may even be a little in pocket after paying the debt”
(1954,paragraph 581). Moreover, in the course of foreclosure, the debtor is charged all of 
the costs involved, including those of the auctioneers whose costs are usually thought to be 
excessive (UAM, 132). Because these costs are high and totally out of the control of the 
borrower49, the defaulter feels further aggrieved by the situation (see also (Shipton, 
1992:376)).
Politics can also be a factor in the foreclosure process. Shipton reports a 1991 Presidential 
Standing Order that prevented financial institutions from auctioning land without having 
cleared this first with the provincial administration (1992:378). As Wanjala (2000) points 
out, this was tantamount to making the judiciary subordinate to the executive, and such 
edicts present means through which patronage can be dispensed. An appeal to the 
provincial administration or direct to the President can often be made when the family has 
not been involved in the transaction and the land is being foreclosed (NAK, 196; UIK, 198) 
and such a case is reported by Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994:9). As a result auctioning land
48 A feature o f  the ‘Donde’ Bill passed in 2001 is that the total interest charged on a loan should not exceed the 
principal amount borrowed. See Chapter Six for a brief discussion o f  the ‘Donde* Bill. Source: Kenyan Banks 
Stop Lending over Donde Act, The East African, 24th September, 2001
49 One informant had been taken to civil jail in October 2000 for non-payment o f a debt to a supplier from 
whom he had obtained inputs for the local coffee factory. The original debt was Kshs750,000. By the time he 
had sold a piece o f land for some Kshs300,000 and used at least another Kshs250,000 to make repayments, the 
debt was still in the region o f Kshs750,000 as not only interest; but lawyers and court costs and the chaiges for 
him being in civil jail for six months had also been added to the debt
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can take many years - “in Kenya things don’t always go according to the law” (NAK, 196). 
A local bank manager reported an attempt to divert his pursuit of a debtor, although the 
case did not involve land: a young man who was a member of the local KANU Youth 
Wing had borrowed for his businesses (a bar and second-hand shoe stall). When the 
manager pursued him, a prominent local KANU politician telephoned the manager 
suggesting that the President could pay the money. The manager was particularly keen to 
pursue this man because he had been boasting locally that he would “see what the manager 
would do with him” (UYN,213). The manager was not diverted, saying that he only 
wanted to be repaid, and the young man spent three weeks in civil jail before the money 
was paid.
As a result of these problems with rural land, banks generally prefer to take land that is 
inside urban or municipal boundaries. This land is more likely to be have been purchased 
and therefore not to be part of family and community ties which would prevent its disposal. 
However, the difficulties of actual foreclosure by the banks - even of a piece of 
commercial land within municipal boundaries - were well illustrated during the course o f 
the fieldwork.50 A local businessman owned a bar and restaurant just outside the town. He 
had borrowed against the property and been unable to repay the loan. The property was 
put up for auction, and this was held in front of the post office in Karatina in July 2000.
The auction was disturbed by drunkards and did not proceed. An informant, who had 
attended the auction and who was a close associate of the businessman, later explaind that 
“we have our ways of diverting these things”, arguing that employing such tactics to abort 
the auction was a “question of survival” (RJN, 170).
The second problem that the banks have had to deal with has been the problem of false title 
deeds. Kanyinga has documented in detail how the political system uses land as a tool of 
patronage through “grants from above” (1998:50). The ‘grabbing’ of public land in the 
mid-1990s became a public scandal with many reports in the national newspapers on the 
subject.51 One explanation of this phenomenon is that it was a response to the suspension 
of aid by donors in 1991 and the arrival of multi-party politics. According to Klopp 
(2000), this led to a search for new sources of patronage by the ruling elite with which to 
satisfy the greater bargaining power that competition for political power had produced.
50 There were many means o f thwarting the system. One anecdotal story was that o f a man who had divided his 
plot into two and registered two titles, using one to secure a loan. His house was built just over the edge o f  one 
o f the plots making it un-sellable when the bank came to foreclose.
51 See, for example, Robert Shaw in Daily Nation o f 6th March 1994, “Why Kenya’s looting brigade now has its 
eyes on public land”.
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As titles to pieces of public land were handed out, and used to obtain loans, banks had 
great difficulty in knowing whether they were genuine. While the most high profile cases 
of such land grabbing were of land in and around Nairobi, such as the Karura Forest 
(Klopp, 2000), areas such as Karatina have not been immune. During the period of the 
fieldwork, a road reserve at the junction of two main roads was fenced off and the 
foundations for a petrol station built there.
The third main factor affecting the acceptability of land as collateral has been land clashes 
in the Rift Valley and at the Coast in the run-up to elections in 1992 and in 1997 
respectively (Ogachi, 1999; Southall, 1999; Klopp, 2001). It has been shown above that 
land is central to politics and these conflicts were central to the transition to political 
liberalisation. In the post-independence period it was the Kikuyu who were seen as a 
potential political threat and who, as agriculturalists, were hungry for land and eager to 
leave the over-crowded Central Province. (Kanyinga, 2000). As a result, in the 1960s and 
1970s, they settled in the Rift Valley on settlement schemes, such as the Million Acres 
Scheme. While Kenyatta had not been able to solve the land question, as mentioned 
above, he was able to “freeze” it through the political alliances and rewards that he offered 
minority groups. Since the beginning of the Moi regime in 1978, “the political elites ...had 
disinterred and dusted off the land question as a political tool to fight those opposed to 
them” (Kanyinga, 2000:56). This resulted in the resurgence of the majimbo (regionalist) 
project and ethnic differences that had earlier threatened the eviction of Kikuyus from the 
Rift Valley (Chege, 1994:69). It was these areas that were the focus of “ethnic clashes” in 
1992 (Africa Watch and Human Rights Watch, 1993; Ogachi, 1999). Given the 
identification of the Kikuyus with opposition political parties, the violence was intended to 
drive out Kikuyus who had settled in the Rift Valley, because they were a threat to the 
electoral chances of loyal KANU politicians (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1996).
These developments are a national problem, and a feature of the broader political economy 
in which land in Kenya is rooted. Although land clashes have not directly affected the 
Mathira area, there were nonetheless implications for those Kikuyu who owned plots in the 
Rift Valley but did not live there, as they would now find it difficult to use these plots as 
collateral. Although bank managers argue that the viability of the investment project is far 
more important than the availability of collateral, and that they will do their utmost to find 
ways to fund viable projects, it is a legal requirement that banks have adequate security.
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From the point of view of bankers, the difficulties of foreclosing on lineage land and the 
willingness of defaulters to use whatever tactics they can to prevent auctioning, has 
produced a situation where rural land is no longer acceptable as collateral. This reluctance 
to use land as collateral has been compounded by wider political developments in which 
land has been a tool of patronage and political conflict.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the reasons underlying the limited use of land as collateral -  a 
finding of Chapter Seven - from both the perspectives of borrowers and lenders.
The Swynnerton Plan, and the subsequent phase of land registration and titling, sought to 
make rights to land exclusive and alienable in order for security of tenure to allow 
investment to take place, and land to be mortgaged to obtain credit. However, land reform 
in the Kikuyu areas was essentially a political process responding to the need to deal with 
Mau Mau and offer the Kikuyu land security to placate their fears of further European 
expansion. This produced a fundamental contradiction in policy, since those who had 
struggled for their land rights were expected to risk them as collateral for loans.
The experience of land titling has produced a complex situation. In our survey, 81% had 
access to land via family relationships but only 39% of household heads actually had titles 
in their name. A further 42% had access via their father or another family member. The 
process of land reform has failed to deal adequately with customary land rights, and claims 
on the basis of these are particularly strong. Indeed, the Land Control Boards, which were 
set up to implement the policy and enable economic development, have instead done more 
to uphold customary rights. Given the importance of land as a social safety net, it is 
unsurprising that social considerations have become key to their deliberations. Moreover, 
both men and women have been able to use customary rights to prevent the mortgage or 
disposal of land in which they have an interest.
At one level it could be argued that these problems simply represent an increase in 
transactions costs for banks, yet on closer reflection such an interpretation of the situation 
seems to be inadequate. First, it is clear that the social and cultural importance of land
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means it is an asset that cannot be put in jeopardy. This element of risk refers not simply 
to the fact that a borrower may not manage to pay, but to the fundamental uncertainty o f  a 
borrowing environment in which one has little power, and in which the rules of the game 
may also change. The failure of the Kikuyu-owned banks in the banking crises of the 
1980s and early 1990s is relevant here (see Chapter Five). An informant who commented 
that “anything is possible in this country -  you know we have had mountains move” 
(FGD6), further underlines this concern.
It therefore seems undeniable that the demand for credit backed by land is severely 
constrained by the factors cited above. Yet the view that this situation is one where 
transactions costs are out of hand may lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to improve 
the legal system and foreclosure processes in order to make land a viable form of 
collateral. But adopting such a position would in turn neglect the fact that the underlying 
social relations go beyond any simple analysis of transactions costs. As Shipton states:
“the mortgage credo, seemingly so logical, begins to look increasingly foreign and 
fantastic, and the complex of institutions built around it increasingly futile” (1992:359).
The complexity of social relations around land and its cultural meaning have resulted in a 
situation in which few potential borrowers are both willing and able to borrow against 
land, and lenders are increasingly wary of accepting it. In part, this also explains why 
mutuals have become popular with borrowers in the 1990s, since borrowing from them 
does not require that land be put at risk. The next chapter investigates users preferences 
for mutuals in depth.
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Chapter 9 Understanding Mutuality
“I f  I  take my money to the bank then when I  have a problem, who will help me? ”
(HH39W)
In Chapter Six it was shown that the outreach of the mutual sector in Mathira was 
considerable -  accounting for approximately one half of the number of savings accounts 
and between 20% and 30% of the value of funds intermediated. Chapter Seven confirmed 
the importance of ROSCAs and ASCAs, with almost half of the sample using ROSCAs, 
70% saving in a mutual and 38% borrowing from them. This chapter investigates the 
reasons for this extensive use of mutuals.
The available evidence suggests that there has been increasing provision of financial 
services through the mutual sector in the 1990s -  both formally through SACCOs and 
informally through ROSCAs and ASCAs. The explanation lies in a combination of factors 
and it is argued that these factors are fundamentally related to the organisational form of 
mutuals discussed in Chapter Three.
First, on the savings side, the way in which the banks raised minimum balances gives a 
transactions cost argument for moving to mutuals. However, it was seen in Chapter Six 
that the cost of loans from mutuals was not lower than the banks. This implies that 
borrower transactions costs alone cannot explain these choices.
Respondents explained their preferences for mutuals as resulting from a number of factors. 
First, they explained that using these mechanisms imposed discipline on their saving. 
Second, that these mechanisms gave them better access to loans. Third, that mutuals can 
provide access to a social safety net through the social networks that they create and this 
has been particularly important since the deterioration of the economy since 1997. Finally, 
that mutuals do not require land or other major assets as collateral. Borrowing from them 
does not create downside risks that may be exacerbated by the uncertain environment -this 
aspect was discussed in Chapter Eight.
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However, to ascribe these preferences for mutuals to the economic downturn alone would 
be to overlook their importance as an enduring feature of the financial landscape. The 
evidence suggests that mutuals embody a set of social relationships very different to those 
of banks because they are owned and managed by their members. This gives users voice 
in setting the rules and the ability to negotiate when it comes to enforcement. These 
characteristics make mutuals particularly important in mitigating risk in an environment of 
uncertainty. But the option of using mutuals to mitigate risk would not be available if the 
underlying social networks and social relations were not structured in ways that allowed 
collective action of this type to emerge.
The final section of the chapter goes on to examine the relationship between rural SACCOs 
and politics, demonstrating that it is their organisational form that makes them an 
important means of mobilising support and rewarding clients.
9.1 Trends in provision: SACCOs, ASCAs and ROSCAs in the 1990s
A mixture of sources suggest that mutuals have become increasingly numerous and 
popular over the 1990s.
First, national data on the SACCO sector helps to illustrate a steady rise in membership. 
Table 9.1 gives data for rural SACCOs which suggests a doubling of membership in the 
1980s followed by a further rise of 30% between 1990 and 1997 (see also (Alila and 
Obado, 1990)). However, it is important to be careful with this data as it may 
overestimate growth, since failing or dormant SACCOs are rarely closed down and 
removed from the figures quickly. While the table suggests a trebling of deposits between 
1990 and 1995 this represents only a 10% growth in real terms due to the rapid inflation of 
the early 1990s. However, while savings did grow by 19% in real terms between 1990 and 
1997, the level of loans outstanding actually fell by 12%.
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Table 9.1: Rural SACCO membership, savings and loans 1975-1997
Year Membership Balance of 
savings accs 
(m Kshs)
Number of loans Loan balance 
(m Kshs)
1975 85,000 56 74,000 62
1980 374,000 311 92,000 252
1985 541,000 726 104,000 388
1990 665,000 992 120,000(est) 547
1995 821,000 3094 131,000 919
1997 863,000 4010 119,000 1630
Source: '[ntemational Co-operative Alliance, 1998:25
In the urban SACCO sector, there was a 32% growth in the number of SACCOs between 
1990 and 1997 with membership growth of 29%. The 1998 provisional figures suggest a 
decline in the number of SACCOs and membership compared to 1997. Explanations for 
this may include retrenchment in the public sector and the removal of SACCOs that were 
either dormant or failing. Share capital fell in value by 20% in real terms between 1990 
and 1995 but had recovered to the 1990 level by 1997. With higher numbers of members 
this means lower mean balances per member, but it is difficult to know whether this is due 
to the effects of inflation or the influx of new members. The value of loans fell similarly in 
real terms between 1990 and 1995, but had been restored to the 1990 value by 1997.
Table 9.2: Urban SACCO numbers, membership, share capital and loans 1988-1998
Year Number of 
societies




1988 1725 811,452 7,741 5,689
1990 1828 948,644 8,515 8,382
1995 2215 1,120,056 19,339 17,625
1997 2418 1,229,862 29,254 21,614
1998* 2003 1,046,412 28,595 22,856
♦-provisional figures
Source: Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-operatives Ltd (no date)
Despite these caveats the data does suggest membership growth even if amounts 
intermediated suffered through inflation. For Mathira, the date of registration of SACCOs 
helps to demonstrate their emergence in the 1990s. Table 9.3 shows that the two tea 
SACCOs were registered in the early 1990s, and a new coffee SACCO was registered in 
2000, although it was still recruiting members at the time of the research. Employers who 
have been in the area for some time have registered SACCOs for employees much earlier. 
Jamii Hospital opened in the 1990s and registered an employee SACCO in the mid-1990s.
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But the main area of expansion has been in the business and transport sector. Part of the 
explanation for these new SACCOs is the liberalisation of the co-operative legislation and 
the reduction of the role of government in the running of SACCOs (see Chapter Five). But 
these changes cannot explain the parallel growth of ROSCAs and ASCAs, to which we 
now turn.
Table 9.3: Registration dates for SACCOs in and around Karatina
SACCO Date of registration
Cash crops:
Nyeri Farmers (Coffee) 1960s -  new SACCO 1998
Mathira Coffee Farmers (no services yet available) 2000
Mathira Tea Growers SACCO 1990
Nyeri Tea Growers SACCO 1992
Employee based:
Wikio (Town council) 1978
Uringiti (Tumutumu Hospital staff) 1979
Tumutumu (non teaching staff at Tumutumu schools) 1987





Mathira Rural Matatus (MRM) 1996
Nyakati 1998
Biashara 1995
Mt Kenya Investors 1995
Source: Divisional Co-operative Office
Chapter Six indicated the growth of MFO managed ASCA programmes from their start in 
1994 to their coverage of some 29,000 members in 2000. These figures are again likely to 
be overestimates because members in default and dormant groups are not quickly removed. 
However, evidence from many qualitative interviews indicated that respondents had 
observed patterns of increasing ROSCA and ASCA use. Many also related this 
development to the financial difficulties that households were facing.
WACJ58 ( a local sub-chief): He thought that there had been an increase in the 
number o f groups in the area and that this was due to the lack o f money. While 
people could not manage the few  thousand neededfor schoolfees, they could 
contribute the few  hundred that they needed to go to the group in order to save fo r  
the school fees.
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Although a number of women reported having reduced the number of ROSCAs in which 
they participated due to economic hardship, they had rarely ceased to use them altogether. 
Rather, the implication of those who reported the increasing use of groups was that those 
who had not previously joined them, particularly men, were now doing so.
FGD4 (better o ff men in tea zone): “men never used to be in groups, mostly they 
were for women, but then there were money problems due to economic hardships 
and men have joined groups to get money fo r the requirements such as school fees , 
and even fo r buying cookingfat. .. .Men were happy to see the way that women’s  
groups were contributing to building homes and houses. Before the 1980s men did 
not join women’s groups since they did not want to mix with women as they fe lt this 
meant that they were lowering their dignity ”.
An employee of the Co-operative Bank who worked with SACCOs, explained that after 
seeing the benefit of pooling their savings, some groups then see the need to formalise their 
operations into a SACCO (DNO,51). This trend was clearly evident among the transport 
SACCOs, which had emerged out of self-help groups of matatu owners on a particular 
route. The move to this form of organisation in the matatu industry arose in the 1980s. In 
1998 the nationwide Matatu Vehicle Owners Association was banned for organising 
countrywide strikes in protest against the government. Thereafter touts had taken over the 
matatu stages and were controlling the business. Drivers would often collude with touts 
and deny owners earnings from the trips they had made. As a result, a self-help group of 
Nissan minivan owners formed in Karatina in 1993. They registered as an association with 
the Ministry of Culture and Social Services, set up an office and recruited members. They 
then ejected the touts from the stage and took back control of their vehicles. The self-help 
group started with a ROSCA (or merry-go-round) partly because they needed an activity to 
register themselves with. As they developed they decided to register as 2NK SACCO 
(AAM,056).
A contributory factor to the emergence of some of these SACCOs has been the support of 
people who had experience of SACCOs in other settings -  especially in employment. Key 
players in two SACCOs -  Karombu and Mt Kenya Investors SACCO -  had retired or 
resigned from formal employment and moved back to their home areas. They had the 
skills and knowledge of SACCO operation to stimulate and support their start up.
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This section has presented evidence from a variety of sources that suggests that there has 
been significant growth in the membership of SACCOs, ROSCA and ASCAs in the 1990s. 
The next sections explore explanations for this trend.
9.2 Saving in mutuals: cost and discipline
Two of the reasons that informants cited for preferring mutuals to banks were the costs of 
saving in banks and the lack of discipline. These are now discussed in turn.
9.2.1 The transactions costs of saving
The behaviour of the banks in terms of the minimum balances that customers were 
expected to hold in their deposit accounts in order to avoid being charged fees, was 
explained in Chapter Six. The implementation of minimum balances for the two 
internationally owned banks was part of a strategy to target services towards personal 
customers with “high net worth”. During 1999 and 2000, all of the four main banks in 
Karatina increased their minimum balances on deposit accounts.
The minimum balance is the level at which there are no charges made on the account. If  
the balance drops below this level then charges are made for the running of the account. 
The effect of this increase in minimum balances was that the customer had either to put 
more savings into the account, or pay the charges. For example, at the Co-operative Bank, 
charges were Kshs300 per month. The minimum balance for a savings account in the Co­
operative Bank rose from Kshs1000 to Kshs3000 in November 1999 and then in steps 
during 2000 to a peak of Kshs6500 in August 2000. Thus a customer who had Kshsl500 
in her account would after five months have nothing.
HH122W: “Ifyou don ’t go on putting your money in the bank then they eat your 
money through charges'1.
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As Barclays increased its minimum balance to Kshs 10,000, so in a small town such as 
Karatina it was perceived as a bank which did not want local people’s accounts. One o f 
the local bank managers himself reported that he thought that the minimum balance had 
driven a lot of people away and even the local government staff felt that they were not 
being “cared for”. In a town with only a Divisional headquarters where many government 
staff earned about Kshs 10,000 per month, the minimum balance represented an entire 
months pay that must remain in the bank untouched.
In the interviews, respondents were asked which accounts they had closed or stopped using 
in the last two years. Out of the 68 individuals, seven (10.3%) reported having closed a 
bank account due to the raising of the minimum balance or the charges that were being 
made on the savings account. Three of these were in the two rural sub-locations and four 
in Karatina town. One of the seven had opened another bank account specifically 
designed to be targeted at small business people, and related to access to their microfinance 
loan product52. Two more had moved to a Building Society that had a very low minimum 
balance. While some respondents had opened accounts in the last two years, in most cases 
this involved a shift from one bank to another. While this does not suggest that individuals 
moved their savings out of the formal sector this tended to represent a shift away from the 
“mainstream” national banks to alternatives which were targeting their services more 
directly at the smaller saver, such as Equity Building Society, and which had a low 
minimum balances of KshsSOO. The bad publicity which increasing minimum balances 
generated even led to a Landmark Motion in Parliament which could have resulted in a bill 
to prevent minimum balances rising above Kshs1000 (Weekly Review, 1999).
9.2.2 Savings discipline and security
A further reason given for preferring to use groups rather than a bank was that saving in 
banks did not enforce sufficient discipline in saving. When it is hard to accumulate 
money beyond everyday needs, the discipline to save for necessary expenditure becomes 
not only harder but also more necessary. Velez-Ibanez reports comparable circumstances
52 The Co-operative Bank with assistance from donors designed a savings account called “Haba na Haba” with a 
minimum balance of Kshs1000 and much easier terms and conditions on deposits and withdrawals. The product 
was not promoted extensively by staff at the branch who saw the account as being linked to people who wanted 
to take a Biashara loan, an individual loan specifically designed for small businesses. They preferred people to 
open the normal savings account which in 1999 had a m i n i m u m  balance of Kshs2000 but which rose during 
2000 to a peak o f Kshs6500. The Swahili saying “Haba na Haba kujaza kibaba” means “little by little the pot is 
filled”.
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in Mexico where many lived beyond their means. As a result the forced savings element 
of ROSCAs, supported by social pressure, was important in enabling people to overcome 
the desire to spend (Velez-Ibanez, 1983).
Group based finance offers not only the discipline of regular saving but also restricts 
access to the funds in ways that the bank does not:
IDN,AA W,RGN, 058 (committee members o f MRMSACCO): stressed that in the 
SACCO you are forced to save or “aided to save ” As others are saving so you are 
also encouraged to do so. I f  you save on your own then you can put Kshsl 00 in the 
bank today and go back for it tomorrow.
This preference for savings that are illiquid has been noted in the literature (Ardener, 1995; 
Hospes, 1996) and may be achieved in a number of ways. Hospes notes the choice to save 
in building materials in Ambon as a means of distancing savings from the claims of 
relatives. ROSCAs in Mathira were seen as a useful means of ensuring that small amounts 
were saved rather than consumed:
HH62W: “Merry-go-rounds are good because it is difficult to put the money aside 
fo r things
HH98W: “It is easier to save in a group because otherwise I  would be tempted to 
use the money ”
Moreover, ROSCAs can offer women a place to save that is also safe from the claims of 
husbands or other relatives. There are a number of ways of doing this. Some have groups 
which their husbands do not know about; others ensure that their husbands do not know 
when it is their turn to receive the payout, and some groups may have a system where they 
all agree on what is to be bought, and even go to buy the goods with the member (see also 
Ardener, 1995).
HH86W: Her husband does not know about her merry-go-round because she 
thought that if  he knew about it he might ask fo r the money and misuse it.
HH53W: When we started discussing groups she said that most women did not like 
discussing groups because their husbands didn 7 know about them: “Most
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husbands are drunkards and don ’t take responsibilityfor things in the house. I f  I  
bring something fo r the house such as furniture, then he can't go and sell it, but i f  
he knows I  will get money then he will demand it.
One of the reasons for the preference for groups over banks was the fact that banks had 
become more expensive places to save, especially for small amounts. Moreover, even 
once the money had been put there the saver had no idea whether the bank would change 
its minimum balance and start charging fees. Alongside this, the economy was not 
performing well and access to lump sums through for example cash crop payouts had 
declined. In this context groups were an important means of imposing discipline in saving 
-  both in terms of putting money away and not withdrawing it: elements of discipline 
which the bank could not offer but that people increasingly felt the need to impose on 
themselves.
9.3 Borrowing from mutuals
This section explores the different reasons why borrowers prefer to take loans from 
mutuals rather than banks. The issue of price was discussed in Chapter Six, where it was 
shown that the price of borrowing from SACCOs was much higher than the nominal 
declining balance interest rate (usually 12%), but that members usually did not realise this 
because they did not take into account the opportunity cost of their savings. On the other 
hand, borrowing from the MFO managed ASCAs and independent ASCAs was expensive 
(15% upwards) -  with high nominal and effective interest rates. Hence ASCA borrowing 
cannot be explained by price alone. SACCO borrowing could be explained by reference 
to cognitive failure on the part of clients. However, if a loan from a bank cannot actually 
be obtained then the relative price is immaterial. Access is discussed first.
This leads on to a discussion of the organisational form of mutuals and the implications of 
the ways in which rules in mutuals are formulated and enforced. Mutuals allow members 
voice and this is a major reason why they prefer to use them. It is because of this that 
mutuals play an important role in creating a social safety net for borrowers. Members can 
both reduce the risks of borrowing and create social networks that offer them new avenues 
of financial and social support to deal with the risks and uncertainties that they face.
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9.3.1 Access to loans
The first, main reason that informants preferred mutuals to banks was their ability to obtain 
loans. Membership organisations in the mutual sector have formal constitutions or are 
constituted on the basis that once the conditions of access are fulfilled then access is 
guaranteed. This fundamentally differs from the situation with any other type of financial 
intermediary. In all other types ownership is with shareholders (in the case of the banks); 
the state (in the case of parastatals); or the individual (in the case of a moneylender). In all 
of these forms, the decision to lend is taken either by those appointed by the owners or by 
the owner themselves. As a result, the criteria for lending are adapted to safeguard their 
interests. In the case of mutuals the criteria for lending are devised by the members and 
are based on the norm of equal access for all.
First, the evidence shows that access to loans from formal sector intermediaries such as the 
banks and AFC is limited. Chapter Six maintains that the proportion of savings lent locally 
was low by comparison with other types of intermediary, and the ratio of savers to 
borrowers in intermediaries (Chapter Seven) was lowest for banks at 16.2%. Indeed, the 
manager of an NBFI, which was only taking deposits and was not able to give loans, 
explained that this was one reason why people could not deposit their money in his branch 
(YOK, 078).
This evidence underlines the view of informants that:
FGD4 (better o ff men in Chehe): It is not possible to get loans from the banks or 
AFC (which according to them had been pulled down by rich people) “trying to get 
a loan from these organisations is like milking an elephant!”
By contrast, the data showed that respondents were much more likely to get loans from 
ROSCAs, cash crop SACCOs and friends and relatives. While the use of employee 
SACCOs and ASCAs was not necessarily high, it was access that many used to explain 
their membership.
HH132FHH: explained that she saves in a managed ASCA because she could 
borrow according her savings. I f  she needed a loan then she would not have a
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problem getting one. Indeed she had borrowed KshslO, 000from the group in 
January to pay fo r schoolfees for her brother because she had nowhere else to 
borrow and also did it as a trial to see i f  she really would get the loan. She thought 
that it was easy to explain to the women in the group what she needed the loan for.
The difference between access to a loan through a bank and in a SACCO was neatly 
summarised as follows:
“Nobody is there to deny you a loan... it is not like a bank, because in a SACCO 
you have a right but in a bank it is not a right but a privilege ” (IAK, 189).
Similarly, members of managed ASCAs knew that, as long as their shares were at the 
correct level and the money was available, they could get a loan the following month once 
they had applied (e.g. HH76FHH). Hence while actually obtaining the loan may depend 
on the liquidity status of an ASCA or SACCO, this constraint is of a very different order 
when compared to the ease with which a bank manager can refuse a loan.
9.3.2 Ownership and voice in rules and enforcement
The fact that members own the funds in the group means that they set the lending policies 
and can do this in the light of their own objectives and interests. One of the key decisions 
that they make is over the price of loans:
Members ofMEDA (201) -  an ASCA o f businessmen in Karatina: The group had 
instituted a “financial strains committee ” and one o f the results o f this had been to 
reduce the interest rate to 6.7% fla t per annum i.e. a fla t rate o f 20% fo r a three 
year loan. “We know our problems, we dictate the interest rate ” When I  
challenged them that once they took into account the fact that the loan was only 
twice their savings then this made the effective interest rate on the net borrowing 
much higher, their response was to underline the fact that it is they who get the 
dividend anyway. As one o f the members emphasised (IDN, 194): in the group it is 
easy to access money and terms are strict but not like the bank because the 
strictness was fo r their own benefit to keep discipline: “better we struggle when we 
are helping ourselves... everything is within us, nothing is going outside.... i f  we had
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taken (a loan) from the bank the interest would have gone kapisa! (completely) 
...which bank is going to pay you for taking a loan from them? Nothing from the 
group goes out. When you are taking it to the bank the interest has gone to pay the 
shareholders. We divide it out to ourselves as we are the shareholders... With 
banks you are told what to do but it is our decision what to do. Banks don ’t care 
but we are able to shape our own destiny. With banks there is nothing like that, as 
long a you are doing well they are happy with you but i f  they see you going down 
they will not help you at a time o f need but accelerate your going down ”
Similarly, a worker with the SACCO sector pointed out that it is the members of SACCOs 
who vote for a change in interest rates if there is to be one (COW,230). This explanation 
makes a number of important points. The members of MED A point out that they can set 
the price in their own interests, as they are the owners. Given the evidence on the 
instability of interest rates in the banking sector in the 1990s presented in Chapter Six, their 
ability to control the interest rate was clearly important as a means of reducing the risks of 
borrowing. Indeed the ‘‘financial strains committee” was a result of them exercising voice 
about the previous interest rate.
The members also pointed out that it was they who received the interest in the form of a 
dividend. As discussed in Chapter Six (pi 56) this is also an explanation for the high 
interest rates that they set. The fact that interest comes back to the members led another 
group to set up its own ASCA with the intention of reducing the member’s borrowing from 
an MFO:
JUN, 004: This group had an ASCA o f its own and was also taking loans from one 
o f the mainstream MFOs. They explained that the ASCA fund was growing and 
they fe lt that they might not need to turn to the MFO fo r loans in the future, or they 
would only need to take smaller loans, as the ASCA would cater to their needs.
They said that this meant that they would be paying themselves interest instead o f 
paying it to the MFO.
Finally, the MEDA members pointed out that in the event that a member has a problem the 
bank is not likely to assist him further but to “accelerate your going down”. Mutuals are 
seen as being there to support their members and there is thus some leniency in the way 
they deal with defaulters. At a minimum, members have the opportunity to present their 
case, i.e. to exercise voice.
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HH53W: She said that she preferred women \s groups (to other places to get loans) 
because i f  she was unable to pay she would tell them when she could pay and they 
would accept.
MAK, NGE, 075: the reason for getting into groups is that they can help if  
something goes wrong eg i f  your house bums down then they can give you a 
hearing whereas the bank cannot, so there is some flexibility. Even groups 
understand better than SACCOs. A SACCO is more rigid and you can get money 
sooner from a giteti.
Groups are therefore seen as giving the member an opportunity to explain the situation and 
negotiate the terms of repayment, along with a degree of leniency that can mitigate the 
potential risks of borrowing. However, degrees of leniency varied. The ROSCAs in 
Karatina market appeared to vary in the strictness with which contributions had to be 
made. Some charged fines for late contributions and others were more “patient”
(kurekera) with members who were late with their contribution if they gave a good reason. 
It was not possible to identify what might have brought about these differences in the 
character of groups. For example, it was not necessarily the case that those groups that 
were patient knew each other better than groups that were not.
Furthermore, the reasons given also indicate that groups by setting their own rules are able 
to isolate themselves from the banking system in particular. By setting interest rates 
themselves, distributing the profits among themselves, and giving members the opportunity 
for voice, they have been able to resist what they see as the means through which banks 
exploit them.
9.3.3 Mutualist finance as a social safety net
In Chapter Two the potential for ROSCAs to operate as a means of risk diversification was 
discussed with reference to the work of writers such as Platteau. The analysis of ROSCAs 
by both Besley and Platteau concentrated on an analysis of the ROSCA mechanism itself 
and the extent to which risk could be diversified through that mechanism. Their analysis 
concluded that ROSCAs in themselves, were not effective in diversifying risk. But this
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overlooks the way in which people actually use groups to protect themselves against risk. 
This is primarily by developing their social networks as a means to developing social 
support mechanisms as has been discussed in the literature on ROSCAs (Ardener, 1995).
Respondents preferred to borrow from mutual finance arrangements because the risks o f 
borrowing in the event of repayment difficulties were of a different nature and because 
they were able to reduce them through negotiation. It is useful to distinguish the different 
ways in which informants indicated that this could be achieved.
First, in some ROSCAs it is possible to make a claim on the fund that is to be distributed 
that week on the basis of need:
The Gathaithi Cattle Buyers Group started in 1969 with with the objective o f buying 
grade cattle its 30 male members. By 2000 the group had 742 members and had 
increased from about 500 in two years. The group had sub-groups, some owned shares 
and others contributed to a welfare fund To join, it was necessary to have guarantors 
in the area and a tangible asset as a guarantee. Members o f the main group 
contributed Kshs200per month and gave it to between 30 and 40 people each time 
with a payout ofKshs3600. I f  a member had a genuine case o f need then they could 
consider whether s/he should get the money that month before the ballot was held. 
However the informant stressed that it had to be a genuine case o f need and this meant 
that it was necessary fo r someone else to pleadfor the person rather than the person 
himself (AM, 15 7).
Second is the case where although it may not be the member’s turn, she can swap with 
another member of the group in a side arrangement.
HH19W: said that ROSCAs are better than putting your money in the bank because if  
there is a problem she can just to talk to other members and swap places with them.
She may then just go home with the money and she has not had to payfor transport to 
the post office or anything to withdraw money.
Third, it may be possible to simply borrow from another member not linked to whether that 
member is receiving the fund at that time. This is a much clearer example of how the 
social networks generated by the ROSCA enable individuals to access additional funds.
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An alternative but linked case is where members make contributions for each other when 
they do not have the money to pay.
HH106W: She prefers saving with groups because if  there is a problem it is harder 
to withdraw than i f  you had put the money in the bank, and you would go running 
there. Instead if  you have a problem you can borrow from a friend in the group 
and the savings remain for your future plans.
A fourth example is where members may contribute additional funds for a member in 
need. This kind of support could be substantial as the case of MEDA again illustrates:
The Microenterprise Development Association (MEDA) described one o f the key 
rationales for the group as welfare and that if you have a problem then instead o f 
having to go looking fo r people to help you, the group can help you. In the course o f  
the meeting this was demonstrated A member o f the group who had a matatu was 
having a problem with the engine and as a result he was struggling to repay his loan. 
He had already needed to ask his guarantors in the group fo r assistance. At the end o f 
the meeting, a member raised the issue and proposed that the man be helped?3. The 
issue was debated and in the process some o f his behaviour was censured: he was told 
not to spend so much time and money playing pool and drinking. The conclusion was 
that they decided to assist him with KshsSO, 000for a new engine. Members 
contributed Kshs1500 each on the spot.
In many ways this is similar to the way in which the village insurance mechanisms with ad 
hoc contributions operate and demonstrates that the relationships in ROSCAs can go 
beyond the basic ‘balanced reciprocity’ of ROSCA business.
HH39W: explained that while she had left two groups in the last two years because o f 
lack o f money she still hadfive groups o f her own. One o f these was a cash ROSCA 
while the others were for household items and utensils. She says she joined because 
she wanted to be with other people in the village and preferred this because i f  she had 
a problem they would also contribute and help her. I f  she took her money to the bank 
then she thought that no one could help her when she had a problem..
53 Apparently this had not been discussed with anyone prior to the meeting. A rule of the group is that all the 
business is discussed at the meeting openly and there are no separate meetings for the committee as a result.
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In further cases such financial support in the event of emergency need -  especially 
hospitalisation and death - had been organised through the establishment of a welfare fund.
FGD10: Three women were interviewed who were members o f a group o f 90 
businesswomen in Karatina. The group ran a merry-go-round and a welfare fund. The 
welfare fund contribution was Kshs250per month and was banked The merry-go- 
round contribution was KshslOOO which was balloted and given to nine people at each 
meeting. To join it was necessary to have three guarantors in the group and new 
members had to make a non-refundable contribution equivalent to the average member 
value o f the group's funds. They described the assistance a member would get in the 
event o f a problem. I f  admitted to hospital the group would give Kshs4,000. I f  a 
member died then they would pay to bury her and contribute Kshs8000 i f  it was a 
member, their husband or child They described with great pride how, when a single 
mother in the group had died recently, they bought the coffin, arranged the transport 
themselves to go to the funeral in Kieni hiring vehicles in the process (usually a role 
fo r men) and paid o ff the hospital bill. Indeed, members could be fined i f  they were 
selected as representatives to attend a funeral and did not go. One o f the members 
commented that the group supports its members during happiness and sadness, morally 
andfinancially.
There were many examples where groups offered assistance in the case of death. Many of 
these cases involved ad hoc contributions in the form of mutual aid rather than the 
establishment of welfare funds. Frequently the support involved the contribution of a 
coffin. However, it is not simply financial support that is important. The group also acts 
as a means through which support can be mobilised to meet the social and cultural needs of 
organising and attending funerals, as the above two examples also demonstrate. The fact 
that a member could be fined for not attending, clearly underlines the importance of this 
social aspect.
In SACCOs, the main mechanism for assisting people when they have problems is through 
emergency loan products. These are usually easily accessible. For example, in the Nyeri 
Teachers’ SACCO, emergency loans are a maximum of Kshsl5,000 and can be applied for 
on the spot. The manager said that for these small amounts it was easy to ask other people 
waiting in the office to act as guarantors. These loans were usually prioritised by the 
SACCO and paid out quickly. Emergencies are defined and monitored more tightly in 
some SACCOs than others but members appreciated the easy availability of these loans.
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This contrasts with borrowing from a bank where, in the event of a difficulty, it is unlikely 
to assist with further funds -  however small. From these explanations it becomes clear that 
joining an ASCA or SACCO in which the member’s interests are allied with each others, 
means that assistance is forthcoming in event of problems arising rather than the shock 
making the situation worse.
This evidence suggests that, as has been seen elsewhere (e.g. Ardener, 1995), the social 
networks that ROSCAs and ASCAs enable people to create have multiple uses. When 
discussing the role of informal finance in mitigating risk in Chapter Two, I referred to 
Platteau’s argument that ROSCAs exemplified a case of balanced reciprocity and that there 
was little redistributive element within it. I argued that his analysis was for a single cycle 
and confined to the transactions of the ROSCA itself. Therefore, if balanced reciprocity 
did not operate, the ROSCA would not adequately act as a mechanism for financial 
intermediation. Moreover screening would tend to limit the redistributive element in 
ROSCAs.
The evidence shows that members are screened - especially for the ASCAs with larger 
funds although these also operated ROSCAs. For example, membership of MEDA 
required a new member to pay into the fund the same amount as the lowest share value 
held and at the time this was of the order of Kshs90,000. But this group was equally 
concerned about people that they considered to be too rich creating problems because they 
feared they would not pay.54 Similarly the group of 90 businesswomen now required that 
Kshs20,000 should be paid in order to join. Thus screening on the basis of ability to pay 
is key to ensuring the effective operation of the ROSCA or ASCA.
Nevertheless balanced reciprocity clearly does not entirely explain what is happening. 
Welfare funds, where contributions are regular, clearly demonstrate elements of 
conditional reciprocity.55 Mutual aid is also in evidence and ROSCA membership has 
become a strategy for ensuring a means to access it. A number of informants indicated that 
these were important aspects of the reasons they joined ROSCAs although they would, of 
course, prefer that situations such as death or hospitalisation in their family, never arose.
54 When the local mayor applied to join he was asked if he was prepared to drink tea at Kshs5 in local hotels 
rather than the more expensive tea in the hotels he was more used to visiting as an indicator of whether or not he 
was on the same level o f other members!
55 It appeared that in cases where a welfare fund had been propedy established a member could not withdraw her 
contributions when she wished to leave.
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In Chapter Six we discussed the more traditional insurance mechanisms that operate at the 
village level through lineage relations. All household heads are expected to contribute 
when a person dies, and the payments are set at relatively low levels which all can afford, 
usually between Kshs20 and Kshs 100. Contributions might also be collected in cases o f 
serious hospitalisation or a house being burnt down. These systems cross socio-economic 
boundaries due to their lineage base and belonging to them is a means of seeking social 
inclusion. In one better off household both the husband and wife had decided to join their 
lineage group - the woman explained that she wanted to do this because when she had an 
occasion (such as a birth or death) she might need the help of the other women in the 
village [HH19]. It is usual for neighbours to assist by bringing their cooking pots and 
helping with cooking. While town dwellers may no longer have such direct links to their 
lineage and its ability to socially mobilise people in the event of death, this has spurred 
some to create these mechanisms in their groups. A very interesting example was the 
Muthua Self-Help group.
KAI, 103: Muthua Self Help Group consisted mainly ofprofessional people in 
Karatina - accountants, teachers, bank clerks, doctors, nurses and two small 
business owners. Its origins were in a burial committee which formed when a 
mutualfriend died. A ll o f his friends on the committee were from outside o f 
Karatina and succeeded in organising the funeral without any assistance from his 
family who were 170km away in Nyahururu. They then met after the funeral and 
organised a fund raising eventfor the family: After that, they thought that since 
they had done this very successfully and none o f them had relatives near by, and 
hence any o f them could be in the circumstances that their friend had been in, that 
they should meet again. Out o f this grew a merry-go-round, and this grew into an 
ASCA. Later they also joined an MFO and started taking loans.
The week I  interviewed him, a member o f the group had been buried and he 
described the comprehensive design o f their welfare scheme and how it had come 
into operation. The provisions were as follows:
• I f  a member dies then each member o f the group contributes KshsSOO.
• I f  a member’s spouse or child dies then each member contributes Kshs300.
• I f  a member’s parents die each member contributes Kshs200.
In case o f hospitalisation the rules were that:
• For a member, the group will pay 30% o f the hospital bill to a maximum o f 
Kshs300per member.
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• For a spouse or child, the group will pay 30% o f the hill to a maximum of 
Kshs300 per member.
In the event o f the death o f a member the group would pay Kshs 6,000 towards a  
coffin. The system is that the entitlement is taken from the group funds (which is 
possible because they have an ASCA) and then repaid to the fu?ul by the members.
The member whose wife had just died had a hospital bill o f Kshs36,S40. Because 
o f the system o f payments, her husband who was also a member received Kshs6000 
fo r the coffin andKshs800per member i.e. KshsSOO fo r the wife as a member and 
Kshs300 because it was his wife. Then under the hospitalisation system he got 
Kshs300from each member. In total he received a payout o f over Kshs36000. The 
Muthua SHG members also organised the funeral, providing transport and so on. 
So he explained that you might lose your spouse or someone close to you but yon 
would not end up poor as a result.
Further, the insurance payouts sought by the better off are also likely to exceed those 
sought by poorer people in terms of the expense of hospital bills - in terms of the type of 
care they would seek to get - and funerals that they see as being necessary in terms of their 
social status. Hence membership of ROSCAs and ASCAs when combined with welfare 
provisions allows balanced reciprocity to interact with mutual aid.
Finally, while I have argued here that there may be a redistributive element to the wider 
relationships surrounding ROSCAs rather than within the mechanism itself, it is important 
to consider whether these groups involve “adverse incorporation” and whether these 
redistributive elements may actually produce greater inequality (Wood, 1999). There are 
three reasons for arguing that this does not appear to be a feature of ROSCAs and ASCAs 
in this context. The first is the nature of screening indicated above -  especially in groups 
where contributions are significant. This process tends to produce groups that are 
relatively homogeneous in terms of socio-economic status. Where there is more socio­
economic diversity contributions tend to remain low. Second, there was no evidence that 
exit from groups was socially constrained. Many respondents told us that they had left 
groups -  perhaps because they no longer could afford the contributions in multiple groups 
but these accounts did not refer to any barriers they had faced in leaving. Finally, some of 
the explanations for ASCAs and SACCOs given above suggest that their creation has been
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about joint resistance to what is understood as exploitation by wider economic processes: 
in particular, the behaviour of the banks in terms of minimum balances, interest rates and 
the distribution of profits.
Conclusion
This evidence clearly demonstrates the importance of mutually based financial 
intermediaries in terms of their ability to deliver both financial and social support in the 
event of emergencies. Even if the ROSCA has no welfare fund attached to it, at a 
minimum it provides a fund to which access can be negotiated on the basis of need. Voice 
can be exercised and negotiation can occur, either in the formal context of the group or 
through side arrangements with other members. It is also apparent that the social networks 
which they enable people to generate are extremely important components of the process.
The evidence from Chapter Seven that membership in ROSCAs in particular is multiple 
also tends to suggest that the desire to expand financial options can operate hand in hand 
with the extension of social networks, which in turn multiplies the potential sources of 
social assistance.
While balanced reciprocity allows for an element of give and take in ROSCA functioning, 
it appears self-evident that screening will tend to produce this result rather than a 
redistributive one because ROSCAs would not work without it. However we can also 
argue that Platteau’s analysis appears not to go far enough in capturing the multiple 
dimensions of ROSCA operation and supports Ardener’s (1995) conclusion regarding the 
inseparability of social and economic aspects. The multiplicity of relationships through 
which transactions are conducted -  whether with the whole group, or in individual 
arrangements with members - tends to defy attempts to examine the operation of balanced 
reciprocity only within the ROSCA structure. Shipton also argues that, among the Luo, the 
multiplicitous nature of local borrowing and lending arrangements, which are often not 
cash based, defy enumeration and typology but appear to operate on the basis of 
entrustment and delayed reciprocity (Shipton, 1992:364). Indeed, Velez-Ibanez argues 
that ROSCAs represent a combined learning process in which learning how to do 
something does not just represent an output, but also accumulates understanding of how 
the learning process is achieved. Thus he suggests that ROSCAs allow “trust in mutual 
trust” to be learned and then expanded (1983:131). Thus ROSCAs and ASCAs can lead to
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a virtuous circle of expanded social networks. This was apparent in the explanation of a 
young unmarried man who argued:
“Being in a group raises your social status since you are deemed to be a person 
who can mix with other people. It also shows that you can be trusted since you 
have been able to stay with other people. It is an issue o f having met with people 
other than your brothers and sisters ....you are regarded as being able to mix with 
other people and handle them without conflict... ”(FGD2)
Similarly the idea that reciprocity cannot occur within a ROSCA cycle is to a large extent 
overcome by the longevity of many ROSCAs. Indeed, it could be argued that an objective 
of many to participate in ‘good’ ROSCAs is in order to develop sets of social relationships 
that enable systems of reciprocity to be developed over time. The ROSCAs that have 
turned into ASCAs and SACCOs demonstrate this well. Furthermore, there is a wider 
range of social and economic benefits that can be gained through such participation 
ranging from how to behave as a woman (see next chapter) or as a means of meeting other 
business people, or of knowing who are trustworthy business collaborators. Preferences 
for saving in groups therefore go beyond requirements for discipline and the cost of saving 
in banks when people feel they can least afford it. Rather they allow for a multiplicity o f 
social relationships and require a broader analytical perspective.
9.4 Cash crop SACCOs in political perspective
This section moves beyond the examination of individual preferences for mutuals to 
explore the political dynamics behind their establishment and operation. In Chapter Five, 
the history of the co-operative movement was reviewed with analysts suggesting that its 
development in the period after independence presented opportunities for political 
leadership and patronage. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that this logic has 
been important to the development of SACCOs in Mathira in the 1990s. This is illustrated 
by developments in the coffee and tea sectors and these are discussed in turn.
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9.4.1 Coffee
“Coffee is a political crop, especially in Mathira” (SKI,221) with chairmanship of societies 
still being seen as a springboard to local and national politics due in particular to their 
immediate access to large numbers of farmers56. As Hedlund (1992) indicated in his 
detailed study of the Kibirigwi coffee co-operative some five miles from Karatina in the 
1980s, membership of the management committee gives prestige and influence in the local 
community. However from 1982, civil servants and full time politicians were no longer 
allowed to run for office in the co-operatives57, nevertheless politicians would tend to 
create patron-client relationships with important committee members. While much has 
been documented of the role of co-operatives prior to the end of the one party state in 
1992, little has been written about their role in the 1990s.
The “splitting” of the Mathira Coffee Society into 13 separate societies was explained in 
Chapter Five. The split was strongly politically motivated. The local MP until 1992 was a 
man named Kuguru who had been a chairman of the Mathira Farmers Society in the 1970s 
when he helped to establish the society. During the one party state, his local KANU 
competitor for the seat was Matu Wamae. In the 1992 election, Wamae ran for the seat 
under the opposition Democratic Party and won, establishing Mathira (along with Nyeri 
District as a whole) as a firm opposition zone. Prior to the election neither Kuguru nor 
Wamae had been “pro-split” although the idea had been circulating for some time. After 
the election, it is reported that Kuguru and the local KANU leadership started agitating to 
split the society. This would have the benefit of attempting to split the opposition and for 
Kuguru to be able to exploit local connections to win support in the future, now that he had 
lost access to the main Mathira Farmers society. When the society held meetings, it is 
reported that more people attended than would attend one called by the Provincial 
Commissioner. So, it is argued, that KANU wanted the society to split in order to 
minimise the influence of any single individual (EMM, 175).
Wamae had considerable confidence in the depth of local support for the opposition but 
when Kuguru argued for the split he said that it would benefit farmers. It was then difficult 
for Wamae to oppose the move as he would be perceived as denying his supporters 
potential benefits. So Wamae changed his position and became “pro-split”. This also fitted
56 Apparently Moi always used to visit the Mathira Society on visits to Nyeri because it represented some 26,000 
farmers.
57 In Karatina the Chair o f the Madura Farmers Society was also the local MP until this edict was brought in.
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with a view that opposition politicians should be against centralised government control 
and promote liberalisation. But one informant commented that, once a “wave” such as 
“splitting” gets going there is no stopping it or reasoning with people until it has worked 
itself out (DNU,224).
The split led to the creation of thirteen societies58, meaning that the number of leadership 
positions multiplied from thirteen in the management committee of the Mathira Society to 
nine members of each of the thirteen new societies. Original intentions had been to split 
the society into between five and seven societies to ensure their economic viability59. But 
according to the ex-chairman, the members of the Mathira management committee realised 
that not all would remain chairmen of their local primary societies if the split resulted in 
five or seven, rather than thirteen societies (SKI,221).
“When you are a chairman you have access to the administration etc, you can see 
the PC [Provincial Commissioner] very easily, so you move from being a nobody 
one day to being someone people listen to the next. I f  the President is visiting you 
will get a seat -  even if  it is just a stool! Being a chairman is just an opening to 
everything you ever wanted -  getting your child into the best school and so on — 
that is why people fight over leadership. It is a springboard to other things. Some 
o f the current leaders deliver very few  kilos -  their interest is not really coffee, but 
farmers never understand this when it is all being discussed ” (NDU, 224)
This background is important to understand what has been happening in the SACCO sector 
in the 1990s. It was explained in Chapter Five that the Nyeri Farmers SACCO is the 
product of the transformation of the Union Banking System and its separation from the 
Nyeri District Co-operative Union. In 1999 there was a move to establish a SACCO for 
coffee farmers in Mathira independently of Nyeri Farmers SACCO. The roots of the 
SACCO lay in the remains of the Mathira coffee society that, once split, remained with an 
office building which was jointly owned, the board being constituted of the Chairmen of 
the 13 societies. This board had apparently attempted to form its own SACCO around the
58 By early 2001, one o f these had again split resulting in a two further primary societies, and a total o f  14 in the 
division. Few local opinions that I heard thought this was sensible, rather that it was further evidence o f the 
problems they were now facing.
59 The 13 societies have between one and four coffee factories in each. The overheads o f vehicles, sitting 
allowances and so on are therefore borne by a far smaller number o f farmers and amount o f coffee production. 
When prices are high they can survive, but with recent collapses in prices, their economic viability is seriously 
under threat.
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time of the split but had not succeeded. It had again applied for registration in January 
2000 and received it later that year. The chair explained that:
“People o f Mathira fe lt they needed a SACCO to serve their own people... this is  
fuelled by the era o f ‘splits ’. Nyeri Farmers SACCO, as a product o f the District 
Co-operative Union, is negatively affected and people no longer wanted to do 
things through the secondary societies. They want something o f their own and fee l 
they are being used by other people. With Nyeri Farmers SACCO they were asking 
whether the benefits they were getting were proportional to what they were putting 
in. People in Mathira feel that they are superior and are better farmers and were 
being used by the other parts o f the society”. However he also acknowledged that 
being linked to the old “Giant” Mathira society had also made it difficultfor them 
to get the initiative going. (SKI, 221)
As another informant explained, the feeling that people in Mathira were losing out in Nyeri 
SACCO was partly due to the fact that it had built new offices in the other divisional 
headquarters, Mukurweini and Othaya, and was planning to build in Mweiga, while in 
Karatina it was still renting the same, rather old, building. Because of this they felt that 
their money was being used to benefit others. So that “they feel that if they have their own 
then the profits that Nyeri is getting will be ours” (JGN,163). Mathira Coffee Society was 
registered in mid-2000 at around the time that Nyeri Farmers SACCO was undertaking its 
membership drive for the transition into the new SACCO. However, it appeared that 
neither was having much success mainly because coffee farmers had received such small 
payouts that year.
9.4.2 Tea
The fact that moves to establish SACCOs in Mathira are a means to ensure access to 
resources both individually and collectively, and with political objectives is further 
supported by the history of the Tea SACCOs. There are two tea SACCOs now serving 
Mathira division. Although the Nyeri Tea Growers SACCO Society had only established 
an office in Mathira in mid-2000, it had provided a mobile service in the division since it 
began.
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Mathira Tea SACCO was registered in 1990 while the Nyeri Tea SACCO, which was an 
initiative of the KTDA divisional tea committees, was registered in 1992. Apparently, 
while Nyeri Tea SACCO was first to put in its application for registration this had been 
delayed in order that Mathira could be registered first. An informant explained that the 
supporters of the local KANU MP, Kuguru, had lost their positions on the divisional tea 
committees in the 1991 tea elections - as by this time pressure for multi-party politics was 
becoming irresistible. Plans to start the Nyeri Tea SACCO were underway but the 
Headquarters was to be in Othaya. Those who had lost their positions wished to “show 
that they could do something for the farmer” (JNM,207) and decided to register a Tea 
SACCO for Mathira. Since Kuguru was the local MP, his supporters were able to mobilise 
in Mathira using the local administration (which is operated through the Office of the 
President), since they could no longer use the KTDA committees. At that time Kuguru 
was the Minister for Home Affairs and Heritage and, it is claimed that he used his political 
influence to expedite the registration of the Mathira SACCO and delay the registration of 
the Nyeri Tea Growers SACCO60.
The rivalry continued and in 1995, Mathira Tea SACCO took Nyeri Tea SACCO to court 
because the latter wanted to open an office in Karatina and the former said they had been 
refused permission to open an office in Nyeri. The court ruled that either could open a 
branch anywhere provided there was tea growing in the area.
In conclusion, these two cases demonstrate the close relationship between rural SACCOs 
and politics.61 Rural SACCOs are far more than simply a means of providing financial 
services. They are a means of mobilising rural voters and creating patronage relations both 
between local leaders and farmers and between political leaders and local leaders. This at 
the same time allows the pursuit of private wealth through the patronage opportunities that 
are both received and in the power of leaders to offer. These characteristics therefore 
seem to allow for the convergence of the objectives of inclusion and the creation of public 
benefit that were key to the moral economy debate about the relationship between the 
achievement of private wealth and civic virtue (see Chapter Five). Moreover, these two 
examples suggest that political liberalisation has contributed to changing the financial
60 The old co-operatives policy required that only one co-operative with a particular common bond be 
established in a district. However having registered Mathira — on a divisional basis — it would no doubt have 
been extremely difficult for Kuguru as an MP in Nyeri District to refuse to register the Nyeri SACCO, or attempt 
to specifically exclude it from operating in Mathira, especially given its roots in KTDA.
61 Interestingly, Hedlund (1992) reports that coffee farmers in Kibirigwi in the 1980s saw KTDA as having no 
‘politics’.
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landscape, with politicians taking advantage of the liberalised environment to use co­
operatives and SACCOs to develop rival bases of support.
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the reasons that informants gave for preferring mutually based 
financial services to banks. While the transactions costs associated with saving in the bank 
had been rising, transactions costs do not adequately explain the ongoing growth in the 
SACCO sector and apparent burgeoning of group-based finance in the late 1990s. The 
explanations for this are more diverse and complex. The reasons encompass: the need to 
create discipline in saving and protect that saving by being unable to access it; the ability to 
gain access to loans as a right; the means to exercise voice both in setting the rules (e.g. the 
interest rate) and to re-negotiate payment once difficulties strike. These groups also allow 
members to create expanded social networks through which both financial and social 
support can be sought at times of crisis.
In terms of analysis information and transactions costs, these non-price features of the 
services that mutuals offer can only be understood through the transactions costs they 
involve. But it is difficult to see how the right to access a loan could be valued. By 
contrast, the conceptual framework of Chapter Three enables these features to be 
understood and analysed as endemic to the service that mutuals provide. Mutuals offer 
voice to members who own the organisation. This means that lending policies are the 
result of negotiation and members themselves set prices. Lending criteria are clearly laid 
down and if they are met then it is only liquidity constraints that might constrain a 
member’s receipt of a loan. Of course, there is the potential for patronage and favouritism 
in this process. However the data in Chapter Seven demonstrated the better performance 
of SACCOs and ASCAs in enabling members to access loans than banks.
It is the way in which mutuals allow voice that enables them to operate in risk reducing 
ways. This has been especially important during a period of economic downturn when 
downside risks are enhanced and where political liberalisation has increased aspects of 
political uncertainty. But these decisions appear to be more than the result of an economic 
calculus in which members seek financial support. Social support as well as financial is
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important in the event of crisis especially in cases of illness and death. As user-owned 
organisations ROSC As, ASCAs and SACCOs allow the extension of social networks in 
ways that other forms of intermediation are unable to do.
It is therefore necessary to understand these choices as deeply embedded in social 
relations. Berry’s interpretation of negotiability as resulting from transactions that have 
multiple meanings and are multi-dimensional in nature was quoted in Chapter Five, and 
captures well the elements of relationships in mutuals. They are forms of intermediary in 
which voice allows for negotiation, and negotiability is a key means of managing 
livelihoods. It has been shown that these transactions are multi-dimensional, 
encompassing reciprocity and mutual aid as well as social support. Moreover, these 
relationships are clearly also open-ended and intent on expanding options rather than 
severing connections that are not immediately beneficial.
Finally, this chapter has argued that cash crop SACCOs are a means through which politics 
is pursued. Because they are member-owned they offer a group identity and a means 
through which patronage can be dispensed - both to the group and the individual. 
Moreover, the evidence here shows how this has been done in the context of increasing 
liberalisation of the co-operative sector. The Co-operative Act of 1997 did not give any 
indication as to the criteria for registration of SACCOs with potentially overlapping 
domains. This de facto  relaxation of the rules has enabled SACCOs to be used to develop 
control over local resources and rival bases of political support.
There may appear to be a contradiction between the argument that mutuals, and SACCOs 
in particular, do not tend to involve relationships of adverse incorporation while at the 
same time suggesting that they allow systems of patron-client relations to operate. It is 
important to distinguish between the cash crop SACCOs and other types that do not have 
the same links to formal politics. Yet the potential for leadership and the achievement of 
wider social status converge in both cases. Moreover it appears that in the recent economic 
context of Mathira, mutuals have also been a means to resist processes of exploitation by 
the banking system through the creation of financial intermediaries that are insulated from 
it. Hence relationships in SACCOs have a degree of negotiability not evident in banks.
This chapter has demonstrated the ways in which preferences for mutuals can be explained 
with reference to their organisational form. Member ownership allows social and
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individual needs to be reflected and expressed. The next chapter goes on to explore the 
role of gender relations in influencing the use of financial services.
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Chapter 10 Gender and Financial Service Use
Evidence of financial service use presented in Chapter Seven suggested that a key socio­
economic determinant of ROSCA use was gender. ROSCAs were found to be 
significantly more likely to be used by women than men, and women were likely to save in 
a higher number of ROSCAs and to save higher amounts, especially married women - 
although rural women saved much lower amounts than women in town. This can in part 
be explained through the more limited access women in general have to formal sector 
borrowing requiring land as collateral, as was discussed in Chapter Eight. This chapter 
seeks to further explain these findings using two analytical approaches. First, a framework 
is developed to analyse the gendered demand for financial services. Second, the reasons 
for women being greater users of ROSCAs are explored through an analysis of how gender 
relations better enable them to engage with ROSCA rules and enforcement mechanisms.
In order to develop a framework for the gendered analysis of financial service use, the 
chapter examines gendered intra-household economic relations in the rural context, as 
these are critical to an analysis of how individuals in married households engage with 
markets. The approach is adapted from Pujo (1996) - as explained in Chapter Four. It has 
three steps, first the gender division of labour and the way it relates to the control of 
income from different activities is discussed. Second, the gendered division of expenditure 
responsibilities is analysed. It is the transition from income to expenditure that generates 
demand for financial services. The third element considers how intra-household financial 
management actually takes place. This draws on a classification of household financial 
management systems devised for the European context, which appears to be a useful 
starting point for analysis of the Mathira case. This analysis allows patterns of control over 
income, expenditure responsibilities and management systems to be identified which give 
rise to gendered patterns of demand for financial services.
The second section examines explanations of ROSCA use in more depth. It is well known 
that women make extensive use of ROSCAs in Kenya (Nelson, 1995; Robertson, 1997) 
and in many other parts of the world (Ardener and Burman, 1995). Ardener’s overview of
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the 1995 edited volume ‘Money-Go-Rounds: The Importance of Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations for Women’ notes many features of ROSCA operation, for example:
(i) the fact that social sanctions such as disgrace and shame act as mechanisms which force 
people to repay; (ii) the value members place on the social networking and solidarity which 
ROSCAs offer; (iii) the fact that women’s ROSCAs tend to have smaller and lower 
contributions than men’s; (iv) that women often prefer single sex ROSCAs and will 
actively exclude men; and (v) the opportunities for secrecy that ROSCAs offer in savings 
accumulation. Ardener also makes a plea for more detailed gendered analysis of ROSCA 
use.
The second part of the chapter therefore examines some of the social and cultural norms 
that help explain the differential participation of men and women in ROSCAs. First, the 
historical and anthropological roots of Kikuyu women’s involvement in ROSCAs are 
traced. The argument then focuses on the role of shame -  a factor which women 
themselves used to explain the differential participation and effectiveness of ROSCAs 
among men and women. Shame in this context appears to function more effectively as a 
social sanction among women than among men and hence operates as an enforcement 
mechanism in women’s ROSCAs better than it does in men’s. This takes the analysis 
directly back to the conceptualisation of financial intermediation explained in Chapter 
Three, where it was argued that different types of financial intermediaries entail different 
sets of rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Since shame appears to be a 
gendered enforcement mechanism this also helps to explain why ROSCAs appear to be 
more viable as a financial intermediation mechanism among women than among men in 
this context.
Bringing these two analytical approaches together, I argue that a clear basis for the gender 
embeddedness of ROSCA use can be established. The sources and uses of the money to 
which women and men have access, and the wider social context in which they operate, 
present a more complete account of the gendered use of ROSCAs.
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10.1 The analysis of gender as an economic institution in financial markets
The framework developed for analysing gendered patterns of demand for financial services 
investigates gendered intra-household division of labour, control over income, and 
expenditure responsibilities before considering how households manage their finances.
The short review of anthropological literature in Chapter Five indicated that men 
traditionally allocated land to women for food crops. They worked on and managed the 
land and controlled the output from it. They kept the grain separately and controlled 
income from the sale of any surplus. Although in part dependent on the size of 
landholding, increasing land pressure has resulted in migration by men, so women have 
taken on more responsibility for household provisioning. This has allowed women greater 
autonomy and control over their own income according to Stamp (1996), though it is not 
clear that it has altered their bargaining power over male incomes.
The next section considers the current patterns of division of labour and control over 
income arising from these activities. The data used to establish these patterns was derived 
from 13 focus group discussions with groups of men and women, in two categories of less 
well off and better off, in each of the three research areas of Mathira. The data on 
expenditure responsibilities is derived from the second-round individual interviews with 
married households in which both husband and wife were interviewed separately about 
these patterns and about the ways they managed income and expenditure with their 
partners.
10.1.1 Gender division of labour and control of income: the current situation
By contrast to key anthropological accounts in which the division of labour and control is 
in the main discussed in relation to subsistence food crops, cash crops and off-farm income 
are now very important to the household economy. This section uses data which was 
collected using focus group discussions and participatory research exercises among groups 
of better off (>200 coffee trees and > 1 acre) and not so well off (<200 coffee trees, <1 
acre) women and men in each of the rural locations (see Chapter Four). The division of 
labour and control of income from the product of this labour was discussed by asking them
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to make relative assessments of the contributions of men and women. Hence the data 
represents women and men’s views about their work and the control of the income from it. 
It presents patterns of labour and control of income in relation to the following income 
sources: coffee, tea, dairy, horticulture, food and casual labour. Given time constraints it 
was not possible to undertake a more detailed assessment of labour input or control of 
income. Employment and business as income sources, are briefly reviewed in relation to 
the main interview data. While this evidence is not exhaustive it presents a sufficient 
basis on which to proceed with the analysis.
In the coffee zone, women and men did not in general agree about the relative extent of 
their work on coffee. In better off households with larger farms, both men and women 
thought they did more work on coffee than their spouses. Women justified their position in 
relation to support roles such as providing food for workers. Those with smaller shambas 
were more magnanimous about the amount of work carried out by their spouses. Since 
poorer farmers are less able to afford chemicals they tend not to spray as much, so men 
perceive that their work is less and they say that women do more. From the women’s point 
of view, where there are few coffee trees (between about 50 and 200), men sometimes 
grew horticultural crops underneath the coffee and as a result do the weeding of the coffee 
at the same time as the horticulture so reducing the work left for women.
However there was little disagreement over who received and controlled income from 
coffee, which was usually a man. As women explained:
“ Men prefer to go fo r the money themselves and have the women asking fo r it. A 
very few  men send their wives [to collect the money] because they know that they 
themselves might get diverted on the way back via a bar. Men mostly make the 
decision about what to do with the money. But since the time o f the dollar62 men 
hide the slips from women i f  there is a lot o f money, but i f  there is little they show 
them so that they can *t be askingfor it. When there is a lot o f money you can go 
there i f  there is a joint account andfind that the husband has told them not to let 
you withdraw any money. Women can’t be given as they are supposed to be 
asking fo r it to buy salt and so on ” (FGD12).
62 Since the eariy 1990s farmers co-operatives have been paid in dollars Prior to this the over-valuation of the 
exchange rate resulted in a heavy indirect tax (Karanja, 2002). Farmer’s revenue rose in the mid-1990s both 
because the exchange rate was poor and world prices were quite strong.
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In the better-off category women estimated that their husbands would usually give them a 
small proportion of the money, about 20%, but women in the less well off category said 
they always had to ask for money to buy food and clothes. Men argued that women had a 
role in making decisions over how the coffee money was used, but that it was mainly men 
who decided. However, with the collapse of coffee prices in the late 1990s there were a 
number of reports, including from one of our informants, of women who had been given 
overall control of the coffee and the income from it by their husbands because it now 
yielded so little money.
For tea, the story was very similar. While men had the main role in establishing tea farms, 
after the bushes have matured, women in the better off households did more of the work. 
Poorer households with smaller farms indicated that the work was more evenly split. 
Similarly men were the main controllers of the tea income. While many had joint accounts 
in the tea SACCO, men had the decision making power over them. Women again had to 
ask for the money and give reasons for needing it although they were sometimes given a 
small amount of pocket money for their own use. An informant explained that:
She takes care o f the tea hut her husband controls the income. They were given the 
tea two years ago by her father-in-law and it has helped her because she knows 
how much they are getting from the payslip. She accompanies him to the tea 
SACCO to withdraw the money because otherwise she fears he may drink it. While 
he has never done this with the tea money, she is sure that i f  he goes alone he won ’t 
bring her any money. (HH86W)
In both Gatundu and Chehe, dairy cows are another important source of household income. 
Again both men and women thought that they did more of the work in looking after cows. 
It was not possible to assess in more detail these competing claims. This may be because 
men emphasise their role in providing cash to buy the cow, provide medicine and buy 
napier grass, while women emphasise the daily job of cutting and bringing the napier grass.
Control over income from dairy presents an interesting pattern. In better off households in 
Gatundu, both men and women reported that men were the main controllers of dairy 
income. But in poorer households both men and women reported that women were the 
main controllers of this income. In Chehe, on the other hand, better off women said that 
men usually controlled the income while there husbands said that this income could be 
given to women because it was small and could be used “anyhow” without affecting the
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welfare of the home. In the poorer households it was more consistently the case that men 
controlled this income.
A possible explanation is that with the decline of coffee incomes, dairy income was a 
relatively more important source of income for better off men in Gatundu , than those in 
Chehe where tea income has been stable. Moreover, in better off households in Gatundu, 
dairy income may amount to around KshslOOO per month and be received through the 
Kirinyaga Dairy Co-operative. This enables men to collect the money as a lump sum at the 
month end and retain their membership of the co-operative as a potential source of loans. 
However, women and men reported that some of this money is immediately given to the 
wife in order to “encourage them to carry on doing the work” (FGD 12). Whereas, in the 
poorer households in Gatundu, milk was more likely to be sold locally to neighbours or to 
milk brokers63 who came to the door, as these households preferred not to wait for a lump 
sum at the month end from the co-operative. Since men in these households often had to 
undertake casual labour it is their wives who received and managed this income. Since 
these households are less able to feed cows well due to lack of land for fodder, milk yields 
were likely to be lower. The husband therefore left control of this income to his wife to 
cater for daily household expenses.
In Gatundu, vegetables were also cultivated as a cash crop because there are water sources 
that can be used for irrigation and due to its proximity to the main road to Nairobi. This 
production is for local markets rather than export and mainly involves tomatoes, sukuma 
wiki (a type of kale), green peppers and aubergines. In the poorer households horticulture 
can be an important source of income and men are more likely to control it even though 
both men and women reported that the work they did on it was about equal. It is easier for 
poorer households to rent or borrow a piece of land to grow vegetables than, for example, 
to afford another cow as virtually all dairy cows are zero-grazed and sources of fodder can 
be difficult to obtain. So the control of dairy income may be in the hands of the woman 
whereas the man will control the horticultural income. In the better off households women 
reported that they do more of the work on horticulture while men thought it was fairly 
evenly split. However, this horticultural income is in the main controlled by women. This, 
they argued, was because it was small compared to the coffee income and can be used for
63 Milk marketing is another area where there has been liberalisation. Private brokers now buy milk and take it to 
independent dairies. Previously it was Kenya Co-operative Creameries to which all milk from the marketing co­
operatives was sold . A pattern reported in the fieldwork has been that brokers go into an area where there is a 
co-operative and offer high prices for some time until they have undermined the supply o f milk to the co­
operative. The co-operative closes and the brokers have a captive market, at which point prices are lowered.
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daily expenses. This means that women do not necessarily have to ask for money from 
their husbands for this.
Food crops are in the main the work of women, and this has long been a documented 
feature of the agricultural division of labour. While this was the main pattern reported, in 
poorer households in Chehe both men and women reported relatively equal work inputs. It 
is also the case that women control income from the sale of food crops as they are able to 
take any crop from the shamba and sell it in the market. Since food crop production is in 
the main for household consumption and this is not an area in which maize and beans are 
cultivated for sale, the amounts of food sold are relatively small.
Where casual labouring income is the main source of household income, then earnings 
may be pooled at the end of the day or there is agreement between them on how the money 
will be used. For those households who undertake casual labour where this income is not 
the main source for the household, it is the person who goes out to do the labour that 
controls the income and women can use their income as they wish including on personal 
expenditure. Indeed, it was reported by poorer women in Gatundu that since it is the 
husband’s responsibility to provide, then if they use the money they have earned in the 
house then they will be seen to manage the household themselves and fear that he will stop 
providing and start to use his money for himself.
The second-round survey data for 24 married households showed that only three women 
did not have direct access to any income source, see Table 10.1. Two of these were very 
young women who had not been married long; the other was a very old woman whose 
husband had always been the provider. Nine had access to income via business and five 
via employment. Kikuyu women have a long history in business and trade (Leakey, 1956; 
Robertson, 1997). Of the nine in business, three were in businesses in which husbands 
were also involved. Two were small rural grocery shops, one of these was set up by the 
husband and run by the wife, and he expected her to utilise the income to run the family 
and would help buy stock from his salary. In this case the wife reported that she does not 
disclose all of the income from the shop to her husband for fear that he might take it and 
drink it. In the other shop the wife did disclose the income to her husband. The third case 
was an electrical workshop run by the husband and an electrical shop run by his wife. In 
this case the wife recorded all income and expenditure made from it in a book which they 
discussed at the end of the day.
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In the other six cases of women in business, this involved small scale trading of food and 
vegetables in two cases where the women visited local markets. The other four cases all 
involved town-based women. Of these two were trading second-hand clothes in the 
market, one was trading in new clothes on a small stall and the fourth had a clothes making 
business. In all of these enterprises women clearly controlled the income.
Table 10.1: Sources of wives9 main income in married households
(Number of cases) Gatundu Chehe Town Total
Employment 2 1 2 5
Business 3 1 5 9
Casual labour 1 4 0 5
Income from crops or dairy 1 1 0 2
None 1 1 1 3
Total 8 8 8 24
Hence in the majority of households (21 out of 24) women had access to an income source 
although in two of these cases the income source is not independent of the husband’s 
influence. Thus, in 19 out of 24 cases wives have income sources over which they have a 
considerable degree of control. However, table 10.2 indicates that overall women’s 
reported incomes were approximately 38% of their husband’s64.






This evidence suggests two key patterns in the gender division of labour and the control 
over the income streams that they generate. First, men seek to control the sources of 
income that generate the largest returns. Second, this means that control of particular 
income sources, for example, tea, coffee and dairy, can differ depending on wealth 
categories and changing returns to these crops. Third, that resources that generate small 
but regular returns and on which women work, may often be assigned to women. These 
features of income sources in turn mean that the income that men control - and which they 
may want to save or use to repay loans - tends to involve larger amounts than women, and
64 Two cases o f shops have been excluded because the incomes women reported were not clearly under their 
own control.
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some of these have a lumpy and irregular pattern, as in the case of tea and coffee income. 
By contrast women control smaller but more regular amounts and are likely to need 
financial services that can accommodate these flows.
10.1.2 Household expenditure responsibilities and financial management
Having reviewed the sources of income and the control of these income sources within the 
household, the next step is to examine the allocation of expenditure responsibilities in the 
household. Data on expenditure responsibilities was collected from both husbands and 
wives in the 24 married households in the second round survey. Since heads of household 
who were single, divorced or widowed tended to be responsible for all expenditure these 
are excluded from this part of the analysis. The categories offered to respondents were 
five: husband’s sole responsibility; husband makes a major contribution and wife makes a 
minor contribution; equal contributions; wife makes major contribution and husband 
makes minor contribution; wife’s sole responsibility.65 Of course the results are not 
entirely consistent and husbands and wives disagree about the extent of their relative 
contributions. While this can also be seen as evidence of bargaining behaviour, this is not 
the main focus of the analysis here since the purpose is to reveal broad patterns of 
expenditure responsibility. Table 10.3 summarises these responses and highlights the 
extent of agreement between them. ‘Agreement’ here simply means that the accounts are 
broadly consistent.
Overall, the table suggests a high level of disagreement over expenditure responsibilities. 
In none of the categories does the number of households in which there is total agreement 
over the split in responsibilities reach a half of the 24 households. There is most 
agreement that asset purchase is a male responsibility. However, there is still considerable 
disagreement, with men under-reporting women’s contribution according to women. The 
explanation for this might be that women often buy household assets, such as furniture, 
from ROSCA funds and think that they are contributing to household assets which men 
overlook. Men on the other hand tend to think of purchase of larger assets such as land, 
building a house, bicycles and so on.
65 Stichter used these categories to explore the division o f responsibilities in households in Nairobi (Stichter, 
1987).
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Table 10.3: Household expenditure responsibilities by expenditure category
Food Non-food Clothes for 
children






H ’s W ’s H ’s W ’s H ’s W ’s H ’s W ’s H ’s W ’s H ’s W ’s H ’s W ’s
view view view view view view view view view view view view view view
Husband’s sole responsibility 13 6 9 6 10 5 12 9 18 9 19 10 12 10
Husband major /  wife minor 1 6 2 7 2 2 3 4 1 4 1 3 1
Equal contributions 6 1 8 1 7 3 4 4 5 3 3 7 3 4
Wife major / husband minor 1 5 1 4 0 2 1 1 1
Wife’s sole responsibility 3 4 4 5 3 9 1 6 1 3 2 5
Total 24 22 24 23 22 21 19 19 24 23 24 24 17 20
Other/Not applicable 0 2 0 1 2 3 5 5 0 1 0 0 7 4
Extent of agreement1:
Total agreement 5 5 6 9 8 11 10
Minor disagreement: 10 6 5 5 6 3 1
Of which:
a) Men report lower contribution by women 7 4 2 4 5 2 1
b) Men report higher contribution by women 3 2 3 1 1 1
Major disagreement: 13 10 4 10 10 9
Of which:
a) Men report lower contribution by women 5 11 9 3 4 8 5
b) Men report higher contribution by women 3 1 1 1 5 2 1
Summary Majority of There is more Quite strong Numbers lower Second highest Highest number Half of men
men report disagreement disagreement, because 5 hhs number of men reporting that it reporting it is
sole in the case of with nine cases don’t have reporting it is is men’s their
responsibility non-food where women school going their sole responsibility responsibility
but likely that expenditure report that they children. responsibility. although there is and second
men than food, with contribute Stronger But still most agreement highest degree
underestimate women significantly agreement that it extensive in this category of agreement
contribution reporting more than men is men’s disagreement, still major but strong
made by higher relative and only five responsibility however in this disagreements minority
women. contributions women agree but women’s case women and women disagreeing.
that it is the contribution reported by men reporting that
man’s sole underestimated to be making they contribute
responsibility. in 7 cases by higher more than men
men. contributions. think they do.
Note to table 10.3: Total agreement is where the accounts by both husbands and wives of their contribution 
are entirely consistent e.g. they both report that they contribute equally, or one indicates it is the spouse only 
and the other reports sole responsibility. Minor disagreement is where the accounts they gave are only one 
category apart -  e.g. the husband reports that he has sole responsibility and the wife reports that she makes a 
minor contribution Major disagreement is where the categories of responses are more than one category 
apart. In cases of disagreement, the extent to which women’s contribution is under-reported by men and the 
extent to which men report that women make higher contributions than they do is then reviewed into two 
categories, both from men’s perspective: a) Men report that women make a lower contribution than women 
report they make; b) Men report that women make a high contribution than women report they make. Totals 
regarding major disagreement differ where there are differing numbers of husbands and wives responding.
Farm inputs are also more of a male responsibility with agreement over the situation in ten 
households and twelve cases where men reported sole responsibility. However there is still 
disagreement in nine households but not all of these fitted the analysis because other 
family members were involved in input provision.
School fees are also mainly a male responsibility. In this case there is a reasonably high 
level of agreement with men reporting it as their sole responsibility in two-thirds of cases 
and the lowest level of major disagreement across all categories. This is likely to reflect 
the fact that as an important and major expense it is an area that has to be explicitly 
budgeted and agreed on.
Men also mainly reported health expenditure as their sole responsibility. However the 
cases of major disagreement show a slightly different pattern to other categories in which 
men reported that women were making higher relative contributions than they themselves 
reported. The dynamics here are often that the smaller day to day illnesses of children for 
which they require a trip to the clinic or some tablets from the local shop, tend to be paid 
for out of women’s pockets but men see themselves as responsible in major cases of 
illness. It may be that where cases of major illness are not present men do therefore 
recognise this contribution.
The purchase of food, non-food items and clothes for children are areas where there is least 
agreement and also categories where fewer men reported that these were their sole 
responsibility. While these are not cases where men necessarily concede that women have 
the major responsibility it is clear that responsibility is shared. The findings also indicate 
quite high levels of major disagreement. This may reflect that where women have then- 
own incomes, they tend to spend on these items and this is not necessarily discussed with 
the husband. Men may therefore tend to be unaware of some of the expenditure made in 
these areas.
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Table 10.3 concentrates on major areas of expenditure, some other categories of 
expenditure were included in the survey. Rent, transport, and business investment applied 
to around one half of the households. Rent was clearly a male responsibility in town- 
based households. On the other hand transport tends to be an expense that is paid for by 
whoever is incurring it. So that the greater mobility of men means that they have 
significantly higher levels of expenditure on transport than were reported by women (see 
table 10.4). Business investment tends to be another instance where it depends on whose 
business it is and it is primarily that person’s responsibility. Supplementary school 
expenses such as transport and books were not major expenses and were more likely to be 
an expense to which women contributed. Finally, is the category of expenditure on clothes 
for self and spouse. Expenditure on clothes for the husband was the category in which 
there was overall the highest agreement that this was the husband’s responsibility: 21 men 
and 18 women. There was more disagreement over whose responsibility it was to buy 
clothes for the woman: the same number of women reported that it was their sole 
responsibility as men reported that it was their responsibility.
Given the level of disagreement over these household expenditure responsibilities, it would 
seem likely that these might be reflected in household expenditure reporting. An analysis 
of the previous month’s expenditure, with data collected from husbands and wives 
separately (for the 21 cases in which data existed), indicated that the mean difference in 
total reported monthly expenditure was Kshs5365 (see table 10.4). Husbands on average 
reported higher expenditure than their wives did in all categories and these differences 
were particularly significant for transport and clothes. These differences can be more 
easily understood in the light of the above analysis of expenditure responsibilities. It is 
clear that for transport expenditure men have responsibility for their own expenditure and 
are more likely to be mobile than women, hence it is a category where women are less 
likely to be able to make a clear estimate of their husband’s expenditure. Similarly where 
men were purchasing clothes for their family and themselves their wives were less likely to 
have a clear view of his expenditure on clothes, and men were more likely to be 
responsible for buying clothes for their wives than their wives were for buying clothes for 
them. Hence the difference may be explained by the husband’s purchase of his own 
clothes.
Further, men reported that they funded 91% of total household expenditure from their own 
income, while women reported that just over 50% was funded from their income. These 
figures are significantly different (5% level) and suggest a major difference in the
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perspectives of husbands and wives over their contributions. The difference in estimates 
given in Table 10.4 of Kshs5365 is approximately one-third of mean monthly expenditure 
reported by men in married households and over a half of that reported by women. How 
can this be understood?
Table 10.4: Mean difference in monthly expenditure as reported by husbands and




estimate as % of wife’s 
mean
Mean difference (Kshs) 
(Husband’s less wife’s 
estimate)
Overall expenditure 170 5365
Own food 154 857
Bought food 136 447





Other expenditure 791 1151
A study of household financial management in the UK has classified the mechanisms 
through which husbands and wives manage income streams to meet necessary household 
expenditure (Pahl, 1989) 66 From the discussion held with husbands and wives about the 
ways in which they managed household finances, households have been categorised using 
Pahl’s schema (Table 10.5) since they appeared appropriate to the data. Pahl uses the 
word management to indicate, “the administration of household finances; an activity which 
includes the payment of bills for daily living expenses." (ibid:29).
66 Analysis o f this nature could not be found for developing country contexts.
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Table 10.5: Classification of household financial management systems
Classification Definition Households conforming to this pattern
Independent
m anagement
Both have separate 
sources o f  income 
and neither has 
access to all 
household funds
This system best characterises the m ajority o f 
households (15).
Pooling system All household 
income is shared and 
both have access
Three households were found to clearly operate a 
system o f  this nature. Two in Chehe were 
dependent on casual labour undertaken by both 
husband and wife as their main source o f  incom e. 
They described bringing the money they had 
earned to  the table and deciding w hat needed to  be 
bought w ith it.
The third case was where the wife manages an 
electrical shop and the husband operates the related 
workshop -  on a  daily businesses they pooled w hat 
they had earned and planned how to use it
Housekeeping
system
M an usually gives 
wife a  fixed sum for 
housekeeping and 
retains the rest
Five cases can be described as operating on this 
basis however the am ount that is provided is n o t 
fixed. In tw o cases the wife had no independent 
income. However husbands m ay also give w ives 
money for household expenses even where she also 
has an independent source o f  income.
M ale whole wage 
system
Husband manages all 
household finances
One household where the wife had no independent 
source o f  income appeared to  fit this type o f  system  
it did not appear that the wife handled any cash, 
rather that the husband was entirely responsible for 
purchasing everything for the household.
The independent management system best reflects the majority of cases in our data set and 
clearly reflects elements of the earlier evidence presented from anthropological sources. 
The “housekeeping” system can however run alongside the independent management 
system. Even in households where the woman did have an independent income source the 
husband may give money to the wife for household expenses, as this income might be too 
small to make a significant contribution.
However the management system classification does not say anything about the knowledge 
of one partner of the income of the other although Pahl defines control as indicating overall 
direction of the finances of the household, incorporating the notion of ownership of the 
money or property under discussion. Burgoyne points out (1990) that management systems 
shade into one another and are difficult to classify, explaining that differences may relate 
to attitudes about claims on income even though management remains under the control of
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one person. This raises the critical question of the relationship between claims and 
control, and it is differences in attitude on these that make the line between independent 
management and shared management a very thin one.
The evidence from Mathira suggests that this in turn largely depends on the nature of co­
operation and conflict within the household. It therefore depends on a co-operative 
relationship between husband and wife in how they mix and match their income streams to 
meet expenditure priorities. One point that is clearly distinct between the European 
context and that of Mathira, is that the presence of bank or savings accounts was 
ubiquitous in Pahl’s sample and their joint use was common. In Mathira, by contrast, the 
system is on the whole a cash management system that is supported by the use of accounts 
but rarely operates in a way in which all money flows into and out of accounts. This 
suggests that the nature of claims and control may be very different since pooling income 
in bank accounts requires considerable a priori agreement on use, whereas separate cash 
income streams does not. Under independent management in which women and men 
control their own income, men and women adopt financial services independently in order 
to manage these income and expenditure flows which may be means of ensuring separation 
and entrenching independent control. Indeed the qualitative evidence suggests that this 
was an important function of financial service use, the very few couples who reported 
greater joint use of bank accounts tended to be better educated, and either employed or 
operating a business in town.
In this sample the evidence was mixed and there was a tendency for the accounts of 
husbands and wives to be more consistent where there was clearly greater discussion 
between them about the levels of income and division of responsibilities.68 This often also 
related to levels of tension and conflict in the household relating to financial and other 
matters, often men’s behaviour. Hence:
She says that some time ago when she saw that he drank she realised that they 
needed to plant tea so as to be able to pay fo r schoolfees when the children were 
older. So they agreed a long time ago that the tea money was mainly fo r school 
fees. She says that she doesn't know what he earns although he can ask to see her
67 Burgoyne analyses financial management by European couples who have remarried in which she uses 
categorisations o f shared and pooled management For her the difference between shared management and 
pooling is an attitudinal one about the claims that each can make in relation to the income o f fete other. That is, 
even if  income is not pooled so that access is equal, it is putatively pooled in the sense that all is available for 
household use even if the management arrangements remain separate.
68 There is insufficient space to present a more detailed analysis o f this aspect here.
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payslip [both are teachers], although she says that if  she asks to see his payslip 
then he could not show it to her. She complained: “You know, African men are not 
there to tell you what they have in their pockets -  that is their secret... his money is 
to do what he wants with ”. (HH90W)
Social norms about household provisioning are contested and men may take the view that 
it is their responsibility to provide, although women’s role in household provision has 
historically been strong among the Kikuyu (see Chapter Five). A married woman stated it 
thus:
“Men believe they are going to do everything in the house but they can’t manage ” 
and so she explained that she assists him. Her husband expressed a similar view 
saying it was his responsibility to provide and that his wife's role was to 
supplement. (HH106)
This belief appears to be particularly important for young men. There appeared to be some 
sensitivity among young married men in Chehe about the extent to which their wives might 
have their own income and handle money. This seemed to be a result of the need for 
young men when married to establish themselves as household heads.
Nevertheless, male behaviour and marital conflict had implications for household 
expenditure responsibilities. Two young married households, each with a single child, 
demonstrated this clearly. Both reported that their husbands had not been providing for 
the household as they had been spending their money on drinking and womanising, instead 
they had had to buy food either through earning from casual labour or business. In both 
cases they had taken action: one had returned to her parent’s home and the other had 
complained about her husbands behaviour to local elders. In both cases the situation led to 
change and when the interviews were held both women reported that their husbands were 
now taking responsibility for household provisions. After the re-negotiation the women 
were free to use their own income for their own ends. In these cases both women invoked 
norms of male household provision to support their cases for change.
This section has suggested that financial management within the household can best be 
understood as characterised by an independent management system in which each have 
separate sources of income and neither has access to all household funds. This degree of 
separation in income streams and expenditure responsibilities also helps to explain why
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men and women often have rather different views over the extent of their contribution to 
household expenditure.
Before concluding this section, the situation of single households deserves comment. In 
both male and female single households the individual tended to be in control of the main 
income sources and responsible for major expenditures. However, one finding was that in 
households headed by widows where there were adult but unmarried children who were 
themselves working - usually as casual labourers -  these were making contributions to 
household expenditure, either by buying food or giving money to their mother. It was 
notable that one of the expenses that they themselves catered for was buying clothes for 
themselves.
10.1.3 Gender and household financial management: conclusion
The analysis of the gender division of labour and distribution of income suggests that 
where both women and men contribute labour and men have primary control of the 
resources involved in a productive activity, men tend to seek to control the sources of 
income that produce the highest returns. These income streams in turn enable them to 
meet their responsibilities for areas of expenditure such as asset purchase, farm inputs, 
school fees and health care. These expenditures tend to be relatively large and relatively 
lumpy and their income streams often also have these characteristics. Women are more 
likely to be allocated streams of income that will enable them to purchase food and other 
basic household items that are required on a regular basis. Hence their income streams 
tend to be smaller and more frequent.
Financial management in these households can best be characterised as independent where 
both men and women have access to their own income sources and neither has access to all 
household funds. However men have the ability to reallocate income streams where these 
derive from resources over which they have primary control, but this is constrained by a 
basic norm that women have control over subsistence food grains. Men also may make 
claims on women’s income. As indicated in Chapter Nine Section 2.2, ROSCAs can be 
used as a means to resist these claims.
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These patterns have implications for financial service use and suggest that the demand for 
financial services is gendered. Due to the fact that men and women have some 
independence of access and control over their income streams, the different character o f 
these income streams, and the expenditure responsibilities they must meet with them, they 
have different demands for savings and loan services.
First, since women’s incomes are generally lower than men’s and they tend to use this 
income primarily for household necessities and their personal expenditure, they have 
smaller amounts to save and the sums they require as lump sums to finance expenditure 
will also be smaller than men’s. However, it was noted in Chapter Seven that women in 
Karatina town saved significantly more in ROSCAs than their rural counterparts, and some 
of the analysis here has used a primarily agriculturally based analysis to explain these 
lower levels of income and saving. Married women’s income is also more likely to be 
used either for immediate requirements or to build a larger sum with which to buy clothes 
or household items -  for example by putting it into a ROSCA:
HH22FHHH(a widow): She has left 3 groups in the last couple o f years due to lack 
o f money but is still in four. She used to use her casual labour money fo r groups 
and through this bought everything in the house: the sofa set, the glass fo r the 
windows. She says that casual labour income is “little by little ” and she has a 
mixture o f groups for cash and other items to meet her needs. When her husband 
was alive she was in many groups and she says he never asked about them -  he 
could see that she would bring something fo r the house e.g. some cups, and 
therefore that she was assisting.
Even those who do not have a direct source of their own income may use savings from 
money given them by another household member to buy food to join a ROSCA:
HH109W: She contributes Kshs20 daily from the money her mother-in-law gives 
her to buy food She hasn’t told her husband but doesn’t think he could refuse.
Women are also likely to need funds quickly and conveniently to meet immediate food or 
non-food requirements (such as fuel) or small health expenses in relation to children’s 
ailments. Hence the accessibility of savings is also a concern, but for those in ROSCAs 
this is overcome by borrowing from another member as was explained in Chapter Nine, 
Section 3.3.
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Second, men have access to lumps of income from cash crops payments or salaried 
employment. In association with this they have greater responsibility for providing for 
lumpy payments such as school fees and asset purchases. In order to provide for lumpy 
expenditure, they require places to save their income or places from which they can borrow 
to meet their credit needs in relation to these requirements.
10.2 ROSCA participation: the role of gendered social norms and sanctions
This section examines reasons for men and women’s different participation in ROSCAs. 
First, the social and cultural history of women and men’s collective activity is briefly 
reviewed. The analysis then moves on to discuss explanations that men and women 
themselves gave for this difference. The key factor they cited concerned men and 
women’s different response to social norms in relation to repayment and default.
10.2.1 Group participation: a brief review of anthropological evidence
Anthropological sources offer evidence of the social and economic role that groups have 
played in Kikuyu society. Fisher (1954) describes different types of work groups of either 
sex involved in agricultural tasks. Ngwatio were small work groups of two or three people 
who would work together around their gardens with the host providing food. Larger work 
parties called gutumcma wira of up to ten people were used to undertake larger tasks or 
tasks that a farmer wants to complete quickly. Stamp describes ngwatio more specifically 
as the cultivation by women of each other’s shambas. She also notes that women would 
jointly co-operate in other types of work such as matega, a custom involving the collection 
by women of firewood for a woman who had just given birth, until she was again capable 
of collecting it for herself. Other women at the new mother’s home would in turn cook for 
this group. (Stamp, 1975:24).
Stamp also details the way in which young girls would form their own ngwatio groups in
which they undertook joint activities. The fact that there were age-sets of women
alongside those of men was noted in Chapter Five, Stamp describes how these groups
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would be formed of girls prior to clitoridectomy, and by moving the focus of girls attention 
to the group would also weaken their links to their mother’s homes. The girls groups 
would have names corresponding to the age-set (riika) names of boys. The function of 
these groups was to prepare girls for womanhood and to train them in behaviour 
appropriate to adult women’s organizations.
Stamp notes the lack of discussion of women’s lodges (ndundu) in the main Kikuyu 
anthropological texts, although she has evidence that they did exist. According to her, 
ndundu in Mitero consisted of women married into a particular lineage and had economic, 
social and judicial functions. For example it could bring cases against those who broke 
group regulations and participate in communal functions such as initiation ceremonies.
She also cites evidence that there was an important age-grade system operating among 
women based on circumcision and marital status with highest status being accorded to 
women whose first child had been circumcised (nyakinyua). This system regulated 
participation in social events and structured aspects of economic activity with nyakinyua 
women being regarded as leaders who were capable of disciplining others. These age-sets 
gave women power “apart from” men rather than over men, and Robertson argues that 
their functions both legitimised and perpetuated patriarchal values while also defining a 
women’s sphere and forbidding male entry (Robertson, 1997:243).
Robertson, in reviewing changing patterns of women’s collective action over 70 years, 
argues that women’s organisations have shifted away from “a more specific form of 
gerontocratic organization concerned with producing properly socialized adults and 
controlling sexuality to a more class-based women’s solidarity involved with promoting 
women’s economic activities” (ibid:240). She argues that this process began to take place 
in the 1930s with the breaking of the link between clitoridectomy and women’s group 
membership. Clitoridectomy was a cultural practice which missionaries amongst others 
sought to change (Robertson, 1997). While Robertson emphasises the shift to 
economically motivated groups, this may be a result of the urban focus of her research. 
Stamp’s view (although some 20 years earlier) was that such groups continued to play an 
important social as well as economic role for women in the rural context (Stamp, 1975).
New forms of organization for women, primarily based in communal labour, started to 
emerge in the 1940s when the British colonial government identified women as a means of 
promoting loyalty and reaching men as well as women. It therefore supported the 
formation of Maendeleoya Wanawake (Kiswahili for ‘Progress for Women’). The aim
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was to mobilise groups of women “who will not be content with their present lot” 
(Department of Agriculture quoted in Robertson, 1997:248) in order to develop 
programmes of social development which primarily saw women in their domestic roles69 
and in so doing also put pressure on men to work.
It was after independence that ROSCAs clearly became one of the activities of these 
groups and in the 1970s and 1980s that women’s groups expanded hugely (Robertson, 
1997:249). This expansion was in part spurred by the broader ideology and practice of 
Harambee (Kiswahili for pulling together) promoted by the government and often 
supported by donors (Mwaniki, 1986; Udvardy, 1998). These groups undertook a wide 
range of activities: joint farming, or joint selling of their labour in agriculture; water 
projects; accumulation of funds to buy land for cultivation or building; setting up their own 
co-operatives and so on. Savings funds and ROSCA activities were often a core activity or 
necessary feature to enable the projects to take place (Maas, 1986; Nelson, 1995; 
Robertson, 1997).
10.2.2 The social significance of women’s participation in groups
The evidence from this research clearly indicated the ongoing social importance of 
women’s groups. As one young man put it: "To a woman a gitati is her lifestyle it’s her 
way of life ... a woman is not a woman until she is in a gita ti" (YIK, S34). Women 
explained that since women in their groups are not all of the same age, this social context 
enables them to learn how to speak properly in public and the older women educate the 
younger women on how to handle things in their homes and discuss problems with their 
husbands. Their ability to buy a sweater or a smart dress with the ROSCA payout and be 
dressed smartly and cleanly enables them to gain in self-esteem and mix freely with richer 
people -  “You can become a woman” (FGD3). This was judged important by town 
women who felt that their men will run away if they were not smart because he would 
compare her to a woman dressed smartly that he had met in a bar. But although he wants 
her to dress well he will not provide the money to do this. “Men just need to see the
woman in the house so its upon her to get the way to dress and manage the house”
(FGD3).
69 An informant who had been involved in women’s groups before independence said that women were 
encouraged by the Colonial Government to “hide” a little money out o f what they were given by their husbands 
so that they could not be short in the house when the husband was away (MNK,172).
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One of the main roles that groups perform for women is that of providing themselves with 
household utensils. They noted that if you enter the house of a woman who is in a group 
then it will be noticeable because she will have cups, plates and sufurias (cooking pots). 
Women explained that while a man will be interested in building a house, he would not be 
concerned with buying what goes inside it. While some men expect those things to be 
there even though they will never buy them, others will not care: “if there is no cup to 
drink from he will just tell you to bring the tea in the sufuriaY\FGD3). Wainaina 
underlines the social importance of having such utensils by saying that women without 
them are “shy to come out and meet with other women, or to allow visitors in to their 
homes” (quoted in Ardener, 1995:13).
10.2.3 Differing experiences of men and women in ROSCAs
Early on in the fieldwork it became clear that women used ROSCAs more effectively as a 
mechanism for financial intermediation than in the case of men. Later interviews with 
members of the main sample, focus group discussions and key informants, therefore sought 
to explore this differential experience using open-ended questions to ask how informants 
understood and accounted for this.
The most consistent aspect of their explanations concerned the social consequences of non­
payment and how they differed between men and women. Informants said that women felt 
shame if they were unable to make a contribution to their ROSCA -  a woman would rather 
borrow from a friend to take money to the group than not pay as she did not want to be 
embarrassed and “spoil” the group. Nor did she want the shame of people coming to take 
things from her house. As one woman put it:
“It is embarrassing to go to a gitati without money ....you are going to be told to 
give them their m oney-you have helped yourself and used the money and today 
you are giving another person, so you have to pay it back. You are going to spoil 
your name and people will be fearing you - seeing you as someone who doesn *t 
pay, I  would prefer to ask someone to give me the money than to go to the gitati 
without the money ...ifyou can’t pay they may come to take your security, your
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TV.... It is not good... it will be auctioned. Would you be happy? The children w ill 
be asking questions -  how do I  answer them? ” (EJN, 142).
A moneylender reported that with recently deteriorating economic conditions, women in 
local microfinance groups had borrowed from him to repay their group loans -  at 40% per 
month -  because they wanted to avoid the shame of the group members coming to take 
their assets. He took consumer durables as collateral and described how the women would 
send someone else with the asset and visit him separately afterwards to get the money.
It appeared that men also sought to avoid putting women in a situation where they might 
experience shame through not being able to pay. Both wives and husbands explained that 
husbands had refused when they asked to join a gitati. These were cases where the wife 
had asked to join a ROSCA but where the husband would have to give her the 
contributions as she had no independent income of her own. If the husband felt that he 
could not reliably provide the contributions he felt it was better for the wife not to join, as 
he did not want her to be embarrassed in the group by his failure to bring money for her. 
Where women had their own incomes or were given housekeeping money, then it was 
usually up to them how they managed it. If they wished to make contributions to groups 
from this, they were usually free to do so.70
The need to avoid bringing shame on women also extended to a male rural moneylender 
who explained that he could lend to women in town but not in rural areas. In town women 
had their own incomes and because of this were “like men” (UIU,114). By contrast if he 
lent to a woman in the village and she could not repay he would bring shame on her. If  her 
husband had not been aware of the loan then it was possible to bring conflict to the home 
and he feared being blamed for causing the problem as it would then reflect badly on him. 
In the rural areas it was mainly the husband’s income that would be used to repay. The 
moneylender’s policy was therefore only to lend to women in the village if a man she 
trusted came with her -  this could be a male friend or relative. This would enable him to 
give the man the money and the man would then give it to the woman.
By contrast, these social norms and sanctions did not appear to have the same effect for 
men. Male informants reported many cases of mens’ groups that had failed. In a number
70 An exception to this arose in Chehe where less well o ff young men did not like their wives belonging to 
groups. This seemed to be due to a sense o f  insecurity in their marriage. Some wives explained that their 
husbands do not like them to bring things for die house because they felt die women would boast about it and 
undermine their status as head of die household.
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of cases fights had occurred over group breakdown and some young male informants could 
show the resulting scars. Some of these cases involved con men claiming to start groups 
and canvassing the young men in town to make contributions. These groups never met and 
by the time it came to their turn they would not get the money. They knew that even if 
they took the case to the police they were unlikely to get their money back and taking the 
case to court was too expensive.
Men themselves explained this as the result of a more individualistic culture among them. 
In Chapter Five the traditional system of age-sets was described as a means through which 
men collaborated across lineages. But Lonsdale suggests that male solidarity was not 
strong, especially after they married, quoting the Kikuyu saying: “helpful age-mates 
become rival householders” (1992:327). To the extent that there is male collaboration this 
has been based in the mbari (FGD4). Moreover, since age-sets no longer exist, the 
socialisation process for men has not involved group membership and it has certainly not 
been adapted to current circumstances in the way that Robertson describes for women. 
Moreover, the empirical material in Chapter Nine (p234) indicated the contempt with 
which men viewed women’s group activities. Hence it can often be the case that a young 
man only learns about groups from his wife once he has got married (AIG,17).
Both men and women explained that men have a “don’t care” attitude. Men reported that 
they did not like the strictness of the rules involved in groups and the fines they would 
incur if they didn’t attend. Other men also explained that men could not mix with each 
other since they do not want to be seen as needing to depend on others and so being seen as 
inferior. They did not like to consult each other when they had problems but preferred to 
keep their problems to themselves:
“men are proud and do not trust each other ....every man is clever....you know 
someone is going to mess you up ” (i.e. i f  you get into a group with them) (FGD6).
Often the rules of the group were not written down and men realised that nothing could 
really be done if they did not pay, so they did not fear default. If a woman was not able to 
complete her payments in the group then the group could go and repossess the items but a 
man would resist this. Women explained that this was why they could not have men in 
their groups:
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"men don't like struggling he won't struggle to get money fo r the meeting, he will
just say he has nothing in his pocket and what will you do to make him pay? You go 
to his place to start selling things and he will just say no. Whereas a women, i f  she 
doesn't have money, will borrow from a friend  - even get it from her husband - but 
men don't like coming to meetings and complying with rules ” (REM, ARG, 121).
These women further reflected that men did not feel shame in the way that women did, 
with a local saying: “thoni cia arume ciri igoti ” which in translation means “the shame of 
men is at the back of the head”. She used this to mean “a man does not care about 
anything if he believes he is unable to pay at that time” (REM, 121). It refers to the fact 
that when a woman feels shame it is evident in her expression, and she is unable to look 
someone in the eye, but a man will not feel such shame and will hold his head up high, in 
this case, when telling others that he has no money to bring to the group.
This difference between men and women is underlined by an informant whose wife had 
been a member of a local MFO group and taken a loan for a piggery project at home for 
which he had been providing the weekly repayments. He explained that he did not want 
her to take another loan because he did not feel that she would be able to make a business 
work in the current economic climate and did not want her to be shamed by him being 
unable to provide her with repayments. He said that he would rather take the loan himself 
because he would “know what to do” (LOR,94) if he could not find the payments, and that 
the worst that could happen to him was six months in civil jail.
This is not to say that men did not join groups - whether men’s or women’s - or that they 
did not also value groups. In fact a number of young men demonstrated their eagerness to 
join a ‘good’ group -  which usually meant a reliable women’s group - and lamented their 
inability to gain access to such groups. Some young men reported “being carried” by 
women in groups. This was where a young man, who had a good relationship with a 
woman who trusted him, joined a group through her. He would then give her the 
contributions but only her name appeared on the register. This is one of the few ways a 
young man could join reliable groups when he was not yet married and could not therefore 
do this through his wife.
However, men also reported that circumstances have changed greatly in recent years and 
especially since 1997. Many men reported that they had now joined self-help groups due 
to the hard times they were facing as the economic downturn had “brought the men to
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being able to be humble in their homes”(FGD5). Men were finding it difficult to take 
loans from banks due to high interest rates. Minimum balance requirements for savings 
accounts had also been raised, making it more difficult to save and earn interest there 
(FGD6). They said that in the past groups were just for women, but they had come to see 
what women have been able to achieve in the home as a result of being in the groups.
They now needed to be able to save little by little and this was one of the few ways in 
which they could acquire small assets. As a result they reported that they had learnt how to 
behave in groups. Further, given that they were having financial problems they found that 
they could share these in the group without having to go around telling all of their friends 
about their problems and asking for money.
Men said that they preferred to start their own groups because they saw women’s groups as 
dealing with small things i.e. household items such as utensils, where as men they need to 
save for purposes such as school fees and investments. One men’s group said that they had 
started as men only (in the rural area) but wives came on behalf of their husbands - usually 
because the husband was not reliable - and so it became hard to exclude them (FGD4).
They complained that when women come in they “change the minds of the men to make 
them think of small things” but that they did not want to change their minds, as they want 
to do “big things”. As was seen in the last section, men have expenditure responsibilities 
that involve bulky payments for school fees, asset accumulation and so on. Thus for men, 
if groups are to be a means of financing these responsibilities, they need to be in groups 
where the payments are higher to be able to achieve this in a period of time they regard as 
acceptable.
10.2.4 ROSCA participation: conclusion
This part of the analysis has explored the reasons for women’s greater use of ROSCAs 
through the use of anthropological material on gendered social relations and respondents 
own explanations.
This evidence suggests that, first, women were traditionally socialised in groups prior to 
clitoridectomy as part of the age-set system and that women’s labour groups were also a 
feature of women’s collaborative activity. These groups also contained internal 
disciplinary mechanisms. The colonial government also promoted women’s groups as a
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means of gaining loyalty and promoting women’s domestic roles. But after independence 
these became the basis of collaborative economic activity in a range of areas, and the need 
to save for these projects was often at the centre. By contrast, while men were similarly 
socialised in age-sets, these provided little basis for solidarity after men had married. 
Moreover, with the decline of age-sets, there has been little social basis for cross-lineage 
collaborative activity.
Second, respondents referred to gendered norms of behaviour in explaining the capacity of 
women to operate more effectively in groups than men. These contrasted the 
individualistic and opportunistic behaviour of men with the shame that women would 
experience if they failed to repay. While, both women and their husbands explained how 
they would seek to avoid this shame, preferring not to enter groups where they could not 
be confident of making contributions, this gendered difference may reflect the greater 
dependence of women on female kin, neighbours and related social networks in coping 
with livelihood shocks, for example.71 This suggests that, in the context of ROSCAs, 
shame is used as a sanction to enforce rules in women’s groups but that it does not operate 
so effectively for men. By contrast, men do not appear to have access to a similar sanction 
that can enable their ROSCAs to work.72
The implication of this is that the ways in which women are socialised in groups, and the 
systems of discipline that they practice, have enabled them to more effectively use 
informal group-based financial systems than men.
10.3 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to explain women’s greater use of ROSCAs as a financial 
intermediation mechanism through the development of two lines of analysis.
71 An example o f the way in which women reciprocate and support each other with food and other transfers is 
described in Francis (2000).
72 A reflection on the need for strong sanctions to be available and enforceable in men’s groups was the reported 
case o f a group that had been formed among men from the Meru community living in Karatina. The collector 
was a policeman and it was reported that everyone paid because they feared him. When the policeman was 
transferred out o f the area the group collapsed.
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An analysis of gendered intra-household economic relations was developed to establish the 
gendered demand for financial services. Patterns in the division of labour and control over 
income showed that women were allocated some of the income from these activities -  not 
necessarily commensurate with their labour input -  and sometimes given control of the 
income stream in its entirety. However, it also showed that men tended to control income 
streams that yielded the highest incomes. However, the allocation of income streams can 
be seen as associated with responsibilities for particular household expenditures. Men 
often believe and expect to provide for the household and this includes primary 
responsibility for larger and lumpier expenditures such as for assets, school fees, farm 
inputs and health. The smaller and more regular flows received by women were usually 
used to buy food and for non-food household expenditure - where they are seen as 
“supplementing” their husband’s contributions.
The different characteristics of these income flows and expenditure responsibilities 
alongside the relative independence of their management, result in different demands for 
financial services. Women’s small but frequent income streams result in their use of 
ROSCAs that can accommodate small and regular payments. ROSCAs enable these 
amounts to be converted into small lump sums that allow them to cater to their personal 
expenditure needs for larger amounts such as clothes or household assets for which they 
also have responsibility. Men on the other hand require savings services which enable 
them to accumulate income streams which may be infrequent, such as cash crop payments, 
into sums for other lumpy and less frequent expenditure on assets, farm inputs, health care 
and so on. Alternatively, they seek loans that enable them to meet these needs.
The second line of the analysis emphasised the gendered nature of social sanctions and the 
role they play in enforcement in ROSCAs. The anthropological literature demonstrates the 
role that co-operative activity has played in women’s socialisation in the past and this was 
different for men. This helps to explain the differing views that men and women had 
about their ability to conform to ROSCA rules and the efficacy of the sanctions available 
when these are broken. The argument here is not that men do not experience shame at all, 
but that in the context of ROSCA activity this social sanction does not ensure men’s 
compliance to the rules of the group as effectively as it does for women.
This supports the argument presented in Chapter Three that social relations operate in ways 
that effect the implementation of rules and enforcement mechanisms in financial 
intermediaries. In the case of ROSCAs it appears that the sanction of shame performs a
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role in enforcement that makes ROSCAs a more viable form of financial intermediation for 
women.
These two lines of analysis are also related. The nature of the income streams which men 
control can be large and irregular. This means that they are less likely to have access to the 
regular contributions which ROSCAs demand. Moreover, their expenditure 
responsibilities are also lumpy, and in many cases are tied to particular times of year. For 
example, farm input requirements are governed by seasonality and school fees by school 
terms. The ability of ROSCAs to cater to these needs is limited since they offer members 
the payout in rotation and not all can take the funds at the same time. For women on the 
other hand, the purchase of clothes or household utensils and assets with these funds can 
take place at any time of year.
The scale of men’s expenditure requirements is another factor. In order to gain adequate 
lump sums from ROSCAs, men would need to contribute higher amounts. Given the 
apparent weakness of informal social sanctions in men’s ROSCAs and the larger amounts 
they would need to save in them to make them useful, this makes ROSCAs a much more 
risky place for them to save compared to formal financial institutions. Alternatively, more 
effective enforcement mechanisms would need to be found as is to some extent the case in 
formal mutuals such as SACCOs.
Finally, this discussion also helps explain the finding of Chapter Seven that being young 
educated and male raised the likelihood of borrowing from friends and relatives. Since 
men do not have social relationships that enable them to join groups to meet their financial 
needs they are more likely to turn to friends and they explained that this was how they 
were most likely to borrow. The young educated men that this finding referred to were 
unmarried, living in Karatina and running their own businesses. This meant that they 
needed funds, had no collateral and had not yet had the opportunity to learn about groups 
or the behaviour required to manage to borrow from them.
In conclusion, two analytical approaches have been used to show how gender relations 
influence both men’s and women’s engagement with financial intermediation. The first 
demonstrated how intra-household gender relations influenced the demand for financial 
services. The second showed how aspects of gender relations beyond the household affect 
the ability of women to join groups and respond to an enforcement mechanism.
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Chapter 11 Conclusion
This study set out to analyse financial markets in Mathira using approaches that view 
markets as exchange processes that are regulated and structured by social institutions. Its 
purpose was to develop an holistic and systematic analysis that described market structure 
and analysed social embeddedness. Within the terminology of orthodox economics, it has 
sought to examine the extent and nature of fragmentation and to explain its origins.
The approach taken suggests that two sources of fragmentation can be theorised. First, 
there is fragmentation that arises from the nature of financial intermediaries as forms of 
collective action. Second, there is fragmentation that results from the ways in which social 
relations influence who can engage with these intermediaries due to the rules and 
enforcement mechanisms they involve. The field research has demonstrated the existence 
of both of these sources of fragmentation in Mathira.
This conclusion starts by reviewing this approach and the findings of the detailed 
investigation of Mathira’s financial markets. It then discusses the implications of the study 
for both real market and NIE approaches. Since the research methodology was innovative, 
it then reflects briefly on how further research on real financial markets might best be 
conducted. Finally, the implications of the study for financial sector policy generally and 
in Kenya are considered.
11.1 Financial intermediation reconsidered
The study started by taking a step back from the conventional focus on the supply and 
demand for savings and loans to consider the nature of organisations that are able to carry 
out financial intermediation. The purpose of financial intermediation is to take funds from 
those who wish to save and on-lend to those with a demand for credit. For neo-classical
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theory the ‘pure’ market situation would involve agents seeking out individuals with 
excess fimds from whom they can borrow -  money lenders or friends and relatives -  
together these have been termed ‘direct’ lending. But business is also transacted by three 
types of financial intermediary, each of which constitutes a different form of collective 
action: banks arise from the private firm (private ownership); SACCOs, ROSCAs and 
ASCAs from the co-operative form (collective ownership); parastatals are formed by the 
state (collective ownership via the state). Microfmance organisations originating in NGOs 
are privately owned and can either remain owned by NGOs or are likely to become 
regulated deposit takers under special legislation. Each type of intermediary has a 
different set of rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms linked to the underlying 
form of collective action.
This approach to identifying the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of 
financial intermediaries allows the further development of an institutional analysis. The 
first point is that the owners set the rules and decide how the monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms are to be implemented. This allows the power and interests of the owners to 
be discussed in terms of the way these rules are set and enforced. The regulatory and 
supervisory structure laid out by the state also regulates the exercise of this power. It is for 
banks that this is most obvious through liquidity and reserve requirements, audit 
procedures, deposit protection and so on. But state regulation usually deals with financial 
intermediation by co-operatives and parastatals differently - primarily because the 
relationship between owners and users in banks presents enforcement problems for 
depositors. It has also been pointed out that SACCOs, ASCAs and ROSCAs are all 
mutuals, with the key difference between them being the formal regulation of SACCOs 
compared to ASCAs and ROSCAs.
The rules and enforcement mechanisms used by financial intermediaries also depend both 
on formal laws such as property rights, inheritance and employment law, and on informal 
norms and sanctions. Indeed social order could not be maintained without this complex 
infrastructure of informal norms, involving trust and morality. Further, many aspects of 
these informal norms are in turn embedded in social relations such as those of age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion and class. The structure of these social relations influences the ways in 
which agents engage with rules and sanctions.
This approach, which prioritises an analysis of financial intermediaries in terms of their 
rules and enforcement mechanisms, has a number of implications. First, it allows key
286
characteristics of financial services - both savings and loans - to be understood as resulting 
from the form of the financial intermediary. Hence, the need for banks to take collateral 
results from the fact that banks are lending other people’s savings and need to protect the 
interests of both savers and their own capital base. By contrast in mutuals, savers are also 
borrowers and hence their own savings, and the savings of their fellow members, may be 
used as collateral for a loan. Further, the ways in which prices are set also differ 
fundamentally between banks and mutuals. It is the board and management of banks who 
set prices, whereas in mutuals the constitution is likely to require a general meeting of the 
membership i.e. the users, in order to decide on prices.
Thus the characteristics of the financial services that an intermediary can offer are 
determined by organisational form. Only one of these characteristics is price, and 
economists often refer to other characteristics as “non-price factors”. But a vital point here 
is that the organisational form affects the decision-making processes through which prices 
are set and the influences on price formation can be entirely different. While in banks, 
management sets prices independently of savers and borrowers; in mutuals prices are set 
by members who are both savers and borrowers. Moreover, in mutuals borrowing 
entitlements are usually related to saving. These limit the comparability of interest rates 
between providers and hence the relevance of conventional neo-classical price analysis. .
Second, this approach offers an alternative means to understand market fragmentation.
The analysis of financial markets based in new institutional economics has moved beyond 
neo-classical economics by proposing that price differences in the financial market can be 
explained by the information and transactions costs associated with different forms of 
provision and that it is therefore necessary to analyse risk-adjusted returns to find evidence 
of fragmentation. But it does not recognise that the fundamental differences in the ways 
intermediaries deal with these costs cannot be reduced to an analysis of the costs of funds, 
screening, default and profit.
For example, mutuals have a screening system based on membership and one that at the 
same time provides collateral. This is a very different situation to that of banks, which 
must screen their borrowers using a range of techniques such as interviews and business 
plans, and find legally enforceable ways of taking collateral. Moreover, analysts who have 
tested the NIE empirically have recognised the role of social relationships in conveying 
information and reducing transactions costs but have been unable to demonstrate how these 
can be incorporated into the analysis. To sum up, market fragmentation arises not just
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from the existence of significant transactions costs, nor solely from product differentiation, 
but from fundamental organisational differentiation.
A further step has to be made: the effectiveness of a particular type of intermediary is 
determined by the actual ways in which the rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms operate. This depends on how they interact with politics, culture and social 
relations in practice. Focussing on the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
therefore suggests a means through which the embeddedness of financial institutions in 
these relations can be analysed. Moreover, if the operation of rules, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are dependent on norms and sanctions arising from social 
relations, this suggests that the use of services will differ according to socio-economic 
groups. Social relations are therefore a further potential source of fragmentation.
This conceptual framework therefore theorizes fragmentation in financial markets as 
arising from two sources. First, from the organisational form of financial intermediaries 
and second from the ways in which social relations influence their rules and enforcement. 
With this understanding in mind, the study set out to investigate the financial 
intermediation in Mathira.
11.2 Real financial markets in Mathira
The collection and analysis of data in Mathira took an holistic and systematic approach to 
both the supply and demand sides and the role of both formal and informal services. The 
purpose was to first describe this financial landscape and second, explain its contours 
through an investigation of the influence of social relations, politics and culture. The 
analysis has also served to examine the usefulness of the conceptual framework developed.
The survey of formal financial service providers in Mathira showed that the banks and 
formal privately owned intermediaries dominated in terms of the value of mobilised 
deposits (80%) and outstanding loans (64%), and 49% of the number of savings accounts. 
However, the mutual sector was an important part of the landscape, accounting for 21% of 
the value of deposits, 28% of outstanding loans by value and with 49% of the number of 
accounts. This also reflects the fact that mutual providers tend to deal with smaller
288
deposits and loans than the banks. Moreover, when considering the extent to which 
intermediaries on-lend their deposits locally, it was seen that the banking sector performed 
poorly by comparison to managed ASCRAs and SACCOs. MFOs lent donor funds and 
deposits that they mobilised became a source of funds for the banking sector. They did not 
represent a significant proportion of the value of outstanding loans (4%).
The demand side analysis was able to explore the role of informal group-based 
mechanisms that were not captured by the supply-side survey. This demonstrated that 
group-based savings systems were used by a wide variety of people. ROSCAs were used 
by 48.5% of the sample and group-based savings mechanisms as a whole by 52.8%.
Once formal SACCO provision was taken into account, some 70.6% of the sample was 
found to be using mutually based services. Hence, the evidence from both the supply and 
demand side survey indicates that mutually based mechanisms are an important form o f 
intermediation.
On the borrowing side, few had borrowed from formal banks or parastatals. Indeed the 
loans from banks were all unsecured and smaller than loans available from employee 
SACCOs, MFOs and even from independent ASCAs. By contrast the importance of 
borrowing from cash crop SACCOs was clear (19.1%), although these loans were 
relatively small. When comparison is made of the extent to which savers access loans 
from the same type of intermediary, it is clear that banks performed least well compared to 
mutuals, apart from mainstream MFOs where savings are compulsory. ROSCAs were not 
included as borrowing mechanisms though in many ways they are. Had they been 
included these would have been the single most important source of loans also.
Employers, friends and relatives were also an important source of loans.
Overall, ROSCAs were the most used arrangement and it was found that women made 
significantly more use of them than men. Not only were they more likely to be members, 
but they also joined significantly more groups than men did and saved significantly more 
in them -especially married women.
These findings suggested the need to further investigate the following: (i) the role of 
mutuals in the market; (ii) the causes of the lack of secured lending by banks; and (iii) the 
causes of gendered ROSCA use in order to explore further to what extent these findings 
were evidence of fragmentation in the market and if so, what their origins were. In each
289
case the research sought to relate the stylised fact to social embeddedness and market 
fragmentation.
11.2.1 Land
The form of banks as intermediaries makes it necessary to take collateral, and land has 
always been seen as one of the most useful assets for secured lending. Moreover, using 
land as collateral has been one aspect of the rationale for land registration and titling 
programmes in Kenya and elsewhere.
Land in Kenya has been fundamental to politics since the arrival of the British, and titling 
and registration under the Swynnerton Plan were in part premised on the need to increase 
the efficiency of the agricultural sector through access to credit. Yet it had the 
contradictory objective of ensuring land security for the Kikuyu in the face of European 
expansion. It was unlikely that those to whom land rights were so important would then 
risk them as collateral for loans.
The research has shown the continuing role of land in Kikuyu society and culture. Land is 
of primary importance to social structure especially that of the mbari with a patrilineal 
inheritance structure. The first round household survey found that a minority of 
households, some 39%, had holdings registered in the name of the household head. For a 
further 42%, access was via another family member or relative, most often the father. 
Women owned land in just under half the instances where they cultivated land. But the 
process of titling failed to deal adequately with customary land rights, and these claims 
were not expunged. In fact the Land Control Boards, which were set up to enable 
economic development through dispossession of less successful farmers as they defaulted, 
have instead upheld customary rights. Land is a vital social safety net and such 
considerations have become key to Board decisions. Moreover, the existence of these 
customary rights has enabled both men and women, as wives, brothers, sons and daughters 
to prevent the mortgage or disposal of land in which they have an interest.
Cultural constraints to its use as collateral included the role that burial on family land plays 
in confirming identity with the mbari, and the way curses can be placed on land 
transactions involving money. Hence, the complexity of land-based social relations and
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the cultural importance of land helps to explain the failure of borrowers to use it as 
collateral. Furthermore, these constraints do not only operate from the demand side. 
Banks have experienced difficulties in disposing of land as families have resisted forced 
sales. Moreover, in the 1990s land has continued to be at the core of politics. Land 
grabbing, the issuing of false title deeds and ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley and the coast 
have affected its usefulness as collateral.
11.2.2 The role of mutuals
The explanation of limited borrowing from banks has concentrated on the difficulties 
involved in using land as collateral. Yet explanations for choosing mutuals also invoked 
other reasons for not using banks. While the transactions costs associated with saving in 
the banks had been rising, transactions costs clearly do not adequately explain the ongoing 
growth in the SACCO sector and an apparent burgeoning of group-based finance in the late 
1990s. The explanations for this are more diverse. The reasons encompass the need to 
create discipline in saving, and protect that saving by being unable to access it -  illiquidity 
preference. The fact that access to loans in a mutual is a matter of right is also important. 
Moreover, as user-owned organisations members have voice: they set the interest rate and 
can negotiate terms and conditions of payment once difficulties strike. Groups and 
SACCOs also allow members to expand their social networks and this enables them to gain 
both financial and social support at times of crisis.
These preferences fit well with Berry’s (1993) view of African agrarian social relations.
The elements of her analysis that have been highlighted suggest that there are contradictory 
pressures between exclusive claims to resources and the need to develop sufficient 
authority to make such claims by mobilising support through inclusionary strategies.
These strategies use social networks to expand the support base. Moreover, these are 
multidimensional, have multiple meanings and allow scope for negotiation.73 Hence 
strategies for developing access to resources are concerned with extending social networks 
and expanding the range of options available rather than short-term calculations of material 
benefit.
73 Indeed the bad debts in the banking sector have resulted from the ways in which elites and politicians have 
negotiated access to the banking sector both as owners and borrowers.
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The political economy of these social relations also contributes to understanding the 
importance of cash crop SACCOs. Marketing co-operatives have historically been deeply 
entrenched in politics and used as a means of mobilising political support because they 
have a direct role in representing the interests of members. In Mathira, the motivation for 
SACCO formation in the cash crop sector has also partly been political. The history of 
Kikuyu social relations reviewed in Chapter Five suggested that legitimacy in public office 
was built on private wealth and ambition but should also deliver a public benefit. This also 
conforms to Berry’s analysis of the pressures for inclusion. SACCOs are a prime example 
of the means through which these dual objectives converge and can be achieved: SACCOs 
create a resource for a group of people while also offering opportunities for private wealth 
accumulation through the patronage opportunities that are both received and in the power 
of leaders to offer. However, a much more in-depth analysis is necessary to understand 
exactly to what extent and how processes of unequal redistribution might operate and 
whether there is evidence o f ‘adverse incorporation’.
It is also important to set these developments within the broader context of Kenya’s 
political economy in the 1990s. Two aspects need to be emphasised. The first is that a 
number of banks owned by Kikuyus had failed in the mid-1980s, many because of their 
political connections (see Chapter Five). This was described by one commentator as part 
of Moi’s “economic war against the Kikuyu” 74(Ogachi, 1999:97). Second, banking sector 
interest rates have been influenced by domestic monetary policy through Treasury Bill 
sales. Moreover, banks such as Barclays and Standard have had to operate in line with 
their parent companies’ objectives and meet international profitability targets. In the 
context of these national political and economic struggles, mutuals are an organisational 
form through which agents may isolate themselves from these wider influences to protect 
their resource base.
These reasons clearly demonstrate why it is important to look at the form of the 
intermediary and its rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Mutuals offer voice 
because the members own the organisation. The right of access to loans is embedded in 
this form. The data demonstrates that savers in SACCOs and ASCAs were able to borrow 
the funds they had deposited, in contrast to banks where it was a minority which borrowed. 
Of course, there is the potential for patronage and favouritism in the process of loan
74 Liberalisation in the coffee and dairy industries are locally interpreted as having been driven by intentions to 
undermine the Kikuyu economy.
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allocation -  but this too is part of the reason for their popularity: norms are understood and 
negotiation is possible for all members.
In allowing for voice, mutuals also reduce the risks of borrowing by comparison with 
banks. This has been especially important during a period of economic downturn when 
downside risks are enhanced and where political liberalisation has increased aspects of 
both economic and political uncertainty. Members of mutuals are able to negotiate with 
their fellow members. The research has demonstrated the multiple ways in which financial 
and social support in the event of crises can be gained using the social networks that 
members develop both inside the group and outside of it.
11.2.3 The gender embeddedness of financial markets
The finding from the demand side survey that women were more likely to use ROSCAs 
than men suggested the need to investigate the role of gender relations in access and use of 
financial services. The way in which patrilineal inheritance systems affect women’s land 
ownership was discussed in Chapter Eight. It can be argued that this is also a reason for 
their limited use of formal sector financial services but it was argued that women’s ability 
to use land as collateral was constrained in similar ways for both men and women. The 
explanation of women’s ROSCA use was developed through two lines of analysis. First, 
gendered economic relations within the household were analysed and their implications for 
the demand for financial intermediation by men and women were examined. Second, the 
comparative effectiveness of shame as a sanction for enforcement in informal groups of 
men and women was explored.
The analysis of gendered economic relations within the household suggested that patterns 
in the division of labour and control over income meant that women were allocated some 
of the income from these activities or given control of this income stream in its entirety. 
However, men tended to ensure that they controlled income streams that yielded the 
highest incomes. The allocation of income streams can also be seen as associated with 
responsibilities for particular household expenditures. While men face a social norm in 
which they are expected to provide for the household, this includes primary responsibility 
for larger and lumpier expenditures such as on assets, school fees, farm inputs and health. 
Women’s contributions from their income streams are usually related to food and non-food
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household expenditure - where they are seen as “supplementing” their husband’s 
contributions.
The differing characteristics of these income and expenditure flows, alongside the relative 
independence of their management, results in gendered patterns of demand for financial 
services. Women’s small but frequent income streams result in their use of ROSCAs that 
can accommodate small and regular payments. ROSCAs enable these amounts to be 
converted into small lump sums that allow them to cater to larger personal expenditures 
such as clothes or household assets, for which they also have responsibility. Men on the 
other hand require savings services which enable them to accumulate income streams 
which may be infrequent, such as cash crop payments, into sums for other lumpy and less 
frequent expenditure on assets, farm inputs, health care and so on. Alternatively they seek 
loans that enable them to meet these needs.
The second strand of the analysis emphasises the gendered nature of social sanctions and 
the role they play in enforcement in ROSCAs. The anthropological literature demonstrates 
the strong role that co-operative activity has played in women’s socialisation in the past, 
and the way it has been adapted both by government and women themselves in the colonial 
and independence periods. While age-sets did provide a basis for cross-lineage 
collaboration among men, they did not provide a strong basis of solidarity among men 
once they had married. Moreover, the age-set system no longer exists. This helps to 
explain the differing attitudes of men and women to group-based activity.
It was further argued that one of the reasons for women’s more extensive use of ROSCAs 
was the effectiveness of shame as a sanction. Informants’ own accounts suggested that 
women would seek to avoid the shame of not being able to pay and that men would also 
seek to protect women from this. The argument here is not that men do not experience 
shame at all, but that in the context of ROSCA activity this social sanction does not ensure 
their compliance to the rules of the group as effectively as it does for women. However, 
the evidence also suggests that men were beginning to recognise the usefulness of 
ROSCAs as a form of financial intermediation that could meet their needs for lump sums. 
They themselves reported that it was necessary for them to learn how to adapt their 
behaviour in order to make ROSCAs effective. It could be argued that this is consistent 
with a view of the evolution of economic institutions in response to changing transactions 
costs, i.e. that men have changed their behaviour in response to the increasing difficulties 
of borrowing from formal sector banks and the changing nature of their income streams.
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However it must be borne in mind that the cause of the need for these changes were the 
political economy of macro-economic management, banking sector performance and cash 
crop SACCO re-structuring. This is an example of Khan’s criticism of the NIE (p34) that 
the ranking of institutions is not independent of the polity.
An additional point here is to highlight the gendered division between ROSCAs and 
SACCOs. Cash crop and business SACCOs tend to be male dominated as men have 
controlled cash crops and business opportunities. This further underlines the apparent need 
for more formal types of sanctions related to their larger borrowing requirements.
These two lines of analysis together demonstrate that gender relations influence access to 
financial services. The first aspect of the analysis demonstrated the influence of gendered 
intra-household relations on the demand for services to bridge the gap between income and 
expenditure. The second, showed how ROSCA use had been influenced by the extent to 
which women socialised in groups and had learnt the skills to do this, and the effectiveness 
of shame as a mechanism in enforcement.
11.3 Implications for theory
11.3.1 Implications for institutional economics and for the study of real financial 
markets
This study has taken the ‘old’ institutionalist view that markets are exchange processes 
regulated and structured by social institutions and sought to develop and apply it to 
financial markets. While many studies, especially of informal finance, have shown how 
these mechanisms are socially embedded, this study sought to take an holistic and 
systematic approach to enabling the nature and origins of this embeddedness to be 
theorised.
In order to develop the approach, the initial focus was the organisational form of financial 
intermediaries. This allowed for analysis of their rules and enforcement mechanisms and 
of the relationship between these and social relations. This approach has in some ways 
bridged aspects of the NIE analysis of organisational forms -  mainly the firm - with the
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emphasis of real market analysts on the role of power and social relations. It allows for a 
clear theorisation of the ways in which social relations and power influence access to and 
use of financial intermediaries, and provides a basis for understanding how socio-economic 
groups are differentially located in markets.
Moreover, the inter-disciplinarity o f ‘old’ institutionalism allows the multi-dimensional 
nature of social relations to be recognised and explicitly brought into the analysis. Hence 
transactions can have dimensions of social and cultural meaning and conformity with 
norms of behaviour as well as economic intent. This study shows the need for this step and 
conversely demonstrates the limitations of optimising rationality as a behavioural 
assumption.
In order to explore the extent to which this analysis has systematised and operationalised a 
more realistic framework for examining the reality of financial markets, we can return to 
White’s (1993) four-fold framework for the political analysis of markets, which - as was 
suggested in Chapter Two- offered a bridge between institutionalist and political economy 
approaches. The four aspects were: state involvement, market organisation, market 
structure and social embeddedness. The last aspect required that market analysis examined 
the means through which social organisation affected market operations, which, as already 
discussed, the approach developed here is primarily geared to achieving.
In terms of state involvement, this approach allows both the direct role of the state as an 
actor in the market to be recognised -  either as state-owned banks or parastatals -  as well 
as the regulations that it imposes on financial intermediaries. The framework allows wider 
political influences on the way rules are made and enforced to be a focus of analysis, but it 
has not theorised more generally how these relate to each other. However, White also 
highlighted the pervasive and saturating influence of a myriad of other rules and 
regulations. This analysis has made reference to the framework of property rights and 
formal laws that are also necessary for financial intermediation and showed how these also 
need to be examined in terms of their influence -  especially for land.
Second, White highlighted the means by which participants in the market could collaborate 
and operate to their own advantage. One such example in this study has been the way in 
which agents may collaborate to form mutuals, thereby isolating themselves from wider 
influences and gaining power to create their own internal market for funds. Indeed this 
analysis has also revealed how participation in the market is linked to the extent of voice
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and hence negotiation in market regulation. The analytical framework developed here can 
draw attention to forms of market organisation among providers through examination o f  
rule setting and implementation. For example, an empirical question that arises from this 
study and that is worthy of further analysis is that of the dynamics among the large 
commercial banks as evidenced by their behaviour over minimum balances and interest 
rates. The evidence seems to suggest that banks followed market leaders rather than 
demonstrating ‘perfectly’ competitive behaviour, but it was not possible to explore this 
further. This suggests the need for analysis of the ways in which norms of behaviour 
among similar providers tend to operate.
Third, the politics of market structure refers to the unequal power relations involved in 
exchange and the inter-linking and inter-locking of contracts between credit and other 
markets. This study found little evidence of these types of relationship in Mathira’s 
financial markets, but the framework does allow for their analysis through the description 
of the deposit and loan services available from different forms of intermediary including 
from moneylenders. An analysis of the rules of moneylenders and the ways in which they 
enforce contracts would enable these aspects to be described and the analysis of who uses 
them and the social norms and sanctions that surround this engagement to be made. 
Analysis that suggests adverse incorporation into credit relations is compatible with this 
approach.
However, while there was little evidence of direct inter-linking of factor markets such as 
labour and inputs in credit relations in Mathira (except for two cases of borrowing from 
employers where interest was not charged), the role of land to formal financial 
intermediation is however critical. The relationship between credit and land is core to the 
design of financial intermediaries that require collateral and is therefore likely to appear as 
a feature in the analysis of any real financial market. By focusing on enforcement the 
framework deals with this explicitly. Land acts as an intermediary variable through which 
social relations influence financial markets and must be analysed.
This analysis does therefore appear to satisfy the main requirements of a ‘real’ markets 
approach and also to advance the conceptual framework for operationalising their 
empirical analysis. It is able to incorporate the variety of available mechanisms for 
financial intermediation, ranging from banks through to direct lending and reciprocity. 
Although financial intermediation is specific in dealing with the problems surrounding the 
time-based nature of financial claims, the variety of organisational forms - private firms,
297
co-operatives, state-owned enterprises, ‘informal’ entities -  are evident in a range of 
markets. This approach to analysing the influence of social relations on access may 
therefore be applicable in other markets.
This study has also built upon the work of Pujo (1996) in analysing how gender relations 
systematically influence the use of financial services. It has undertaken a similar analysis 
of gendered economic relations based in the intra-household division of labour, distribution 
of income, control over income and responsibility for expenditure and examined their 
implications for the gendered need for financial intermediation. This analysis was not 
able to go into as much depth as would a study which was aimed only at examining 
gendered embeddedness; nevertheless it has demonstrated that this approach can be used in 
other markets to explain the positioning of men and women and suggests that similar 
approaches should be used in the development of analyses of other real markets. However, 
qualitative investigation found that gendered social norms were also important in 
explaining this use and demonstrates the need to go beyond the household alone in 
undertaking a gendered analysis. A systematic approach to gender relations beyond the 
household that is applicable to any market will require further research.
11.3.2 Implications for New Institutional Economics and the study of financial 
markets
The approach taken in this study to reconsider the types of organisations that undertake 
financial intermediation and examine their rules and enforcement mechanisms uses North’s 
insights, and is consistent with the types of questions that Coase and Williamson were 
asking about the reasons why firms and other non-market organisations exist. Yet it is at 
the same time critical of a narrow focus on information and transactions costs -  especially 
in lending -  that has obscured the organisational origins of financial intermediation.
The analysis of financial intermediation in Chapter Three has shown how the incidence of 
transactions costs of lending differs according to the organisational form of the financial 
intermediary. The information and transactions costs analysis has done much to 
demonstrate both the importance of the informal financial sector to rural finance, and to 
identify the complexity of contracts that this finance embodies. Yet the organisational 
context affects the type and range of products that a financial intermediary offers both in
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terms of both their price and ‘non-price’ features. It is these differences that affect the way 
in which information embedded in social relationships is brought into -  or excluded from -  
financial transactions. It follows that attempts at the valuation of transactions costs at a 
particular point in the intermediation process cannot capture and adequately reflect these 
differences. Empirical analysis demonstrating that risk-adjusted returns do not equilibrate 
therefore produces a trivial result. Rather, exposing the underlying forms of intermediation 
shows that processes of price formation and even the meaning of profit are inherent to 
these organisational forms. Consequently, fragmentation can be seen as endemic and 
resulting in several markets rather than a single homogeneous financial market.
Conclusions that markets are fragmented lead neo-classical economists to focus on barriers 
to entry, with a view to enabling competition to erode excess profits. However, this 
research demonstrates the complexity of ‘real’ barriers to entry on both the supply and 
demand sides. On the supply side, barriers to entry differ as a result of the type of 
intermediary and this in turn affects how they are inserted into wider economic dynamics. 
Regulatory requirements for banks involve minimum capital levels which can be varied 
depending on government objectives for the sector. The experience of the ‘political’ banks 
in Kenya shows how these were lowered to allow entry. In addition, political 
manipulations of their ability to raise deposits also precipitated exit. On the other hand, the 
requirement for SACCOs to have a common bond is both exclusionary and monopolistic 
but these are necessary for creating the basis of collective action that enables them to 
function. For parastatals the situation is different again: the example of the AFC in 
Kenya which is incorporated under its own Act shows how exit, or transformation, is 
dependent on the decision of the government75
Differential use presents evidence on the demand side of the extent, complexity, and depth 
of barriers to entry, or movement between intermediaries: “who you are” matters. But the 
emphasis on transactions and information costs is clearly inadequate in theorising the 
relationship between social relations and financial intermediation because of the multi­
dimensional nature of these relations.
The analysis of mutualist forms of financial intermediation also challenges the underlying 
assumptions entailed in both neo-classical and new institutional analysis. In mutuals, 
supply and demand are inter-related - indeed it could be argued that the demand for loans 
creates its own supply. This means that for these forms of financial intermediation even
75 Discussion in 2001 involved its possible transformation into a Farmers Bank.
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though there are separate ‘prices’ for the savings and credit components, the two services 
are not actually separable. Moreover, their user-owned basis means that members set their 
own price for funds in an endless number of markets and there will be no single ‘market- 
clearing’ price. Neo-classical theory is therefore unable to analyse these forms of 
intermediary effectively. Its tools - and those derived from it - cannot claim to possess 
universal applicability for financial market analysis.
In Chapter Four, the structure-conduct-performance approach to market analysis was 
briefly reviewed. Following Harriss-White (1999), it was argued that analysis of 
performance based on price was logically inconsistent because of multiple deviations from 
Pareto optimality in actual markets. Hence, little can be concluded from empirical studies 
about market efficiency. This study has demonstrated that comparisons of price are flawed 
because of the differing organisational form of financial intermediaries and the different 
product mixes that these result in. Prices in mutuals are a clear example of the limitations 
of studying price as an indicator of performance.
The view of the NIE propounded by North is one in which economic institutions evolve in 
response to changing transactions and information costs towards more efficient outcomes 
driven by competition over the long term. It allows actors to process incomplete 
information through mental models and also allows for vested interests and inertia to 
influence behaviour. However, the origin of institutions in this approach has been argued 
to be reductionist because it does not allow for the origin and persistence of institutions in 
wider social institutions or relations. The evidence presented here has demonstrated that a 
wide range of institutions including social and cultural norms and sanctions (such as those 
of land inheritance and burial, and the gendered incidence of shame) affect economic 
behaviour and can help to explain the persistence of particular sets of financial 
arrangements over time. Moreover, while there is competition and actors do respond to 
transactions costs (for example, men starting to make greater use of ROSCAs), it is 
apparent that these reasons are in turn set within the wider political economy and the 
influence this has had on both the economic and financial opportunities open to them.
These clearly demonstrate the importance of going beyond a functionalist account of the 
influence of information and transactions costs on the development of institutions to an 
understanding of how both the political economy and a wider set of social institutions can 
be systematically incorporated into the analysis.
300
11.4 Methodology
Chapter Four discussed the use of SCP and commodity chain analysis in research on real 
markets. The essential aspects of structure and conduct were used in the fieldwork and the 
performance element was discussed above. The field research methodology also drew 
from commodity chain analysis. While the approach is not directly transferable to 
financial markets, it was the insight that savings and loans were inextricably linked that led 
to the development of the conceptual framework that concerned itself with how financial 
intermediation actually takes place.
However, in contrast to a commodity chain, the emphasis on the institutions involved in 
financial intermediation has allowed for an in-depth description and analysis of the 
complexity of the context in which exchange relationships are embedded. As suggested 
above it may be capable of adaptation to provide some of this depth of context in other 
markets -  an aspect that commodity chain analysis is liable to miss.
The limitations of the supply and demand side surveys were discussed in Chapter Four.
On the supply side, the availability of data and concerns about confidentiality are likely to 
be encountered in any similar study. On the demand side, the research would benefit from 
a larger and random sample for the detailed individual survey of financial service use. 
However, in order to overcome the small cell sizes this would have to be significantly 
larger in order to undertake detailed statistical or regression analysis. The constraint of 
research resources is therefore still likely to be present. Not least because the importance 
of the methodology of interviewing both husbands and wives has been confirmed in these 
findings and is a necessary component for any study of real markets.
Moreover, the approach has combined quantitative and qualitative research methods and 
demonstrated the importance of the detailed explanations that semi-structured and open- 
ended interviews have to offer. Studies of markets will continue to be “hollow” without 
these detailed descriptions. Trade-offs in research design that prioritise quantification are 
therefore likely to enable better assessment of the extent of fragmentation but may fall 
short of allowing its sources to be adequately explained.
301
11.5 Implications for financial sector policy
The methodology of this study was inductive, seeking to build from the specific to the 
general. More studies of this kind would enable the accumulation of evidence from a 
range of contexts and allow “middle-order generalisations”76 to be made from a developing 
body of evidence. The analytical framework developed should allow such generalisations 
to be drawn out in a more systematic way as it gives a means of identifying what are more 
likely to be general as opposed to specific patterns. In turn, these can permit policy 
proposals to be informed by their likely effects. Policy implications must therefore be 
drawn tentatively from this study and await further confirmation or contradiction from 
further research.
The evidence from Mathira suggests three main concerns for policy. First, the implications 
of extensive market fragmentation are considered. Second, the role of the banking and 
mutual sectors must be reconsidered and these are discussed in turn. Finally, the role o f 
microfinance organisations is also discussed. .
11.5.1 Market integration
The view of financial repression that has dominated neo-liberal financial sector policy 
focused on the role of control measures such as interest rate ceilings in undermining the 
efficiency of the economy because they deterred savings and resulted in sub-optimal 
investments. However, analysts could not agree exactly how liberalisation might affect 
quantities and prices since some also recognised a degree of segmentation and hence could 
not generalise as to what impact this would have. While formal tests of market integration 
and the correlation of interest rates have not been undertaken, the evidence collected does 
indicate that transmission mechanisms from the formal to the informal sectors are weak. 
The conceptual approach developed here helps to explain the persistence of differential 
interest rates across financial markets and why they have not converged around a “market” 
rate.
76 This term has been used by Barbara Harriss-White to refer to die accumulation of evidence regarding the way 
in which the economy in India is socially regulated (“India’s Informal Economy — Facing the 21st Century” 
Seminar at the University o f Bath, 26* April 2002)
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The analysis also suggests that interest rates are only one feature of financial products and 
particularly that “non-price” features are equally, if not more, important. It has explained 
how these features can relate quite specifically to the needs of particular socio-economic 
groups. Indeed the extent of social regulation and political influence means that neo- 
classically based analysis fails to recognise the full character and extent of financial 
repression from both “above” and “below” (see Chapter Two). Policy often tends to focus 
on barriers to entry on the supply rather than the demand side. This may be because 
supply-side barriers are easier to change through policy (by changing bank regulatory 
requirements for example), whereas those embedded in social relations cannot so easily be 
re-structured.
These findings therefore suggest the need to shift emphasis from universal models of the 
inter-linkages between components of the financial system, to an understanding of the 
extent of inter-dependence in particular national contexts and how those linkages occur 
through financial intermediaries themselves or via the behaviour of individuals.
11.5.2 Implications for the banking sector in Kenya
The liberalisation of entry requirements into the banking sector has created a two-tier 
market with strong competition among international banks targeting corporate and wealthy 
personal customers but gradual withdrawal from rural areas and poorer clients: it is not yet 
clear whether the national commercial banks -  themselves facing extensive difficulties - 
will fill this gap. Increased competition has resulted in reduced outreach rather than active 
competition to extend the market.
The exceptions are the Co-operative Bank with its Biashara loan scheme and the Equity 
Building Society, which has been re-orienting itself with donor support to serve poorer 
clients. Meanwhile SACCOs have also been moving into the provision of low-cost basic 
banking services. While the sector is dynamic at this bottom end and is responding to 
demand and opportunity, state regulatory resources have been stretched by bank failures 
and the extent of bad debt in the sector. The Central Bank also faces ongoing challenges to 
its independence from the government77 which affects its ability to protect the banking
77 The Central Bank Governor was replaced in April 2001 prior to the existing governor’s actual retirement in 
July and despite his security o f  tenure under the 1997 Banking Act
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sector from the political interference evidenced here and complications from parliament 
such as the Donde Bill (see Chapter Six). Equity remains a building society yet its services 
are increasingly indistinguishable from those of banks. Deposit protection for non- 
members of SACCOs, who use front-office services, is also necessary and under 
discussion.
The problems surrounding land as collateral will continue to present challenges for banks 
to extend their outreach in rural areas unless innovative alternatives can be found. Lending 
against savings and income are the obvious options but so far new products of this type 
have been focused on the high net-worth personal market. These findings add further 
evidence to a growing view that initiatives to extend land registration are inappropriate and 
must pay more attention to local systems of land tenure (see, for example, Platteau, 1996).
11.5.3 SACCOs
This study has demonstrated the importance of mutuals especially in rural areas and for 
poorer people. Policy towards the financial sector needs to better recognise this and to 
consider the implications for both the SACCO sector and for policy towards informal 
groups. Here the role of SACCOs is discussed, while ASCAs and ROSCAs are discussed 
in the next section on microfinance organisations.
The history of co-operatives shows that they are a problematic sector for policy. However, 
some commentators have pointed out that SACCOs are often less prone to corruption and 
mismanagement than marketing co-operatives (Youngjohns, 1980) and this distinction has 
been noted in the discussion here. Policy in the Kenyan SACCO sector has changed from 
tight government control to an almost total lack of oversight in the 1990s. Co-operatives 
became unfashionable in the neo-liberal 1990s, but players such as the World Council of 
Credit Unions have done much to keep them on the map in microfinance sector debates. 
The spontaneous formation of small SACCOs provides new challenges for the support 
structures in this sector (such as Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-operatives and the 
Co-operative Bank) in providing assistance and training and means of auditing to ensure 
adequate accountability to members. Donor policy should recognise and resource this role.
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11.5.4 Microfinance organisations
The evidence suggests that despite being one of the areas where a number of MFOs have 
operated from some time, they have remained a very small player with limited outreach 
(2000 members) and value of outstanding deposits and loans (2% of savings, 4% of loans). 
This was confirmed by the demand side survey, which indicated that only 7.6% (5 
individuals) of the sample had borrowed from them. The users in the sample were 
concentrated in Karatina town, educated beyond primary school level and operating 
businesses. None of them were poor on an expenditure definition, all had more than one 
type of savings service and half were also using other loan sources. Moreover at the time 
of the study, problems of macro-economic decline had led to increasing client recruitment 
problems for the MFOs and deteriorating repayment performance. How can this 
apparently poor performance of MFOs, whose broad objective is to lend to the poor, be 
explained?
The analysis has shown that the organisational form of a financial intermediary affects the 
characteristics of the products they offer. Looked at from the point of view of 
organisational form, MFOs (whose loan capital has originated from donors) are similar to 
parastatals whose loan fund is the result of a transfer of funds from taxpayers (or donors in 
the past). The “owners”, in the form of the NGO, appoint the management and they in turn 
set the rules. While groups may be used as a delivery mechanism, the role of these groups 
is inverted by comparison to a mutual. In MFO groups, the loan funds are external and the 
members are required to enforce repayment from others or risk the loss of their own 
savings. In a mutual, a user’s own savings are lost if another member does not repay. But 
it is the membership that decides on how the defaulter will be pursued. Hence while the 
final result -  the loss of savings -  may be the same, the social relations of that loss are not. 
In a mutual individuals are negotiating with each other over repayment of their own money 
and we have pointed out earlier the importance of this feature of negotiability.
In contrast, the findings suggest that mutually based informal group-based mechanisms are 
of key importance to poor people, especially in reducing their vulnerability to entering the 
credit market. Donor policy in Kenya and to a large extent elsewhere in Africa has 
focused on the development of microfinance organisations as providers of services rather 
than the promotion of informal user-owned group systems.
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The local NGOs found in Karatina offer an alternative model of promotion that avoids 
making strong assumptions about the abilities of groups in self-management. They 
demonstrated higher levels of coverage extending further into the rural areas with
approximately 10,000 members, mobilising 3% of savings by value and making 10% of
*
outstanding loans by value, although use in the demand side survey was about the same as 
for MFOs. The service these NGOs offer is the management of women’s group funds 
(essentially ASCAs) for a fee, which covers the costs of the NGO. In a follow up study, 
there were found to be problems with the model that require attention,78 however its 
outreach and sustainability are significant compared to the mainstream MFO sector. This 
suggests that donors should consider actively promoting user-owned groups as a more 
cost-effective and sustainable strategy.
MFOs have justified targeting women on the grounds of (a) their historic lack of access to 
credit resulting from their asset poverty (especially land); and (b) the scope for 
empowering women through income generation. However, criticisms have been made of 
the virtually exclusive targeting of such programmes to women in Bangladesh as 
instrumentally using their subordinate position. Rutherford (1995) notes their lack of 
mobility, and hence availability in the village when meetings are held and comments on 
their greater deference to authority. This makes them easier for MFO workers to manage 
and women can therefore be employed as credit officers and are cheaper than men. 
Potential negative effects have also been documented due to the fact that intra-household 
relations may dictate that women hand over the loan to their husband and experience 
conflict in having to request repayments from him (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rahman,
1999). While MFO programmes in Kenya are not exclusively targeted to women, credit 
officers also explained that groups whose members are at least half female were easier to 
manage. This is supported by the analysis of shame as an enforcement mechanism for 
women in groups discussed in Chapter Ten. This produces an inherently contradictory 
position for women in microfinance programmes. At one level these are means of 
addressing their lack of access to credit, while on the other they make instrumental use of 
their gendered subordination. Yaqub (1995) has argued that borrowers may eventually be 
“empowered to default” as a result of the skills and confidence they gain through 
participation in group-based microfinance programmes which may then reduce the 
effectiveness of peer lending groups by changing the underlying social relationships
78 See Mule, Johnson et al., 2002 for more details. The problem involves incentive structures in the operation of 
the system and especially in relation to division o f responsibility between the group and the NGO on debt 
collection.
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involved. On the other hand, women in Kenya have a significant degree of autonomy in 
managing their own income streams in contrast to the Bangladesh case and hence the 
impact of loans on intra-household relations is also likely to be different. The multifaceted 
nature of gender relations means that strategies for empowering women through credit are 
therefore likely to depend on context and have diverse and sometimes contradictory 
outcomes.
This in turn is why MFOs find men less manageable in these programmes. The findings 
here have also tentatively suggested that men may also lack access to collateral. Young, 
educated men also find themselves in a position where they lack the social relationships 
that would enable them to borrow through these mechanisms. This in turn suggests that 
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Annex 1 Poverty indicators
This annex explains the derivation of two indicators used in the analysis in Chapters Five 
and Seven: consumption poverty and asset scores.
A l.l  Consumption poverty
The poverty line was constructed using the method used by Copestake (Copestake, 1999). 
This constructed updated food and overall poverty lines using data from the Government 
of Kenya’s Second Welfare Monitoring Study (Government of Kenya, 1998). The food 
poverty line is the income required per month to ensure that an adult equivalent can 
purchase 2250 calories per day. Children between 0 and 4 years of age count as 0.24 adult 
equivalents and between 5 and 14 years count as 0.65 adult equivalents. The overall 
poverty line makes additional allowance for non-food expenditure. This additional 
component is taken to be the average amount actually spent (per adult equivalent) by 
households whose total expenditure lay between -20% and +10% of the food poverty line.
At mid-1994 prices food and overall poverty lines in Kenyan Shillings per month per adult 
equivalent were estimated to have been as follows:
mid-94 prices Urban Rural
Food poverty line 875 703
Overall poverty line 1490 978
The difference between urban and rural reflects differences in food prices and in non-food 
expenditure incurred by those around the food poverty line in the two categories (higher in 
urban areas because of the need to purchase more items, to pay for transport to places of 
employment etc). At then prevailing exchange rates, the rural overall poverty line 
represented only 60% of the international benchmark of ‘one dollar a day’. The rural 
poverty line is used both for the rural and town based households in this study because 
Karatina town is small and essentially rural.
Price indices were used to update these figures to June 2000. The index of 679.14 for 
prices in June 2000 compared to a June 1994 index o f469.96 giving an overall increase of 
144.51 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2001). This gives new poverty lines for June 2000 of:
June 2000 prices Urban Rural
Food poverty line 1264 1016
Overall poverty line 2153 1413
Using household expenditure reported by individuals in the second round survey to 
calculate the adult expenditure equivalents and compare them with the poverty lines gave 
the results shown in Chapter Five, Table 5.6.
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A1.2 Household asset scores
Using the household assets data I have created an asset score on the basis of the following 
valuations and consequent points:










Table and chairs 2,000 2
Sofa set 3,000 3
The Pearson correlation co-efficient between the asset score and the poverty expenditure 
(ie continuous variables) was 0.42 and significant at the 1% level. The mean asset score 
was 19.5 with a median of 11 points.
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Annex 2 Calculating effective interest rates
This annex provides an example of the calculation used to derive comparable interest rates 
between loan products. A standard loan size was used (Kshs20,000) to calculate the 
effective declining balance interest rate and for a comparable period of 12 months.
The calculation uses an internal rate of return calculation on the resulting cash flow.
Abbreviations:
Loan P= loan principal
LAF = Loan application fee
ED = equity deposit (or savings deposit)
Int p.a. = interest rate per annum -  this may be flat or declining balance and this is taken 
into account to calculate the interest payments.
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SMEP Loan P= 20,000 Int. 22%LAF 0.0% ED 10% Term 12
Month No. - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Loan inflow 20,000
Loan Repay out - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667 - 1,667
Loan Interest out - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367 - 367
Registration Fee - 200
Loan Applic. Fee - 300
Loan insurance fee - 400
Personal Savings Min Bal - 400
Monthly PS acct fees
Personal Savings Withdrawal 400
Compuls Savings/Equity Deposit- 2,000 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200 - 200
Equity Withdrawal 4,400
Equity/Savings Interest 88
Cashflow 16,700 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 - 2,233 2,655
IRR (monthly) 5.47%
IRR (annual) 89%
Annex 3 Analysis of Financial Service Use Using Logistic Regressions
A3.1 Explanation of models used
Logistic regressions enable dichotomous variables to be modelled using log linear 
techniques. This approach can enable an understanding of the effect different variables 
have on the probability of an event occurring. In this context, logistic regressions are used 
to examine the effect that different socio-economic variables have on the probability that a 
particular type of savings or loan service is used. The coefficients in logistic regressions 
are computed are the change in the odds ratio compared to a reference category within the 
data while holding all other factors constant. In contrast to the cross-tabulations used in 
Chapter Six, the logistic regressions enable the effect of a single variable to be examined 
while holding others constant and hence to understand which factors are driving the 
changing likelihood of the use of a service. Odds ratios are also multiplicative and 
therefore a combination of factors can be seen to substantially increase the odds of a 
particular service being used.
The technique can allow independent variables to be either continuous or categorical.
While the data for sex, marital status, education, and main income source is clearly 
categorical, that for age, poverty by expenditure relative to the poverty line, asset score and 
landholding is continuous. In the cross-tabulations categories for expenditure poverty, 
asset and landholding data were constructed but it is not necessary to do this for the 
regressions although categorical data has been retained in most cases.
While it is the case that a theoretical view should drive the specification of the model, a 
problem here was that the expenditure poverty data is probably less reliable than the asset 
data but both behave slightly erratically. Asset data and landholding data are key variables 
to be included as both are indicators of poverty but also because both may provide 
collateral. Asset and land data, it should be noted is at the household level rather than 
individual level.
While logistic regressions enable the effective use of relatively small amounts of data it has 
not been possible to use them in all cases. Where the number of positive cases of a service 
being used is few and the causal factors disparate, the model is unable to yield plausible 
results. It has therefore been used selectively in the analysis and it was necessary to select 
the variables to be included with care.
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A3.2 Results of logistic regressions













Primary & less 
































+ - Significant @ 10% level; *- significant @ 5% level; ** - significant @1%
Interpretation: The value of the variable with 1— ‘ in each case is 1. The result given 
shows the marginal increase (>1) or reduction (<1) in the odds ratio. In this case the 
likelihood that a woman used a ROSCA was 4.22 times higher than the likelihood that a 
man would use a ROSCA and this was significant at the 5% level.
327
Table A3.2: Use of bank/building societ









































Table A3.3 : Logistic regression on rural SACCO use

















Table A4.3 indicates the significance of age as a driving factor in increasing the odds of 
using a rural SACCO -  if you are over 40 this increases the odds of rural SACCO use by 
33 fold compared to being under 40. Whereas being a woman reduces the odds by 20 fold 
compared to being a man. This can be explained via patterns of cash crop control which is 
predominantly in the hands of men and patterns of land sub-division and inheritance which 














Women 1.260 .585 1.203
M arital status:
Married — —
Not married .682 1.505 .641
Age:
<40 — — -----------
>=40 1.541 2.330 .473
Education:
Primary& less — — ----
Secondary & above 1.289 1.070 1.232
Location:
Rural — . — ----
Karatina Town .569 .343 .500
Main income:
Agriculture — — -----------
Business .880 1.040 1.802
Employment .355 .322 .635
Casual labour .037* .001 .843
None .893 2.750 1.835
Asset score:
0-5 —  . — -----------
6-10 .239 .618 .294
11-20 1.602 2.927 .355





1 -2 .9 9 .697














































Business & Employment 10.462






In the case of borrowing from friends and relatives, a secondary education is the most 
significant in increasing the odds that an individual will borrow from friends and relatives, 
at the same time being older and being a woman reduced the odds significantly. Since 
odds ratios are multiplicative, having secondary education, being young and male increases 
the odds hugely.
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